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Abstract 
 
 
Recent accounts of creative-cognition propose that creativity requires the use of different 
modes of thought.   One mode supports the generation of ideas while a second mode of 
thought is conducive to evaluating ideas (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002; 
Kaufman, 2011).  It has been suggested that creative individuals may be characterized by 
being good at shifting between different modes of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002; Kaufman, 
2011; Vartanian, 2009).  Modern definitions of creativity emphasize that for a product to be 
deemed ‘creative’, it must exhibit both novelty and utility (Cropley & Kaufman’s, 2011; 
Plucker, Beghetto & Dow, 2004).  Shifting could be an integral facet of creative-cognition 
that enables one to produce a creative product possessing these attributes (Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013).  Prior research has suggested a link between shifting and creativity.  However, it has 
framed shifting in a rather narrow way and examined the link using paradigms that are far 
removed from the theorized role of shifting in the creative process (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).   
 
The present thesis used an experimental paradigm, a novel self-report measure of shifting and 
a ‘think-aloud’ protocol to examine multiple facets of shifting and the relationship of these 
facets to measures of creativity.  It revealed that the relationship between shifting and 
creativity is more complex than previous research suggests, differing across contexts and 
different creative domains.  Different facets of shifting appear to be related to different types 
of creativity, with metacognitive awareness of shifting distinct from competence shifting and 
affective processes appearing to play an important role in shifting in the domain of garden 
design.  Based on these findings, it is proposed that future research should take into account 
the multifaceted nature of shifting.  Doing so could significantly aid progress in 
understanding the nature of the relationship between creativity and shifting between different 
modes of thought.  
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Chapter 1- How does this thesis seek to further our understanding of 
the relationship between creativity and shifting between modes of 
thought? 
 
 
This program of research aimed to examine the relationship between creativity and shifting 
between different modes of thought.  This chapter defines creativity and introduces the 
approaches used to assess creativity in this thesis.  The concept of different modes of thinking 
is introduced and the nature of shifting between modes of thinking within theories of 
creativity and dual-process models of cognition discussed.  Existing empirical evidence 
suggesting a link between creativity and shifting between modes of thought is reviewed and 
critiqued.  Based on this review the case will be made that the relationship between creativity 
and shifting between modes of thought warrants further investigation.  Finally, I will present 
an overview of the ways in which the following empirical chapters aimed to further our 
understanding of the relationship between creativity and shifting between modes of thought. 
 
Definition of creativity 
 
Creativity is a multifaceted construct (Ward & Kolomyts, 2010; Kaufman, 2009).  Plucker, 
Beghetto & Dow (2004) provide a definition which captures this quality defining creativity as 
“the interaction among aptitude, process and environment by which an individual or group 
produces a perceptible product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social 
context”.  Aptitude reflects ability and affective influences and can be shaped by experience 
and learning.  Processes reflect activities, such as creative problem solving, which when 
engaged in may lead to creative outcomes.  The environment refers to the present context an 
individual or group is operating in (Plucker, Beghetto & Dow, 2004).  Plucker, Beghetto & 
Dow (2004) also argue that a perceptible product must be produced which exhibits both 
novelty and usefulness within a social context.  This mirrors Cropley & Kaufman’s (2011) 
definition of functional creativity, with creative products being both novel and serving a 
useful social purpose.  Assessment of the creativity of the products produced in empirical 
work in the present thesis was assessed based on these criteria.  A key aspect of Plucker, 
Beghetto & Dow’s (2004) definition of creativity is the link made between the creative 
thinking process and the creative product produced at the end of that process.  A similar 
argument concerning the link between creative thinking processes and the creativity of 
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products has been made by others (Gabora, 2010; Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003; Ward & 
Kolomyts, 2010).  This conceptualisation of the link between creative thinking processes and 
creative products is a central tenet of the present thesis.  In the present thesis one facet, 
hypothesised to be an important part of the creative thinking process was examined; namely, 
shifting between modes of thought.  Essentially then, the present thesis aimed to examine the 
link between one facet of creative thinking, shifting between modes of thought, and the 
creativity of the product of this shifting process
1
.  There is agreement among researchers that 
there is more than one facet of creative thinking underlying individual differences in 
creativity (Vartanian, 2002).  This thesis does not propose that the variance in product 
creativity can be fully-explained by variance in the shifting process.  It is focused on the 
shifting process in order to provide an in depth examination of the relationship between 
creativity and shifting between modes of thought.  A focus on the shifting process however 
does not mean that it was examined in isolation; the influence of aptitude and environment 
were taken into account.      
 
What do we mean by different modes of thinking? 
 
Prior to outlining the theoretical case for a link between shifting modes and creativity, it is 
important to clarify what we mean by different modes of thinking.  The distinction between 
two modes of thinking was coined in early theorizing on creativity (Kris, 1952 cited in 
Martindale & Dailey, 1995).  Modern theorizing on creativity has focused on differences in 
the attentional characteristics of different modes of thinking (Gabora, 2010; Howard-Jones, 
2002; Kaufman, 2011; Vartanian, 2009).  The terms associative and generative thinking have 
been used to describe thought characterised by defocused attention.  The terms analytic and 
explorative have been used to describe thought characterised by focused attention (Gabora, 
2010; Howard-Jones, 2002; Kaufman, 2011; Vartanian, 2009).  It is important to note here 
that divergent thinking would appear to involve associative thinking and convergent thinking 
would appear to involve analytic thinking.  This however may not always be the case 
(Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  Divergent and convergent thinking certainly appear to 
entail a broader range of cognitive processes than associative or analytic modes (Ward & 
Kolomyts, 2010).   
                                                 
1
 In some empirical chapters, creativity reported on self-report scales was used as a proxy measure of product 
creativity.  It was inferred that there would be a positive relationship between self-reported and product 
creativity.  Evidence in support of this is provided in chapter four of the thesis. 
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The characterization of different modes of thinking in terms of defocused and focused 
attention appears to be related to Mednick’s (1962) associationist view of creativity (Gabora, 
2010; Howard-Jones, 2002).  Mednick (1962) proposed that the greater the number of 
associations an individual is able to make in response to a problem, the more likely that 
individual is to reach a creative solution.  The associations that Mednick (1962) refers to are 
those between items in memory.  Mednick (1962) found that creative individuals have a 
flatter associative hierarchy than less creative individuals, with a stimulus evoking both 
highly related and remotely related items in memory (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  
Less creative individuals in contrast have a steep associative hierarchy with a stimulus 
evoking only highly related items in memory.  The flattened associative hierarchy that 
creative individuals possess would appear to be conducive to forging links between items in 
memory which were hitherto only remotely associated (Gabora, 2010; Howard-Jones, 2002; 
Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014). The process of defocusing attention may enable creative 
individuals to traverse their flat associative hierarchy and forge new links to produce novel 
ideas (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  It has been argued that focused attention characterizes a 
mental state conducive to performing in depth mental operations on a small number of items 
(Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  This mental state would appear to benefit creativity by supporting 
more logical streams of thought that enable one to evaluate ideas (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  
It is important to note that one’s associative hierarchy appears to be a trait disposition that is 
distinct from the focus of one’s attention.  It would appear that all individuals, irrespective of 
whether they have a flat or steep associative hierarchy, can move from focused to defocused 
attention.    
 
The characterization of different modes of thinking in terms of defocused and focused 
attention also appears to be related to low and high levels of cognitive control respectively.  
(Kaufman, 2011).  It has been argued that the capacity for disinhibition underlies the ability 
of creative individuals to defocus attention while the capacity for inhibiting automatic 
responses underlies their ability to refocus attention (Bristol & Viskontas, 2006).  The same 
underlying mechanism may determine both the level of attentional focus and the level of 
cognitive control.  In support of this, the executive control network which modulates the 
controlled aspect of attention appears to determine the level of cognitive control applied in a 
given situation (Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005). 
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The majority of theoretical accounts of different modes of thinking in creativity have 
differentiated between two modes based on their cognitive characteristics (Howard-Jones, 
2002; Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Vartanian, 2009).  Reference has been made to 
non-cognitive factors, such as relaxation, which might help or hinder the operation of 
different modes of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).  However, Howard-Jones (2002) makes 
no reference to the non-cognitive qualities of the modes of thinking themselves such as their 
affectivity.  Dietrich (2004) proposed a neuroanatomical framework for the operation of 
different modes of thinking in creativity which does account for both cognitive and affective 
processing.  Within this framework, there are two distinct modes of thinking, spontaneous 
and deliberate, that draw upon affective and cognitive content from different brain networks.  
Deliberate processing is controlled by the operation of the brain’s frontal attentional network.  
When one is in this mode, the frontal attentional network either draws upon knowledge stored 
in the temporal, occipital and posterior cortices (TOP) or affective memory stored in 
emotional structures, specifically the cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Dietrich, 2004).  Spontaneous processing occurs when subconscious neural activity is 
spontaneously represented in working memory.  This neural activity can be cognitive in 
nature, stemming from TOP areas which have been spontaneously released from the control 
of the frontal attentional system.  It can also be affective, with neural activity from structures 
that process emotional information spontaneously entering consciousness. 
 
Spontaneous processing has similarities with associative thinking, with both hypothesized to 
occur spontaneously without top-down control (Dietrich, 2004; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  
Analytic thinking like deliberate processing would appear to require top-down control.  In 
support of this, there is evidence that accurate evaluation, which appears to be underpinned 
by analytic thinking, is linked to strong global cognitive control (Groborz & Nęcka, 2003).  
Associative and analytic modes of thinking have been conceived as being opposite poles of a 
continuum, with one’s mode of thinking free to vary across this continuum (Howard-Jones, 
2002; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  Dietrich (2004) also proposes that one’s mode of thinking is 
a state which varies.  It varies as function of a mix of the four different components; 
spontaneous, deliberate, cognitive and emotional.  Dietrich’s (2004) spontaneous-cognitive 
mode does appear to partially map onto the associative mode of thinking and the deliberate-
cognitive mode does appear to partially map onto the analytic mode of thinking.  
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In summary, different theoretical accounts of creativity do appear to converge on the 
existence of two modes of thinking; from here on termed associative and analytic.  Different 
theoretical accounts also appear to be in agreement concerning the nature of the different 
modes of thinking.  Differences between theories in the conception of the different modes 
appear to concern the level of detail that they specify and in this respect, different accounts 
complement one another.  Hence, descriptions of the two modes of thinking pooled across 
theories were used to define the different modes of thinking in chapters three, four and five of 
this thesis.    
 
In contrast to the majority of accounts (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora, 2010; Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013; Vartanian, 2009), Dietrich’s (2004) framework specifies a role for affective 
alongside cognitive processes.  However, Dietrich’s (2004) framework does not provide the 
same level of detail as the other accounts (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora, 2010; Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013; Vartanian, 2009) concerning how different modes of thinking differ in terms of 
attentional focus and cognitive control.  Current dual-process accounts of creativity still leave 
unaddressed how certain processes, for example intuitive processes, map on to the different 
modes of thinking.  The next section compares the different modes of thinking described in 
theorizing on creativity with the different types of thinking described in dual-process models 
of cognition.  A closer mapping between modes and types of thinking may give further 
insights into the characteristics of the different modes. This may in turn aid in differentiating 
between the different modes of thought in empirical work. 
 
Different modes of thinking versus different types of thinking 
 
Recent accounts of dual-process theories of cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich 
& Toplak, 2012) propose that there are two different kinds of thinking processes termed type 
1 and type 2 thinking.  The defining feature of type 1 thinking is that it is autonomous and 
does not require working memory.  Type 1 thinking comprises an assortment of automatically 
triggered processes including those involved in emotional regulation, implicit learning and 
overlearned associations (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  The defining feature of type 2 thinking 
is that it involves the use of working memory to buffer and enable one to manipulate 
hypothetical simulations of the real world.  This involves the decoupling of representations of 
imaginary situations from representations of the real world; a process termed cognitive 
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decoupling (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014; Stanovich & 
Toplak, 2012).  Some dual-process theories of cognition propose a distinction between type 1 
and type 2 processing, with processing of each type distributed across different neural 
structures.  Other theories propose that different systems, termed system 1
2
 and 2 (Stanovich, 
2013) or the experiential and rational system (Epstein, 2003), underpin the two different 
types of thinking. 
 
The different modes of thinking described by Gabora & Ranjan (2013) and Howard-Jones 
(2002) appear to map closely on to these two different types of thinking (Sowden, Pringle & 
Gabora, 2014).  The spontaneous and deliberate modes of processing (Dietrich, 2004) also 
appear to partially map on to type 1 and type 2 thinking.  The concept of overlearned 
associations appears to correspond to the proposal that associative thinking is based on one’s 
existing associational network in memory (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).   
Like type 1 thinking, implicit processing is thought to underlie associative thinking (Gabora 
& Ranjan, 2013).  Dietrich’s (2004) conceptualisation of the spontaneous mode of processing 
as acting independently of the frontal attentional network is mirrored in Stanovich & 
Toplak’s (2012) proposal that type 1 processes are automatically executed without input from 
high level control systems.  The involvement of brain structures that process emotional 
information in Dietrich’s (2004) spontaneous-emotional mode is consistent with the 
involvement of affective processing in type 1 thinking (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) and 
experiential thinking (Epstein, 2003).  The mapping between type 1 thinking and spontaneous 
processing is less clear in terms of the involvement of working memory processes.  Working 
memory appears to be involved in spontaneous processing (Dietrich, 2004) but is not 
involved in type 1 thinking (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  The role of working memory in the 
associative mode of thinking is not specified (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).    
 
The use of working memory to buffer and manipulate hypothetical simulations of the real 
world appears to be a key component of logically testing, evaluating and elaborating ideas 
using the analytic mode of thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  Type 2 thinking 
would therefore appear to be closely aligned with the analytic mode of thinking.  Like type 2 
thinking, the deliberate mode of processing involves buffering and manipulating items in 
working memory (Dietrich, 2004).  It could be that only within the deliberate mode can items 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that it has been proposed (Stanovich, 2009) that system 1 is not a unitary system and is 
actually a set of systems.    
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be actively ‘manipulated’ in working memory.  Within the spontaneous mode of processing 
items may simply be buffered.  If this were the case, this would enable a clearer mapping 
between the spontaneous mode and type 1 thinking and between type 2 thinking and the 
deliberate mode. 
 
In addition to the defining features of type 1 and type 2 thinking, there are also attributes 
which are correlates of each type.  A list of the attributes aligned with each type of thinking 
as outlined by Evans & Stanovich (2013) is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Kinds of thinking, defining features and typical attributes frequently associated with dual-process and 
dual-system theories of cognition (this table was adapted from that included in Evan’s & Stanovich, 2013)  
    Type 1 processes  Type 2 processes  
Different kinds of thinking        
that these processes underlie intuitive  reflective 
   
   
Defining features 
does not require working 
memory requires working memory 
 
autonomous  
cognitive decoupling; mental 
simulation 
   Typical correlates Fast Slow 
 
High capacity Capacity limited 
 
Parallel Serial 
 
Non-conscious Conscious 
 
Biased responses  Normative responses 
 
Contextualized  Abstract 
 
Automatic Controlled 
 
Associative Rule-based 
 
Experience-based decision 
making Consequential decision making 
 
Independent of cognitive ability Correlated with cognitive ability 
   
 
(System 1) (System 2) 
Additional attributes Evolved early Evolved late 
proposed by two-systems  Similar to animal cognition Distinctively human 
theorists (e.g. Stanovich, 
Epstein) Implicit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
 
Basic emotions Complex emotions 
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The first row of the table lists the different kinds of thinking which have commonly been 
thought to underlie the operation of the two different types of thinking; intuitive and 
reflective.  The second row shows the defining features of the two different types of thinking 
and the third row the typical correlates of each as conceived by Evans & Stanovich (2013).  
The final row displays the additional attributes that two systems theories (e.g. Stanovich, 
2009) attribute to the different systems, 1 and 2.  
 
Stanovich & Toplak (2012) provide a strong argument to suggest that the attributes aligned 
with each type of thinking do not have to co-occur to reveal the operation of that type of 
thinking.  For the purposes of the present thesis these attributes do however provide a means 
to differentiate between the different types of thinking.  The close mapping between types 
and modes of thinking suggests that these attributes, along with the defining features, could 
also provide a means to differentiate between the different modes of thinking.  The 
characteristics of the different types of thinking listed in table one were used to help 
differentiate between the different modes of thinking in chapters three, four and five of this 
thesis. 
 
There are however some important differences between the conceptions of modes of thinking 
within the literature on dual-process theories of cognition and modes of thinking within dual-
process theories of creativity.  Firstly, in dual-process accounts of cognition (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013) the term ‘mode’ of thinking describes a stable thinking disposition or 
cognitive style governed by different forms of type 2 processing while in dual-process 
accounts of creativity it describes a transient state.  Within dual-process accounts of 
creativity, thinking dispositions would appear to map on to the conception of a default mode 
from which transient changes to a more associative or more analytic mode of thinking are 
made (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014). 
 
In the current thesis, the decision was made to follow Gabora (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 
2014) and conceptualise modes of thinking and thinking dispositions as separate constructs.  
This therefore enabled a mapping of characteristics from type 1 and type 2 thinking onto 
associative and analytic modes of thinking.  This difference between the conception of modes 
of thinking within the dual-process literature on creativity and dual-process theories of 
cognition may merely reflect a difference in terminology.   
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Within the dual-process literature on creativity, modes of thinking are conceptualised as 
varying on a continuum from analytic to associative thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora 
& Ranjan, 2013; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  The different types of thinking on the 
other hand reflect a dichotomy between qualitatively distinct forms of processing (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013).  This difference shows that, despite many similarities, a perfect mapping 
between different modes and different types of thinking is not possible at present. 
 
Conceptions of the process of shifting and its relationship to creativity  
 
Different dual-process theories of creativity make reference to the process of shifting between 
modes of thinking.  This section outlines the explanation of shifting within each theory.  The 
similarities and differences in the conceptions of shifting and the relationship between 
shifting and creativity across theories are discussed.  Existing empirical evidence that 
supports these theories is presented.  This section also examines how switching between 
different types of processes in dual-process accounts of cognition may inform our 
understanding of the process of shifting between modes.  Finally, it examines the overlap 
between shifting between different modes of thinking and cognitive flexibility and how 
shifting may be related to persistence. 
 
Comparisons of different theoretical accounts of shifting within dual-process theories of 
creativity 
 
The “Honing theory” of creativity (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013) conceptualises 
shifting between associative and analytic modes of thinking.  As stated previously, the 
associative mode of thinking is characterized by defocused attention while the analytic mode 
of thinking is characterized by focused attention (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  
Honing theory conceptualises shifting between modes of thinking as involving a change in 
the focus of one’s attention.  Shifting is referred to as ‘contextual focus’; the capacity to 
modulate the focus of attention to match the demands of the current situation.  Shifting is 
conceptualised as occurring spontaneously in response to changes in the nature of a task one 
is working on or the situation one is in.  Shifting is also conceptualised as occurring in series 
along a continuum, from strongly analytic at one end to strongly associative at the other.   
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Honing theory also outlines the neural mechanism which may underlie shifting.  It suggests 
that tuning the flatness or spikiness of neural activation modulates the focus of attention 
(Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  It also clearly 
explains how shifting is related to creativity.  Individual’s shift between an associative mode 
of thinking that supports the generation of creative insights to an analytic mode of thinking 
conducive to logically testing if these insights have practical value (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013).  Different functions are performed by shifts in different directions.  Shifting 
from analytic to associative thinking is predicted to enable one to overcome being stuck in a 
rut while shifts from associative to analytic thinking enable the evaluation of previously 
generated creative insights.  Empirical work examining the relationship between shifting and 
creativity in chapter five of this thesis accounts for these differences in the direction of shifts.  
Gabora & Ranjan (2013) view shifting between modes of thinking as a capacity possessed by 
all humans.      
 
Honing theory provides a detailed account of the process of shifting and how shifting impacts 
on creativity.  It also specifies that individual differences in thinking dispositions may 
influence the shifting process.  Thinking dispositions may determine one’s ‘default’ starting 
point on the continuum between analytic and associative thinking.  The theory however 
leaves undefined how thinking dispositions may impact on shifting and hence creativity 
(Pringle, Sowden and Gabora, 2014).  This issue is examined in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
The dual-state model of creative cognition (Howard-Jones, 2002) proposes that shifting 
between modes of thinking is central to the process of creative design.  Within this model 
shifting is proposed to occur between one mental state supporting the generation of ideas and 
another mental state supporting the evaluation of ideas.  The mental state underlying 
generative thinking is described as involving unfocused attention and supporting 
associational thinking while the state underlying evaluation involves focused attention and 
supports analytical thinking.  The conceptions of the different modes of thinking in the dual-
state model appear very similar to those in honing theory.  Like honing theory, the dual-state 
model specifies how shifting impacts on creativity, with cycling between idea generation to 
produce novelty and evaluation to evaluate or explore these novel ideas.   
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Similarly to honing theory, Howard-Jones (2002) also argues that shifting occurs in series.  
He argues that it is important that the mode of thinking engaged in a given situation is 
matched to the requirements of the activity one is working on. In support of this he cites 
evidence that presenting exemplars of solutions to design problems leads to conformity 
between exemplars and the ideas generated (Jansson & Smith, 1991).  He argues that this 
“fixation” on a limited set of example ideas represents over-focusing of attention within a 
generative stage which conflicts with the broad attentional mode of thinking that is most 
conducive to successful ideation within this stage (Howard-Jones, 2002; Jansson & Smith, 
1991).  There is further evidence to support the importance of correctly matching the mode of 
thinking to the requirements of a task from a recent fMRI study by Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman 
& Christoff (2012).  Different brain networks were observed to be activated when 
participants were working on a task phase requiring them to generate ideas for book cover 
designs in comparison to when they were working on a task phase requiring them to evaluate 
these ideas.  Participants were asked to provide subjective ratings of how successfully they 
were able to focus only on generating ideas the whole time when in the generative phase and 
how successfully they focused only on evaluating ideas when working in the evaluative 
phase.    Participant’s subjective ratings of how successful they were in following instructions 
to generate ideas were positively correlated with activity in the brain networks that were 
found to be activated in the generative phase.  Similarly, subjective ratings of the success in 
engaging in evaluation were positively correlated with activity in the brain networks that 
were found to be activated in the evaluative phase.  These findings support Howard-Jones 
(2002) prediction of the importance of matching the correct mode of thinking to the 
requirements of the current phase of the task one is working on.  This suggests that a possible 
measure of successful shifting is the ability to maintain successful task performance when 
having to switch between performing tasks that require different modes of thinking.  This was 
the key premise of the empirical work in chapter two of this thesis.     
     
Howard-Jones (2002) argues that shifts from analytic to associative thinking can overcome 
this “fixation”, which is a key barrier to creativity since it limits the production of novel 
ideas.  This then suggests that, like Gabora & Ranjan (2013), Howard-Jones (2002) considers 
the direction of shifting to be important.  Like Gabora & Ranjan (2013), Howard-Jones 
(2002) also suggests that there are individual differences in the ‘default’ mode on the 
continuum that people usually operate in. 
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Howard-Jones (2002) states that “creativity may be characterised by the ability to move from 
one mode of thought to the other without difficulty” (p. 220).  He argues that individuals with 
proficiency in design also demonstrate this ability to shift without difficulty.  This implies 
that the ease or efficiency with which one is able to shift between modes is positively 
associated with creativity.  This level of specificity on individual differences is a step beyond 
that detailed in honing theory which does not specify how differences in shifting may impact 
on creativity. 
 
Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues (Vartanian, 2009) argue that, compared to less creative 
individuals, creative individuals demonstrate greater flexibility in adjusting their focus of 
attention in response to changes in task demands compared to less creative individuals.  They 
frame adjustments in attentional focus in terms of changes between focused and defocused 
attention.  While they don’t state it explicitly, this account clearly appears to map on to the 
process of shifting between associative and analytic modes of thought.  Vartanian (2009) 
argues that the speed of processing across different types of task may be used as an indirect 
measure of variation in the focus of attention.  Specifically, when working on a problem 
where one has to attend to many concepts simultaneously one will defocus/broaden attention 
and as a result processing will slow down.  The more one’s attention is broadened the more 
their processing will be slowed.  In contrast, when one is working on a problem which 
requires dealing with few concepts simultaneously, attention will be focused and processing 
will speed up.  The more focused one’s attention the faster their processing will be.   
 
The strength of Vartanian’s (2009) theory is firstly that it makes a specific prediction 
concerning the link between shifting and creativity.  He predicts that the degree of variability 
in the focus of attention is greater in more versus less creative individuals.  On tasks where a 
broad attentional focus is beneficial (e.g. on ill-defined ambiguous problems, tasks that 
require attending to many concepts simultaneously) creative individuals should benefit by 
being able to broaden their attentional focus to a greater extent than less creative individuals.    
On tasks where focused attention is beneficial (e.g. on well-defined unambiguous problems, 
tasks that require attending to few simultaneous concepts) creative individuals should benefit 
by being able to focus their attention to a greater extent.  These predictions suggest that the 
link between shifting and creativity is based on the extent to which one is able to shift 
between different modes based on changing task demands; with creative individuals having 
the capacity to shift to a greater extent to match their attentional focus to the task demands.  
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These appear similar to the prediction of Howard-Jones (2002) that creative individuals are 
capable of shifting easily and efficiently between modes. 
 
There is empirical evidence to support Vartanian’s (2009) predictions.  There were positive 
correlations between creative potential and response speed on negative priming and global-
local tasks which appear to involve interference or ambiguity.  This supports the prediction 
that more creative individuals demonstrate more of a slowdown because they broaden their 
attention to a greater extent than less creative individuals.  Conversely on tasks which did not 
involve interference or ambiguity there were negative correlations between creative potential 
and response speed (Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatowksi, 2007).  This supports the 
prediction that more creative individuals demonstrate quicker responding because they can 
focus their attention to a greater extent than less creative individuals.  These findings were 
replicated in a different population (Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008).  
Variability in response times were also shown to be unrelated to differences in IQ (Dorfman, 
Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009).  This 
suggests that the relationship between variability in attentional focus and creativity exists 
independent of differences in intelligence. 
 
Vartanian, Martindale and Matthews (2009) also make predictions concerning the mechanism 
that may modulate shifts between focused and defocused attention.  Similarly to Gabora & 
Ranjan (2013), they argue that shifts can occur automatically.  They however also argue that 
shifting may be under top-down control.  Whether shifting occurs automatically or is under 
top-down control may depend on the stage of problem solving one is engaged in.  They 
suggest that in the early stages of problem solving shifts occur automatically but at later 
stages shifting is under top-down control (Vartanian, Martindale and Matthews, 2009).  
Vartanian, Martindale and Matthews (2009) cite evidence that creative individuals perform 
poorly on biofeedback tasks as evidence that they do not consciously control shifts in a top-
down fashion (Martindale, 1999).  However, their argument, based on evidence from 
Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007), that shifting may also be under top-down 
control appears erroneous.  The reason for this is that it appears to conflate type 2 processes 
with processes that may control the shift between different modes of thinking (e.g. type 3 
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processes
3
) (Evans, 2009).  Chapter four of this thesis examined whether self-reported 
shifting tapped task based shifting between different modes of thinking.  Evidence of a 
positive association here would suggest that it was possible to introspect on the shifting 
process and therefore it may be under conscious top-down control.  
 
The findings of Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues suggest that creative individuals are 
able to adopt an associative mode of thinking to match the requirements of the situation one 
is in and are also able to adopt an analytic mode of thinking when the situation requires it.  
However, the different tasks used within the experiments by Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatowksi (2007), Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian (2008) and Vartanian, 
Martindale & Matthews (2009) were undertaken separately and therefore this work does not 
directly examine shifts between different modes of thinking.  Further, this work does not 
examine shifting on a creative task.  This issue is addressed in chapter two of this thesis 
which examines the relationship between creativity and shifting between modes of thinking 
within a task switching paradigm, designed to reflect switches between different activities 
that draw on different modes of thinking during the creative process.  The samples of 
participants used in the experiments by Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues were students 
which also limits the generalizability of the findings.   
 
Another account of shifting between different modes of thinking that frames different modes 
in terms of defocused and focused attention is provided by Kaufman (2011).  Kaufman 
(2011) draws upon the work of Finke, Ward and Smith (1992) that creative invention 
involves cycling between two principal phases.  A generative phase involves the production 
of many ideas and a mental representation called a ‘pre-inventive’ form.  This is followed by 
an explorative phase where generated ideas are examined and their implications assessed.  
Kaufman (2011) argues that defocused attention has a greater role in the generative versus 
explorative phase while focused attention has a greater role in the explorative compared to 
the generative phase.  Focused attention activates high cognitive control in the explorative 
phase.  Kaufman (2011) suggests that “the highest levels of creativity require…the flexibility 
to switch modes of thought throughout the creative process” (p. 458).  This statement 
suggests that the extent to which shifting is required may vary as a function of the level of 
creativity required on a given task.  Kaufman (2011) does not elaborate on this issue but 
                                                 
3
 The role of type 3 processes and other processes which may control the switch between different types/modes 
of thinking is discussed in a later section of this chapter.  
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research by Basadur (1995) has suggested that the ratio of ideation to evaluation may differ 
across professionals as a function of differences in the nature of the work they conduct.  This 
suggests that the relative importance of shifting for creativity may differ as a function of the 
domain one is working in.  This issue is explored in chapters three and four of the present 
thesis. 
 
Basadur, Graen, and Green (1982; see also Basadur, 1995) propose that ideation and 
evaluation occur during the creative process.  This account suggests that individuals cycle 
between these two processes during the creative process. It is argued that the ratio of ideation 
to evaluation varies across stages of the creative process (see Allen & Thomas, 2011 for a 
similar argument based on type 1 and type 2 thinking).  Cycling between ideation and 
evaluation clearly maps on to shifting between associative and analytic modes of thinking.  
For example, there may be a higher ratio of ideation to evaluation in an initial stage where 
one works on finding the problem compared to a later stage where one is implementing a 
solution (Basadur, 1995).  This account suggests that it may be important to consider that 
shifting may differ as a function of different stages or different time points in the creative 
process (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  This issue is explored in chapter five of the 
present thesis.    
 
The accounts of the link between shifting and creativity provided by Kaufman (2011) and 
Basadur, Graen, and Green (1982; see also Basadur, 1995) are however not framed at the 
same level of detail as those provided by Gabora & Ranjan (2013) Howard-Jones (2002) or 
Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues (Vartanian, 2009).   
 
The accounts of the process of shifting provided so far do not make any reference to whether 
affective processing is involved in shifting between different modes of thought.  A recent 
fMRI study however suggests that evaluating ideas involves brain regions that process 
affective content (Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman & Christoff, 2012).  The failure to take account 
of the role of affective processing in shifting therefore appears to be a drawback of the 
theories previously outlined.   Dietrich’s (2004) neuroanatomical framework of creativity is 
of value here.  Dietrich (2004) states that different modes of thinking based on both cognitive 
and affective content are used in combination to determine creative behaviour.  He does not 
explicitly define whether shifts between different modes of thinking occur.  However the use 
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of a different combination of modes does leave open the possibility for shifting in his model.  
The role of affective processing in shifting is examined in chapter five of this thesis.    
 
In summary, the conceptions of the different theoretical accounts of shifting differ in their 
level of detail, the aspects of shifting discussed and the evidence that supports them.  
However, there does appear to be considerable overlap between the predictions of different 
accounts concerning the nature of shifting and its relationship to creativity.  Further, different 
accounts do appear to be mutually compatible.  The next section examines the relationship 
between creativity and switching between type 1 and type 2 processing.  It will discuss how 
theoretical accounts of switching between type 1 and type 2 processing in dual-process 
theories of cognition may inform our understanding of the relationship between shifting 
between modes and creativity. 
 
Theoretical accounts of switching within dual-process theories of cognition 
 
It is important to explain at this stage the difference between the use of the term switching 
with reference to the process of alternating between type 1 and type 2 thinking and shifting 
with reference to the process of alternating between associative and analytic modes of 
thinking.  Switching is used in this thesis to refer to the latter because type 1 and type 2 
thinking involve qualitatively distinct forms of processing.  Moving between associative and 
analytic modes of thinking may however involve shifts on a continuum (Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013; Howard-Jones, 2002). 
 
It has been argued that both type 1 and type 2 thinking are involved in creative thinking 
(Allen & Thomas, 2011) and that a process of switching between type 1 and type 2 thinking 
may impact on creativity (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  Dual-process models of 
cognition provide accounts of how type 1 and type 2 thinking interact.  Since, as mentioned 
previously, there appears to be considerable overlap between the different modes and types of 
thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014), these accounts could shed light on the nature of 
the process of shifting between associative and analytic modes during the creative process.   
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There are two distinct variants of dual-process theories of cognition which make different 
predictions concerning the nature of the interaction between type 1 and type 2 thinking.  
These are default interventionist and parallel competitive theories.  Default-interventionist 
theories assume that type 1 processing operates as the ‘default’ type of thinking generating 
intuitive responses.  Type 2 processing is used to examine these processes and either allows 
them to proceed or intervenes with analytic reasoning (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 
2009).  Parallel-competitive theories (Sloman, 1996; Lieberman, 2003 cited in Evans, 2009; 
Sloman, 1996; Barbey & Sloman, 2007 cited in Evans & Stanovich, 2013) propose that type 
1 and type 2 processing operate in parallel with each process capable of taking control of 
behaviour and conflict resolved if it arises.   
 
The extent to which switching between different types of thinking occurs in series or in 
parallel has direct relevance to the process of shifting between modes.  If shifting between 
modes occurs in series as default-interventionist models suggest, then successful shifting may 
hinge on the ability to successfully disengage one type of thinking prior to engaging another 
(Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  If shifting occurs more in parallel then successful 
shifting may hinge on the capacity to easily access the analytic mode of thinking so that 
evaluative processes are quickly available “on tap” (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  More 
generally, these differences demonstrate that empirical work designed to investigate the 
relationship between creativity and shifting must clearly define the shifting process being 
measured.  This would appear crucial to progressing our understanding of exactly how 
shifting is related to creativity. 
 
Dual-process theories of cognition may provide some insight into how the process of shifting 
is controlled.  Accounts of the mechanisms that may control shifting are lacking from dual-
process theories of creativity.  Evans (2009) argues that a third type of process, type 3 
processes, control the switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking.  Evan’s (2008) also argues 
that type 3 processes are not conscious which is in agreement with Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) 
conception of shifting being under automatic control.   
 
Another proposal is that metacognitive processes control the switch between type 1 and type 
2 thinking.  A metacognitive process termed the “feeling of rightness” may determine 
whether a switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking occurs (Thompson, 2009).  If a strong 
“feeling of rightness” is produced by a stimulus then default type 1 thinking is likely to be 
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allowed to proceed unchecked.  A stimulus that produces a weak “feeling of rightness” will 
more likely trigger a switch from type 1 to type 2 thinking. This feeling is affective and 
carries no cognitive content but is subject to conscious awareness (Thompson, 2009).  
Metacognitive “feelings of rightness” may automatically cue switches without conscious 
evaluation of the feeling.  A switch from type 1 to type 2 thinking may also be made on the 
basis of a conscious “judgement of rightness” which is an interpretation of the “feeling of 
rightness” and the cues that gave rise to it (Thompson, 2009).  This account of the control 
processes underlying switching is in agreement with Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews 
(2009) conception that shifting may either occur automatically or be under top-down control.    
 
The theoretical accounts presented so far clearly suggest a relationship between shifting 
between different modes of thinking and creativity.  However it might be argued that 
creativity is simply associated with cognitive flexibility, with shifting merely being one 
example of this.  The next section examines theoretical accounts and evidence of the 
relationship between creativity and cognitive flexibility.  The overlap between cognitive 
flexibility and shifting between modes of thinking is then discussed.  
 
Shifting between different modes /switching between different types of thinking and cognitive 
flexibility 
 
Cognitive flexibility has been defined in terms of the ease with which one is able to consider 
different perspectives or switch to a different approach, goal or set (Nijstad, De Dreu, 
Rietzschel & Baas, 2010; Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999; Baas, De dreu & Nijstad, 2008).  The 
dual-pathway model (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010) proposes that there are two 
routes through which creativity can be achieved; a flexibility pathway and a persistence 
pathway.  The focus in this section is on the flexibility pathway, the persistence pathway is 
discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.  Creative insights may be realised through a 
flexibility pathway which is characterized by a broad attentional focus and the ability to 
flexibly switch between approaches to a task.  Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas (2010) 
also suggest that since increased cognitive flexibility may result in lower cognitive control 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), a mechanism to evaluate ideas, termed an “idea monitor”, 
operates in this pathway to judge the appropriateness of generated ideas and keep behaviour 
in line with goals.     
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This account of the flexibility pathway suggests that, within this pathway, there may be a 
shift between a state characterised by high cognitive flexibility but low cognitive control and 
a broad attentional focus, and a state characterized by high cognitive control.  This appears to 
map on to the distinction between associative and analytic modes of thought proposed in 
other dual-process theories of creativity.  In sum, this account suggests that cognitive 
flexibility is a characteristic of the associative mode of thinking.  It is important to note that it 
does not suggest that shifting between different modes of thinking is akin to cognitive 
flexibility.  Demonstrating cognitive flexibility by switching to a different approach and then 
evaluating the appropriateness of this new approach is the process which appears to be 
underpinned by a shift from associative to analytic thinking. 
 
Vartanian (2009) has argued that flexibly modulating attention, which appears to represent 
shifting between modes, underpins the ability to flexibly adjust one’s approach or strategy on 
a task.  In support of this, Vartanian (2009) cites evidence that participant’s use different 
strategies over the course of working on a divergent thinking task (Gilhooly, Fiortou, 
Anthony, and Wynn, 2007) and that participants who switch strategy in response to changes 
in task context score higher on divergent thinking (Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 
2003; Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn, 2007).  Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn 
(2007) used a ‘think aloud’ protocol, where participants vocalize their thoughts, to determine 
the cognitive processes used while working on a divergent thinking task; the alternate uses 
task (AUT).  The AUT involves generating novel uses for items such as a shoe.  It was 
revealed that participants, who were university students, initially demonstrated the tendency 
on the AUT to use a strategy of retrieval of uses stored in long term memory.  It was argued 
that the use of a memory based strategy involved automatic and rapid processing (Gilhooly, 
Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn, 2007).  Participant’s appeared to switch later on in this task to 
strategies that in contrast appeared to involve greater executive control such as ‘imagining 
disassembling the object and using parts of it or recombining parts’ (Gilhooly, Fiortou, 
Anthony, and Wynn, 2007).   
 
The activity of imagining disassembling and recombining parts would appear to involve type 
2 ‘cognitive decoupling’ (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Switching from a strategy involving 
rapid automatic processing to one that involves ‘cognitive decoupling’ would appear to 
involve a switch between type 1 and type 2 thinking.  Further, out of all of the strategies used 
by participants in Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn’s (2007) study, the strategy of 
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‘imagining disassembling the object and using parts of it or recombining parts’ was the 
strongest independent predictor of novelty on the AUT.  This suggests a positive relationship 
between the switch in strategy and novelty.  This then provides indirect evidence of a positive 
relationship between switching between type 1 and type 2 thinking and one facet of creativity; 
novelty (Cropley & Kaufman, 2011).   
 
Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski (2003) examined the performance of undergraduate 
students in a rule discovery task.  Participants were instructed to determine the rule 
underlying a sequence of numbers e.g. “2-4-6”.  In order to do this they were instructed to 
write down similar sequences with the experimenter providing feedback on whether or not 
the sequence conformed to the rule.  Two different strategies could be used to discover rules.  
One was for participants to write down sequences which conformed to what they guessed the 
rule to be, termed confirmatory hypotheses, and the other was to write down sequences which 
could falsify what they guessed the rule to be, termed disconfirmatory hypotheses.  For 
example, if you guessed the rule was “increase by two” writing “6-8-10” would indicate use 
of a confirmatory hypothesis while writing “4-6-9” would indicate the use of a 
disconfirmatory hypothesis.  Initially all participants used “confirmatory hypotheses” but the 
group who successfully determined the rule evidenced a switch in strategy to the use of 
“disconfirmatory hypotheses” towards the end of the time period provided for writing down 
sequences.  Participants who discovered the rule also evidenced a greater number of uses for 
objects generated on an alternate uses task (AUT).   
 
Although Vartanian (2009) suggests that flexibly modulating attention underpins the ability 
to flexibly adjust one’s approach or strategy he doesn’t actually specify the mapping between 
defocused and focused attention and the different strategies used in Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatkowski (2003) and Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007).  The generation of 
“disconfirmatory hypotheses” would appear to involve ‘cognitive decoupling’ (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013), specifically decoupling one’s representation of the problem from an 
imagined sequence that could falsify it.  The mapping between type 1 processes or the 
associative mode of thinking and “confirmatory hypotheses” is however less clear.  The 
findings of Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski (2003) therefore seem unclear on the issue 
of whether switching between different strategies is underpinned by switches between 
different types/shifts between different modes of thinking. 
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The findings of Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) and Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatkowski (2003) appear initially to be at odds with the other theoretical accounts of 
shifting that specify shifts occur between generative and evaluative processes.  Evaluative 
processes may however have been operating in these experiments, for example to judge 
whether the existing strategy is working and whether or not to switch to a new strategy.  
Overall though, the findings of Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) and Vartanian, 
Martindale & Kwiatkowski (2003) suggest that demonstrating cognitive flexibility by 
switching to a different strategy could be underpinned by switches between type 1 and type 2 
thinking, and therefore between associative and analytic modes of thought.  However, the 
question of whether there is a direct relationship between strategy switching and shifts 
between different modes of thinking needs to be tested empirically.  This is examined in 
chapter five of the present thesis.     
 
The relationship between persistence, shifting between modes of thinking and creativity 
 
The dual-pathway model of creativity (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010) proposes 
that creativity can be achieved through either a flexibility pathway or through a persistence 
pathway.  In this model persistence is defined as an “effortful exploration of possibilities and 
in-depth exploration of only a few categories or perspectives” (p. 44).  The persistence 
pathway is characterized by higher cognitive control and lower cognitive flexibility than the 
flexibility pathway.  The prior discussion of the flexibility pathway suggested that shifts 
between different modes of thinking could occur within this pathway.  In contrast, shifts 
between different modes of thinking would seem unlikely within the persistence pathway.  
Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas (2010) argue that individuals may switch between the 
use of the flexibility and persistence pathways.  This suggests that one may switch between a 
process of shifting between different modes of thinking and a process of persisting in one 
mode during the course of the creative process (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  The issue 
of whether shifting and persistence may vary as a function of time point during the creative 
process is examined in chapter five of this thesis.   
 
Zabelina & Beeman (2013) also argue that in addition to flexibility, persistence can positively 
impact on creativity.  They report evidence of a positive relationship between scores on a 
self-report measure of creative achievement, the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ), 
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and the number of errors made when switching between making responses based on local or 
global features of stimuli.  A key feature of this task was that it entailed sequences eight trials 
in length where participants had to respond based on the same type of feature; either local or 
global.  At the end of these sequences a set of the other type of trial were presented, requiring 
participants to switch their approach; that is whether they responded based on local or global 
features.  Those reporting high creative achievement evidenced more errors when they had to 
switch compared to those reporting low creative achievement.  It was argued that a broad 
attentional focus is involved in processing global features and a narrow attentional focus in 
processing local features (Zabelina & Beeman, 2013).  This suggests that this task may 
involve shifts between associative and analytic modes of thinking, and therefore that these 
results demonstrate a negative relationship between shifting and creative achievement.  
Zabelina & Beeman (2013) argued that high creative achievers made more errors when 
switching approach because they showed attentional persistence at one level, which made it 
more difficult for them to switch to a different approach when required.  This explanation 
contradicts the argument of Vartanian and colleagues that creative individuals are more able 
to alter their attentional focus.  Zabelina & Robinson’s (2013) explanation also suggests that 
persisting in one mode is the opposite of shifting between modes. 
 
These accounts suggest that both shifting and persistence are involved in the creative process 
and a lack of shifting may indicate greater persistence and vice-versa.  It was important then 
that the empirical work in the present thesis considered the role that persistence may play 
when examining the relationship between shifting and creativity.     
 
How will this thesis further our understanding of the relationship between creativity 
and shifting between modes of thought? 
 
The empirical work presented in subsequent chapters of this thesis is based on the theoretical 
accounts and past empirical work presented in the current chapter.  In this section I briefly 
outline the empirical studies included in the different chapters of this thesis.  I summarise 
their key novel aspects and how they aimed to further our understanding of the relationship 
between creativity and shifting between modes of thought.   
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Chapter two examines the relationship between creativity and shifts between modes of 
thinking with an experimental paradigm, designed to reflect the operation of activities that 
draw on different modes of thinking during the creative process.  This builds on the empirical 
work by Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues suggesting a relationship between creativity 
and the capacity to alter the mode of thinking engaged across tasks requiring different levels 
of attentional focus.  The novel aspects of this study, compared to the previous work cited, 
are that it examines shifts between tasks that involve activities (e.g. divergent thinking and 
convergent thinking) that are actually involved in the creative process
4
.  The aim of this study 
is to examine if creativity is positively associated with a heightened capacity to shift between 
the different modes of thinking that support these different activities.         
 
In chapter three a novel self-report measure of shifting is devised in an attempt to examine if 
people can consciously introspect on their shifting process.  In this chapter I also examine 
how this shifting process differs across different contexts and as a function of one’s 
professional role and level of expertise.  These aspects of shifting have yet to be examined 
empirically.   In chapter four, I examine whether the measure of shifting processes developed 
in chapter three taps shifting on tasks that appear to capture shifts between associative and 
analytic modes.  In this chapter I also examine if scores on the self-report measure of shifting 
are positively related to measures of creativity.  This work could shed light on whether people 
are consciously aware of the process of shifting between modes and therefore whether it 
might be under top-down control (Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009).   In chapter 
five, shifting in-vivo during the creative process of designing a garden is recorded.  The 
relationship between in-vivo measures of shifting and the creativity and design quality of the 
product of this process, a garden design, is then examined.  This is the first known study that 
examines Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) prediction that shifting during the creative process is 
associated with the product of that process.   
 
In sum, these empirical studies are designed to test the predictions and shed light on the gaps, 
outlined throughout this chapter, concerning our current understanding of the nature of the 
shifting process and the relationship between shifting and creativity.   
 
                                                 
4
 These activities may not always be involved in the creative process but they often are.  
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Chapter 2- The relationship between creativity and repeatedly 
shifting between different modes of thinking in a task-switching 
paradigm  
 
It has been argued that both divergent and convergent thinking operate during the creative 
process and both are required to produce creative products (Cropley, 2006; Runco, 2003).  
Cropley (2006) and Runco’s (2003) accounts suggest that divergent and convergent thinking 
are coupled stages in the creative thinking process which implies that shifts between 
divergent and convergent thinking occur during the creative process.  Cropley (2006) argues 
that divergent thinking involves processes such as making associations between remote ideas 
and that it supports idea generation, both key characteristics of the associative mode of 
thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).  Convergent thinking is 
characterized as involving logical processes and honing in on a single best answer, supporting 
the exploration and evaluation of ideas (Cropley, 2006).  These are key characteristics of the 
analytic mode of thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).  Examining shifts 
between divergent and convergent thinking would appear to provide an indirect means of 
examining shifts between associative and analytic modes of thinking that are hypothesized to 
occur during the creative process (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).     
 
The empirical findings reported by Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues in chapter one 
provide evidence that more creative individuals have a greater capacity to match their mode 
of thinking to the task requirements than less creative individuals.  However, the different 
tasks that Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues used appeared to lack face validity as 
activities that occur during the creative process.  Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues used 
the hick (Hick, 1952), concept verification (Knorr & Neubauer, 1996), negative priming 
(Claridge et. al, 1992) and global precedence tasks (Navon, 1977). The Hick task assesses the 
speed with which participants can detect and react to a stimulus and the concept verification 
task the speed with which they can understand a rule and whether a subsequently presented 
object satisfies that rule.  These two tasks were chosen to assess the extent to which 
participants were able to effectively apply focused attention, with faster reaction times 
indicative of an ability to focus attention to a greater extent.  The negative priming task 
assesses the extent to which participants are able to resist inferring information from a 
previously presented trial when responding on a current trial.  The global precedence task 
assesses the extent to which participants are able to respond accurately based on global 
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features of a stimulus and resist inference from local features or vice-versa.  These two tasks 
were chosen to assess the extent to which participants defocused attention, with slower 
reaction times indicative of a defocusing attention to a greater degree.  It does seem possible 
that the concept verification task could capture facets of analytical evaluative thinking that 
occur during the creative process; specifically, evaluating whether an idea corresponds to an 
internalized rule and therefore whether it is appropriate.  However, it is much less clear how 
the negative priming and global-precedence tasks capture facets of activities that could occur 
during the creative process.  Further, these two tasks don’t appear to capture the generation of 
novel ideas which is a key component of the creative process hypothesized to be supported 
by the associative mode of thought (Howard-Jones, 2002; Kaufman, 2011; Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013).              
 
The tasks used by Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues were only completed one at a time 
and therefore they did not offer the possibility to examine the process of actually shifting 
between different modes of thought.  A novel experimental paradigm was used in the present 
study to address these issues.  It did so by investigating how more creative individuals 
differed from less creative individuals in their capacity to switch between one set of problems 
that appeared to require divergent thinking and another set appearing to require convergent 
thinking.  This paradigm therefore enabled an examination of how the capacity to actually 
shift between modes differed as a function of participant’s creativity. 
 
A key issue for the present study was which activities were used to induce convergent and 
divergent thinking within the experimental paradigm. Compound remote associates problems 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003) were used to induce convergent thinking.  Performance on 
these problems was taken as the measure of the extent to which participants were able to 
engage in convergent thinking.  Compound remote associate problems were chosen to induce 
convergent thinking for a number of reasons.  Firstly, performance on them is based on easy 
to score measures of correct or incorrect solution generation and speed of solution generation 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).  Secondly, since the present paradigm involved repeated 
switching between divergent and convergent problems, multiple convergent problems were 
required.  Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003) compiled a list of 144 remote associate problems 
(RAPs) from which problems were selected for the current study.  This provided a large bank 
of similar convergent tasks allowing for an examination of repeated switching that was not-
confounded by exposure to the same items previously or different types of convergent tasks.  
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Thirdly, there is evidence that remote associate problems require convergent thinking.  Taft 
& Rossiter (1966) suggested that performance on remote associate problems depends on a 
participant’s ability to choose the answer that best fits the cues presented and performance on 
them has previously been correlated with measures of both verbal and non-verbal IQ 
(Mendlesohn, 1976; Taft & Rossiter, 1966).  Performance on remote associate problems is 
also very strongly correlated with ratings of creativity for architects (r = .70) and moderately 
correlated with creativity ratings of graduate psychology students (r = .55) (Mednick, 1962; 
Mednick, 1963).  The findings indicating performance on remote associate problems 
correlate with creativity ratings suggest that RAPs tap aspects of convergent thinking 
required during the creative process.  Taft & Rossiter’s (1966) proposal that remote associate 
problems assess the ability to choose the answer that best fits the cues presented appears to 
reflect a similar process to the ability to evaluate ideas in order to choose the best one.  
Evaluation has been considered to be underpinned by the operation of the analytic mode of 
thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  The extent to which remote associate problems induced 
convergent thinking in the present study was assessed by examining the correlation between 
performance on them and a measure of Intelligence.  Measures of IQ are generally considered 
to be measures of convergent thinking (Guilford, 1959 cited in Clark, Veldman & Thorpe, 
1965). 
 
A novel task was devised to induce divergent thinking in the present study.  This was done in 
order to keep the stimuli involved in completing the divergent task as similar as possible to 
the convergent task, with the only difference between them being the extent to which 
divergent thinking was required.  Classic divergent thinking tasks such as the alternate uses 
(AUT) appear to differ from remote associate problems not only in the extent to which they 
require divergent thinking but also on the process of retrieval of solutions.  For instance, uses 
of objects on the AUT could be generated by imagining uses, which may draw upon visual 
imagery (Chyrsikou & Thompson-Schill, 2010).   Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn 
(2007) reported that strategies for the generation of alternate uses rely on processes such as 
the retrieval from long term memory of pre known uses and imagining disassembling the 
object from which uses are generated into components; a process clearly involving visual 
imagery.  In contrast, performance on remote associate problems appears to be based on a 
more uniformly verbal process of searching memory for a word that can form a connective 
link between the three cues presented (Mednick, 1962).   
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Switching between performing divergent thinking tasks such as the (AUT) and remote 
associates problems could therefore involve switching between a more visual mode of 
processing to imagine alternate uses and a more verbal mode of processing to identify 
connecting link words.  This would make it an impure paradigm within which to assess the 
capacity to shift between different modes of thinking.  A novel divergent thinking task was 
therefore designed in order to develop a means of inducing divergent thinking that engaged 
verbal processes to a similar extent to remote associate problems.  The novel measure 
required participants to generate as many creative examples of compound words as they 
could from single ‘seed’ words, with ‘seeds’ being the solution words from the bank of 
remote associate problems compiled by Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003).  The novel task 
required was in essence a remote associate problem performed in reverse and hence these 
types of problems were labelled inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs).  The task 
instructions asked participants to generate multiple solutions which were creative, less 
obvious, unusual and uncommon.  These criteria are in line with the characteristics of 
divergent thinking as defined by Cropley (2006) and as such the novel task has face validity 
as a means of inducing divergent thinking.  The extent to which inverse remote associate 
problems induce divergent thinking was assessed in the present study by examining the 
correlation between performance on them and self-report measures of creativity and 
openness; which have previously been shown to correlate with divergent thinking (Carson, 
Higgins and Peterson, 2005). 
 
A key issue for the present study was also how to assess participant’s level of success in 
shifting between different modes of thinking.  The experimental paradigm used in the present 
study was used previously in research on task switching (Monsell, 2003).  Remote associate 
problems and inverse remote associate problems were presented within a task switching 
paradigm where performance on each type of task within switch blocks is compared to blocks 
where only one type of task is performed repeatedly.  Mixing costs have been shown in the 
form of slower performance when switching within a block in comparison to when only one 
task is performed within a block (Monsell, 2003).  An explanation given for this is that there 
are carry-over effects of task set activation or inhibition from the preceding task to the one 
currently being performed and participants must spend time reconfiguring their task set to 
perform the current task (Monsell, 2003).   
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The above account bears some similarity to accounts within serial models of shifting which 
suggest that one mode of thinking must be disengaged prior to the other mode being engaged 
(Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  It also fits with the suggestion 
that a possible measure of successful shifting is the ability to maintain successful task 
performance when having to switch between performing tasks that require different modes of 
thinking.  Thus, a comparison of participant’s performance within switching and pure blocks, 
where only one task is performed throughout, would appear to allow a test of the prediction 
that more creative, in comparison to less creative, individuals demonstrate a heightened 
capacity to shift between different modes of thinking.   
 
Switch costs were measured in the present experiment by comparing performance within 
switch blocks that require switching between remote associate (RAPs) and inverse remote 
associate (I-RAPs) problems to performance within pure blocks containing only one type of 
problem.  Switch costs were defined as the negative effect on measures of performance 
within switch compared to within pure blocks.  The predictions for the present experiment 
were that individuals reporting lower levels of creativity would exhibit greater switch costs 
than those individuals reporting higher levels of creativity.  Those reporting higher levels of 
creativity were predicted either to exhibit low switch costs or no switch costs at all.  It was 
also predicted that individuals higher in self-reported creativity would exhibit better 
performance on measures of both convergent and divergent thinking than individuals lower in 
creativity.  It was predicted that individuals higher in IQ would exhibit better performance on 
measures of convergent thinking.     
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
An opportunity sample of fifty-two participants was recruited on site at the University of 
Surrey.  Forty-eight participants were recruited in order to ensure that the order of 
presentation of the two conditions (switch vs. pure) was counterbalanced across the sample.  
Recruiting fifty-two participants ensured that this criterion was still met even after some 
participants were excluded from the analysis.  Participants were recruited from posters and in 
person at communal areas within cafeterias and University buildings on campus and outside 
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on campus grounds.  They were also recruited from the students union and from within the 
School of Psychology.  A first batch of participants (N = 27) were informed that upon 
agreeing to participate they would be entered into a prize draw to win £50.  A second batch 
(N = 25) were informed that they would receive £8 upon completion of the study.  
Participants were members of staff and students at the University, 16 of whom were male and 
36 of whom were female.  Prospective participants were screened prior to testing in order to 
ensure that they were native speakers of English.  Participants were also screened both 
prospectively and retrospectively, in order to determine whether or not they were dyslexic
5
.  
All participants were between 18 and 27 years of age (M =22.52, SD = 2.39).  One 
participant was retrospectively found to be a non-native English speaker and one found to be 
dyslexic.  Data from these participants were excluded from the analysis.  The experiment was 
approved by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.    
    
Measures and covariates 
 
Method of inducing shifts between convergent and divergent thinking 
 
A novel experimental paradigm was devised to induce shifting between convergent and 
divergent thinking.  Convergent remote associate problems (RAPs) were selected from a list 
of compound remote associate problems compiled by Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003). These 
consisted of three target words presented on a computer screen in the format shown in figure 
1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Information about whether or not participants were dyslexic was only identified as important once testing was 
already underway.  As such some participants had to be contacted by email and asked about this retrospectively. 
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basket
eight
snow
ball
 
Figure 1. Displaying the format in which convergent RAP problems (left) and divergent I-RAP problems (right) 
are presented. 
 
The goal of the task was to identify a solution word which could form a compound word or 
phrase with all three words.  For example, “ball” here links all three to form “basket-ball”, 
“eight-ball” and “snow-ball”. Divergent I-RAP problems consisted of the single solution 
words given in Bowden & Jung-Beeman’s list (2003) which were used as ‘seeds’ from which 
participants were asked to generate multiple compound words and phrases.  For example, if 
they were given the word “ball”, as shown on the right in figure 1, they could generate 
“basket-ball”, “eight-ball”, “snow-ball”, “ball-room”, “ball-gown” etc.  The three target 
words and seed word were chosen at random from a list of 144 examples included previously 
in research by (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).  A random number generator programmed 
into the computer program e-prime was used to select the problems and the order in which 
they were to be presented for each block and for each participant.  The randomisation of 
which seed words were selected across participants and across blocks was performed as there 
was evidence that some remote associate problems may be easier to solve than others and 
hence randomisation across participants would help minimise systematic effects due to 
problems in any block or for any participant being easier or harder than those in other blocks 
or those administered to other participants (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).   
 
The problems themselves were presented to participants using Microsoft Power-Point.  
Participants completed 4 blocks, each consisting of 24 problems.  Two blocks were pure 
blocks comprising of either 24 convergent or 24 divergent problems only.  Two blocks were 
switch blocks comprising of both convergent and divergent problems, presented one after the 
other in an alternating sequence.  Both switch blocks comprised of 12 RAP problems 
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interleaved with 12, I-RAP problems with one switch block starting with a RAP problem 
(RAP, I-RAP etc.) and the other starting with an I-RAP problem (I-RAP, RAP etc.). 
   
Assessment of creativity 
 
Two measures were used to assess the creativity of participants; the creative achievement 
questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and the creative personality scale 
(CPS) (Gough, 1978).   
 
Creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ) 
 
The CAQ is a self-report measure which is designed to capture creative achievement across 
ten different domains; visual arts, music, dance, architectural design, creative writing, 
humour, inventions, scientific discovery, theatre and film and culinary arts (Carson, Peterson, 
& Higgins, 2005).  Individual domain scores are then summed to give a total score for 
creative achievement which has been shown to be stable across different time points (r = .81). 
The CAQ has good internal consistency (α = .96) and split-half reliability (α = .92); and 
shows predictive validity with a positive correlation between total CAQ score and the 
creativity of collages as rated by real artists (r= .65).  The CAQ also shows reasonable 
convergent validity with other measures of creativity, such as the creative personality scale 
(Gough, 1979), and discriminant validity with IQ and a measure of social desirability 
(Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005).             
        
Creative personality scale (CPS) 
 
The CPS is a checklist of 30 adjectives, with 18 items positively related to creativity and 12 
items negatively related to creativity (Gough, 1979).  Participants are instructed to indicate 
which adjectives best describe themselves and to tick all that apply.  One point is given for 
each positive adjective checked and one point subtracted for each negative item checked.  A 
score for creativity is therefore obtained by summing the positive adjectives ticked and 
subtracting the negative ones ticked, giving a range between -12 and 18 (Gough, 1979). Both 
positive and negative items were selected based on correlations with ratings of creativity 
given to students by experts across a variety of different domains.  The scale has 
demonstrated acceptable levels of internal consistency across different samples (lowest; α = 
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.73, highest; α = .81) and convergent validity with other measures of creative personality 
(Gough, 1979).   
 
Measurement of criterion variables/covariates   
 
NEO-Five Factor Inventory 
 
The personality dimensions of extraversion, openness and neuroticism have previously been 
shown to be associated with creativity and divergent thinking (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 
2005; Feist, 1998; Martindale & Dailey, 1996; Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008).  Measures of 
personality were recorded in the present study for two reasons.  Firstly, in order to provide 
covariates to reduce noise in the data so as increasing the power of inferential statistical tests 
performed to detect significant effects within the sample.  Secondly, openness and 
extraversion scores were used as criterion variables on which to assess the validity of the 
inverse remote associate problems as a measure of divergent thinking.  The NEO-FFI 
provides a brief but comprehensive assessment of the five domains of personality, consisting 
of five 12 item scales measuring each domain; namely neuroticism, extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness (Costa & Macrae, 1992).  Correlations with the 
established full-scale measure of the five domains of personality, the NEO-PI-R are within 
acceptable limits (r= .92, .90, .91, .77 and .87 for N, E, O, A and C respectively) as are the 
coefficients for internal consistency (α = .86, .77, .73, .68, .81 for N, E, O, A and C 
respectively).       
 
Weschsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
 
The intelligence of the present sample was measured in order to provide a measure on which 
to validate the remote associate problems as a measure of convergent thinking.  IQ tests 
appear to be good candidate measures on which to validate measures of convergent thinking 
as they appear to measure convergent thinking abilities (Guilford, 1959 cited in Clark, 
Veldman & Thorpe, 1965). The two-subtest form of the WASI was used to provide a brief 
measure of an individual’s intelligence (Wechsler, 1999).  The two-subtest form comprises 
the vocabulary and matrix reasoning subtests, with the latter test always administered 
following the former.  The two-subtest form sacrifices some degree of accuracy for speed of 
administration but was chosen based on its short administration time of 15 minutes which 
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allowed additional measures to be included in the second session of the study within a limited 
period of time.  It has also been standardised on a nationally representative sample (Wechsler, 
1999).  Use of the two-subtest form only permits the measurement of full-scale IQ (Wechsler, 
1999).          
 
Verbal fluency task 
 
Verbal fluency was measured in order to control for participants’ ability to fluently generate 
words.  Since solutions to divergent I-RAP problems were produced verbally, including this 
measure as a covariate should allow creative fluency to be separated from mere fluency of the 
production of words on divergent problems.  Verbal fluency was assessed using the FAS test 
where participants are asked to produce as many words as possible that begin with a specific 
letter within a specific period of time (Spreen & Strauss, 1991).  Three letters were given in 
total; F, A and S and participants were given one minute for each letter in which to produce 
as many words as possible, being instructed that they should avoid words that are proper 
names and avoid using the same word again with a different ending (Spreen & Strauss, 
1991).  Verbal fluency is scored as the sum of all admissible words across all three letters 
(Spreen & Strauss, 1991).  Retest reliability over weeks (r = .88) and one year (r = .70) is 
good and concurrent validity has been found with other measures of verbal fluency (Spreen & 
Strauss, 1991).            
             
Research design 
 
A mixed design was used, with block type as the repeated measures factor and creativity as 
the between-subjects factor.  Block type had two levels, with performance within pure blocks 
containing only remote associate or inverse remote associate problems compared to 
performance within switch blocks containing both remote associate or inverse remote 
associate problems, presented in an alternating fashion one after the other.   
 
Performance on the remote associate problems (RAPs) was assessed based on the percentage 
out of the total number of trials on which correct solutions were generated, and the speed at 
which correct solutions were generated.  It is important to note at this stage that it has been 
argued that solutions on RAPs can be generated by both insightful and strategic means 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).  Insight has been defined as a process where a solution 
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appears suddenly in consciousness without awareness of the process by which the solution 
was generated.  This is contrasted with step by step analytic problem solving where one is 
aware of the process by which the solution was generated (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).       
 
The manner in which correct solutions to RAPs were generated was examined in the present 
study based on subjective ratings of the extent to which solutions felt like they were 
generated by insight.  High ratings of insight experienced while solving remote associate 
problems have previously been associated with different brain activation patterns compared 
to low ratings for subjective measures of insight suggesting that the insight measure has 
validity as a measure of different strategies of solution generation (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 
2003).   
 
Performance on inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs) was assessed based upon both 
objective and subjectively scored measures of divergent thinking.  Objective measures 
include the number of solutions (i.e. compound words) generated in response to each ‘seed’ 
word, termed ‘fluency’ and the number of unique compound words generated from each 
‘seed’ word, termed ‘uniqueness’.  An objectively scored measure of ‘originality’ for each 
compound word generated across the entire sample of participants was also calculated as 
follows: 1 / (Number of examples of that compound word generated across the sample/the 
total number of participants who generated items based on that ‘seed’ word) 
 
To illustrate, take the example of the ‘seed’ word “air”.  32 participants were randomly 
presented with the ‘seed’ word “air” across all I-RAP problems presented across all blocks.  
A total of 32 participants therefore could generate items based on that ‘seed’ word.  10 
participants across the entire sample generated the compound word “air plane” based on this 
seed word.  Using the above formula, 1 / (10/32) = .69, reflects the inverse of the frequency 
of the compound word “air plane” across all participants who were exposed to the ‘seed’ 
word “air” and therefore could have generated this compound word.  Higher scores on this 
measure reflect more original compound words. 
 
Participants were assigned scores on two measures of originality calculated from the 
‘objective measure of originality’ explained above.  These were the ‘average originality’ 
across all compound words produced in response to each ‘seed’ word and the average of the 
two most infrequently generated words’ that each participant generated in response to each 
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‘seed’ word, termed ‘two most original’.  For each participant, scores on both of these 
measures were then averaged across I-RAP trials separately within switch and pure blocks.     
  
Subjectively scored measures were included alongside objective measures in response to 
concerns raised by Silvia et al. (2008) that responses which are unique or statistically 
infrequent are not necessarily creative responses.  Three independent raters scored the 
creativity of all compound words generated across blocks.  The independent raters consisted 
of three female students enrolled in psychology PhD programs at the University of Surrey.  
The three independent raters rated the creativity of all compound words produced on inverse 
remote associate problems in pure and switch blocks according to instructions used 
previously by Silvia et al. (2008).  These instructions stated that creativity may be high on 
three facets and creative responses will generally be high on all three.  The three facets were 
that creative ideas are uncommon, only remotely linked to everyday objects and clever in that 
they often strike people as smart.  It is important to note that it has been argued that these 
facets of what Silvia et al. (2008) term ‘creativity’ may only tap the novelty and not the 
usefulness of generated ideas and therefore assesses divergent thinking ability rather than 
creativity (Runco, 2008).  However the facet “smartness” could capture an element of the 
usefulness of an idea.  In sum, the I-RAP task was used as a measure of divergent thinking 
but it may also be tapping creativity.    
 
Subjective scoring required raters to rate the creativity
6
 of compound words created relative 
to the entire bank of compound words generated from each ‘seed word’.  Creativity was 
judged at the level of each ‘seed’ word.  The rationale for this was that it may be easier to 
generate creative examples of compound words based on some ‘seeds’ than others.  This 
procedure also made the rating task more manageable for raters as there were 96 seed words 
in total with multiple compound words generated on each.  Subjective ratings given by these 
three raters on the creativity of generated compound words were averaged to produce a 
measure of subjectively judged novelty for every compound word generated within the 
sample.  Two subjective measures of novelty were then calculated based on these measures; 
one being the ‘average subjective ratings of novelty’ within pure and switch blocks and the 
other being the ‘average of the two most novel solutions’ generated on the pure block and on 
the switch block.     
                                                 
6
 As stated in the previous paragraph this may be ‘novelty’ rather than ‘creativity’. 
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Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of two sessions, with all participants completing the first session 
prior to the second session. 
 
Session 1 
 
Participants were seated at a desk in a lab in the school of psychology and given an 
information sheet explaining what the study would involve and information concerning 
ethical considerations and their consent to take part.  Once they had read this and signed the 
consent form the task was explained to them.  They were told that they would be asked to 
perform two types of problem.  In the first type, they were told that they would be presented 
with three stimulus words on a computer screen and they would be asked to generate a fourth 
‘solution’ word that could form a compound word or phrase with each of the three words on 
the screen.  An example of this type of problem and its solution was presented and 
participants told that they would receive three practices of this type of problem with 30 
seconds within which to generate the solution word.  They were asked to press a button in 
front of them as quickly as they could once they had generated the solution and write the 
solution word on a record sheet in front of them.  They were told not to worry if they did not 
manage to produce a word and, if so, they should just put a line on the record sheet to 
indicate that they did not generate a response.   
 
Participants were informed that once they had generated a word they should then indicate 
how they generated the solution on a scale of 1 to 5.  The ratings were described in 
accordance with instructions given in Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2007) in the following 
manner: “A rating of 1 means that at first, you didn’t know whether the word was the answer, 
but after thinking about it strategically (for example, trying to combine the single word with 
each of the three problem words) you figured out that it was the answer. A rating of 3 means 
that you didn’t immediately know the word was the answer, but you didn’t have to think 
about it much either. A rating of 5 means that when you saw the word you suddenly knew 
that it was the answer (“It popped into my head”; “Of course!” “That’s so obvious”; “It felt 
like I was already thinking that”). Ratings of 2 and 4 indicate feelings somewhere in between. 
It is up to you to decide what rating to give each of your responses. There are no right or 
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wrong answers.”  The headings “strategically” and “sudden knowing” were provided as 
anchors at either end of the 5 point scale to help participants remember these instructions.  
The rating scale was reversed for 21 out of the 46 participants.   
 
Prior to commencement of the practice session, participants were instructed to place their 
dominant hand on the response button.  They were then given 3 practice problems obtained 
from examples from Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003).  These problems were not included in 
the main blocks of trials in the present study.  Participants were asked to press the button and 
say out loud their response to the experimenter whereupon they were given feedback on 
whether the solution they had provided was correct or not.  They were asked to refrain from 
writing down their answers to the practice problems or giving ratings on the 5 point scale in 
the practice session.  The rationale for this was so that they could focus on gaining experience 
with the RAP problems.  Participants were given the chance to ask any questions about the 
RAP problems.  They were then given instructions on the I-RAP problems. 
 
In the I-RAP problems participants were told that they would be presented with one ‘seed’ 
word and asked to generate as many compound words and phrases as they could within 30 
seconds using this word.  The word ‘TREE’ was given as an example of a seed word and 
participants were given example responses that they could generate using this; 
‘TREEHOUSE, PALMTREE, APPLETREE’.  They were told to try and be as creative as 
possible with the compound words and phrases that they generated.  To illustrate this they 
were given the example of how TREEHOUSE could be considered as more creative than 
merely listing different types of trees.  In line with instructions given by Silvia et al. (2008), it 
was emphasised to participants that they should say aloud all of the unusual, creative and 
uncommon examples of compound words and phrases that they could think of within thirty 
seconds.  Additional instructions were provided in order to clarify what compound phrases 
were.  It was explained to participants that in addition to compound words, consisting of two 
words, two-word compound phrases were also acceptable.  For example, a two word 
compound phrase produced in response to the ‘seed’ word “BLIND” could be “OPEN-
BLIND”   Participants were however instructed to avoid producing compound phrases with 
more than two-words and avoid adding prefixes and suffixes that did not constitute a distinct 
word onto the end of ‘seed’ words.  Participants then completed three practices of this type of 
problem being instructed to say out loud their responses and being asked by the experimenter 
if their solutions could also be recorded on a an mp3 audio recorder.  All participants agreed 
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so responses were recorded both on paper in the experimental session and checked against the 
recording. 
 
The experimental session then commenced, with participants informed that they would be 
asked to complete both types of problem in four different blocks, with the nature of the block 
(pure or switch) explained prior to the start of each one.  The order in which the four blocks 
were completed was counterbalanced across participants.  Once all blocks had been 
completed participants completed the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ).  
 
Session 2  
 
Participants returned to the same lab in which they had performed the first session and were 
told they would be asked to do a number of different tasks.  The Creative personality scale 
(CPS), NEO-FFI, WASI and FAS test were administered in accordance with their respective 
instructions, with the order of administration counterbalanced across participants.  Finally 
participants were given the debrief form, thanked for their time and entered into the prize 
draw or paid £8. 
 
Section outlining general statistical decisions 
 
The following section outlines the general statistical decisions made throughout the thesis.  
These decisions apply to all subsequent analyses across all chapters. 
 
Assessing whether data met the assumptions for univariate parametric analyses 
 
Distributions of all variables in the present thesis were individually assessed for normality by 
dividing skewness and kurtosis statistics for each variable by their respective standard errors.  
If calculations revealed values higher than 1.96 or lower than -1.96 the distribution on that 
variable was classed as having broken the assumptions of normality. Variables that failed to 
meet the assumptions of normality were transformed in order that they then met this 
assumption.  If after transformation variables still failed to meet the assumptions of normality 
then non-parametric tests were run.  Where it was not possible to run non-parametric tests, 
for example in complex ANOVA designs, the normal analysis of variance was run on the 
rank transformed data (Conover & Iman, 1981).  Specifically, the rankit formula was used to 
  
39 
 
rank transform variables in the present thesis.  The assumptions of homoscedacity, 
homogeneity of variance and linearity were assessed on an analysis to analysis basis by 
examining the variance of one variable across all levels of another variable by visually 
inspecting scatterplots showing correlations between sets of variables (Field, 2009; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
 
Test statistics reported when the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated 
 
The Welch F-ratio was reported for univariate ANOVAs and the Games Howell statistic for 
post-hoc tests when homogeneity of variance was violated.   
 
Measures of effect size 
 
 
Cohens d, Pearsons’s r, and partial eta squared (ηp
2
) are used throughout as measures of the 
size of the effects reported. These measures of effect size allow one to compare the size of 
effects revealed by different analyses and across analyses reported in different chapters.    
 
Marginally significant effects 
 
 
Effects with p value’s <.10 but >.05 when the power of tests was < .8 were reported as 
marginally significant (“APA style”, 2009).    
 
Overall Results  
 
Examining the concurrent validity of self-report measures of creativity with criterion 
variables previously associated with creativity 
 
Creativity was measured in this study using two self-report measures of creativity: the CAQ 
and CPS.  Prior to examining the relationship between creativity and performance on the 
experimental task it was important to assess the concurrent validity of both self-report 
measures with criterion variables previously shown to be associated with creativity.  
Evidence that these were correlated would support the use of these measures, as valid 
measures of creativity in subsequent analyses of the relationship between creativity and 
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performance on the experimental task.  The criterion variables of interest for this assessment 
were the personality dimension openness to experience, intelligence as measured by full-scale 
IQ scores on the two sub-test form of the WASI and the personality dimension extraversion.     
 
Openness to experience has been characterised as reflecting a person’s imagination and 
curiosity which appear be key facets of creativity (Feist, 2010).  Scores on measures of 
creativity and divergent thinking have previously been shown to be associated with the 
personality trait openness to experience (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005).  In a meta-
analysis on the relationship between personality and creativity, creative scientists scored 
higher in openness than less creative scientists (d =.31) (Feist, 1998).  Correlations between 
openness and CAQ scores (Hirsh & Peterson, 2008; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & 
O’Connor, 2009; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and openness and CPS scores (Carson, 
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) have been reported previously.  It was therefore predicted that 
openness scores would be positively correlated with both CAQ and CPS scores within the 
present sample.     
 
Previous research has reported a positive relationship between extraversion and measures of 
both divergent thinking (Martindale & Dailey, 1996; Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008) and self-
reported creativity (Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008).  Feist (1998) also reported that creative 
scientists scored higher in extraversion (d = .39) than less creative scientists but all of the 
effects of extraversion came from the component assessing confidence.  It was therefore 
predicted that extraversion scores would be positively correlated with both CAQ and CPS 
scores within the present sample. 
 
Evidence concerning the relationship between creativity and intelligence is mixed.  The 
argument has been made that there is positive relationship between creativity and intelligence 
but only up until a threshold level of 120 IQ points (Simonton, 2000).  However in practice 
there has been limited support for the threshold theory (Kim, 2005).  The proportion of the 
current sample with an IQ score above the 120 point threshold was calculated by converting 
this value to a z-score and examining the proportion of scores above this score.  54 % of IQ 
scores in the sample (M = 121.09, SD= 10.33) were above the 120 point threshold.  Carson, 
Peterson, & Higgins (2005) failed to find a significant correlation between CAQ and IQ in 
their sample.  As with our sample, the majority of IQ scores in their sample were above the 
threshold of 120 IQ points (M = 129.40, SD= 10.93) (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005).   
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Based on this it was predicted that there would be no significant correlation between IQ and 
scores on either the CAQ or CPS in the current sample.       
 
Each self-report measure of creativity will also act as a criterion variable for the other with 
significant correlations between CAQ and CPS scores predicted based on the premise that 
they both measure creativity.  Correlations between the CAQ, CPS and criterion measures of 
personality and intelligence are shown in table 2.  Measures of age, verbal fluency and 
dimensions of personality, other than openness, are included in order to provide an 
assessment of the extent to which these variables correlate with one another.  No a priori 
predictions were made concerning the predicted relationships other than that it was predicted 
that only the variables previously associated with creativity would correlate with CAQ and 
CPS scores.      
 
Table 2. Summary of Inter-correlations between measures of creativity, dimensions of personality, intelligence, 
verbal fluency and age. 
 
 
CAQ scores were correlated with the NEO-FFI measure of openness to experience (rs= .40, p 
= .01) as were CPS scores (rs= .29, p = .02).  CPS scores were also correlated with 
Extraversion scores (rs = .37, p = .02) but CAQ scores were not correlated with Extraversion 
(rs = .01, p = .71).  CAQ scores were not correlated with full-scale IQ scores (rs= .12, p = 
.21) but there was a marginally significant positive association between CPS scores and IQ 
(rs = .24, p = .08).  CAQ and CPS scores were found to be moderately correlated (rs = .45, p 
= .001).  Only the criterion variables previously associated with creativity were found to 
correlate with CAQ and CPS scores.  The other significant correlations that were found were 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. CAQ .45** .40** .13 -.01 -.17 .09 .12 .10 .17
2. CPS .29* .12 .37* -.10 -.18 .24 .21 .07
3. Openess -.13 -.02 .12 .09 .35* .16 .39**
4. Concientiousness .22 .21 -.18 .01 .08 .02
5. Extraversion .07 -.50** -.12 .02 -.20
6. Agreeableness -.13 .15 .05 -.01
7. Neuroticism .27 .22 .31*
8. FSIQ .46** .33*
9. FAS .23
10. Age
Note. CAQ = Creative achievement Questionairre, CPS = Creative Personality scale, FSIQ = full-scale IQ,
FAS = measure of verbal fluency.  CAQ, CPS and Neuroticism scores were not normally distributed and as such Spearman's correlation coefficients  
are displayed for correlations involving these measures.  Pearson's correlation coefficients are displayed for all other correlations 
**p <.01
* p <.05
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negative correlations between extraversion and neuroticism (rs = -.50, p = .001), and positive 
ones between openness and FSIQ (r = .35, p = .05), openness and age (r = .39, p = .05), 
FSIQ and FAS scores (r = .46, p = .001) and between FSIQ and age (r = .33, p = .05).    
 
Summary 
 
Findings showing correlations between the measures of creativity and openness, a robust 
predictor of creativity across studies with different measures of creativity, supports the 
validity of the CAQ and CPS as valid measures of creativity in the present sample.  Findings 
showing correlations between CPS scores and extraversion lends support to the use of the 
CPS as a measure of creativity which may capture aspects of the creative person such as 
being independent, confident and assertive that the CAQ does not capture (Gough, 1979).  In 
the present sample CAQ scores were not correlated with the measure of intelligence but there 
was a marginally significant positive relationship between CPS scores and intelligence.  
These findings lend further support to the use of the CAQ as a measure of creativity that is 
independent of intelligence (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005).     
 
In summary, the CAQ and CPS demonstrate good concurrent validity with variables that have 
previously been found to be linked to measures of creativity in past research.  Both variables 
demonstrate good concurrent validity with Openness.  Findings showing concurrent validity 
of CPS scores with Extraversion, discriminant validity between CAQ and IQ scores and only 
a moderate correlation between CAQ and CPS scores suggest that they do capture different 
facets of creativity.  As such both self-report measures of creativity will be used in parallel 
lines of analyses investigating the relationship between creativity scores and performance on 
the experimental task.    
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Examining the reliability of subjective assessments of the creativity of solutions 
generated on inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs) 
 
The inter-rater reliability of creativity ratings given for solutions on inverse remote associate 
problems across three independent judges was calculated based on the creativity ratings of all 
solutions generated across all trial blocks; switch and pure.  Consistency of ratings across the 
raters was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) which has been used 
previously to measure inter-rater reliability in creativity research (Kaufman, Baer, Cole & 
Sexton, 2008).  Cronbach’s alpha in the present study showed only a moderate level of 
consistency of ratings across raters (α= .61).  Nunnally & Bernstein (1994) have argued that 
for reliable data on a measure, alphas should exceed .70.  The level of alpha calculated here is 
clearly below this threshold.  However, DeVellis (1991) argued that alpha’s of .6 are 
acceptable if undesirable.  In light of the below threshold consistency found for ratings of 
creativity between raters, any effects found subsequently in analysis based on the subjective 
ratings of creativity will be interpreted with caution.       
 
Three independent judges were also used to assess the reliability with which different 
categories were assigned to solutions on the inverse remote associate problems.  Reponses 
were assigned to categories based upon the subjective decisions of three independent raters.  
Firstly, the experimenter created categories for each seed word separately and then assigned 
responses to each ‘seed’ word into these different categories.  Two other raters blind to the 
experimenter’s categorisation then referred to the list of categories produced for each ‘seed’ 
word and assigned the responses to these categories.  Krippendorff’s alpha was used to check 
the consistency of assignment of categories across the three independent raters (Hayes & 
Krippendorf, 2007).  Krippendorf’s alpha was used as the measure of inter-rater reliability 
here because it was necessary to identify absolute agreement in categories assigned to 
solutions across raters.  Cronbach’s alpha is appropriate as a means of assessing the reliability 
of a mean judgement such as that used in the analysis of reliability of creativity ratings, but 
reliability of categorisation required measuring the proportion of instances when raters agreed 
on categories.  Cronbach’s alpha does not capture this (Hayes & Krippendorf, 2007).  
Krippendorff (1980) recommends that if Krippendorff’s alpha falls within the range of (.67-
.79) conclusions concerning the reliability of data coding should only be made tentatively 
(Krippendorff, 1980).  The average agreement between the three raters was just marginally 
below the acceptable threshold (α= .63).  While reliability was clearly a problem here it was 
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possible to deal with discrepancies between coders on an item by item basis by evaluating 
categorisations given for each compound word.  Where differences in categories existed 
between the raters, the categories for those words were reassessed based on three a priori 
rules.  Firstly, if two of the three raters agreed on the category for a word then the category 
which they agreed on was assigned.   There were only two exceptions to this rule.  The first 
exception was when one category was obviously correct in which case that category was 
assigned. For example, rater 3 assigned CAUSTIC ACID to the category ‘description of 
properties of acid’ while raters 1 and 2 incorrectly agreed on assigning it to ‘different types of 
acid itself’. Caustic is used to refer to corrosive properties of an acid and is not an acid itself.  
The second exception were cases where inconsistencies in the categories assigned between 
raters appeared to be due to the categories not being clearly distinct.  For example categories 
for sweet ‘something that’s emotionally sweet’ and ‘something that’s sweet in the sense that 
its really good/cool’ were assigned by different raters for the same response SWEET SONG.  
Consequently, such categories were merged into one to form one overarching category; in 
this case ‘something that’s emotionally sweet, good or cool’.   
 
In cases where all raters disagreed on the category, a subjective assessment of the category 
that best fits the response was made based on definitions of the word from online dictionaries, 
Google searches and Wikipedia entries.  These subjective assessments were based on criteria 
such as which category was the compound word most likely to fit into and which category 
most specifically captures the word’s definition.  There were on some occasions instances 
where the category of the compound word generated was inherently ambiguous, for example 
AFTER EIGHT.  If there was not agreement by at least two raters on which category the 
word could be placed into then participants were credited with the category that maximised 
their flexibility score for that seed word.  For example if a participant produced AFTER 
EIGHT and AFTER DARK in response to the seed word AFTER, then they were given 2 
points for their flexibility score because AFTER EIGHT could be interpreted as a ‘brand of 
chocolate’ as well as just ‘after a period of time’.  The important point is that the same rules 
were applied to all participants across all experimental conditions to avoid any systematic 
effects of these subjective decisions.         
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Examining the validity of the remote associate problems (RAPs) as a measure of 
convergent thinking and the inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs) as a measure 
of divergent thinking 
 
Prior to beginning analyses concerning the relationship between creativity scores and 
performance on the experimental task, it was first necessary to examine the evidence 
concerning the extent to which the different types of problems used in the experimental task 
engaged different modes of thinking.  In order to do this performance on the remote associate 
problems (RAPs) and inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs) was correlated with CAQ, 
CPS, IQ, verbal fluency scores and scores across the five personality dimensions.  These 
correlations were performed separately based on trials within pure blocks and trials within 
switch blocks.  
 
Successful performance on the remote associate problems was expected to primarily draw 
upon convergent thinking processes allowing one to arrive at one specific correct answer 
(Cropley, 2006).  It was predicted that measures of performance on the remote associate 
problems would therefore positively correlate with FSIQ scores that tap convergent thinking 
abilities (Guilford, 1959 cited in Clark, Veldman & Thorpe, 1965) and would not correlate 
with measures previously associated with divergent thinking (CAQ, CPS and Openness 
scores).  It was also predicted that performance on RAP problem measures would evidence 
discriminant validity in the form of no significant positive correlations with measures of 
performance on the inverse remote associate problems used to induce divergent thinking.   
 
Successful performance on inverse remote associate problems was expected to require 
divergent thinking in order to generate disparate and original solutions (Cropley, 2006) and 
also verbal fluency to generate as many solutions as possible in the given time.  It was 
predicted that scores on inverse remote associate problems would correlate with measures 
which have been found in previous research to correlate with divergent thinking namely, 
CAQ, CPS and Openness (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) as well as the FAS measure of 
verbal fluency. The extent to which inverse remote associate problems were a pure measure 
of divergent thinking ability, independent of intelligence, was also assessed by examining 
correlations on I-RAP measures with scores on the measure of FSIQ.  It was also predicted 
that correlations between measures of performance on the RAP and I-RAP problems and the 
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criterion variables would be the same within both pure and switch blocks.  The rationale for 
this was that the same type of problem was performed across both pure and switch blocks.    
 
Results  
 
Correlations across measures on the RAPs with measures of personality, Intelligence and 
verbal fluency and scores on the CAQ and CPS when the problems were presented within 
pure and switch blocks are shown in table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. 
       Correlations between performance on RAPs with criterion measures across pure and switch blocks  
        Block Pure      Switch      
 Measure Correct RT Insight Correct RT Insight 
               
 1. CAQ .01 -.24 .12 .29* -.01 -.03 
 2. CPS .03 -.29* -.13 .02 .07 .04 
 3. Openness .19 -.19 .06 .18 .11 -.14 
 4.Concientiousness .01 .09 -.10 -.14 -.16 .15 
 5. Extraversion -.12 -.06 -.22 -.11 -.02 -.06 
 6. Agreeableness -.07 .28 -.07 .04 .07 -.03 
 7. Neuroticism .18 -.05 .31* .10 .01 -.01 
 8. FSIQ .44** -.17 -.09 .20 .03 -.23 
 9. FAS .44** -.33* .35* .10 -.32* .19 
 10. Age .26 .18 -.16 -.07 -.12 .06 
 Note.  RAPs: Correct = % of correct solutions, RT = speed at which correct solutions generated,   
 Insight = extent to which solutions were generated by insight.   
   **p<.01 
       * p <.05 
        
As predicted, the percentage of correct solutions generated on RAPs within pure blocks 
positively correlated with FSIQ scores, supporting the predication of a positive association 
between performance on this measure of RAP performance and IQ.  Speed of generation of 
correct solutions and the extent to which correct solutions were generated by insight within 
pure blocks failed to correlate with FSIQ scores.  This failed to support the predicted 
association between performance on these RAP measures and IQ.  Within pure blocks, as 
predicted CAQ scores were not correlated with any RAP measures of performance.  
However, contrary to predictions CPS scores were negatively correlated with the speed of 
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generation of correct solutions.  This indicated that the generation of faster solutions within 
pure blocks was associated with higher self-reported creativity on the CPS
7
.  An unexpected 
positive correlation was also found between scores on the personality dimension Neuroticism 
and the extent to which solutions felt like they were generated by insight.   
           
Contrary to predictions, within switch blocks FSIQ scores failed to correlate with the 
percentage of correct solutions generated, speed of generation of correct solutions or insight 
ratings on RAP problems.  The percentage of correct solutions generated within switch 
blocks was instead found to correlate with CAQ scores while there were no correlations 
between the other measures of RAP performance and the criterion variables.  Significant 
correlations were found between FAS scores and all measures of RAP performance within 
the pure blocks but only between speed of generation of correct solutions and FAS scores 
within the switch block. 
 
Correlations across measures on the I- RAPs with measures of personality, Intelligence and 
verbal fluency and scores on the CAQ and CPS when the problems were presented within 
pure and switch blocks is shown in table 4.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Faster speeds for the generation of correct solutions are measured by lower scores on these variables so the 
negative correlation indicates that CPS scores are positively associated with faster speeds of correct solution 
generation.  
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               Table 4. Correlations between performance on I-RAPs with criterion measures across pure and switch blocks  
       
Block Pure Switch 
Measure Fluency Ave orig 2 most orig Unique Flex subj. ave subj. 2 most Fluency Ave orig 2 most orig Unique Flex subj. ave subj. 2 most
1. CAQ .11 .15 .12 .13 .20 .10 -.03 .21 .33* .26 .23 .15 .33* .32*
2. CPS -.18 -.06 -.03 .10 .02 .12 .07 .07 .01 .02 -.03 .08 .10 .06
3. Openess .15 .21 .11 .10 .25 .41** .15 .23 .13 .15 .21 .15 .47** .33*
4. Concientiousness -.03 -.12 -.07 .00 -.11 -.14 .21 -.04 -.01 .02 -.03 -.14 -.01 .06
5. Extraversion -.22 -.20 -.18 -.18 -.26 -.21 -.07 -.21 -.11 -.11 -.09 -.19 -.11 -.23
6. Agreeableness .04 .12 .06 .08 .08 .02 -.03 -.04 .03 .05 .06 -.02 .12 .09
7. Neuroticism .27 .17 .20 .28 .33* .24 .14 .24 .25 .29 .23 .33* .29* .26
8. FSIQ .30* .27 .26 .28 .36* .40* .41** .33* .22 .28 .26 .46** .44** .37*
9. FAS .44** .27 .29* .18 .45** .41* .27 .43* .21 .25 .19 .41** .19 .21
10. Age .24 .02 .10 .12 .27 .14 .25 .27 .22 .24 .22 .17 .31* .23
Note. 
 I-RAPs: Fluency = no. of solutions, Ave. Orig = average statistical infrequency, 2 most orig.=  ave. of the 2 most infrequent
Unique = unique solutions across sample, Flex = no. of categories generated, Subj. Ave = average of subjective ratings of creativity,
 Subj. 2 most = average of two highest rated creative solutions within a block  
**p <.01
* p <.05
  
49 
 
As predicted, within pure blocks a significant correlation was found between the I-RAP 
measure of the average of subjective ratings of creativity and the personality dimension of 
openness.  However performance on this measure of the I-RAP failed to correlate with CAQ 
or CPS scores. Scores on all other I-RAP measures within pure blocks failed to correlate with 
openness scores as well as also failing to correlate with CPS and CAQ scores.  As such there 
was only marginal support for the predicted relationship between CAQ, CPS and Openness 
scores and performance on the I-RAPs within pure blocks.  I-RAP scores on pure block 
measures of fluency, flexibility, the average subjective ratings of creativity and the average of 
the two highest rated creative solutions within a block were all correlated with FSIQ scores.  
This indicated a positive association between performance on these measures and IQ.  As 
predicted, performance across four of the measures of I-RAP performance (fluency, 
flexibility, average subjective ratings of creativity, two most original) correlated with FAS 
scores indicating a positive association between verbal fluency and performance on these I-
RAP measures.  Scores on average originality, uniqueness and the average of the two highest 
subjective ratings of creativity however failed to correlate with FAS scores.    
  
Contrary to predictions, a different pattern of correlations between measures of I-RAP 
performance and CAQ scores was evidenced in switch in comparison to pure blocks.  Within 
switch blocks average subjective ratings of creativity, the average of the two highest rated 
creative solutions within a block and average infrequency of generated solutions all 
correlated positively with CAQ scores.  Average subjective ratings of creativity remained 
positively correlated with openness scores within switch blocks and the average of two 
highest rated creative solutions within a block were also positively correlated with openness 
scores.  The same measures of performance that were correlated with FSIQ scores within the 
pure block (fluency, flexibility, average subjective ratings of creativity and the average of the 
two highest rated creative solutions within a block) also correlated with FSIQ within the 
switch block.  Correlations between FAS scores and I-RAP measures of performance were 
also similar in pure compared to switch blocks, with correlations between FAS scores and 
fluency, flexibility and average subjective ratings of creativity.   
 
Unexpected positive correlations were found between scores on the personality dimension of 
neuroticism and flexibility within both pure and switch blocks and between neuroticism and 
age and average subjective ratings of creativity within switch blocks only.   
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Correlations between RAP and I-RAP measures were conducted in order to further examine 
which RAP and I-RAP measures were related.  This should shed further light on which 
measures tap similar underlying abilities.  Correlations were again examined within both pure 
and switch blocks.  Tables 5 and 6 below show correlations across all measures of RAPs and 
I-RAPs within pure and switch blocks respectively.   
 
Table 5. 
           Correlations between all measures of RAP and I-RAP performance within pure blocks  
   
            Problem type                      
 Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I-RAPS           
 
    
 
  
 1. Fluency 
 
.79** .94** .93** .92** .42** .47** .05 .50** -.13 
 2. Ave orig 
  
.94** .85** .77** .33** .39** -.13 .37* -.10 
 3. 2 most orig 
   
.91** .89** .50** .46** -.06 .43** -.11 
 4. Unique 
    
.83** .46** .52** -.09 .42** -.08 
 5. Flex 
     
.50** .46** .15 .42** -.11 
 6. subj. ave 
      
.54** .19 .19 -.19 
 7. subj. 2 most 
       
.13 .01 -.15 
 RAPs 
           8. Correct 
        
-.09 -.35* 
 9. Insight 
         
-.22 
 10. RT 
           Note.  RAPs: Correct = % of correct solutions, RT = speed at which correct solutions generated,   
    Insight = extent to which solutions were generated by insight.  I-RAPs: Fluency = no. of solutions,  
Ave. Orig = statistical infrequency,  
2 most orig.= 2 most infrequent 
          Unique = unique solutions across sample, Flex = no. of categories generated, Subj.  
Ave = average of subjective ratings of creativity, 
 Subj. 2 most = average of two rated as most creative   
        **p<.01 
           * p <.05 
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Table 6. 
           Correlations between all measures of RAP and I-RAP performance within switch blocks  
   
            Problem type                      
 Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 I-RAPS           
 
    
 
  
 1. Fluency 
 
.79** .93** .92** .93** .23 .58** .16 .20 -.02 
 2. Ave orig 
  
.94** .89** .71** .35** .55** .14 .03 -.02 
 3. 2 most orig 
   
.94** .83** .34* .66** .11 .16 -.01 
 4. Unique 
    
.80** .30* .61** .11 .14 .03 
 5. Flex 
     
.35* .65** .22 .13 .02 
 6. subj. ave 
      
.64** .35* -.19 -.03 
 7. subj. 2 most 
       
.27 .17 -.03 
 RAPs 
           8. Correct 
        
-.13 -.25 
 9. Insight 
         
-.32* 
 10. RT 
           Note.  RAPs: Correct = % of correct solutions, RT = speed at which correct solutions generated,   
    Insight = extent to which solutions were generated by insight.  I-RAPs: Fluency = no. of solutions,  
Ave. Orig = statistical infrequency,  
2 most orig.= 2 most infrequent 
          Unique = unique solutions across sample, Flex = no. of categories generated,  
Subj. Ave = average of subjective ratings of creativity, 
 Subj. 2 most = average of two rated as most creative   
        **p<.01 
           * p <.05 
            
Within pure blocks, ratings of the extent to which correct solutions on RAPs felt like they 
were generated by insight was positively correlated with fluency, the average originality of 
solutions generated, the top two most original solutions generated, uniqueness and flexibility 
scores.  In contrast, within switch blocks there were no significant correlations between these 
insight ratings and any of the I-RAP measures.  As expected, within the pure block the 
percentage of correct solutions generated was negatively correlated with the speed of 
generation of correct solutions.  The correlation between these two measures failed to reach 
the threshold for significance within the switch block.  Within the switch block there was 
however a significant positive correlation between the percentage of correct solutions 
generated and the measure of the average subjective ratings of creativity.  Within pure blocks, 
there were no significant correlations between the percentage of correct solutions generated 
on RAPs and measures of I-RAP performance. 
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Analysis of correlations between fluency, average originality of solutions generated, the top 
two most original solutions generated, uniqueness and flexibility revealed very strong inter-
correlations between all these measures of performance within both pure and switch blocks.  
Correlations between this group of objective measures of I-RAP performance and the two 
subjective measures (average subjective ratings of creativity and the average of the two 
highest subjective ratings of creativity within a block) were also significant but were weaker 
than the inter-correlations between objective measures.  This implies that objective and 
subjective I-RAP measures may be tapping different components of divergent thinking 
ability.      
 
Discussion of findings concerning the validity of the remote associate and inverse 
remote associate problems as a means of inducing convergent and divergent thinking  
 
To what extent is performance on the remote associate problems associated with indicators 
of convergent thinking?  
 
The assessment of correlations between measures of performance on the remote associate 
problem and inverse remote associate problems with criterion variables suggest that some 
measures of performance are more valid measures of the success of engaging in convergent 
and divergent thinking than others.  There is evidence for the validity of the remote associate 
problems as a measure of convergent thinking.  Scores on the percentage of correct solutions 
generated on remote associate problems demonstrate convergent validity with FSIQ scores.  
Previous research assessing the relationship between IQ and scores on the remote associative 
problems revealed similar findings concerning performance on remote associate problems 
and scores on both verbal and non-verbal measures of IQ (Mendlesohn, 1976; Taft & 
Rossiter, 1966).  Scores on the measure of percentage of correct solutions generated on 
remote associate problems were also found to be uncorrelated with performance across all 
measures of inverse remote associate problem performance within pure blocks.  The 
percentage of correct solutions generated on remote associate problems would therefore 
appear to tap different underlying abilities to those tapped by measures of performance on the 
inverse remote associate problems.  It would therefore appear that the percentage of correct 
solutions generated on the RAPs does not tap abilities underlying divergent thinking.  The 
percentage of correct solutions generated therefore appears to be a good candidate measure of 
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the extent to which participants successfully engage in convergent thinking on problems 
within the switching paradigm in the present study.   
 
Performance on remote associate problem measures of the speed of generation of correct 
solutions and the extent to which solutions felt like they were generated by insight were 
uncorrelated with the IQ measure.  Therefore these measures do not appear to capture similar 
processes to those tapped by IQ.  The extent to which solutions felt like they were generated 
by insight correlated strongly with measures of performance on inverse remote associate 
problems while the speed of generation of correct solutions did not correlate with any 
measures of performance on the inverse remote associate problems.  These findings fail to 
support the validity of the speed of generation of correct solutions and the extent to which 
solutions felt like they were generated by insight as valid measures of successful engagement 
in convergent thinking.  The positive relationship between insight ratings on RAPs and 
measures of performance on I-RAPs suggests that insight ratings may tap similar underlying 
abilities to that tapped by I-RAP problems.  These findings only demonstrate an association 
between these measures.   It may therefore merely be the case that individuals who score 
highly on I-RAP problems are also good at engaging in a separate process that enables them 
to solve RAP problems by insight.      
 
To what extent is performance on the inverse remote associate problems associated with 
indicators of divergent thinking? 
 
In contrast to past research showing correlations between the CAQ and CPS measures of 
creativity and measures of divergent thinking (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005), all 
inverse remote associate problem (I-RAP) measures within pure blocks in the present study 
failed to correlate with scores on the CAQ and CPS.  Openness did correlate with 
performance on the measure of the average subjective creativity of compound words 
generated on the I-RAPs.  However, all other I-RAP measures failed to correlate with 
openness.  While the average subjective creativity of compound words does show some 
convergent validity with openness, this measure demonstrates poor discriminant validity with 
convergent thinking, being correlated with FSIQ scores.  Conceptually, the I-RAP problems 
used to engage divergent thinking within the present study fit the characteristics of divergent 
thinking tasks requiring the generation of multiple alternative answers which is distinct from 
the single correct or best answer required by convergent thinking problems such as the RAPS 
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used in the current study (Cropley, 2006).  There are possible reasons why in practice 
measures of divergent thinking on the I-RAPs have failed to correlate with previous markers 
of divergent thinking.  I-RAP performance was tested under timed conditions in the present 
study.  There is evidence that assessing divergent thinking under timed conditions could 
make divergent thinking tasks more like tests and therefore completed in a focused manner 
similar to intelligence tests (Runco, 2010).  This could in turn limit the extent to which the 
participant enters a more defocused, associate mode of thought underlying divergent thinking 
when working on inverse remote associate problems.  It could be argued that the markers 
themselves of divergent thinking used in the present study are not pure measures of divergent 
thinking with CAQ, CPS and openness scores all demonstrating correlations with a measure 
of intellect in addition to measures of divergent thinking in prior research (Carson, Peterson, 
& Higgins, 2005).  Since Insight ratings correlate with scores on five of the seven measures 
of performance on the I-RAPs they may arguably be a better measure of the associative mode 
of thought that characterises divergent thinking than CAQ, CPS or openness scores.  
Descriptions of insight processing appear very similar to that characterizing the operation of 
the associative mode of thought.  For example, it has been argued that both involve 
spontaneously overcoming an impasse (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013
8
; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 
2007).     
 
In summary, the analyses in this section assessed inter-correlations between measures of 
inverse remote associate and remote associate problem performance, and correlations 
between these measures and criterion variables previously associated with convergent and 
divergent thinking.  The findings provided evidence for the validity of the remote associate 
problems as a means of inducing convergent thinking.  The percentage of correct solutions 
generated on RAPs appears to draw on different processes to I-RAP performance.  However 
RAP insight ratings were associated with I-RAP measures of divergent thinking.  The 
measure of the speed of generation of correct solutions did not demonstrate concurrent 
validity with either RAP or I-RAP measures in pure blocks or with criterion variables.  This 
suggested it was not a valid measure of convergent or divergent thinking.  It is not clear from 
this analysis what the measure of the speed of generation of correct solutions is measuring.   
                                                 
8
 Gabora & Ranjan (2013) argue that the associative and analytic mode of thinking are both involved in 
producing a creative insight.  However it is not clear whether their conception of insight maps on to Bowden & 
Jung-Beeman’s (2007).   
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Based on correlations between I-RAP performance and CAQ, CPS and openness scores, there 
was only weak evidence for the validity of the inverse remote associate problem as a means 
of inducing divergent thinking.  The I-RAP measure of the average creativity of solutions did 
correlate with one criterion of divergent thinking, openness scores, but this was the only 
criterion measure that correlated with I-RAP performance.  Better evidence of the validity of 
I-RAP measures as measures of divergent thinking is suggested by positive correlations 
between the extent to which solutions felt like they were generated by insight on RAP trials 
and five out of seven of the I-RAP measures.  This could reflect the shared operation in I-
RAPs and RAPs, solved by insight, of an associative mode of thinking. However all I-RAP 
measures correlated with IQ scores in pure blocks suggesting that the I-RAP is far from a 
pure measure of divergent thinking and that I-RAP performance may draw upon convergent 
as well as divergent thinking.  Half of the full-scale IQ score in the present study was 
calculated based on a test of verbal IQ (Wechsler, 1999).  It could be the case then that 
correlations between I-RAP measures and IQ scores reflect the shared involvement of verbal 
abilities and not convergent thinking per se.     
 
In summary, the extent to which inverse remote associate problems engage divergent 
thinking and remote associate problems engage convergent thinking is questionable.  
However the evidence, with the exception of insight ratings, that performance on measures of 
RAPs and I-RAPs show no significant correlations between the two types of problem do at 
least suggest that they are tapping distinct abilities.  They would therefore appear to be 
distinct tasks that do require a reconfiguration in one’s mode of thinking when switching 
between remote associate and inverse remote associate problems.     
 
Was performance on RAP and I-RAP problems within switch blocks similar to performance 
within pure blocks? 
 
Different profiles of correlations across criterion variables were found on both RAP and I-
RAP measures within pure blocks compared to on the same measures when problems were 
performed within switch blocks.  Within switch blocks the RAP measure of the percentage of 
correct solutions generated was correlated with CAQ scores but not with FSIQ scores while 
the opposite pattern was shown within pure blocks, with correlations between the percentage 
of correct solutions generated and FSIQ scores but no correlation with CAQ scores.  Within 
pure but not switch blocks, CPS scores correlated with speed of generation of correct 
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solutions and insight ratings correlated with verbal fluency scores as measured by the FAS.  
Within switch blocks I-RAP average subjective ratings of creativity, the average originality 
of generated solutions and the average of the two highest subjective ratings of creativity in a 
block all correlated with CAQ scores in contrast to within pure blocks when there were no 
significant correlations between any of the I-RAP measures and CAQ scores.  Within switch 
blocks significant correlations between average subjective ratings of creativity and age were 
found which were not found within pure blocks.   
 
These differences suggest that a different set of cognitive abilities or response tendencies may 
underlie successful performance of RAPs and I-RAPs within switch blocks in comparison to 
performance on the these problems within pure blocks.  It would appear that to successfully 
solve RAP problems within switch blocks, performance draws on cognitive abilities or 
response tendencies that are associated with creativity measured by the CAQ and not IQ.  In 
contrast, within pure blocks performance is supported by cognitive abilities or response 
tendencies associated with IQ, and may not require abilities associated with creativity.  
Underlying abilities associated with CAQ creativity also appear to be involved in generating 
many unusual and creative solutions within switch but not within pure blocks. 
 
These differences may be due to the task switching demands imposed in switch blocks where 
participants have to alternate back and forth between solving the two different types of 
problem.  These demands are not imposed when problems are performed within pure blocks.  
Scores on the CAQ have previously been associated with performance within a Stroop 
paradigm appearing to draw upon the executive ability to switch between high and low levels 
of cognitive control.  Findings from this study revealed that more creative participants 
displayed a pattern of behaviour indicative of modulating cognitive control to a greater 
degree than less creative participants (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  This in turn suggests 
creative participants were demonstrating a greater capacity to shift between associative and 
analytic modes of thought.   
 
Similarly, successful performance on RAP and I-RAP problems within switch blocks in the 
present study may require one to shift between different modes of thinking in response to 
having to switch between different tasks.  It may be the case that creativity scores on the 
CAQ capture individual differences in the executive ability to modulate shifting when having 
to switch between different tasks.  Within switch blocks, higher CAQ scorers may generate 
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more correct solutions on RAPs than lower CAQ scorers because they are better able to 
control shifts between modes and hence optimise their mode of thinking to the changing task 
demands.  RAP problems performed consecutively within pure blocks may instead only 
require repeated use of a strategy involving convergent thinking.  This would explain why 
those higher in IQ, and hence better at convergent thinking, generate more correct solutions 
on RAPs (Mendlesohn, 1976; Taft & Rossiter, 1966).   
 
This explanation suggests that more creative individuals performed better in switch blocks 
than less creative individuals because they had a greater capacity to control shifts between 
different modes of thinking.  However the reason behind the advantage demonstrated by 
higher CAQ scorers in switch blocks is not entirely clear.  The weak evidence that I-RAP 
problems induce divergent thinking certainly raises some doubts that switching between RAP 
and I-RAP problems requires shifting between different modes of thinking.  The advantage 
demonstrated by more creative individuals in switch blocks could also reflect differences in 
motivation, with creative individuals possibly being more motivated within switch blocks.       
Higher CPS scores were associated with a faster speed of generation of correct solutions on 
RAPs but only within pure blocks.  This association was not present within switch blocks.  
This could be explained on the basis that within switch blocks interference may be induced 
from having to alternate between performing different types of problems.  This interference 
would appear to be absent from within pure blocks.  Previous findings also show that higher 
creative potential is associated with faster responding on tasks that do not involve 
interference (Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatkowski, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova 
& Vartanian, 2008).  Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues also reported the converse finding 
that higher creative potential was associated with slower responding on tasks involving 
interference.  However, CPS scores were not associated with response speed on RAPs within 
switch blocks.  The reasons for this are not clear.   
 
In summary, the evidence of a different profile of correlations on both RAP and I-RAP 
measures within pure compared to within switch blocks suggests that performing optimally 
on both problems within switch blocks requires a different set of cognitive abilities or 
response tendencies than within pure blocks.  High CAQ scorers appear to possess the ability 
or tendency to perform better in switch blocks than low CAQ scorers.  Those high in IQ 
appear to possess the ability or tendency to perform better in pure blocks than those low in 
IQ.  What these abilities or tendencies are however is not clear from the present analyses.   
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The prediction that there will be a similar profile of correlations with criterion measures for 
problems performed within switch and pure blocks was certainly not supported.    
 
Other notable findings from correlations between criterion measures, RAP and I-RAP 
problem performance  
 
Verbal fluency was found to correlate with most measures of I-RAP performance, the 
exceptions being uniqueness scores, the average objective originality and the subjective 
measure of the average of the two most creative solutions generated within a block.  Given 
the similarity between the I-RAP objective measure of fluency and the FAS measure of 
verbal fluency, and the strong correlation between I-RAP fluency and flexibility, these 
correlations were not surprising.  
 
It is also not surprising that verbal fluency is correlated with RAP measures of performance. 
Selecting candidate words to form compound words with each of the 3 words chosen would 
appear to require rapid sub-vocalisation of words from the mental lexicon.  The correlation 
between verbal fluency and the extent to which solutions felt like they were generated by 
insight may reflect the role of verbal fluency in allowing a rapid spread of activation through 
networks of semantically related words.  Such a process may increase the likelihood of sub-
threshold activation of semantically related words and hence experiences of insight (Bowden 
& Jung-Beeman, 2003).  The failure to find a correlation between verbal fluency and insight 
ratings within switch blocks could point towards a different strategy of the generation of 
correct solutions via insight in these blocks, although it is not clear what this could be.  
 
Findings showing positive correlations between neuroticism and the extent to which solutions 
felt like they were generated by insight and the number of distinct categories (flexibility) of 
compound words generated are surprising.  The evidence for the relationship between 
neuroticism and divergent thinking is mixed with negative and null relationships reported 
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Reichenbacher, 2008; King, McKee-Walker & Broyles, 1996; 
Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008).  Furnham & Bachtiar (2008) reported a positive correlation 
between neuroticism and unusual uses generated for three objects but a subsequent regression 
analysis showed that neuroticism did not significantly predict generation of unusual uses.  It 
may be possible that neurotic individuals are better at evaluating the categories of responses 
generated and this might help in evaluating which categories of responses they have already 
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generated so that they can subsequently generate more categories.  This explanation is highly 
speculative but there is some evidence that negative mood enhances evaluative performance 
(Sowden & Dawson, 2011) and more neurotic individuals may be more prone to negative 
moods (Chamorro-Premuzic & Reichenbacher, 2008).   
 
It is also important to note that there was a sizeable negative correlation between extroversion 
and neuroticism (rs=-.50) in the present study.  Chamorro-Premuzic & Reichenbacher (2008) 
found that the effects of neuroticism on divergent thinking were almost fully mediated by 
extroversion.  It may be the case that extraversion is having a mediating effect in the present 
study with individuals higher in neuroticism better at identifying when they generated 
solutions via insight because they were also more introverted. Being introverted may make 
them more attentive to their internal mental states and therefore better at identifying when 
they experienced insight.   
 
Correlations between the RAP measure of the extent to which solutions felt like they were 
generated by insight and the objective measures of I-RAP performance were also unexpected.  
It is important to note that insight ratings only correlate with objective measures of 
performance and not subjectively judged measures of creativity.  A possible reason for this 
could be that insightfully generated solutions on the RAP problems are correlating with those 
generated by a similar associative strategy on the I-RAP problems.  The solutions generated 
by associative processes on the I-RAP may be unusual in the sense that they are statistically 
infrequent within the sample but not particularly creative.  The objective divergent measures 
reward infrequent solutions without judging whether or not they are particularly clever or 
remote.  The instructions given to raters to help them subjectively judge the creativity of 
solutions emphasised the importance of cleverness of solutions in addition to unusualness 
(Silvia et al., 2008).  It may be the case that objective measures on the I-RAP capture solution 
generation via processes similar to those underlying insight that are unusual but do not reflect 
the processes that lead to creative solutions which are clever as well as unusual.     
     
Examining the relationship between self-reported creativity and switch costs incurred in 
the task switching paradigm 
 
The evidence of positive correlations between creativity as measured by the CAQ and 
performance on both RAP and I-RAP problems within the switch block suggests that 
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successful performance on both problems within the switch block may draw on abilities or 
response tendencies which creative individuals possess but less creative individuals do not 
demonstrate to the same extent.  However the evidence provided so far merely suggests an 
association between self-reported CAQ creativity and performance on the switch block.  The 
evidence presented so far also does not provide any information concerning the reasons for 
this relationship.  There was a lack of any correlation between self-reported creativity on the 
CPS and RAP and I-RAP measures of performance within switch blocks.  This suggests that 
the CPS fails to tap abilities that underlie switching between RAP and I-RAP tasks and which 
therefore may underlie shifting between modes of thought.  As such, only the CAQ was used 
as a measure of creativity in subsequent analyses. 
     
It was predicted that high CAQ (creative) individuals would demonstrate the ability to 
maintain successful task performance, or at least limit the switch costs, when having to 
switch between performing different types of problems within switch blocks.  If this was the 
case then it would be expected that less creative individuals would suffer larger decrements in 
performance on problems performed within switch versus pure blocks in comparison to more 
creative individuals.   In order to fully examine this hypothesis, measures of problem 
performance within pure and switch blocks were compared within both high and low creative 
groups formed from the current sample.  Specifically, it was predicted that the performance 
of a low CAQ creativity group on both RAP and I-RAP measures would be lower within 
switch blocks than pure blocks. A high CAQ creativity group was predicted to evidence 
either no decrement in performance within switch compared to pure blocks or the decrement 
would be of a lower magnitude to that evidenced by the low CAQ creativity group.    
 
Results 
 
A low and high creativity group were formed from the current sample by splitting 
participants into groups based on their CAQ scores.  The entire sample was split into low (n= 
24, M= 4.63, SD= 3.06) and high (n= 24, M= 23.00, SD= 16.77) groups based on a median 
split on CAQ scores.  A comparison of measures of performance across pure and switch 
blocks and across groups high and low in CAQ creativity is presented in table 7. 
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Did switch costs on remote associate problems differ as a function of CAQ creativity? 
 
A higher percentage of correct solutions on RAPs were generated within switch blocks (M= 
37.25, SE = 2.43) compared to within pure blocks (M= 35.94, SE = 2.77) by the high CAQ 
creativity group.  The group identified as low in CAQ creativity evidenced a lower 
percentage of correct solutions generated within switch blocks (M= 33.56, SE = 2.97) 
compared to within pure blocks (M= 35.02, SE = 2.78).  Correct solutions on remote 
associate problems appeared to be generated more rapidly within switch blocks than pure 
blocks by both high (switch: M= 9.84 seconds, SE = .80; pure: M= 10.35, SE = 2.08) and low 
(switch: M= 9.96 seconds, SE = 1.15; pure: M= 13.05 seconds, SE = 2.25) CAQ creativity 
groups. 
 
A doubly multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine differences across pure 
and switch blocks as a function of CAQ group, on the two related measures of performance 
on RAPs.  These were the measures of the percentage of correct solutions generated and 
speed with which correct solutions were generated described above.  Scores on both these 
measures were skewed but applying a rank transformation to both removed this skew.  The 
doubly multivariate ANOVA was run on these rank transformed scores (Conover & Iman, 
1981).  It is important to note that an inverse rank transformation was applied to the speed of 
generation of correct solutions measure.  The reason for this was so that higher scores on this 
measure now reflected faster reaction times.  Higher scores on both dependent measures in 
the ANOVA therefore reflected improved performance on RAPs.   
 
A two (Group (2) - High CAQ, Low CAQ) x two (Block (2)- Pure, Switch) doubly 
multivariate ANOVA was run on the transformed measures of the percentage of correct 
solutions generated and the speed of generation of correct solutions on RAPs.  Multivariate 
tests revealed effects on overall RAP performance.  This took account of the combined 
effects of performance on both percentage correct and speed of solution generation measures.  
These revealed a significant interaction between group and block (F (1, 45) = 4.25, p = .02, 
ηp
2
= .16, power = .72).  The main effects of block (F (1, 45) = .00, p = 1.00, ηp
2
= .00, power = 
.05) and group (F (1, 45) = .57, p = .58, ηp
2
= .02, power = .14) were non-significant.  
Univariate tests were run to examine on which dependent measures the interaction between 
group and block was significant.  These revealed that there was a significant interaction 
between group and block on the measure of the speed of generation of correct solutions (F (1, 
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45) = 5.69, p = .02, ηp
2
= .11, power = .65) but not on the measure of the percentage of correct 
solutions generated within a block (F (1, 45) = 1.04, p = .31, ηp
2
= .02, power = .17).   
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to break down the significant interaction between 
group and block.  Within each group, the speed of generation of correct solutions across pure 
and switch blocks was compared.  The low CAQ creativity group generated correct solutions 
to remote associate problems significantly faster within the switch block than within the pure 
block (switch: Mdn = 9.07 seconds
9
 , IQR= 7.46; pure: Mdn= 11.35 seconds , IQR= 4.38 ,z = 
-2.06, p = .02, r = .30) while the speed of generation of correct solutions by the group high in 
creativity was not significantly different across switch and pure blocks (switch: Mdn = 9.44 
seconds , IQR= 3.33; pure: Mdn= 9.72 seconds, IQR= 5.09, z = -.97, p = .17, r = .14). 
 
A (2: group x 2: block) mixed ANOVA on ratings of insight linked to the generation of 
correct solutions on remote associate problems with groups formed on the basis of a median 
split on CAQ scores revealed a significant main effect of block (F (1, 46) = 6.17, p = .02, ηp
2
= 
.12, power= .68), with higher ratings of insight reported for correct solutions generated within 
switch blocks (M= 3.61, SE = .11) than correct solutions generated within pure blocks (M= 
3.38, SE = .12).  The main effect of group (F (1, 46) = .17, p = .69, ηp
2
= .01, power= .07) and 
the interaction between block and group (F (1, 46) = .04, p = .84, ηp
2
= .01, power= .06) were 
not significant.   
 
The evidence, presented above, that more correct solutions were generated via insight in 
switch versus pure blocks could explain why the low CAQ creativity group generated correct 
solutions faster within the switch block.  It has been argued that insight processes lead to 
faster solution generation (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007).  In order to test this prediction, 
bivariate correlations were run examining the association between insight ratings and speed 
of generation of correct solutions across pure and switch blocks within the low CAQ 
creativity group.  The measure of speed of generation of correct solutions used here was the 
inverse rank transformed measure, so higher scores indicated faster solutions.  There was a 
significant positive correlation between insight ratings within the switch block and the speed 
of generation of correct solutions within the switch block (r = .41, p = .02).  The correlation 
between insight ratings within the pure block and the speed of generation of correct solutions 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that this analysis was run on the untransformed measures.  The Wilcoxon test is a non-
parametric test so there was no need to transform measures prior to analyses. 
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within the pure block was non-significant (r = .27, p = .10).  Within the high CAQ creativity 
group, the correlation between insight ratings within the switch block and the speed of 
generation of correction solutions within the switch block was marginally significant (r = .29, 
p = .09) but was lower than that found within the low CAQ creativity group.  Within the high 
CAQ creativity group, the correlation between insight ratings within the pure block and the 
speed of generation of correct solutions within the pure block was non-significant (r = .18, p 
= .20).   
 
Did switch costs on inverse remote associate problems differ as a function of CAQ creativity? 
  
The objective measures of performance on the I-RAP problems all evidenced very strong 
inter-correlations with one another.  It thus appears that these measures all capture very 
similar aspects of performance on I-RAP problems.  As a result of this, the decision was 
made to compare performance on I-RAP problems across pure and switch blocks and high 
and low creative groups only on the measures of fluency, average ratings of subjective 
creativity and the average of the top two most creative solutions generated in a block.  The 
reason specifically for choosing fluency as the objective measure of performance was that 
previous research has found that almost all of the variance in divergent thinking tasks can be 
explained by fluency scores (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999).  Fluency scores correlated the most 
strongly with the other objective measures of performance on the I-RAP problems providing 
support for the argument that this measure captured shared aspects of performance across 
objective measures.  The two subjective measures were included in the analysis as they are 
much less strongly correlated both with one another and with objective measures of I-RAP 
performance.   
 
The high CAQ creativity group evidenced higher fluency scores within switch (M= 3.91, SD 
= 1.29) in comparison to within pure blocks (M= 3.73, SD = 1.35) while the low creativity 
group evidenced the opposite pattern with lower fluency scores within switch (M= 3.39, SD 
= 1.37) in comparison to within pure blocks (M= 3.47, SD = 1.21).  The high CAQ creativity 
group also evidenced higher average subjectively rated creativity scores within switch (M= 
1.85, SD = .13) in comparison to within pure blocks (M= 1.81, SD = .13).  Within the low 
CAQ creativity group, average subjective ratings of creativity scores within switch blocks 
(M= 1.79, SE = .09) and pure blocks (M= 1.79, SE = .08) were the same.  The high CAQ 
creativity group evidenced lower scores on the average of the two highest subjective ratings 
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of creativity within switch blocks (M= 3.54, SD = .33) in comparison to within pure blocks 
(M= 3.69, SD = .30) as did the low creativity group (M= 3.34, SD = .34) in comparison to 
within pure blocks (M= 3.70, SD = .36). 
 
A doubly multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to examine differences across pure 
and switch blocks as a function of CAQ group, on the three measures of performance on I- 
RAPs described above.  A two (Group (2)- High CAQ, Low CAQ) x two (Block (2)- Pure, 
Switch) doubly multivariate ANOVA was run on fluency, average subjective ratings of 
creativity and average of the two highest subjective ratings of creativity.  Multivariate tests 
revealed effects on overall I-RAP performance.  This took account of the combined effects of 
performance on the three dependent measures.  Multivariate tests revealed a significant main 
effect of block (F (1, 44) = 11.19, p < .001, ηp
2
= .43, power = 1.00) and a marginally 
significant interaction between group and block (F (1, 44) = 2.71, p = .06, ηp
2
= .16, power = 
.62).  The main effect of group was non-significant (F (1, 44) = .79, p = .51, ηp
2
= .05, power = 
.21).   
 
Univariate tests were run to examine on which dependent measures the main effect of block 
and the interaction between group and block were significant.  These revealed that there was 
a significant main effect of block on the average of the two highest subjective ratings of 
creativity (F (1, 46) = 22.53, p < .001, ηp
2
= .33, power = 1.00) but not on average subjective 
ratings of creativity (F (1, 46) = 2.11, p = .15, ηp
2
= .04, power = .30) or on fluency (F (1, 46) 
= .58, p = .45, ηp
2
= .01, power = .12).  Univariate tests also revealed that there was a 
marginally significant interaction between group and block on fluency (F (1, 46) = 3.72, p = 
.06, ηp
2
= .08, power = .47) and on the average of the two highest subjective ratings of 
creativity (F (1, 46) = 3.89, p = .06, ηp
2
= .08, power = .49).  The interaction between group 
and block on average subjective ratings of creativity was non-significant (F (1, 46) = 1.82, p 
= .18, ηp
2
= .04, power = .26).        
 
Planned comparisons were used to break down the marginally significant interaction between 
group and block.  Within each group, fluency and the average of the two highest subjective 
ratings of creativity were compared across pure and switch blocks.  The high CAQ creativity 
group scored significantly higher on fluency, that is they generated more compound words in 
switch (M= 3.91, SE = .26) in comparison to within pure blocks (M= 3.73, SE = .28), (t (23) 
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= 2.21, p = .04, d = .14).  The low CAQ creativity group evidenced no significant differences 
in fluency between switch and pure blocks (t (23) = .74, p = .47, d = .06).   
 
The high CAQ creativity group scored significantly lower on the average of the two highest 
subjective ratings of creativity in switch (M= 3.54, SE = .07) in comparison to within pure 
blocks (M= 3.69, SE = .06), (t (23) = 2.15, p = .04, d = .48).  The low CAQ creativity group 
also scored significantly lower on the average of the two highest subjective ratings of 
creativity in switch (M= 3.34, SE = .07) in comparison to within pure blocks (M= 3.70, SE = 
.07), (t (23) = 4.39, p < .001, d = 1.03).  Both low and high CAQ groups were negatively 
affected by switching in terms of the average of the two highest subjective ratings of 
creativity they produced within a block   It is important to note however that the size of these 
effects differed across low and high CAQ groups.  The negative effect of switching in the low 
CAQ creativity group was double the size of the negative effect of switching within the high 
CAQ creativity group.   
 
Discussion 
         
In summary, the results only provide limited support for the hypothesis that there will be 
decrements in performance within switch compared to pure blocks for groups low in CAQ 
creativity but lower or no such decrements in performance within switch compared to pure 
blocks for those groups high in creativity.  Support for the hypothesis was based on the I-
RAP measure of average ratings of creativity for the two most creative solutions within a 
block.  On this measure, the low CAQ creativity group evidenced decrements of a greater 
magnitude within switch compared to pure blocks than the high CAQ creativity group.  There 
were no significant decrements in switch compared to pure blocks for either low or high 
CAQ creativity groups on any other RAP or I-RAP measures of performance.   
 
Contrary to predictions, the low CAQ creativity group actually generated correct solutions 
faster on RAPs within switch versus pure blocks. Insight ratings associated with correct 
solutions were higher in switch versus pure blocks.  Further, those in the low CAQ group 
who evidenced higher insight ratings in switch blocks generated correct solutions faster in 
these blocks.  This positive association between insight ratings and the speed of generation of 
correct solutions in switch blocks was stronger in the Low CAQ compared to the high CAQ 
group.  The high CAQ group generated more compound words in switch blocks than pure 
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blocks.  Taken as a whole, these findings indicate that switch blocks actually improved 
performance on certain I-RAP and RAP measures in comparison to pure blocks.       
 
General Discussion 
 
 
The results revealed decrements in performance on the inverse remote associate problem 
measure of the average of the top two most creative solutions generated in switch blocks in 
comparison to pure blocks.  Decrements in performance were of a greater magnitude for a 
group identified as low in creativity on the basis of CAQ scores compared to a group 
identified as high in creativity on the basis of CAQ scores.  These findings support the 
hypothesis that greater switch costs would be observed when low creative participants were 
required to repeatedly switch between performing remote associate and inverse remote 
associate problems but switch costs would be of a lower magnitude when high creative 
participants were required to switch between the different types of problem.  The average of 
the top two most creative solutions generated was however the only measure of performance 
on which switch costs were observed on either the remote associate or inverse remote 
associate problems.  As such the hypothesis was only partially supported.             
 
Findings demonstrating switch costs on the measure of the average of the top two most 
creative solutions generated are in accordance with evidence from past research.  These 
findings are in line with predictions that less creative individuals will be less able to 
efficiently shift between different modes of thinking.  They appear to be less able to shift 
between a mode of thinking conducive to optimal performance on RAP problems to a mode 
conducive to optimal performance on I-RAP problems.  They may lack the ability to shift 
away from the mode of thinking they engage when performing RAP problems and hence are 
still stuck in that mode of thinking when performing I-RAP problems on subsequent trials.  
Their performance hence suffers as a result of this mismatch (Howard-Jones, 2002; Jansson 
& Smith, 1991; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman & Christoff, 2012).  The high creative group in 
contrast may be able to reconfigure their mode of thinking from the mode best suited to 
optimal performance on the RAPs to the mode best suited to optimal performance on the I-
RAPs without incurring any negative carry-over effects from the previous task set (Monsell, 
2003).   
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It was somewhat surprising to evidence effects in line with the hypothesis on average ratings 
of the two most creative solutions within blocks but not on average ratings of creativity.  This 
may be due to the average of the top two most creative solutions on inverse remote associate 
problems within a block reflecting the highest levels of performance within pure and 
switching blocks.  It may be that this measure is most sensitive at detecting switch costs 
resulting from carry-over effects from performing remote associate problems in previous 
trials.  The highest levels of performance on this measure may also reflect performance under 
conditions when participants are trying their hardest. Hence the relationship between 
creativity and performance on switch compared to pure blocks on this measure may be least 
confounded by extraneous factors such as motivation or mood.    
     
The conclusions based on the measure of the average of the top two most creative solutions 
within a block are tentative for three reasons.  Firstly, there was a failure to evidence main 
effects showing that scores for the average of the top two most creative solutions within a 
block were higher for the high CAQ creative group compared to the low CAQ creative group.  
There may be a reason why the measure itself could not differentiate between high and low 
CAQ creativity groups.  One reason may be due to ceiling effects in the levels of creativity 
captured by subjective ratings of creativity on the inverse remote associate problems.  A 
number of constraints were imposed with compound words generated having to consist of a 
compound word formed of two real words.  Consequently, there is possibly an upper limit to 
the level of creativity one can express within generated solutions on the inverse remote 
associate problems.  In support of this, is the relatively narrow range of creativity ratings 
given by the raters who subjectively scored the creativity of generated solutions.  There was 
also no context within which to assess ratings of creativity so for example there was no way 
of raters knowing that a compound word generated from a ‘seed’ word such as cart was not 
very remote from the features of a cart (eg. “cartwheel” as in the features of a cart) or more 
remote from the idea of a cart (eg. “cartwheel” as in a gymnastic move with the body) with 
the latter potentially being more characteristic of creativity based on Silvia et al’s. (2008) 
instructions.  Such ambiguity could reduce the sensitivity of the subjective measures on the 
inverse remote associate problems to pick up on the higher levels of creativity within pure 
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blocks
10
of those scoring higher in creative achievement on the creative achievement 
questionnaire (CAQ).  
 
Secondly, the poor convergent validity of the average of the top two most creative solutions 
within a block with measures previously correlated with divergent thinking within pure 
blocks casts doubt on the precision of this measure as a measure of divergent thinking.  The 
failure of the average of the top two most creative solutions within the pure block to correlate 
with self-report measures of creativity, openness or ratings of insight which have previously 
been correlated to or theoretically linked to measures of divergent thinking may be because 
these criterion measures themselves do not adequately capture divergent thinking.  On the 
face of it the measure of subjective ratings of creativity appear to be a measure of divergent 
thinking as it represents solutions generated under instructions to be creative, less obvious, 
unusual and uncommon (Silvia et al., 2008).  These instructions capture characteristics of 
divergent thinking as defined by Cropley (2006).  However, CAQ scores only correlated with 
the average creativity based on the top two most creative solutions within switch and not pure 
blocks.  This suggests that divergent thinking may only be operating within switch and not 
within pure blocks.  It could of course indicate that switch blocks activate the operation of an 
underlying ability which is both positively related to performance on the measure of average 
creativity based on the top two most creative solutions and creative achievement as measured 
by the CAQ.       
 
Thirdly, the consistency of ratings of subjective creativity across raters evaluated using 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) revealed only a moderate level of consistency of ratings 
across raters (α= .61).  There is no reason however to expect that this problem would result in 
systematic effects on the measures based on ratings of subjective creativity.  Therefore it 
seems unlikely that this could have resulted in the significant finding reported above being a 
type 1 error.  Findings indicated significant correlations between CAQ scores and both 
average subjective ratings of creativity within pure blocks and the average of the two most 
creative solutions within switch blocks.  This suggests that despite problems with reliability, 
ratings of subjective creativity do demonstrate some validity as measures of creativity.  It 
may be the case that switch costs observed on the I-RAP measure of the average creativity of 
                                                 
10
 Within the pure blocks high creative individuals would be expected to be able to generate their most creative 
solutions free of any switch costs, which in the present study reduced creativity as assessed on the average of the 
top two most creative solutions. 
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the two most creative solutions do tap the ability to maintain successful task performance 
when having to switch between performing tasks that require different modes of thinking.     
Individuals reporting higher levels of creative achievement on the CAQ may be 
demonstrating a heightened capacity to shift between different modes of thinking and 
therefore minimize switch costs on this measure.  It is not clear however based on the present 
findings whether or not the task set conducive to optimal performance on inverse remote 
associate problems requires divergent thinking and an associative mode of thinking.  The 
evidence that minimizing switch costs involves shifts between associative and analytic modes 
of thought is therefore lacking.   
 
The finding showing that higher insight ratings were given to correct solutions within switch 
blocks compared to within pure blocks suggests that problems could be being solved by 
different mechanisms within switch compared to pure blocks. This could be due to carryover 
effects resulting from previously performing inverse remote associate problems.  Monsell 
(2003) argues that there might be carry-over effects of task set activation or inhibition from 
the preceding task to the one currently being performed in task switching paradigms.  It has 
been argued that on occasions remote associate problems may be solved by insight processes 
which are characterised by an associative strategy or mode of thinking (Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2007; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  This would appear to reflect the task set that has 
been carried over from the previous trial when the participant was working on an inverse 
remote associate problem.   
 
The evidence suggesting that switching between I-RAP problems and RAP problems primes 
insight on the latter provides indirect evidence that both draw upon an associative mode of 
thought.  Findings showing positive correlations between insight ratings and scores on five of 
the seven measures of performance on I-RAPs also suggest that both are tapping the 
operation of the associative mode of thought.  The remote associate problems used in the 
current experiment are based on the remote associate task devised by Mednick (1962) that 
requires making connective links between three presented cue words.  The strategy used to 
solve this problem clearly may involve an associative process and there is indeed prior 
evidence to suggest that this is the case.  Craig and Manis (1960, cited in Mednick (1962) 
found that the number of associates produced from single words was correlated with RAP 
scores (r = .38).   
  
71 
 
The task switching paradigm used in the current study was designed based on the premise 
that moving from one problem to the next would involve reconfiguring ones mode of 
thinking and the difficulty in doing so would be a measure of a participant’s ability to 
efficiently reconfigure their mode of thinking from the previous trial to match the task 
requirements on the current trial.  The possibility that associative processes may be involved 
in generating solutions to both remote associate and inverse remote associate problems 
highlights a key problem with the current paradigm.  When participants switch between 
performing remote associate and inverse remote associate problems the extent to which they 
have to reconfigure their mode of thinking may, in practice be small.  This may therefore 
limit the sensitivity of the paradigm to detect differences in the ability to shift between 
different modes of thought. 
 
There may be another explanation for findings indicating higher insight ratings in switch 
blocks in comparison to pure blocks.  Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2007) have argued that 
solutions to compound remote associate problems might be generated through analytic 
strategies or through insight processes.  They argue that insight solutions are most likely to 
come about “when cognitive control at a preconscious level is required to switch processing 
strategies” (p90.).  It could be the case that insight ratings were higher in switch blocks in 
comparison to pure blocks in the present experiment because executive control is required to 
reconfigure processing strategies when switching between performing remote associate and 
inverse remote associate problems.  Solution generation via insight processes may be less 
likely to occur in pure blocks that don’t place the same demands on cognitive control 
processes.   
 
There was some evidence of switch costs on inverse remote associate problems but there was 
no evidence of switch costs experienced by either the low or high creativity group on remote 
associate problems.  There was evidence that instead of switch costs, less creative 
participants were faster at generating correct solutions on remote associate problems within 
switch compared to within pure blocks.  This finding was unexpected and further analysis 
was conducted to investigate it.  This revealed that insight ratings were positively associated 
with the speed of solution generation on remote associate problems, and that this association 
was stronger within the low compared to the high CAQ creativity group.   It may be that low 
creative participants generate correct solutions quicker on switch versus pure blocks because, 
within switch blocks, they are generated via fast insight processes.  In contrast, the generation 
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of solutions via insight in switch blocks may not speed solution generation in more creative 
participants.  These findings are correlational so cause and effect cannot be determined.  
However they again suggest that the task switching paradigm impacted on performance.  The 
task switching paradigm was used in this study to measure differences in the capacity to shift 
between different modes of thinking.  These findings raise further doubts concerning the 
suitability of the task switching paradigm for this purpose.  It appears that switch blocks often 
influenced performance as opposed to simply providing a means of measuring the capacity to 
shift. 
 
It is important to also consider the positive correlations found between CAQ scores and 
measures of remote associate and inverse remote associate problem performance within 
switch blocks.   The failure to fully validate the RAP and I-RAP as measures of convergent 
and divergent thinking respectively limits the validity with which the task switching 
paradigm used in the present study can be said to be a measure of shifting between 
associative and analytic modes of thinking.  Taking all findings into account, the results from 
this study appear to support the findings of Zabelina & Robinson (2010) that higher creativity 
as measured by the CAQ is associated with an improved ability to selectively modulate the 
level of cognitive control based on the task demands.  However, taken as a whole the 
evidence from this study suggests that creative individuals are better at modulating cognitive 
control and avoiding switch costs under conditions requiring one to rapidly reconfigure task 
set in the switch block.  In pure blocks when demands on modulating cognitive control are 
low, having a higher capacity to modulate cognitive control makes no difference to 
performance.  Within pure blocks, the performance of more creative individuals who are high 
on this capacity therefore does not differ from low creative individuals who may be less able 
to effectively modulate cognitive control.     
 
The partial evidence of switch costs on I-RAP problems does appear to allow us to go a step 
beyond findings by Zabelina & Robinson (2010) and tentatively conclude that the ability to 
modulate cognitive control and avoid switch costs may underpin the ability of individuals 
higher in creativity to more efficiently switch between performing different tasks; the RAP 
and I-RAP in the present study.  However without clearly valid measures of convergent and 
divergent modes of thinking and convergent evidence across measures of performance on 
both RAP and I-RAP problems, the question of whether creative individuals are specifically 
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better able to shift between analytic and associative modes of thinking cannot yet be 
answered.   
 
Future research investigating the link between creativity and shifting between analytic and 
associative modes of thinking should also carefully consider the paradigm used to investigate 
shifting behaviour.  Within the present paradigm, participants were forced to shift between 
different modes of thinking at regular intervals.  During real-life creative acts it would appear 
to be the case that shifts between modes of thinking may occur between stages of the creative 
process but the timing of these shifts is not predetermined (Israeli, 1962).  Work presented in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis aimed to focus on the intrinsic ability to carry out shifts 
between modes and not just the capacity to shift between different modes when requirements 
to shift have been imposed extrinsically, as was the case in the present study and past 
research (Vartanian, 2009; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  Research present in subsequent 
chapters examines the hypothesised relationship between proficiency in shifting modes and 
creativity by investigating factors such as awareness of when shifts are best carried out during 
the creative process in addition to merely assessing one’s capacity to shift between modes of 
thinking. 
 
In summary, the findings of the present study provide some evidence that a group reporting 
low levels of creative achievement evidenced higher switch costs in a task-switching 
paradigm compared to a group reporting higher levels of creative achievement.  These 
findings suggest that creative participants may be more efficient at reconfiguring their mode 
of thinking and switching between performing different problems that engage different task 
sets.  However there was only evidence of switch costs on one measure on one out of the two 
tasks included in the task switching paradigm; on a measure of creativity on a task designed 
to engage divergent thinking.  There was no evidence of switch costs on the majority of 
measures of performance on both types of task.  Doubts were also raised concerning the 
extent to which the two tasks used in the task switching paradigm actually induced 
associative and analytic modes of thinking.  No firm conclusions concerning the relationship 
between creativity and the capacity to shift between associative and analytic modes of 
thinking could therefore be drawn.  Positive correlations between the measure of creative 
achievement and measures of performance on both RAP and I-RAP measures within switch 
blocks, as well as elevated insight ratings in switch blocks, do suggest that creative 
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individuals may be better at controlling switches between the different task sets required to 
perform the different types of problems in switch blocks.   
 
Key findings from chapter 2 
 
 Different profile of correlations in pure versus switch blocks: 
The association between remote associate (RAP) and inverse remote associate (I-RAP) 
measures of task performance and measures of Full scale IQ and creativity differed across 
pure and switch blocks.  When performed within pure blocks, RAP performance was 
positively correlated with Full scale IQ, measured using the WASI.  Conversely, when 
performed within switch blocks, RAP performance was positively correlated with creativity, 
as measured by the CAQ.  Similarly, performance on I-RAP problems was only correlated 
with CAQ scores within switch blocks. 
 
 Elevated performance in switch versus pure blocks: 
Performance on both RAPs and I-RAPs was elevated when problems were performed within 
switch blocks in comparison to within pure blocks.   
 
 
 Higher insight ratings in switch versus pure blocks: 
Ratings of insight attached to correct solutions generated on RAPs were higher within switch 
blocks than within pure blocks.        
     
 
 
Key theoretical/empirical contribution from chapter 2 
 
 
The key findings indicate that performance on both the remote associate and inverse remote 
associate problems differed as a function of whether these problems were presented in pure or 
switch blocks.  Evidence of a different profile of correlations in pure versus switch blocks 
suggests that to successfully solve RAP problems within switch blocks requires cognitive 
abilities or response tendencies that are associated with creativity measured by the CAQ.  In 
contrast, within pure blocks successful RAP performance requires cognitive abilities or 
response tendencies associated with IQ.  Abilities or response tendencies associated with 
CAQ creativity also appear to be involved in generating many unusual and creative solutions 
on I-RAP problems within switch blocks but not within pure blocks.  Evidence of elevated 
insight ratings within switch blocks also suggests that problems were being solved by a 
different means in switch versus pure blocks.   
 
  
75 
 
The task switching paradigm used in this chapter was designed to measure one’s ability to 
avoid switch costs due to having to shift between different modes of thinking.  The key 
findings indicate that the requirement to switch qualitatively changed how the RAP and I-
RAP problems were solved and indeed actually improved performance on them.  The task 
switching paradigm induced changes in performance rather than capturing one’s ability to 
shift between different modes of thinking.  The key contribution from this chapter is therefore 
an empirical one namely, that experimental paradigms designed to induce shifting between 
different modes of thinking are problematic as a method of investigating individual 
differences in one’s ability to shift. 
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Chapter 3- Development of a novel self-report measure of shifting 
between modes of thinking 
 
 
The relationship between creativity and shifting between different modes of thinking has 
previously been investigated using experimental paradigms.  Experimental paradigms have 
examined differences, as a function of creative potential, in the ability to shift attention 
between tasks requiring broad attention and those requiring focused attention (Vartanian, 
Martindale & Kwiatowksi, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008).  An 
experimental paradigm was also used by Zabelina & Robinson (2010) to examine how 
flexibly shifting between low and high levels of cognitive control varied as a function of both 
divergent thinking and self-reported creative achievement.  Shifts between low and high 
cognitive control would appear to be related to differentially focusing attention (Kaufman, 
2011).  Shifts between broad and focused attention can be closely mapped on to Gabora & 
Ranjan’s (2013) conceptualisation of shifts between associative and analytic modes of 
thinking.  Therefore findings from Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatowksi (2007), Dorfman, 
Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian (2008) and Zabelina & Robinson (2010) together with 
the findings from the empirical study described in chapter two of this thesis, provide some 
support for the hypothesised link between shifting modes and creativity.   
 
However, past research that has examined the link between shifting and creativity using 
experimental paradigms has only examined one facet of mode shifting.  Specifically, this is 
the extent to which participants are able to enter the mode of thinking that best suits the 
demands of the task that they are currently engaged in.  This ability is from herein referred to 
as shifting competence as it appears to reflect one’s ability to shift, both in terms of the extent 
to which one is able to shift and the ability to shift to the mode of thinking optimised to 
perform the current task.  For example, shifting competence was examined in chapter two of 
this thesis by examining the extent to which individuals were capable of shifting between a 
mode of thinking conducive to performance on remote associate problems and a mode of 
thinking conducive to performance on inverse remote associate problems.  The extent and 
direction of shifting were both important; if participants did not shift in the right direction or 
to a great enough extent then the mode of thinking engaged would not be optimised to the 
current task. 
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However, experimental paradigms used in previous research do not appear capable of tapping 
facets of mode shifting other than shifting competence.  Another important facet of mode 
shifting that may be related to creativity is one’s self awareness of the shifting process.  The 
ability to monitor one’s mental processes, termed metacognition, has been viewed as an 
important factor in task performance (Thompson, 2009).  Metacognitive judgements could 
assess the degree to which the mode of thinking currently engaged is functioning correctly 
and could determine whether or not to perform a shift to a different mode of thinking 
(Thompson, 2009).  It would appear that when working on a creative task, a design task for 
example, the success of shifting is dependent on one’s metacognitive ability to judge when to 
shift between modes of thinking.  In order to maximise creative output it may be optimal to 
vary the extent to which one shifts across the creative process (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 
2014).  For example, a greater frequency of shifting between modes of thinking may be 
required when engaged in problem solving compared to when merely implementing solutions 
(Basadur, 1995; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  It has been argued (Davidson & 
Sternberg, 1998; Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Feldhusen, 1995; Jausovec, 1994) that there exists 
a positive association between metacognitive ability and success in creative problem solving.  
In support of this Scott, Leritz & Mumford (2004), in a meta-analysis of seventy creativity 
training programmes, reported a positive association between the use of metacognitive 
techniques and improvements in creative problem solving (r = .11).   
 
In summary, metacognitive judgements may determine shifts between modes of thinking 
(Thompson, 2009) and there is evidence of links between metacognition and creative 
problem solving (Scott, Leritz & Mumford, 2004).  It therefore seems important to develop a 
measure that captures individual differences in the metacognitive awareness of shifting.  A 
novel self-report measure of shifting was developed in the present study to examine two 
different facets of shifting; metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence.  An 
advantage of a self-report measure of shifting over experimental paradigms is that it can be 
used to examine individual differences across facets of shifting within a large sample.  The 
self-report measure consisted of items intended to tap metacognitive awareness of shifting 
and other items intended to tap shifting competence.  Responses on the self-report measure 
were factor analyzed to examine if separate factors representing shifting competence and 
metacognitive awareness of shifting emerged.   
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The present study aimed to provide an initial test of the validity of the novel self-report 
measure of shifting by examining differences in responses across different professional 
groups and across different contexts.  There is evidence to suggest that there are differences 
in patterns of shifting across different professions (Basadur, 1995).  It has been suggested that 
one of the most important skills in architecture is the ability to draw upon and combine 
different modes of thought (Lawson, 1997).  In contrast in the discipline of medicine, 
engaging in type 1, associative, thinking could have detrimental effects on the performance of 
physicians (Crosskerry, 2009).  Architects could therefore be expected to evidence elevated 
shifting compared to physicians in their professional roles.  Previous research suggests that 
one’s mode of thinking is adjusted to match different task demands (Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatowksi, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010).  Those in different professions are likely to evidence different sets of task 
demands requiring different patterns of shifting between modes of thinking in their 
professional roles.  However, shifting only appears to take place within a context in which it 
is useful to shift (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  Outside the professional context, there would 
appear to be no systematic difference in the requirement to shift.  It would therefore be 
expected that there would be no differences between different professionals in patterns of 
shifting outside of their professional roles; from here on referred to as shifting in an everyday 
context.  
 
Finally, the present study examined the effect of two factors which may impact upon patterns 
of shifting between modes of thinking.  These are level of expertise and thinking style.  It has 
been argued that metacognition develops with increasing expertise (Sternberg, 1998).  In 
support of this, expert artists have been shown to engage in more metacognition to do with 
monitoring their progress on a task than non-expert artists (Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 
2011).  The present study will therefore examine if metacognitive awareness of shifting and 
shifting competence differ as a function of level of expertise.  Thinking style reflects the 
relative degree to which individuals rely on one mode of thinking over the other mode 
(Epstein, Pacini, Heier & Denes-Raj, 1996).  This may determine the default starting point 
from which individuals shift between modes of thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014; 
Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).  For example, an individual who has a default 
starting point closer to the analytic mode of thinking may find it harder, and as a result have 
less success shifting to an associative mode of thinking compared to an individual who has a 
default starting point closer to the associative mode of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).  This 
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explanation suggests that one’s thinking style may affect the extent to which one is able to 
shift; that is shifting competence.  This explanation does not however shed any light on the 
effect of thinking style on metacognitive awareness of shifting.   
 
Rational and experiential thinking styles were measured in the present study using Norris & 
Epstein’s (2011) rational experiential inventory (REIm).  This measure is based on cognitive 
experiential self-theory where processing is theorized to result from the interaction of systems 
underlying rational and experiential thinking (Epstein, Pacini, Heier & Denes-Raj, 1996).  
The two independent but interacting systems underlying rational and experiential thinking 
differ from Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) view of a continuum from strongly analytic at one end 
to strongly associative thinking at the other.  However, there does appear to be some overlap 
in these views. Those who report a high reliance on rational and a low reliance on 
experiential thinking on the REIm would appear to have a default starting point biased to the 
analytic mode of thinking and hence, would be expected to find it hard to shift to a more 
associative mode.  Similarly, those who report a high reliance on experiential and a low 
reliance on rational thinking would appear to have a default starting point biased to the 
associative mode of thinking and hence, would be expected to find it hard to shift to a more 
analytic mode.  In contrast, individuals with a high reliance on both styles of thinking would 
not have a default bias to one style of thinking over the other.  Hence they would be expected 
to find it easier to shift between modes of thinking.   
 
Based on the previous discussion, it would appear that the REIm can also be used to assess 
individual differences in shifting behaviour.  To illustrate, those who rely heavily on both 
rational and experiential thinking might be expected to shift more between the different 
modes of thinking than those who rely heavily on one style to the detriment of the other or 
those who rely little on either rational or experiential thinking.  It is important to note though 
that the self-report measure of shifting developed in this study differs from the REIm in two 
important ways. Firstly, it was specifically designed to measure shifting between modes.  The 
REIm in contrast only assesses one’s tendency to rely on different modes of thinking.  
Individuals who rely heavily on both modes may merely use one mode of thinking more in 
some situations and a different mode in others.  The REIm does not tap shifting behaviour in 
relation to one goal within a defined time period.  The self-report measure in contrast 
specifically asks people to report on their shifting behaviour during a task or when making an 
important decision.  Thus it emphasizes shifting behaviour in relation to one’s goal within a 
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defined time period.  It is this type of shifting which appears to occur when one is working on 
a creative task or problem.  Secondly, the self-report measure of shifting assesses shifting 
behaviour in two different contexts.  The REIm in contrast only captures differences in the 
degree to which people rely on different modes, not how this changes as a function of 
context.  Theoretical accounts proposing a link between shifting and creativity have 
emphasized that context plays a pivotal role in determining whether shifts occur (Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013; Vartanian, 2009).  The self-report shifting scales provide a novel means of 
assessing context dependent shifting.  In sum, in comparison to the REIm, the self-report 
measure is a more specific measure of the type of shifting behaviour hypothesized to occur 
during the creative process that impacts on the end creative product (Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013). 
 
The present study had three main aims.  The first was to develop a novel measure that could 
capture two different facets of the ability to shift between modes of thinking; metacognitive 
awareness of shifting and shifting competence.  The second aim was to provide an initial 
examination of the validity of the measures of these two different facets of shifting.  Each 
measure of each facet would appear to be a valid measure of that facet of shifting if it 
revealed differences, in line with predictions, across three different groups.  These were 
groups of architects and architecture students, physicians and medical students and a group of 
university students and professionals from disciplines other than architecture or medicine.  
Since the ability to shift between modes of thinking appears to be particularly important in 
architecture (Lawson, 1997), it was predicted that the group consisting of architects and 
architecture students would evidence elevated self-reported shifting within their professional 
role compared to a group of physicians and medical students and also in comparison to a 
group of professionals and university students working or studying in other disciplines.  It 
was predicted that there would be no differences between the architecture, medicine and 
‘other disciplines’ groups in self-reported shifting outside of one’s professional role within an 
everyday context.  It was also predicted that the group of architects would evidence greater 
self-reported shifting within their professional role than outside their professional role in an 
everyday context.  
 
The third aim was to examine the effects of expertise and thinking style on self-reported 
metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence.  Differences in shifting as a 
function of expertise were examined by comparing self-reported shifting between those with 
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lower expertise and those with greater expertise within each of the three professional groups.  
It was predicted that those with greater expertise in architecture would evidence greater 
metacognitive awareness of shifting within their professional role than those with lower 
expertise.  Given that previous research has not examined shifting competence within a 
professional role as a function of expertise, no predictions were made concerning how groups 
differing in expertise would differ on this facet of shifting.  Shifting to an associative mode of 
thinking could have a negative impact within the medicine group (Crosskerry, 2009).  
However it could be argued that metacognitive awareness of shifting is important in medicine 
to enable an analytic mode of thinking to be maintained and avoid slipping into an associative 
mode of thinking.  As such, no specific predictions were made concerning how metacognitive 
awareness of shifting would differ as a function of expertise within the medicine group.  The 
only prediction made concerning the impact of expertise within the ‘other disciplines’ group 
was that the effect of expertise on metacognitive awareness of shifting would be lower than 
in the architecture group. 
 
The relationship between the extent of one’s reliance on rational and experiential thinking, 
measured using the Rational Experiential Inventory, and self-reported metacognitive 
awareness of shifting and shifting competence was also examined.  It was predicted that 
participants demonstrating a combination of a high reliance on rational thinking but a low 
reliance on experiential thinking would evidence lower shifting competence compared to 
those who relied heavily on both modes of thinking. It was predicted that participants with a 
combination of a low reliance on rational thinking and a high reliance on experiential 
thinking would also evidence lower self-reported shifting competence compared to those who 
relied heavily on both styles of thinking.  No specific predictions were made concerning the 
effect of differences in the degree of reliance on rational or experiential thinking styles on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting.  Those who reported a low reliance on both rational and 
experiential thinking would be expected to evidence less shifting than those who relied 
heavily on both styles.  The rationale for this last prediction was that individuals who relied 
little on both thinking styles would have less need for shifting between modes of thinking 
than those who relied heavily on different styles. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were from three different groups representing different professional roles.  The 
first group consisted of individuals who were currently undertaking a university or college 
course in architecture or those who had qualified from a university or college course in 
architecture and were currently practicing architects (N = 150).  The second group consisted 
of individuals who were currently undertaking a university or college course in medicine or 
those who had qualified from a university or college course in medicine and were currently 
practicing physicians (N = 42).  The third group, labelled as ‘other disciplines/professions’, 
consisted of individuals who were in employment other than architecture or medicine, and 
students who were currently undertaking a university or college course other than architecture 
or medicine (N = 92).  With the exception of the factor analysis, subsequent analyses were 
only run on participants from these three groups.   
 
The factor analysis was run on responses on the self-report measure pooled from the three 
groups previously described (N =284) and also from a fourth group consisting of the sample 
from the study described in chapter four of this thesis (N =56).  This group of 56 participants 
consisted of undergraduate, postgraduate students and members of staff recruited from the 
University of Surrey, University of Hertfordshire, University of Reading and at an enterprise 
summer school for students held off campus.  There were no architects or physicians, or 
medicine students within this group.    
 
The rationale for including this fourth group was to increase the sample size to improve the 
likelihood of obtaining an accurate estimation of the factor structure in the population of 
interest (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & Strahan, 1999; Comrey & Lee, 1992).  Given that 
this factor analysis was aimed at determining the factor structure of shifting between modes 
of thinking in humans it was beneficial to conduct the analysis on a diverse sample.  Given 
the prediction that architects will evidence higher levels of shifting than doctors, the inclusion 
of these two groups should maximise variance in shifting and avoid problems that may beset 
factor analysis based on homogenous samples (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & Strahan, 
1999).  The factor analysis was therefore run on a total sample of 340 participants, with 221 
females and 119 males.  The age range was from 16 to 63 with a mean age of 26.32 years (SD 
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= 8.68).  The sample was recruited online and included participants living in different 
countries although the majority lived in the United Kingdom (N = 322).  The sample included 
non-native English speakers although the majority were native speakers of English (N = 277). 
 
Each of the three groups representing different professional roles was further subdivided into 
different categories.  These different categories represented the different levels of training 
and experience participants reported within their disciplines.  Tables 8, 9 and 10 display the 
number of participants within each category in each discipline; architecture, medicine and 
disciplines other than architecture or medicine.  
 
Table 7. Displays the number of participants (N) at each category level of training and experience in 
Architecture.   
    Professional 
discipline Current Level of training/experience  N 
Architecture Undergraduate  1st year  30 
  
2nd year 34 
  
3rd year 16 
  
4th year 14 
  
5th year 9 
 
Postgraduate 
 
30 
 
Qualified & 
practicing Fully qualified architect 9 
  
Architectural assistant  3 
 
Miscellaneous 
category College student 1 
  
Retaking first year 
undergraduate 1 
  
Qualified but not practicing 1 
  
Practicing (1 year to fully 
qualified) 1 
  
Unknown 1 
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Table 8. Displays the number of participants (N) at each category level of training and experience in Medicine.   
 
Table 9. Displays the number of participants (N) at each category level of training and experience in other 
professions.   
    Professional 
discipline Current Level of training/experience  N 
Other student/ Undergraduate  1st year  4 
professional 
 
2nd year 11 
  
3rd year 4 
  
4th year 2 
 
Postgraduate 
 
24 
 
Qualified & practicing 
 
38 
 
Miscellaneous 
category Non-degree holding professional 7 
  
Placement student 1 
  
Working in different degree to job 
role 1 
      
 
Tables 8 to 10 show that within each of the three groups representing different professional 
roles there were undergraduate and postgraduate students as well as qualified practicing 
professionals.  Each category represented the level of education or training which that 
participant was currently undertaking.  For example, the category labelled first year 
undergraduate consisted of participants currently undertaking their first year course.  
Qualified and practicing professionals consisted of those who had both completed University 
degrees and were currently working.  It should be noted that within the professional 
discipline of medicine those undertaking a foundation year, core training and speciality 
training are currently practicing medical professionals who have completed undergraduate 
  
85 
 
medicine degrees (R, Millington (MBChB), personal communication, February 4, 2013).  
Within the professional discipline of architecture, architectural assistants have completed an 
undergraduate architecture degree and are currently practicing within this profession.  
However they are not yet fully qualified architects.  The Miscellaneous category represented 
those within each professional discipline that didn’t fit clearly into any one category. 
 
Sampling procedure 
 
An opportunity sample of participants from each of the three professional disciplines, 
architecture, medicine and other disciplines, was recruited.  Potential participants were sent a 
link to an online survey to examine their “signature thinking styles”.  Emails with this link 
and a short description of what the survey would involve were sent to architecture firms and 
architecture departments in universities across the UK.  Contact details of architecture firms 
and architecture departments were obtained from databases on the Royal Society of British 
Architects (RIBA) website. However, no responses were obtained from emails sent to 
architecture firms.  Qualified practicing architects were instead recruited face to face at 
architecture events in Surrey.  Architecture students and architecture professionals were also 
recruited worldwide via social media.  Physicians and medical students were recruited from 
personal contacts that were studying medicine or practicing as physicians in the UK.  
Physicians and medical students were also recruited worldwide using social media.  Other 
professionals and students studying courses other than architecture or medicine were 
recruited worldwide via social media.  The fourth group, described earlier, consisted of the 
sample from the empirical study described in chapter four of this thesis.  They were recruited 
in person from public areas and at events on campus at the University of Surrey.  They were 
also recruited from the University of Surrey and two other Universities by email. 
 
Research design 
 
The study had a mixed design.  The between-subjects factors were the groups reflecting 
different professional disciplines, different levels of expertise and different combinations of 
thinking styles.  The within-subjects factor was the context, professional or everyday, in 
which self-reported competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting was reported.   
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Instruments 
 
Rational-experiential inventory (REIm)  
 
The Rational-experiential inventory (REI) was designed to measure rational and experiential 
thinking styles based on Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein, Pacini, Heier & 
Denes-Raj, 1996).  Norris & Epstein (2011) built on the REI to produce the REIm which 
contained additional items to the original REI to reflect imaginative and affective facets of an 
experiential thinking style.  The REIm was used in the present study as it has been considered 
to be a better measure of all facets of an experiential thinking style versus the original REI 
which was focused on measuring intuition to the exclusion of other facets of experiential 
thinking (Norris & Epstein, 2011).  The REIm includes three distinct sub-scales of facets of 
experiential thinking; intuition, imagination and affectivity (Norris & Epstein, 2011).  
Participants can be scored on each facet in addition to receiving an overall score on the 
experiential scale.  The REIm scale was administered by presenting participants with 
“statements about feelings, beliefs and behaviours” and asking them to “describe how true 
each statement is for you” on a 5-point likert scale, with 1 indicating completely false to 5 
indicating completely true.  The scale has demonstrated acceptable levels of internal 
consistency for the rational (α = .86) and experiential scale (α = .84) as well as sub-scales of 
facets of experiential thinking; intuition, affectivity and imagination (α = .74-.78).  Rational 
and experiential scales have also demonstrated criterion validity with performance based 
measures (Norris & Epstein, 2011; Epstein, Pacini, Heier & Denes-Raj, 1996).  The three 
facets of an experiential thinking style have also demonstrated discriminant validity (Norris 
& Epstein, 2011). 
 
Self-report measure of shifting between modes of thought 
 
The self-report measure of shifting between modes of thought was created for this study.  An 
initial set of 14 questions asking about one’s shifting behaviour was generated.  Items were 
adapted from items in Norris & Epstein’s (2011) Rational-experiential inventory (REIm).     
 
Items for the present scale were adapted from the REIm to capture self-reported competence 
in shifting between associative and analytic modes of thinking and metacognitive awareness 
of shifting between modes of thinking.  For example, an REIm item tapping rational thinking, 
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“I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis11”, and an REIm 
item tapping experiential thinking “I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for 
important decisions” were adapted to produce the item “I rely on both my intuition and logic 
when making important decisions”.  The item “I rely on both my intuition and logic when 
making important decisions” was intended to capture shifting competence.   Items for the 
present scale were also adapted from REIm items to capture metacognitive awareness of 
shifting between modes of thinking.  For example, the REIm item tapping rational thinking “I 
don't like to have to do a lot of thinking” and the item tapping experiential thinking 
“sometimes I like to just sit back and watch things happen” were adapted to produce the item   
“while working on a task, I go through phases where I do a lot of thinking and other phases 
where I just sit back and muse over things/take a back seat”. The item “while working on a 
task, I go through phases where I do a lot of thinking and other phases where I just sit back 
and muse over things/take a back seat” was intended to capture metacognitive awareness of 
shifting.   
 
A pool of potential items was submitted to other researchers who had experience with the 
literature on shifting between modes and creativity.  They were asked for their comments on 
the items and gave suggestions on items to omit and two additional items to include; “While 
working on a task, I often switch between thinking analytically and thinking intuitively” (S.B. 
Kaufman, personal communication, 29 October, 2012) and “It seems I go through different 
phases of thinking through a task and accomplishing it from start to finish” (L. Gabora, 
personal communication, 18 October, 2012). 
 
The instructions informed participants that they would be presented with “14 statements 
about feelings, beliefs and behaviours”.  They were asked to “describe how true the 
statements are for you” in two different contexts; “with respect to everyday tasks” and “with 
respect to tasks you perform as part of your degree or within your current profession”.  All 14 
items were presented to participants in one context, after which the same 14 items were 
presented to participants in the other context.  The order in which contexts were presented 
was randomised across participants, but before completing either context they were informed 
that they would have to complete both.  This was done to ensure that it was clear that they   
would have to give responses on the items in two distinct contexts. The order of item 
                                                 
11
 These items were reverse coded on the original REIm but were not on the self-report shifting scale.  Pilot 
testing revealed that reverse coded items on the self-report scale were not interpreted in the way intended. 
  
88 
 
presentation within each context was also randomized.  Participants rated themselves on a 5-
point likert scale, with 1 indicating completely false to 5 indicating completely true.  A full 
copy of the self-report measure of shifting between modes of thought is shown in appendix 1. 
 
Results 
 
Principal components analyses on self-reported measure of shifting 
 
The fourteen items developed for the self-report measure of shifting between modes of 
thinking were analyzed using principal-components analysis.  Principal-components analysis 
(PCA) was chosen because it was important to identify components that explained as much of 
the variance as possible in the measured items (Preacher & MacCallum, 2003).  Two separate 
principal components analyses were performed.  One was performed on the set of fourteen 
items administered “with respect to everyday tasks” (an everyday context) and the other on 
the set of fourteen items administered “with respect to tasks you perform as part of your 
degree or within your current profession” (a professional context).  Prior to conducting the 
principal components analyses the normality of all item distributions was examined.  
Distributions of item scores with absolute values of skewness and kurtosis higher than two 
are likely to indicate deviations from normality (C, Fife-Schaw, personal communication, 
April 2013).  Scores on all fourteen items administered within a professional context had 
skewness and kurtosis scores of less than two.  All items except item eight when administered 
within an everyday context had skewness and kurtosis scores of less than two. The 
distribution of scores on item eight administered within an everyday context was kurtotic but 
kurtosis was corrected by using the following formula to transform the distribution of scores 
on this item, maxi - (log10((maxi -i)+1)).  The i refers to the score on item eight and maxi the 
maximum score on that item.   
 
The correlation matrices for items administered within an everyday and professional context 
were examined in order to check that all items correlated fairly well but not too strongly with 
one another (Field, 2009).  Within the everyday context, item five failed to significantly 
correlate with nine out of the 13 other items.  It was thus decided to omit this item from the 
principal components analysis on items administered within an everyday context.  Within the 
professional context, item five also failed to significantly correlate with a majority of items 
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(11 out of 13).  This item was thus omitted from the principal components analysis conducted 
on items administered within a professional context.  Item nine was also omitted from the 
analysis conducted on items administered within a professional context.  The reason for this 
was that excluding this item resulted in a large increase in the internal consistency of the 
component on which it loaded
12
.   
 
The KMO statistic was calculated for both principal component analyses in order to test if the 
pattern of correlations between variables was sufficiently compact and hence the analyses 
would result in distinct and reliable components.  The KMO statistic for both the principal 
components analyses conducted on items administered in an everyday context (.87) and items 
administered in a professional context (.87) were in the ‘great’ range, demonstrating that the 
patterns of correlations between variables was sufficiently compact (Field, 2009).  The 
diagonal elements of the anti-image correlation matrices for items administered in an 
everyday context and items administered in a professional context were all well above .5.  
The off-diagonal elements of both anti-image correlation matrices were small.  Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was significant for both the principal components analysis conducted on items 
administered in an everyday context (p < .001) and items administered in a professional 
context (p < .001).  Therefore all the assumptions were met for both of the principal 
components analyses (Field, 2009).                              
   
The number of principal components to extract was determined by two methods; inspection 
of scree plots and a statistical procedure known as a parallel analysis.  Scree plots for the 
principal components analyses conducted on the set of 13 items administered with respect to 
one’s everyday context and the set of 12 items administered with respect to one’s 
professional context are shown in figures 2 and 3 below.  On both scree plots, the point of 
inflexion follows the second component suggesting that two components should be extracted. 
 
                                                 
12
 Analysis of the internal consistency of the principal components is presented later in this section. 
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Figure 2. Displays the scree plot for the principal components analysis conducted on the set of 14 items 
administered with respect to an everyday context. 
 
   
Figure 3. Displays the scree plot for the principal components analysis conducted on the set of 14 items 
administered with respect to a professional context. 
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Parallel analysis involves comparing eigenvalues obtained from principal components 
analysis conducted on the real data to eigenvalues obtained from the same analysis of a 
random data matrix.  The decision to extract a factor is taken if the eigenvalue obtained from 
the real data is larger than the corresponding eigenvalue obtained from the random data 
matrix (Thompson & Daniel, 1996).  For the principal components analyses administered 
with respect to everyday and professional contexts only the first two eigenvalues obtained 
from the real data were larger than corresponding eigenvalues obtained from the random data 
matrix.  The findings from this method were therefore in agreement with the evidence 
obtained from the scree plot that two factors should be extracted from both principal 
components analyses. 
 
In both principal-components analyses, components were subjected to an oblique rotation 
with Kaiser normalization to identify simple structure.  The two components extracted using 
the PCA on items administered within an everyday context explained 46 percent of the 
variance in self-reported shifting.  The two components extracted using the PCA on items 
administered within a professional context explained 48 percent of the variance in self-
reported shifting.  For both PCA’s, loadings13 from the pattern matrix greater than or equal to 
.4 were defined as salient loadings and these loadings are shown in tables 11 and 12. 
         
     
 
    
 
                                                 
13
 The term ‘loadings’ in this example should technically be referred to as ‘structural coefficients’ (C, Fife-
Schaw, personal communication, April 2013).  The term ‘loadings’ was used here because it is the more familiar 
term.   
  
92 
 
Table 10. Principal components analysis (PCA) run on the 13 items administered with respect to the everyday context.   
    Item  Item  Principal-components  
number   I II 
    
  14 While working on a task, I go through phases where I do a lot of thinking  .74 
 
 
and other phases where I just sit back and muse over things/take a back seat 
  13 I find that I work best on certain problems when I am in a logical mindset  .70 
 
 
and best on others when my mindset is less logical (eg. more infused with emotions, unusual imagery, metaphors etc.) 
  3 When working on a task, I like to think both in depth about the details and drift out of focus  .64 
 
 
and let my mind wander (eg. looking out of the window) 
  11 I find that at times while working on a task, I think or describe things using analogies or metaphors and at other times  .61 
 
 
I don't use these and take a more reality oriented view 
  6 It seems I go through different phases of thinking through a task and accomplishing it from start to finish .55 
 10 I find that at times while working on a task my thinking and behaviour is driven more by my emotions  .49 
 
 
and at other times it is driven more by reason and logic 
  2 While working on a task, I often engage in focused in depth thought during some phases .49 
 
 
and more intuitive thinking during others 
  1 While working on a task, I often switch between thinking analytically and thinking intuitively .43 
 12 I am good at both figuring things out logically and going with my instincts when deciding on a course of action 
 
-.81 
4 I am good at tasks that require both logic and going with my gut feelings 
 
-.77 
8 I rely on both my intuition and logic when making important decisions 
 
-.76 
7 I rely on both careful reasoning and on my intuitive impressions 
 
-.66 
9 When working on a task, I like to think both in depth about the details  
 
-.63 
 
and drift out of focus and let my mind wander (eg. looking out of the window) 
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Table 11. Principal components analysis (PCA) run on the 12 items administered with respect to the professional context.   
    Item  Item  Principal-components  
number   I II 
12 I am good at both figuring things out logically and going with my instincts when deciding on a course of action .82 
 7 I rely on both careful reasoning and on my intuitive impressions .77 
 8 I rely on both my intuition and logic when making important decisions .76 
 4 I am good at tasks that require both logic and going with my gut feelings .74 
 1 While working on a task, I often switch between thinking analytically and thinking intuitively .55 
 14 While working on a task, I go through phases where I do a lot of thinking  
 
.80 
 
and other phases where I just sit back and muse over things/take a back seat 
  3 When working on a task, I like to think both in depth about the details and drift out of focus  
 
.79 
 
and let my mind wander (eg. looking out of the window) 
  11 I find that at times while working on a task, I think or describe things using analogies or metaphors and at other times  
 
.47 
 
I don't use these and take a more reality oriented view 
  6 It seems I go through different phases of thinking through a task and accomplishing it from start to finish 
 
.46 
2 While working on a task, I often engage in focused in depth thought during some phases 
 
.46 
 
and more intuitive thinking during others 
  10 I find that at times while working on a task my thinking and behaviour is driven more by my emotions  
 
.45 
 
and at other times it is driven more by reason and logic 
  13 I find that I work best on certain problems when I am in a logical mindset  
 
.45 
 
and best on others when my mindset is less logical (eg. more infused with emotions, unusual imagery, metaphors 
etc.) 
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Tables 11 and 12 show that both PCAs run on the items administered with respect to 
everyday and professional contexts revealed similar components.  Items 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 13 
and 14 loaded onto both component I in the everyday context (table 11) and component II in 
the professional context (table 12).  These items all refer to being self-aware of one’s own 
shifting process.  Component I in table 11 and component II in table 12 would therefore 
appear to both capture metacognitive awareness of shifting between modes of thinking.  The 
similar pattern of loadings on component I in table 11 and component II in table 12 suggested 
that the structure of metacognitive awareness of shifting modes was similar across everyday 
and professional contexts.  Item 1 which loaded on component I in table 11 but not on 
component II in table 12 was excluded from subsequent analyses.  The rationale for this was 
to enable a valid comparison of scores on metacognitive awareness of shifting across 
everyday and professional contexts in subsequent analyses.  
 
Items 4, 7, 8 and 12 loaded onto both component II in the everyday context (table 11) and 
component I in the professional context (table 12).  It should be noted that when presented in 
an everyday context items 4, 7, 8 and 12 had negative loadings on component II.  This shows 
that lower self-reported scores on the items were represented by a higher component II 
everyday context score.  Items 12 and four refer to being good at using different modes of 
thinking, and thus shifting between them, when making a decision or on a task.  Items seven 
and eight refer to relying on the use of different modes of thinking on task or in general.  
These items therefore appear to refer to the tendency and ability to shift between modes of 
thinking.  The component on which these items loaded would therefore appear to capture 
shifting competence.  Item 9 which loaded on component II in table 11 but was not included 
on the PCA run on the items within the professional context was excluded from subsequent 
analyses.  The rationale for this was to enable a valid comparison of scores on shifting 
competence across everyday and professional contexts in subsequent analyses.   
 
The final structure of the self-report measure of shifting therefore consisted of four different 
scales, each examining a different facet of shifting (metacognitive awareness or competence) 
across two different contexts (everyday and professional).  The four scales were labelled as 
shifting competence in a professional context (SP competence), metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in a professional context (SP awareness), shifting competence in the everyday 
context (SE competence) and metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context (SE 
awareness).  The internal consistency of each scale was assessed with Cronbach’s coefficient 
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alpha (1951) which was calculated separately for each of the scales.  The results revealed a 
good level of internal consistency for shifting competence in a professional context (α = .80).  
They also revealed acceptable levels of internal consistency for shifting competence in the 
everyday context (α = .78), shifting awareness in a professional context (α = .72) and shifting 
awareness in an everyday context (α = .74) (George & Mallery, 2000).  Based on these 
findings showing that the scales possessed alphas for internal consistency that were in the 
acceptable to good range, scores from items making up each of the four scales were summed 
and each used as a separate measure of self-reported shifting in subsequent analyses.   
 
The inter-correlations between scores on the four different facets of shifting are shown in 
table 13.  The presence of inter-correlations between the four different scales suggests that 
the scales capture some shared variance in shifting.  The correlations between the scales are 
in the medium to large range (Cohen, 1988).  SP awareness and SP competence capture 25 
percent shared variance while SE awareness and SE competence capture 21 percent shared 
variance in shifting.  Therefore the scales measuring metacognitive awareness of shifting and 
shifting competence are still capturing a large portion of unique variance in self-reported 
shifting.          
 
Table 12.  Showing inter-correlations between scores across the four self-report shifting scales (N = 340).    
     Facet of shifting 1 2 3 4 
          
1. SP awareness 
 
.60** .49** .33* 
2. SE awareness 
  
.37** .46** 
3. SP competence 
   
.58** 
4. SE competence 
    
     Note.          
Pearson's correlation coefficients are displayed for all correlations  
**p<.01 
      
In summary, these findings support the hypothesis that the items on the self-report measure 
appear to capture two facets of self-reported shifting between modes of thinking; 
metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence.  Both metacognitive awareness 
of shifting and shifting competence emerged as facets of shifting with a similar structure 
across everyday and professional contexts.   
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Does self-reported shifting between modes of thinking differ across professional 
groups?  
 
Scores on the four different self-report shifting scales were compared across the three groups 
made up of those from different professional disciplines; architecture, medicine and other 
disciplines.  Specifically, group differences in both metacognitive awareness of shifting and 
shifting competence were examined across the two different contexts in which self-report 
shifting scores were obtained; everyday and professional contexts.  Prior to conducting 
between group analyses of differences in shifting, the normality of distributions of scores on 
each of the four scales within each group were examined.  Two outliers were removed within 
the group made up of those from medicine (participant IDs = 143 & 144) and five outliers 
were removed from the group made up of those from other disciplines (IDs = 168, 232, 256, 
261 & 262).  Following removal of outliers the assumption of normality was met for scores 
on each of the four shifting scales within each group.   
 
Examining differences in metacognitive awareness of shifting as a function of group and 
context 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Group (3) –architecture, medicine, other disciplines) was run on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting scores obtained with respect to the two different contexts 
(Context (2)- everyday, professional).  This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
group (F (2, 274) = 8.26, p <.001, ηp
2
= .06, power =.96) and context of shifting (F (1, 324) = 
4.20, p =.04, ηp
2
= .02, power =.53).  The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction 
between group and context of shifting (F (2, 324) = 16.05, p <.001, ηp
2
= .11, power = 1.00).  
This interaction is displayed in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Interaction between professional discipline (architecture, medicine, other disciplines) and shifting 
context (everyday and professional) on mean scores of metacognitive awareness of shifting.  
 
Figure 4 suggests that the group made up of those in the professional discipline of 
architecture evidenced greater metacognitive awareness of shifting than the other groups but 
only within a professional context.  Univariate ANOVAs were run to break down this 
interaction and examine differences in metacognitive awareness of shifting between groups 
separately for each context.  The bonferroni correction was applied to correct for multiple 
univariate ANOVAs, two in total, and subsequent planned contrasts being performed, of 
which there were six in total
14
.  A one-way ANOVA (Group (3) –architecture, medicine, 
other disciplines) was run on metacognitive awareness of shifting in the professional context.  
This revealed a significant effect of group (F (2, 274) = 20.37, p <.001, ηp
2
= .13, power = 
1.00).  Contrasts were run to examine the prediction that the architecture group would 
evidence greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context than both the 
medicine and ‘other disciplines’ groups.  Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context was significantly higher in the architecture group (M = 28.26, SE = .32) 
in comparison to the other disciplines group (M = 25.90, SE = .42), (F (1, 235) = 20.10, p 
                                                 
14
 The p-value, following bonferroni correction, that the univariate ANOVAs and planned contrasts needed to 
attain to reach the threshold for significance was p=.05/8= .006. 
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<.001, ηp
2
= .08, power = 1.00).  Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context 
was also significantly higher in the architecture group (M = 28.26, SE = .32) in comparison to 
the medicine group (M = 24.48, SE = .53), (F (1, 188) = 31.35, p <.001, ηp
2
= .14, power = 
1.00).  Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context was higher in the other 
disciplines group (M = 25.91, SE = .40) in comparison to the medicine group (M = 24.47, SE 
= .59), (F (1, 125) = 4.03, p =.05, ηp
2
= .03, power = .51).  After applying the bonferroni 
correction this contrast was non-significant.  The small effect size suggests that, even given 
the lack of power, the difference between medicine and other disciplines groups on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context is very small.    
   
A contrast was run to examine the prediction that within the architecture group, greater 
shifting would be evidenced in a professional context compared to within an everyday 
context.  Within the architecture group, metacognitive awareness of shifting was significantly 
higher in a professional context (M = 28.26, SE = .32) than within an everyday context (M = 
27.04, SE = .33), (F (1, 149) = 16.12, p <.001, ηp
2
= .10, power = 1.00).  In contrast, within 
the medicine group, metacognitive awareness of shifting was significantly higher in an 
everyday context (M = 26.48, SE = .56) than within a professional context (M = 24.48, SE = 
.53), (F (1, 39) = 15.52, p <.001, ηp
2
= .29, power = .97).  Within the other disciplines group, 
metacognitive awareness of shifting was marginally significantly higher in an everyday 
context (M = 26.69, SE = .44) than within a professional context (M = 25.91, SE = .42), (F (1, 
86) = 3.74, p =.06, ηp
2
= .04, power = .48) although after applying the bonferroni correction 
this difference was no longer significant.  The small effect size suggests that, even given the 
lack of power, the difference within the other disciplines group in metacognitive awareness of 
shifting across everyday and professional contexts is very small.          
 
A one-way ANOVA (Group (3) –architecture, medicine, other disciplines) was run on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in the everyday context.  This revealed a non-significant 
effect of group (F (2, 274) = .42, p = .66, ηp
2
= .00, power = .12).    
 
Examining group differences in shifting competence as a function of group and context 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Group (3) –architecture, medicine, other disciplines) was run on shifting 
competence scores obtained with respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)- everyday, 
professional).  The mixed ANOVA is reported below.  The bonferroni correction was applied 
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to correct for multiple univariate ANOVAs, two in total, and subsequent planned contrasts 
being performed, of which there were six in total
15
.  The mixed ANOVA revealed non-
significant main effects of group (F (2, 274) = 1.10, p = .33, ηp
2
= .01, power =.24) and 
context of shifting (F (1, 274) = .01, p =.94, ηp
2
= .00, power =.05).  This ANOVA however 
revealed a significant interaction between group and context of shifting (F (1, 274) = 8.77, p 
<.001, ηp
2
= .06, power = .97).  This interaction is displayed in figure 5. 
  
 
Figure 5. Interaction between professional discipline (architecture, medicine, other professions) and shifting 
context (everyday and professional) on mean scores of shifting competence.    
 
Contrary to predictions, the means in figure 5 suggest that there was little difference between 
architecture and the medicine and other disciplines groups in shifting competence within 
either professional or everyday contexts.  The architecture group certainly don’t appear to 
evidence greater shifting competence in a professional context compared to the other two 
                                                 
15
 The p-value, following bonferroni correction, that the univariate ANOVAs and planned contrasts needed to 
attain to reach the threshold for significance was p=.05/8= .006. 
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groups.  Univariate ANOVAs were run to break down this interaction and examine 
differences in shifting between groups separately for each context.  A one-way ANOVA 
(Group (3) –architecture, medicine, other disciplines) was run on shifting competence in the 
professional context.  This revealed a significant effect of group (F (2, 120) = 4.77
16
, p =.01, 
ηp
2
= .03, power = .79).  Contrasts were run to examine the prediction that the architecture 
group would evidence greater shifting competence in a professional context than the ‘other 
disciplines’ and medicine groups.  Shifting competence in a professional context was higher 
in the architecture group (M = 16.25, SE = .19) in comparison to the other disciplines group 
(M = 15.39, SE = .28), (F (1, 235) = 6.77, p =.01, ηp
2
= .03, power = .74).  After applying a 
bonferroni correction this difference was however no longer significant.  The small effect size 
suggests that the difference in shifting competence between groups was very small.         
There were no significant differences in shifting competence in a professional context 
between architecture (M = 16.25, SE = .19) and medicine groups (M = 16.53, SE = .26), (F 
(1, 86) = .69, p = .41, ηp
2
= .00, power = .10).  Shifting competence in a professional context 
was higher in the medicine group (M = 16.53, SE = .37) in comparison to the other 
disciplines group (M = 15.39, SE = .28), (F (1, 125) = 6.31, p =.01, ηp
2
= .05, power = .70).  
After applying a bonferroni correction this difference was also however no longer significant.  
The small effect size suggests that the difference in shifting competence between groups was 
very small.        
 
A contrast was run to examine the prediction that within the architecture group, greater 
shifting competence would be evidenced in a professional context compared to within an 
everyday context.  Within the architecture group, shifting competence in a professional 
context was not significantly higher (M = 16.25, SE = .19) than within an everyday context 
(M = 16.19, SE = .19), (F (1, 149) = .13, p = .72, ηp
2
= .00, power = .07).  Within the medicine 
group, shifting competence in a professional context was however higher (M = 16.53, SE = 
.26) than within an everyday context (M = 15.78, SE = .33), (F (1, 39) = 6.03, p = .02, ηp
2
= 
.13, power = .69).  After applying a bonferroni correction this difference was no longer 
significant.  However the effect size suggested this was a relatively substantial effect and 
therefore may reflect a meaningful difference if there was greater power.  Within the ‘other 
disciplines’ group shifting competence in a professional context was significantly lower (M = 
                                                 
16
 The Welch F-ratio was reported for this ANOVA. 
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15.39, SE = .28) than within an everyday context (M = 16.24, SE = .25), (F (1, 86) = 14.51, p 
< .001, ηp
2
= .14, power = .97).   
 
A one-way ANOVA (Group (3) –architecture, medicine, other disciplines) was run on 
shifting competence in the everyday context.  This revealed a non-significant effect of group 
(F (2, 274) = .64, p = .53, ηp
2
= .01, power = .16).  In summary, these findings provide support 
for the prediction that the architecture group would evidence greater metacognitive awareness 
of shifting compared to the ‘other disciplines’ and medicine groups.  The hypothesis, that the 
architecture group would evidence greater shifting competence than the ‘other disciplines’ 
and medicine group, was not supported.  As predicted, the architecture group evidenced 
greater metacognitive awareness of shifting within a professional compared to within an 
everyday context.  However, the prediction that the architecture group would evidence 
elevated shifting competence within a professional compared to an everyday context was not 
supported.  The medicine group did appear to evidence greater shifting competence in a 
professional compared to an everyday context.  The ‘other disciplines’ group evidenced the 
reverse pattern; with greater shifting competence evidenced in an everyday compared to a 
professional context. 
 
Does self-reported shifting vary as a function of expertise?     
 
In order to examine how metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence vary 
as a function of expertise, it was first necessary to assign participants in each discipline 
(architecture, medicine and other) to groups with different levels of expertise.  The aim was 
to assign participants within each discipline to different expertise groups based on the 
procedure used by Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011).  Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & 
Sitaras (2011) revealed differences in metacognition as a function of differences in expertise.  
As such, their procedure would appear to be a good basis on which to examine if 
metacognitive awareness of shifting differed as a function of expertise in the present study.  
Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011) examined expertise in the domain of art, 
differentiating a low expertise group of non-artists from a high expertise group of 
professional artists or student artists that had extensive experience in painting and drawing.  
Their means of grouping participants appeared to maximise differences in expertise between 
groups.  The aim was to do the same in the present study within each discipline, with a low 
expertise group of first year undergraduate students with the least experience in the discipline 
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and a high expertise group of professionals who had completed a degree and are working in 
the discipline and who would hence be most likely to have extensive experience in the 
discipline.  This aim was met within the discipline of architecture but within the discipline of 
medicine and ‘other disciplines’ the  sample sizes of low expertise groups formed only from 
first year undergraduate students were too small (medicine: 1
st
 year undergraduate N = 6; 
‘other disciplines’: 1st year undergraduate N = 4).  As such, the low expertise groups in 
medicine and ‘other disciplines’ included first and second year undergraduate students.   
 
The decision was made not to match the characteristics of the low expertise group in 
architecture to that in medicine and ‘other disciplines’ groups by also including second as 
well as first year architecture students in the low expertise group.  It is important to note that 
it was considered to be more important to maximise differences in expertise between groups 
in architecture rather than to provide an exact match between expertise groups in architecture 
and medicine and ‘other disciplines’.  The rationale for this was that the primary hypothesis 
was to examine differences in shifting as a function of differences in expertise in architecture.  
Including groups differing maximally in expertise would appear to provide the strongest 
possible test of this hypothesis. 
 
In addition to a low and high expertise group, the aim was also to form a third, medium 
expertise group within each discipline.  The rationale for this was that it would allow a more 
fine grained analysis of the hypothesis that metacognitive awareness of shifting increases to 
the largest extent as a function of increasing expertise, within the discipline of architecture.  
Within both architecture and ‘other disciplines’, a medium expertise group of postgraduate 
students was formed.  Within the discipline of medicine, it was not possible to form a 
medium expertise group because the sample size was too small.  A high expertise group of 
practicing professionals in medicine had to be pooled from participants who were foundation 
year students through to participants who were GP/consultants.  This was neccessary so that 
it was of a sufficient size to be entered into an analysis of variance.  Even after pooling 
participants in this way the analysis was still severely underpowered (power = .05).  This 
meant that there were no participants who had not already been assigned to the low or high 
expertise groups who could be assigned to a medium expertise group within medicine.              
 
Table 14 below displays the exact make up of each of the expertise groups across each 
discipline. 
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Table 13. Characteristics, (education level or professional experience) of participants constituting each level of 
expertise (low, medium & high) within each of the three professional disciplines.  The number of participants in 
each group is given by N.      
 
 
Within the discipline of architecture, the postgraduate and first year undergraduate groups 
were identical to those displayed in table 8, reported earlier in the ‘method’ section.  The 
‘practicing professional’ architecture group consisted of ‘fully qualified architects’, 
‘architectural assistants’ and the participant who indicated they were ‘practicing but had one 
year till they were fully qualified’.  Within medicine and the ‘other disciplines’ group, the 
low expertise groups were formed by pooling participants from each of these two year 
groups.  The group of practicing professionals within medicine were formed by pooling those 
in ‘foundation year 1’, ‘core training’, ‘speciality training’ and ‘consultant/GPs’.  The group 
of practicing professionals within ‘other disciplines’ was the ‘qualified and practicing’ group 
in table 10 in the ‘method’ section.   
 
Does shifting vary as a function of expertise within the discipline of architecture? 
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Expertise in architecture (3) –low, medium, high) was run on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting scores obtained with respect to the two different contexts 
(Context (2)-everyday, professional).  This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
context of shifting (F (1, 70) = 5.71, p =.02, ηp
2
= .08, power =.65).  The ANOVA revealed a 
non-significant main effect of expertise in architecture (F (2, 270) = .31, p =.74, ηp
2
= .01, 
power =.10).  The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between expertise in 
architecture and context of shifting (F (2, 70) = 3.60, p =.03, ηp
2
= .09, power = .65).  The 
interaction is displayed in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Interaction between architectural expertise (low, medium & high) and shifting context (everyday & 
professional) on mean scores of metacognitive awareness of shifting.   
 
Contrary to predictions, figure 6 suggests that the high expertise group evidenced lower 
metacognitive awareness of shifting than the low and medium expertise groups within a 
professional context.  Within an everyday context, the medium group evidenced lower   
metacognitive awareness of shifting than the low and high expertise groups.  Univariate 
ANOVAs were run to break down this interaction and examine differences in metacognitive 
awareness of shifting between expertise groups separately for each context.  The bonferroni 
correction was applied to correct for multiple univariate ANOVAs, two in total, and 
subsequent post-hoc tests, of which there were a possible 15 tests
17
.   
 
A one-way ANOVA (Expertise in architecture (3) –low, medium, high) was run on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in the professional context.  This revealed a non-
significant effect of expertise (F (2, 70) = .44, p = .65, ηp
2
= .01, power = .12).  A one-way 
ANOVA (Expertise in architecture (3) –low, medium, high) was also run on metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in the everyday context.  This revealed a non-significant effect of 
                                                 
17
 Only the results of three tests are reported.  However, given that for post-hoc tests the p-value must be divided 
by the total number of tests that it is possible to perform .  The bonferroni corrected p-value was thus p=.05/15= 
.003.  P-value’s of the three tests need to reach this threshold to be considered significant (Field, 2009).   
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expertise (F (2, 70) = 1.77, p = .18, ηp
2
= .05, power = .40).  As shown in figure 6, it appeared 
that metacognitive awareness of shifting was elevated in the professional compared to the 
everyday context but only for low and medium expertise groups.  Post-hoc tests run to 
examine these differences revealed that within the medium expertise group, metacognitive 
awareness of shifting was higher within the professional (M = 29.23, SE = .71) compared to 
the everyday context (M = 26.37, SE = .75), (F (2, 70) = 14.73, p = .001, ηp
2
= .34, power = 
.96).  There were no significant differences in metacognitive awareness of shifting as a 
function of context within the low (F (1, 29) = .79, p = .38, ηp
2
= .03, power = .14) or high (F 
(1, 11) = .01, p = .93, ηp
2
= .00, power = .05) expertise groups. 
 
Shifting competence 
 
The pattern of means on shifting competence across expertise groups and shifting contexts is 
displayed in figure 7.  A mixed ANOVA (Expertise (3) –low, medium, high) was run on 
shifting competence obtained with respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)-
everyday, professional).  This ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of context of 
shifting (F (1, 70) = .10, p =.75, ηp
2
= .00, power =.06).  The ANOVA also revealed a non-
significant main effect of expertise (F (1, 270) = .34, p =.71, ηp
2
= .01, power =.10) and a non-
significant interaction between expertise and context of shifting (F (1, 70) = .63, p =.54, ηp
2
= 
.02, power =.15).   
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Figure 7. The pattern of means on shifting competence across architecture expertise groups (low, medium & 
high) and shifting contexts (everyday & professional). 
 
Does shifting vary as a function of expertise within the discipline of medicine? 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Expertise in medicine (2) –low, high) was run on metacognitive 
awareness of shifting scores obtained with respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)-
everyday, professional).  The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of context of 
shifting (F (1, 29) = 8.09, p =.01, ηp
2
= .22, power =.79).  This effect was not explored further 
as it was already reported in the earlier section examining differences in shifting across 
professional groups.  The ANOVA also revealed a non-significant main effect of expertise (F 
(1, 29) = .37, p =.55, ηp
2
= .01, power =.09) and a non-significant interaction between 
expertise and context of shifting (F (1, 29) = .11, p =.74, ηp
2
= .00, power = .06).  The pattern 
of means on metacognitive awareness across expertise groups and shifting contexts is 
displayed in figure 8.     
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Figure 8. The pattern of means on metacognitive awareness of shifting across medicine expertise groups (low, 
& high) and shifting contexts (everyday & professional). 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Expertise in medicine (2) –low, high) was run on shifting competence 
obtained with respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)-everyday, professional).  The 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of context of shifting (F (1, 29) = 4.88, p =.04, 
ηp
2
= .14, power =.57).  Again, this effect was not explored further as it was already reported 
earlier.  The present ANOVA also revealed a marginally significant main effect of expertise 
(F (1, 29) = 3.96, p =.06, ηp
2
= .12, power =.49) with a trend for the high expertise group to 
evidence greater shifting competence than the low expertise group as shown in figure 9.   The 
interaction between expertise and context of shifting was non-significant (F (1, 29) = .08, p 
=.78, ηp
2
= .00, power = .06).   
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Figure 9. The pattern of means on shifting competence across medicine expertise groups (low & high) and 
shifting contexts (everyday & professional). 
 
Does shifting vary as a function of expertise within ‘other disciplines’? 
 
The pattern of means on metacognitive awareness across expertise groups and shifting 
contexts is displayed in figure 10.  A mixed ANOVA (Expertise in ‘other disciplines’ (3) –
low, medium, high) was run on metacognitive awareness of shifting scores obtained with 
respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)-everyday, professional).  The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of context of shifting (F (1, 70) = 3.94, p =.05, ηp
2
= .05, 
power =.50).  Again, this effect was not explored further as it was already reported earlier. 
The ANOVA also revealed a non-significant main effect of expertise (F (2, 70) = .14, p =.87, 
ηp
2
= .00, power =.07) and a non-significant interaction between expertise and context of 
shifting (F (2, 70) = .15, p =.87, ηp
2
= .00, power =.07).   
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Figure 10. The pattern of means on metacognitive awareness of shifting across ‘other disciplines’ expertise 
groups (low, medium & high) and shifting contexts (everyday & professional). 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Expertise in professionals from ‘other disciplines’ (3) –low, medium, 
high) was run on shifting competence obtained with respect to the two different contexts 
(Context (2)-everyday, professional).  The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
context of shifting (F (1, 70) = 11.49, p =.001, ηp
2
= .14, power =.92).  Again, this effect was 
not explored further as it was already reported earlier.  The ANOVA also revealed a non-
significant main effect of expertise (F (2, 70) = .90, p =.41, ηp
2
= .03, power =.20) and a non-
significant interaction between expertise and context of shifting (F (2, 70) = .82, p =.44, ηp
2
= 
.02, power =.19).  The pattern of means on metacognitive awareness across expertise groups 
and shifting contexts is displayed in figure 11.      
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Figure 11. The pattern of means on shifting competence across ‘other disciplines’ expertise groups (low, 
medium & high) and shifting contexts (everyday & professional). 
 
In summary, within the discipline of architecture there was no difference in either 
metacognitive awareness of shifting or shifting competence between groups with differing 
levels of architectural expertise.  However, the group with a medium level of expertise, 
consisting of postgraduate students, did evidence a higher metacognitive awareness of 
shifting within a professional compared to within an everyday context.  The low and high 
architectural expertise groups did not evidence a difference in metacognitive awareness of 
shifting across contexts.  Within the discipline of medicine, the high expertise group appeared 
to evidence greater shifting competence than the low expertise group
18
.  There were no 
differences in shifting competence as a function of expertise within those in ‘other 
disciplines’ or within those in the discipline of architecture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Although this effect did not reach the threshold for significance it was of a reasonable size effects and would 
probably have reached the threshold for significance had the analysis had greater power. 
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Does self-reported shifting vary as a function of thinking style? 
 
Groups were formed on the basis of individual differences in scores on the rational 
experiential inventory (REIm) from the entire sample who completed the REIm (N = 284).  
Individuals were classed as evidencing a high reliance on experiential or rational thinking if 
their scores for that style of thinking were greater than two-thirds of a standard deviation 
above the sample mean.  Individuals were classed as evidencing a low reliance on 
experiential or rational thinking if their scores for that style of thinking were greater than 
two-thirds of a standard deviation below the sample mean.   
 
The rational for using the cut off of two-thirds of a standard deviation was that this cut off 
produced four groups with at least ten participants in each group.  Other cut-off points were 
tried but these resulted in at least one group with an extremely low number of participants.  
There was a clear theoretical rationale for using a groups based rather than a correlational 
analysis here.  A composite score capturing being high in both experiential and rational 
thinking could have been formed from summing scores across experiential and rational 
scales.  Scores on this composite measure could then have been correlated with self-report 
shifting scores.  However, high scores on a composite measure do not necessarily reflect 
relying heavily on both modes of thinking.  High scores could be obtained from scoring very 
high on one measure (e.g. rational thinking) but low on the other (e.g. experiential thinking).  
A composite measure would also fail to differentiate between those scoring high on 
experiential thinking and low on rational thinking and those scoring high on rational thinking 
and low on experiential thinking.  Using cut-off scores to produce four distinct groups 
avoided these problems.             
 
Group one consisted of individuals who reported a low reliance on both experiential and 
rational styles of thinking (N = 20).  Group four consisted of those who reported a high 
reliance on both experiential and rational styles of thinking (N = 25).  Group two consisted of 
those who reported a low reliance on experiential and a high reliance on rational thinking (N 
= 10) while group three consisted of those who reported a high reliance on experiential and a 
low reliance on rational (N = 11) styles of thinking.  Metacognitive awareness of shifting in 
an everyday context was not normally distributed within the group that reported a high 
reliance on experiential and a low reliance on rational styles of thinking.  The distribution of 
scores for metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context in this group was 
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slightly negatively skewed (z-score for skew = -2.15).  Non-parametric analyses were 
therefore run alongside parametric analysis involving the ‘high reliance on experiential & low 
reliance on rational’ group and any differences between the two sets of analysis noted. 
 
Shifting competence 
 
A mixed ANOVA (Group (4) –low experiential & low rational, low experiential & high 
rational, high experiential & low rational, high experiential & high rational) was run on 
shifting competence obtained with respect to the two different contexts (Context (2)-
everyday, professional).  The mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group (F (3, 61) 
= 5.14, p = .003, ηp
2
= .20, power =.91) and a significant interaction between group and 
context of shifting (F (3, 61) = 2.70, p = .05, ηp
2
= .12, power =.63).  This ANOVA revealed a 
non-significant effect of context of shifting (F (1, 61) = .17, p =.68, ηp
2
= .00, power =.07).   
 
Twelve planned contrasts were run to examine patterns of differences across all groups on 
shifting competence in everyday and professional contexts.  These contrasts are displayed in 
table 15.  Only the significant and marginally significant contrasts are discussed in the text. 
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Table 14. Displaying the twelve contrasts examining differences in shifting competence between groups that differ in their reliance on experiential and rational thinking.  
      
Contrast   Self-report shifting scale 
Effect 
size p-value power 
high experiential & high rational   low experiential & low rational 
    (M = 16.96, SE = .45)                (M = 13.70, SE = .89) SP competence .21* .003 .93 
(M = 17.24, SE = .57) (M = 14.95, SE = .64) SE competence .14 .01 .74 
      high experiential & high rational   low experiential & high rational   
    (M = 16.96, SE = .45)                (M = 15.50, SE = .79) SP competence .07 .13 .33 
(M = 17.24, SE = .57) (M = 14.60, SE = .66) SE competence .26* .002 .90 
      high experiential & high rational   high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 16.96, SE = .45)                (M = 17.50, SE = .66) SP competence .01 .50 .10 
(M = 17.24, SE = .57) (M = 16.30, SE = .76) SE competence .03 .41 .17 
      low experiential & low rational low experiential & high rational   
    (M = 13.70, SE = .89) (M = 15.50, SE = .79) SP competence .11 .19 .34 
(M = 14.95, SE = .64) (M = 14.60, SE = .66) SE competence .01 .93 .06 
      low experiential & low rational high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 13.70, SE = .89) (M = 17.50, SE = .66) SP competence .14 .04 .57 
(M = 14.95, SE = .64) (M = 16.30, SE = .76) SE competence .11 .93 .06 
      low experiential & high rational   high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 15.50, SE = .79) (M = 17.50, SE = .66) SP competence .04 .37 .14 
(M = 14.60, SE = .66) (M = 16.30, SE = .76) SE competence .08 .23 .22 
Note: Partial eta squared is reported as a measure of effect size for all contrasts.  
* p <.004, level if significance required for effects to be significant following the bonferroni correction 
(.05/12).       
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The high experiential & high rational group reported significantly higher shifting competence 
in a professional context than the low experiential & low rational group.  The same pattern of 
differences between the two groups was found based on shifting competence in an everyday 
context, albeit this effect was only marginally significant.  The high experiential & high 
rational group reported higher shifting competence than the low experiential & high rational 
group but only for shifting competence in an everyday not within a professional context.  
Shifting competence in a professional but not within an everyday context was marginally 
significantly higher in the high experiential & low rational group compared to the low 
experiential & low rational group.   
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting    
 
A mixed ANOVA (Group (4) –low experiential & low rational, low experiential & high 
rational, high experiential & low rational, high experiential & high rational) was run on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting scores obtained with respect to the two different contexts 
(Context (2)-everyday, professional).  The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
group (F (3, 61) = 14.53, p <.001, ηp
2
= .42, power = 1.00).  The ANOVA revealed a non-
significant main effect of context of shifting (F (1, 61) = 1.01, p =.32, ηp
2
= .02, power =.17) 
and a non-significant interaction between group and context of shifting (F (3, 61) = .40, p 
=.76, ηp
2
= .02, power =.12).   
 
Twelve planned contrasts were run to examine patterns of differences across all groups on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in everyday and professional contexts.  These contrasts 
are displayed in table 16.  Only the significant and marginally significant contrasts are 
discussed in the text. 
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Table 15. Displaying the twelve contrasts examining differences in metacogntive awareness of shifting between groups that differ in their reliance on experiential and rational 
thinking.  
      
Contrast   
Self-report shifting 
scale 
Effect 
size p-value power 
high experiential & high rational   low experiential & low rational 
    (M = 29.04, SE = .85)               (M = 23.60, SE = .96) SP awareness .30* .001 .99 
(M = 29.24, SE = .80) (M = 23.20, SE = .85) SE awareness .37* .001 1.00 
      high experiential & high rational   low experiential & high rational   
    (M = 29.04, SE = .85)               (M = 23.60, SE = 1.27) SP awareness .28* .001 .94 
(M = 29.24, SE = .80) (M = 23.10, SE = 1.73) SE awareness .36* .006 .99 
      high experiential & high rational   high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 29.04, SE = .85)               (M = 31.40, SE = 1.09) SP awareness .09 .08 .43 
(M = 29.24, SE = .80) (M = 30.30, SE = 1.00) SE awareness .02 .37 .14 
      low experiential & low rational low experiential & high rational   
    (M = 23.60, SE = .96) (M = 23.60, SE = 1.27) SP awareness .01 .89 .07 
(M = 23.20, SE = .85) (M = 23.10, SE = 1.73) SE awareness .02 .92 .06 
      low experiential & low rational high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 23.60, SE = .96) (M = 31.40, SE = 1.09) SP awareness .40* .001 .99 
(M = 23.20, SE = .85) (M = 30.30, SE = 1.00) SE awareness .29* .002 .92 
      low experiential & high rational   high experiential & low rational   
    (M = 23.60, SE = 1.27) (M = 31.40, SE = 1.09) SP awareness .46* .001 .97 
(M = 23.10, SE = 1.73) (M = 30.30, SE = 1.00) SE awareness .31* .01 .79 
Note: Partial eta squared is reported as a measure of effect size for all contrasts.       
* p <.004, level of significance required for effects to be significant following the bonferroni correction (.05/12) 
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The high experiential & high rational group reported significantly higher metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in a professional and everyday context compared to the low experiential 
& low rational group.  The high experiential & high rational group reported significantly 
higher metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional and everyday context compared 
to the low experiential & high rational group.  Contrary to predictions, there was a marginally 
significant trend for higher metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context 
within the high experiential & low rational group in comparison to within the high 
experiential & high rational group.  The high experiential and low rational group reported 
higher metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional and everyday context compared 
to the low experiential & low rational group and also compared to the low experiential and 
high rational group.  These findings provide support for the hypothesis that shifting between 
modes of thinking varies based on individual differences in rational and experiential thinking 
style.   
General Discussion 
 
The self-report measure of shifting between modes of thinking produced two distinct 
components: metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence.  The structure of 
these components was very similar when shifting was reported within an everyday or within a 
professional context.  The only difference was that items loaded negatively onto the 
component labelled as shifting competence in an everyday context but had positive loadings 
on shifting competence in a professional context.  Each of the four scales measuring the two 
different facets of shifting across two different contexts evidenced acceptable to good levels 
of internal consistency.  In addition, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional 
context was found to be higher within a group consisting of architecture students and 
architects compared to a group consisting of medicine students and practicing physicians.  
Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context was also found to be higher 
within the group of architecture students and architects compared to a group consisting of 
students and professionals in disciplines other than architecture.  Furthermore, this was a 
context specific effect within the architecture group, with this group evidencing elevated 
metacognitive awareness of shifting only within their professional role. The findings that 
those in architecture reported an elevated metacognitive awareness of shifting within their 
professional role are in line with predictions that shifting between modes of thinking is 
particularly important within the domain of architecture (Lawson, 1997).  As such, these 
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findings lend evidence for the validity of the scales assessing metacognitive awareness of 
shifting as measures of individual differences in shifting.   
 
However, there was a lack of evidence supporting the validity of the measure of shifting 
competence.  Those within the discipline of architecture did report higher shifting 
competence compared to a group of participants from other disciplines but the size of the 
difference between groups in shifting competence was very small.  Further, shifting 
competence was expected to be higher for those in architecture compared to those within a 
group consisting of medicine students and practicing physicians.  Contrary to predictions, 
both architecture and medicine groups displayed similar levels of shifting competence.  
Furthermore, contrary to predictions shifting competence within the architecture group was 
similar across everyday and professional contexts.  Contrary to predictions, there was 
tentative evidence that the medicine group evidenced greater shifting competence in a 
professional compared to an everyday context.  The ‘other disciplines’ group evidenced the 
reverse pattern; with greater shifting competence evidenced in an everyday compared to a 
professional context. 
   
There were no clear effects of expertise on either of the two facets of shifting within the 
discipline of architecture or within the group made up of those from disciplines other than 
architecture or medicine.  There was an unexpected finding within the medium architectural 
expertise group, consisting of postgraduate students, of elevated metacognitive awareness of 
shifting within the professional compared to within the everyday context.  There was a 
tentative effect of expertise within the discipline of medicine, with those with greater 
expertise evidencing higher shifting competence.   
 
There was evidence to suggest that the degree to which one relies on rational and experiential 
thinking has an effect on both facets of shifting.  Those with a combination of a high reliance 
on both rational and experiential thinking evidenced greater metacognitive awareness and 
shifting competence compared to those with a low reliance on both rational and experiential 
thinking.  Those with a high reliance on both rational and experiential thinking were 
hypothesized to engage in more shifting between modes than those who showed a low 
reliance on both.  The aforementioned findings therefore lend evidence for the concurrent 
validity of both metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence as measures of 
shifting.   
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It is important to note that there were still important differences in the type of shifting 
captured by the REIm and the self-report shifting scales in this study.  Specifically, the REIm 
did not distinguish between shifting behaviour in different contexts.  Compared to 
participants evidencing a low reliance on both rational and experiential thinking, those 
participants with a high reliance on both rational and experiential thinking displayed higher 
scores on both facets of shifting across professional and everyday contexts.  The self-report 
shifting scales did however capture differences in shifting behaviour across different 
contexts.  This supports the prediction that the self-report shifting scales provide a novel 
means of assessing context dependent shifting (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).   
 
Effects reported as tentative were only marginally significant.  However the size of the 
effects detected suggest that they may have emerged as statistically significant had there been 
greater power to detect them.   
 
There was some support for the prediction that those who had a strong default bias for one 
mode of thinking, associative or analytic, over the other mode would find it harder to shift.   
Those deemed to be biased towards analytic thinking, with a combination of a high reliance 
on rational and a low reliance on experiential thinking, evidenced lower metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in both everyday and professional contexts than those who relied highly 
on both rational and experiential thinking.  The high rational-low experiential group also 
evidenced lower shifting competence in an everyday context compared to the high rational-
high experiential group.  Those deemed to be biased towards associative thinking with a 
combination of a high reliance on experiential and a low reliance on rational thinking 
evidenced shifting competence scores across both contexts and metacognitive awareness of 
shifting within the everyday context that were very similar to the group who relied heavily on 
both rational and experiential thinking.  Had there been greater power, a trend for greater 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in the professional context within the high experiential-
low rational group compared to the high experiential-high rational group may have emerged. 
 
Considered as a whole, these findings build on previous experimental work that has examined 
competence in performing shifts between modes of thinking (Vartanian, Martindale & 
Kwiatowksi, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010).  The findings of the present study suggest that there are distinct but related 
facets of shifting; shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting.  Shifting 
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competence would appear to capture the extent to which one is good at and relies on shifting 
as well as the ability to shift in the right direction.  Metacognitive awareness would appear to 
capture the extent of one’s self awareness of their shifting process.  There was a positive 
correlation between scores across these two facets of shifting.  Since the ability to shift in the 
right direction requires some self-awareness of the current situation, a correlation between 
these two facets makes sense.   
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting would appear to be closely related to the shifting process 
described by Gabora & Ranjan (2013).  Present findings suggest that those within the 
discipline of architecture were able to modulate the extent of their metacognitive awareness 
of shifting based on whether they were operating within their professional role or within an 
everyday context.  Similarly, Gabora & Ranjan (2013) propose that shifts between modes of 
thinking are brought about by the situation.  For example, when an individual is stuck in a rut, 
unable to solve a problem in an analytic mode of thinking, they may spontaneously shift to a 
more associative mode of thinking.  Architecture, and design in general, would appear to be 
full of potential pitfalls that could lead to situations where a designer becomes stuck in a rut 
(Lawson, 1997).   Architects acting in their professional role may therefore require a high 
level of awareness to judge when the current problem solving strategy, and hence mode of 
thinking, is not functioning optimally.  This would enable them to a shift to a different, more 
effective, strategy underpinned by a different mode of thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 
2014).  It is important to add here that metacognitive awareness of shifting could represent 
metacognitive ability in general.  There is no evidence from present or past research that it is 
specific to the mechanism that controls shifting between modes of thinking.  
 
It is important to add the caviat here that elevated metacognitive awareness of shifting within 
the professional compared to the everyday context was only observed within the medium 
expertise group of postgraduate architecture students.  In contrast, there were no differences 
in metacognitive awareness of shifting as a function of context within the group of practicing 
architectural professionals.  There are a number of possible reasons for this finding.  Firstly, it 
could reflect an expertise related difference in the mechanism of shifting between 
postgraduate students and practicing architectural professionals. Shifting could be 
underpinned by both top-down and bottom-up processes and the type of process relied on 
may vary depending on the stage of the task one is engaged in (Vartanian, Martindale & 
Matthews, 2009; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  It seems plausible that for postgraduate 
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students, shifting could be modulated by top-down processes and hence one is consciously 
able to introspect on one’s shifting process and assess differences in shifting in different 
contexts.  In practicing professionals, shifting may be automatized by experience and as a 
result controlled by bottom-up processes.  If shifting was governed by bottom-up processes, 
context specific differences in the shifting process would not be perceptible. An alternative 
explanation for this finding is that it results from postgraduate architects being more self-
aware of their own shifting process within their professional context.  As a result of their 
recent university studies, postgraduate students may have had opportunities to reflect on their 
own thinking processes in architecture.  Practicing professionals may not have the same 
opportunity to self-reflect on their thinking processes in their professional role.  Another 
alternative explanation is that postgraduate architecture students may even engage in more 
shifting than practising professionals.  For example, postgraduate students may spend more 
time engaged in design activities which involve shifting between modes of thinking 
compared to architects who may spend less of their time engaged in the act of design itself 
(The Farrel review group, personnal communication, 2013). 
 
There was a failure to evidence a meaningful level of elevated shifting competence in 
architects compared to those within disciplines other than architecture or medicine.  There 
was also a failure to evidence elevated shifting competence within a professional context in 
the architecture group compared to those within the discipline of medicine, who were 
predicted to rely less on shifting in their professional role (Crosskerry, 2009).  It could be the 
case that those within the discipline of medicine rely on shifting to a similar extent to those in 
architecture and as such they may be an inadequate control group.  The finding of elevated 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in architects versus those in medicine suggests however 
that this was not the case.  The alternative then is that shifting competence is either a facet of 
shifting that does not differ between those in architecture and those within medicine or it is 
not actually a measure of shifting at all.  It was interesting to note that while shifting 
competence did not vary across contexts in the architecture group it appeared to be higher 
within a professional compared to an everyday context within the medicine group and lower 
within a professional compared to an everyday context within the ‘other disciplines’ group.  
Since shifting competence assesses shifting capacity it might be expected that it should not 
change across contexts.  The findings of differences in shifting competence as a function of 
context in medicine and ‘other disciplines’ groups suggest that this might not be the case.  
This raises further doubts as to the validity of the measure of shifting competence.  Future 
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work in chapter four of this thesis will examine evidence for and against the validity of the 
measure of shifting competence as a measure of the capacity to shift. 
 
The finding that those deemed to be biased towards an analytic mode of thinking evidenced 
lower metacognitive awareness of shifting than those that did not display a strong bias, was in 
accordance with predictions.  This effect appears in accordance with findings showing effects 
of fixation on the rate (Howard-Jones & Murray, 2003) and quality (Jansson & Smith, 1991) 
of idea generation, with fixation appearing to reflect an inability to shift away from an 
analytic mode of thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002).  This effect was the same across everyday 
and professional contexts, which was expected based on the proposal that a bias towards 
analytic thinking is a stable thinking style (Epstein, Pacini, Heier & Denes-Raj, 1996).  There 
was however a failure to evidence lower metacognitive awareness of shifting in those deemed 
biased towards an associative mode of thinking compared to those that did not display a 
strong bias and relied highly on both modes of thinking.  The reason for this could be that 
respondents interpreted the items used to tap shifting as referring to shifting from an analytic 
to an associative mode of thinking, not from an associative to an analytic mode.  If the items 
were interpreted in this way, then those biased towards an associative style of thinking would 
not be expected to report difficulty shifting from an analytic to an associative mode.  Future 
work in the present thesis does tackle this question by examining shifting between modes of 
thinking as a function of the direction of shifting.  There is another possible interpretation for 
these findings.  It has been proposed that thinking styles may moderate the effect of 
metacognitive judgements (Thompson, 2009).  Those biased towards an analytic style of 
thinking may be more likely to ignore metacognitive cues to engage associative thinking and 
instead engage analytic thinking.  However, those biased towards an associative style of 
thinking would not be likely to ignore these cues.  Hence they would act on metacognitive 
cues, and shift modes, in the same way as those without a bias towards one style of thinking 
(Thompson, 2009).  This theory could explain why scores on the measures of metacognitive 
awareness of shifting varied as a function of bias towards an analytic but not bias towards an 
associative style of thinking. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A novel self-report measure of shifting between modes of thinking was developed in the 
present study.  This measure consists of four different scales for assessing two facets of 
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shifting, metacognitive awareness of shifting and shifting competence, within two different 
contexts, everyday and professional.  The scales have been shown to have acceptable 
psychometric properties. There is also preliminary evidence that those assessing 
metacognitive awareness of shifting demonstrate validity.  Findings concerning the effect of 
expertise and thinking style on metacognitive awareness of shifting raise some important 
issues concerning the mechanisms that may underlie shifting.  Findings also raise important 
limitations concerning the insights that can be gained from a self-report measure of shifting.  
Further work is needed to examine the validity of the scales, particularly those assessing 
shifting competence.  The self-report shifting scales do however demonstrate promise as a 
means of assessing individual differences in shifting. 
 
Key findings 
 
 Evidence for the validity of a novel self-report measure of shifting :  
A group expected to evidence elevated shifting in their professional roles (architects) 
reported greater shifting than those expected to evidence less shifting in their professional 
roles (physicians or other professionals).  Architects only reported greater shifting compared 
to physicians or other professionals within their professional role, not outside of their 
professional roles in an everyday context.  These findings were only observed on the 
metacognitive awareness facet of shifting.  
 
 Evidence for the context dependent nature of shifting behaviour: 
Architects reported greater shifting when asked about shifting in their professional roles 
compared to their shifting within the everyday context.  This finding was also restricted to the 
metacognitive awareness facet of shifting.  
 
 
 
 
 
Key theoretical/empirical contribution from chapter 3 
 
 
The key findings provide support for the validity of the novel self-report measure of shifting 
as a means of assessing individual differences in shifting behaviour.  Architects, whom it has 
been argued rely heavily on shifting within their professional roles (Lawson, 1997) reported 
greater shifting within the professional context compared to physicians and other 
professionals.  Architects also reported greater shifting within their professional roles in 
comparison to within the everyday context, suggesting the self-report measure is sensitive to 
the context dependent nature of shifting.  The key contribution from this chapter is therefore 
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an empirical one.  The findings provide the first evidence in support of Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) prediction that the shifting behaviour that one evidences is dependent on the context 
within which one is operating in.  
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Chapter 4- Assessing the validity of a novel self-report measure of 
shifting between modes of thinking 
 
The aim of the present chapter was to explore the relationship between the self-report shifting 
scales developed in the previous chapter and established objective measures of 
shifting/switching, creativity and intellectual ability.  In order to use the shifting-scales to 
examine the prediction that there is a relationship between creativity and shifting between 
modes of thinking, it was first crucial to ascertain if the scales were measuring real shifting 
behaviour.  In order to demonstrate that the scales were measuring real shifting behaviour, the 
shifting scales needed to evidence concurrent validity, by predicting performance on 
established measures of shifting or switching.   
 
The use of the terms shifting and switching represents an important distinction here.  The 
term switching refers to tasks that involve a switch between different approaches, strategies 
goals or sets (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010; Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999; Baas, 
De dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Vartanian, 2009).  The term shifting is used when there is evidence 
that tasks appear to require a shift between associative and analytic modes of thinking.  As 
was argued in chapter one, switching may be underpinned by shifts between associative and 
analytic modes of thought.  Based on this, it was hypothesized that the shifting scales would 
predict performance on measures of real shifting and switching behaviour. 
     
Not only must the self-report shifting scales demonstrate that they measure real 
shifting/switching behaviour, they must also demonstrate that they measure real shifting/ 
switching behaviour that is associated with performance on established measures of 
creativity.  Even if the self-report scales predict real shifting behaviour, if this behaviour isn’t 
associated with performance on measures of creativity then they are not assessing the type of 
shifting hypothesised to occur during the creative process and impact on creative output 
(Gabora & Ranjan, 2013
19
; Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  In order to demonstrate that 
the scales are measuring behaviour that is associated with performance on established 
measures of creativity, scores on the self-report shifting-scales must therefore be able to 
predict performance on established measures of creativity.  
                                                 
19
 It should be noted that Liane Gabora considers the movement between different modes of thinking to take the 
form of a shift rather than a switch (L. Gabora, personal communication, August 22, 2013).  Please refer to the 
literature review for more information on this distinction.  
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The present study was designed to examine the validity of the self-report measures of shifting 
by examining if the shifting scales could predict shifting behaviour on established measures 
of shifting or switching, and performance on established measures of creativity.  Three 
established measures of shifting/switching behaviour were included; the plus-minus task 
(Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000) a Lunchins (1942) type mental set 
task used by Gasper (2003) and a measure of shifting on the Stroop task (Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010).  Three established measures of creativity were included; the Kaufman-
domains of creativity scale (Kaufman, 2012), the disposable coffee cup design task (Jansson 
& Smith, 1991; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005) and the product improvement task (Torrance, 
1978).  Each measure is explained in the methods section together with specific predictions 
concerning which facet or facets of self-reported shifting (metacognitive awareness, shifting 
competence) and in which contexts (everyday, professional or both) will predict performance 
on the measures of switching, shifting and creativity. 
 
Working memory has previously been associated with performance on measures of switching 
(Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009).  Dietrich’s (2004) framework of creativity based on the brain’s 
functional neuroanatomy posits a clear role for working memory in creative thinking.  
Inhibition and intelligence have previously been associated with performance on measures of 
creativity (Carson, Peterson & Higgins, 2003). Measures of working memory, inhibition and 
intelligence were therefore also included in the present study in order to examine if self-
report measures of shifting predict scores on measures of creativity independently of working 
memory, intelligence and inhibition.   
        
Method 
 
Participants 
 
An opportunity sample of fifty-six participants was recruited on site at the University of 
Surrey and off-site at a summer school for students.   The sample needed to be of a sufficient 
size so that partial correlations and linear regressions run on the data would have sufficient 
power to detect effects.  G-Power 3 was used to calculate the sample size required to detect a 
significant medium sized effect for values of R
2 
or partial R
2  
that are equal to .13, which is 
equivalent to the value for a medium sized effect, f 
2
= .15, used in G-Power 3 (Cohen, 1988; 
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Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2007).  Calculations revealed that in order to test the 
significance of one-tailed hypotheses at an alpha level of α = .05 with a sufficient level of 
power (1- B= .80) a sample size of 55 participants would be needed to detect medium sized 
effects (Cohen, 1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2007).  Bivariate correlations would 
also be run on the data, and as such the power to detect effects using this form of analysis was 
also calculated.  G-Power 3 was again used to calculate the sample size required to detect 
effects on the basis of both one and two-tailed hypotheses.  In order to detect a significant 
medium sized effect (r= .30) with a sufficient level of power (1- B= .80) at an alpha of α = 
.05, a sample size of 67 participants would be required to detect effects based on one-tailed 
hypotheses and 84 participants required to detect effects based on two-tailed hypotheses 
(Cohen, 1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2007).  In summary, the final sample size 
obtained (N= 56
20
) meant that there was sufficient power to detect effects using partial 
correlations and linear regressions but the study lacked power to detect effects using bivariate 
correlations.     
 
Undergraduate, postgraduate students and members of staff were recruited on campus at the 
University of Surrey, University of Hertfordshire, University of Reading and at an enterprise 
summer school for students held off campus. Participants were recruited in person at the 
enterprise summer school event and by email from the Universities of Hertfordshire and 
Reading. Participants were recruited from posters and in communal areas within cafeterias 
and University buildings on campus and outside on campus grounds at the University of 
Surrey.  They were also recruited from the Students’ Union and from within the School of 
Psychology at the University of Surrey.  None of the participants who took part in the current 
study had previously taken part in any of the other studies that the researcher had conducted 
as part of his PhD research.  This was important as the remote associate problems used in the 
present study had been used in a previous study and familiarity could affect participant’s 
performance on these problems in the current study.  Participants (N = 56) were informed 
that upon agreeing to participate they would be entered into a prize draw to win 3 cash prizes; 
a first prize of £100, a second prize of £50 and a third prize of £20.  Prospective participants 
were screened prior to testing in order to ensure that all participants were native speakers of 
English.  Four participants, however, reported during the experiment that they were non-
native English speakers and one participant was retrospectively found to be dyslexic. Non-
                                                 
20
 After removal of two outliers the sample size dropped to N=54 but the power to detect significant effects 
remained unchanged (1- B= .80).   
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native English speakers did however all describe themselves as competent English speakers 
and the dyslexic participant stated that they only had mild dyslexia.  The decision was made 
not to exclude these participants from the study as excluding them would result in a lack of 
power to detect effects using partial correlations and linear regressions.  Participants were 
aged between 16 and 56 years of age (M =29, SD =11).  The experiment was approved by 
the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.    
 
Research design 
 
The present study investigated associations between scores on a battery of different self-
report questionnaires and tasks.  There were a total of 11 questionnaires and tasks and 
multiple questionnaire sub-scales and multiple measures of task performance were computed 
from many of these (see next sections).  All participants completed the entire battery of 
questionnaires and tasks, enabling inter-relationships between all sub-scales and measures of 
task performance to be examined.  In general, analyses examining relationships between 
scores on different scales and questionnaire/tasked based measures were run on all 
participants and distinct groups were not formed.  However, some methods of analyses 
required that the sample be divided into groups based on participant’s performance on one of 
the task based measures.  In these cases the analyses took the form of a between-subjects 
design.   
 
Battery of measures 
 
The battery of questionnaires and tasks administered to participants in this study and the sub-
scales and measures of performance on each are summarised in table 17 below.  The 
following sections describe each of the 11 questionnaires and tasks in more detail and the 
measures of performance on each.    
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Table 16. Listing all 11 tasks/questionnaires and each sub-scale/measure of performance used to measure participant’s performance on the task.  Also included is a brief 
explanation to explain what psychological construct each sub-scale/measure is measuring. 
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Self-report measure of shifting between modes of thought 
 
These are the self-report scales measuring shifting competence and metacognitive awareness 
of shifting in professional and everyday contexts as described in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
Stroop task 
 
The Stroop task was used as a measure of flexibly switching between high and low levels of 
cognitive control on a context specific basis (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  Given the 
apparent mapping between high and low cognitive control and analytic and associative modes 
of thinking (Kaufman, 2011; Bristol & Viskontas, 2006), it would appear also to be a 
measure of shifting between different modes of thinking.  This task and how the measures of 
flexibly switching between high and low cognitive control were derived are described below. 
 
Participants completed a computerised version of the Stroop task, which was designed using 
the specifications outlined in Zabelina & Robinson (2010) and programmed in e-prime 2.0.  
The version used in this study required participants to categorize the colour of two colour 
words, ‘green’ and ‘red’, presented in either the colour green or red.  When the word was 
matched to the colour it was printed in the trial was classed as congruent.  When there was a 
mismatch between the word (e.g. red) and the colour it was printed in (e.g. green) the trial 
was classed as incongruent.  The background was black to ensure that there was a high 
contrast between the background and stimuli.  A red and green sticker were placed on keys 
“1” and “6”, respectively, of the computer keyboard in order that participants did not forget 
the colour-response mappings.  Participants were instructed to press the key with the red 
sticker if the word presented on the screen was coloured red and press the key with the green 
sticker if the word presented on the screen was coloured green.  Participants were asked to 
make their responses as quickly and accurately as they could.  There was a 500 ms delay 
following correct responses with a blank black screen shown.  Error responses were followed 
by a 1,000 ms visual error message in the form of the word “Error” presented in white on the 
screen.  This procedure was used as it ensures a high level of accuracy thus rendering 
reaction times the key variable on which to measure individual differences in performance 
(Sanders, 1998).  Participants first completed a practice block of 16 consecutive trials
21
 
                                                 
21
 D. Zabelina (personal communication, June 10, 2013) suggested that approximately 15 practice trials should 
precede the main block of trials when using the Stroop paradigm used by Zabelina & Robinson (2010). 
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followed by a main block of 140 consecutive trials.  Trials consisted of the words “green” 
and “red” printed in either green or red giving a total of four different types of trial.  The 
practice block consisted of all four combinations presented four times in a randomised order.   
 
Stroop interference costs for each participant were calculated by subtracting their mean 
reaction time on congruent trials from their mean reaction time on incongruent trials.  Stroop 
interference costs are used as a measure of the ability to inhibit an automatic activity, namely 
word reading, in favour of a less automatic activity, naming the colour that a word is printed 
in.  As such Stroop interference costs have been labelled as a measure of cognitive control or 
inhibition, with higher scores indicating poorer cognitive control or inhibition (Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010).  In this study Stroop interference costs were calculated, following the 
procedure set out by Zabelina & Robinson (2010), by subtracting the mean of each 
participant’s log10 reaction times for congruent trials on which correct solutions were 
produced from the mean of each participant’s log10 reaction times for incongruent trials on 
which correct solutions were produced.  Incorrect solutions and intra-participant outliers that 
were 2.5 SDs above or below the mean were removed prior to calculating the above scores.  
In the present study Stroop interference costs were included as a measure of inhibition.   
 
Three other indicators of performance were computed based on reaction times on the Stroop 
task.  Prior to computing these measures, all trials first had to be coded on the basis of 
whether they were congruent or incongruent target trials and whether they were preceded by 
congruent or incongruent prime trials.  This resulted in a total of four different pairs of prime 
and target trials.  Examples of these combinations as they might appear within the sequence 
of 140 trials are shown in figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12. displays examples of the four different pairs of prime and target trials.  The first letter within the 
brackets refers to the target and the second letter refers to the prime.  Congruent target trials are either preceded 
by congruent prime trials (Cc) or incongruent prime trials (Ci).  Likewise, incongruent target trials are preceded 
by either congruent prime trials (Ic) or incongruent prime trials (Ii).   
 
It is important to note that the above figure does not show an exhaustive list of all types of 
trials for each of the four types of prime and target pairs.  There are evidently different 
combinations of colours and colour words that could be classified into each of the four pairs.  
However, we collapsed across the different colours of colour words so as to only end up with 
pairs of targets and primes based on congruency and not at the level of specific colours or 
colour words.  This was done in line with the procedure followed by Zabelina & Robinson 
(2010) to ensure analysis was more straightforward.  Based on the congruency of the target 
trial and of the prime trial preceding it, all of the 140 trials in the main block, apart from the 
first trial
22
, were coded as falling into one of these four categories (Cc, Ci, Ic or Ii).  Reaction 
times for each of these four categories were then averaged to produce mean reaction times for 
each.  The actual method of calculating reaction times involved calculating the log10 of 
reaction times for each of the 140 trials and then calculating the mean of these log10 reaction 
times within each of the four categories (Cc, Ci, Ic or Ii).      
                                                 
22
 The first trial was excluded because there was no trial preceding it hence it had no-prime. 
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Measures were calculated to reflect the difference between the effects of congruent and 
incongruent primes on reaction times on target trials.  The prime represents the ‘context’ in 
which cognitive control is adjusted on the target trial (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  The 
difference between the effects of congruent and incongruent primes on reaction times on 
congruent target trials has previously been used as a measure of the extent to which one 
flexibly lowers cognitive control on target trials in response to the changing context; the 
congruency of the prime trial (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  The reasoning being that if the 
prime is congruent participants will recruit less cognitive control compared to if the prime is 
incongruent, resulting in a more automatic mode of processing conducive to faster automatic 
responding to congruent targets.  
   
The difference between the effects of congruent and incongruent primes on reaction times on 
incongruent versus congruent target trials has previously been used as a measure of the extent 
to which one flexibly increases cognitive control on target trials in response to the changing 
context, the congruency of the prime trial (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  The reasoning being 
that if the prime is incongruent participants will recruit more cognitive control compared to if 
the prime is congruent, resulting in individuals entering a more controlled mode of 
processing.  This mode is more conducive to dealing with the colour-word mismatch on 
incongruent trials than a more automatic mode of processing and hence incongruent primes 
will speed responses to incongruent targets relative to congruent primes.   
 
A cognitive control flexibility score was also calculated for each participant that reflected the 
prime congruence effect on both congruent and incongruent targets and hence the extent to 
which one flexibly decreases and increases cognitive control on target trials in response to the 
changing context.  The formulae used to calculate these three measures are explained in the 
results section of this chapter.   
 
This theoretical model of how individuals flexibly switch between low and high cognitive 
control based on the changing context indicated by primes on the Stroop task is supported by 
evidence. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates differences in the effects of different 
primes across different target types.  As predicted, congruent primes speeded performance on 
congruent trials and incongruent primes speeded performance on incongruent trials (Zabelina 
& Robinson, 2010).  Other work examining flexible cognitive control on the Stroop task 
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(Kearns, 2004) and on the Simon task (Kearns, 2006) has demonstrated evidence of similar 
effects.  Thus the measures of cognitive control flexibility used by Zabelina & Robinson 
(2010) appear to be reliable.  
 
The measures of context dependent cognitive control flexibility on the Stroop task would 
appear to tap the extent to which one is able to shift between different modes of thinking.  
This suggests then that scores on the self-report scale measuring shifting competence will 
positively predict flexible cognitive control on the Stroop task.  Metacognitive awareness of 
the shifting process may also be related to flexible cognitive control.  Zabelina & Robinson 
(2010) suggest that a greater awareness of when automatic processing tendencies, 
characterized by low cognitive control, are not working may lead to greater recruitment of 
cognitive control.  This suggests that scores on metacognitive awareness of shifting may also 
positively predict flexible cognitive control on the Stroop task.  There was no clear reason to 
expect that the relationship between shifting competence or metacognitive awareness of 
shifting and the ability to flexibly modulate cognitive control would differ across everyday 
versus professional contexts. As such, predictions concerning the relationship between both 
facets of self-reported shifting and task based shifting were the same in both contexts.  Prior 
research has shown that scores on the abbreviated Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking and 
the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ), considered separately, positively predicted 
cognitive control flexibility scores on the Stroop task.  It was therefore predicted that 
cognitive control flexibility would be positively associated with measures of creativity in the 
present study.  
 
Mental set task      
 
This task was devised by Gasper (2003) and requires participants to form a 4 to 5 letter word 
from a string of letters without changing the letter order.  For example, from the letter string 
LBIKOPN you could form “lion” and from MSAXRCE you could form “mare” (A full list of 
the stimuli that Gasper (2003) previously used can be found in appendix 2).  Trials 1-6 prime 
participants to establish a set response strategy, known as a mental set, to solve the problem 
in the manner shown in the two aforementioned problems; namely to use every other letter 
starting with the first letter to form the name of an animal.  Trials 1-6 can only be solved by 
this strategy.  Trials 7-8 however can be solved by either using the mental set strategy or by 
merely noticing the obvious word that is embedded in the letter string.  For example, on trial 
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8 “FYROOMG” you could form “frog” using the mental set strategy or “room” by merely 
noticing the obvious word embedded in the letter string.  Trial 9 is designed to break 
participant’s mental set.  The letter string on this trial is “GNEVERZOE” and the mental set 
strategy “use every other letter” fails to produce a 4 to 5 letter word, only the “obvious word 
embedded” strategy does, allowing one to form the word “never”.  Like trials 7-8, Trials 10-
12 can be solved by using either of the two strategies.  It should be noted that if participants 
wrote down any 4 or 5 letter words which were judged to be real words but were not those 
formed by either the “obvious word embedded” or the “use every other letter” strategy they 
were still scored as using a strategy that differed from the mental set.   
 
There were three measures of switching on this task.  One was a dichotomous measure of 
whether or not participants broke away from using the mental set strategy, “use every other 
letter”, established on items 1 to 6, and were successful in forming a word on the set breaking 
item, item 9.  This measure thus reflects success in switching from the mental set strategy to a 
novel and appropriate alternate strategy.     The second measure was the tendency to switch to 
an alternate problem solving strategy, in response to the evidence on trial nine that the mental 
set strategy is problematic; that is, it couldn’t be used to form a real word on this trial 
(Gasper, 2003).  This measure was computed based on the proportion of trials after trial nine, 
on trials 10 to 12, on which a novel problem solving strategy was used.  The third measure 
was the tendency to switch to an alternate problem solving strategy prior to trial nine, on 
trials seven and eight.  This is a measure of flexibility when there is no context suggesting the 
necessity to switch to an alternative problem solving strategy may be useful (Gasper, 2003).  
There is no context because these two trials precede the trial, trial nine, on which the mental 
set strategy is shown to be problematic. 
   
The proportion of times that participants broke set after the set breaking item 9, on items 10 
to 12, was scored out of 3 and before the set breaking item was scored out of two, with higher 
scores indicating a greater proportion of times breaking set. 
 
This task therefore appears to have face validity as a measure of switching.  There currently 
exist no direct comparisons between performance on the mental set task used by Gasper 
(2003) and measures of switching that could be used to establish the mental set task’s validity 
as a measure of switching.  There is however evidence of correlations between skill transfer 
errors, which resemble the failure to break mental set on Lunchins (1942) problems, and a 
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latent measure of attentional disengagement formed from measures of attentional switching 
and inhibition (Woltz, Gardner & Gyll, 2000).  These findings lend some validity to the use 
of the mental set task as a measure of flexibly switching between engaging some processes 
while disengaging others (Woltz, Gardner & Gyll, 2000).  Gasper (2003) also suggested that 
the mental set task taps a key facet of creativity, namely flexibly generating a novel and 
appropriate alternate strategy when an established strategy has been shown to fail.  This 
suggests that the type of switching that is being measured on this task may reflect switching 
that occurs during the creative process.  This type of switching could also reflect shifting 
between modes of thinking, with set breaking involving individual’s moving from a rational 
analytic mode of thinking conducive to following the rule based mental set strategy to an 
associative mode conducive to adopting a novel problem solving strategy (Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013).   
 
The extent to which one is able to shift from an analytic to an associative mode of thinking 
would appear to be related to one’s ability to break set on all three of the above measures.  
Assessing the degree to which one’s current mode of thinking is functioning correctly would 
also appear to be important for successful performance on this task, as there is no explicit cue 
given to indicate when one should break set.  It was therefore predicted that both scores on 
the scales assessing shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting would 
predict breaking of mental set on all three measures of set-breaking.  There was no reason to 
expect that the relationship between shifting competence or metacognitive awareness of 
shifting and the ability to break mental set would differ across everyday versus professional 
contexts. As such, predictions concerning the relationship between both facets of self-
reported shifting and task based shifting were the same in both contexts.   
   
Plus-minus task 
 
This task was adapted from the paper and pencil plus-minus task used by Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki & Howerter (2000) and was programmed in e-prime 2.0.  Participants were 
asked to perform a series of problems requiring mental arithmetic in four different blocks.  In 
all blocks participants were presented with 30 trials with a different two-digit number 
between 10 and 99 in each.  The numbers presented on each trial across all blocks were 
generated randomly.  Participants were asked either to add 3 to each number or subtract 3 
from each number and presented with a space on the screen to type in their answers.  The 
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operations required, “+3” or “-3” were presented on the screen for the duration of trials in 
order that participants did not forget the operation required on each trial.  Participants were 
asked to solve the problems and type in their answers as quickly and accurately as they could.  
Prior to beginning the four main blocks of trials participants completed a short practice block 
where they performed one trial with each type of operation, adding 3 and subtracting 3.  This 
was done in order to make sure that they were clear about what the task required of them.  
The first block required them to add 3 to each of the numbers presented and the second block 
required them to subtract 3 from each of the presented numbers.   
 
The third and fourth blocks required them to alternate between performing addition and 
subtraction and consisted of 15 trials on which addition had to be performed and 15 trials on 
which subtraction had to be performed.  Switching between operations of addition and 
subtraction requires one to switch between different configurations of mental resources, 
termed mental or task sets (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000; Monsell, 
2003).  Switching between task sets has been shown to incur a switch cost in the form of 
slower and often more error prone performance when switching within a block in comparison 
to when only one task is performed within a block (Monsell, 2003). 
   
The third block required participants to alternate between different operations in a predictable 
fashion, beginning with a trial where they were instructed to add 3 followed by a trial where 
they were instructed to subtract 3, followed by a trial where they had to add 3 again and so 
on.  The fourth block required participants to alternate in an unpredictable fashion between 
different operations, with the 15 addition trials and 15 subtraction trials randomly interleaved 
throughout the block.  The present study included this block so that it was not possible to 
predict in advance which type of problem would follow the preceding one.  Monsell (2003) 
suggested that the switch cost is reduced by advanced knowledge of the following task so 
including a measure of the switch cost in unpredictable sequences could provide a measure 
that is more sensitive to picking up individual differences in switch costs   
 
The cost of switching in a predictable and unpredictable fashion between the operations of 
addition and subtraction was calculated based on two measures; the time taken to correctly 
solve arithmetic operations and the number of errors made.  The (predictable alternating) 
minus (single task) switch cost on both measures of time and errors was calculated by 
calculating the mean of the means for addition and subtraction blocks and subtracting this 
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score from the mean of the predictable alternating block.  The (unpredictable alternating) 
minus (single task) switch cost on both measures of time and errors was calculated by 
calculating the mean of the means for addition and subtraction blocks and subtracting this 
score from the mean of the unpredictable alternating block.  The time taken to correctly solve 
arithmetic operations on trials was log10 transformed and the mean log10 time taken to 
complete each of the four blocks was calculated.  The number of errors made on each of the 
blocks was also calculated and a log10 transformation applied to errors on each of the four 
blocks to correct for negative skew.     
 
There is evidence to suggest that switch costs, measured on the plus-minus task, capture the 
operation of a sub-set of executive processes.  Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki & 
Howerter (2000) performed a confirmatory factor analysis on nine different measures of 
executive functioning finding evidence for a latent shifting factor.  Switch costs were 
obtained on the plus-minus task.  They were also obtained on tasks where participants had to 
switch between examining local and global features of stimuli and between responding on the 
basis of a number or a letter, in a number-letter pair, based on the spatial position of the pair 
in a quadrant.  Other executive tasks, lacking a switching component, loaded onto separate 
factors of updating and monitoring working memory, or inhibition of pre-potent responses.  
The evidence that switch costs on the plus-minus task load onto a latent factor together with 
other measures of switching lends validity to the use of the switch cost on the plus-minus task 
as a measure of executive switching.   
 
It was predicted that scores on shifting competence would predict switch costs on the plus-
minus task as both appear to capture the capacity to shift/switch.  Scores on metacognitive 
awareness of shifting would not be expected to predict switch costs as the need to switch 
between the goals of addition and subtraction is self-evident from the task instructions.  There 
therefore appears to be no need to assess whether the strategy one has chosen is functioning 
correctly (Thompson, 2009).   
 
Kaufman-domains of creativity scale (K-DOCS)  
 
This measure asks participants to report how creative they rate themselves at performing a 
variety of different acts such as ‘helping other people cope with a difficult situation’ and 
‘figuring out how to fix a buggy computer’.  There are 50 acts in total which fall into 5 
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different domains of creativity; self/everyday, scholarly, performance, mechanical/scientific 
and artistic.  The measure asks participants to indicate how creative they think that they are in 
comparison to people of approximately the same age and life experience as them.  For given 
acts that participants have not performed, they are asked to estimate their creative potential 
based on their performance on similar tasks.  Participants were asked to indicate responses to 
each act on a 5 point scale, from much less creative to much more creative than their peers of 
approximately the same age and life experience.  Performance was scored by summing the 
scores of all the acts that refer to the same domain.  Items 1-11 comprise self-everyday 
creativity, items 12-22 comprise scholarly creativity, items 23-32 comprise performance 
creativity, items 33-41 comprise mechanical/scientific creativity and items 42-50 comprise 
artistic creativity.  The full K-DOCs is shown in appendix 3. 
 
The following explains the reasoning behind the hypotheses concerning which facets of 
shifting, that is shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting were expected 
to predict scores on which domains of creativity on the Kaufman-domains of creativity scale.  
Kaufman & Baer’s (2010) Amusement Park theoretical model of creativity suggests that 
some abilities may be more important to success in some creative domains while other 
abilities may be more important to success in others.  A tentative rationale for hypotheses was 
therefore proposed based on differences in the types of abilities that would appear to be 
important in performing creative acts in different domains.   
 
It was predicted that within the mechanical/scientific domain, where established methods of 
operating may be deeply entrenched, a strong shift may be required to break away from an 
entrenched analytic mode of thinking to enter an associate mode conducive to generating 
novelty. For example, items on the mechanical/scientific scale include “writing a computer 
program”, “carving something out of wood or similar material” and “helping to carry out or 
design a scientific experiment”.   These items all appear to represent activities which require 
an extended sequence of step by step activities appearing to require analytic thinking.  For 
example, “writing a computer program” presumably draws on a step-by-step sequence of 
logical coding rules, “carving something out of wood” on a tried and tested sequence of 
measuring dimensions and using tools and  “helping to carry out or design a scientific 
experiment” on following a set sequence of rules to establish that the experiment has the 
required rigour.  To produce creative solutions on these activities may therefore require a 
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strong shift from an entrenched analytic sequence of thinking to an associative mode 
conducive to the generation of novelty.   
 
This line of reasoning suggests that the extent to which one is able to shift, that is shifting 
competence, will positively predict scores on the Kaufman-domains of creativity 
mechanical/scientific scale.  It is less clear how metacognitive awareness of shifting might be 
related to mechanical/scientific creativity.  It could however be important to be aware of 
when the analytic mode of thinking is not working, for example when a rule based strategy 
for computer programming is not working, engaging the associative mode to generate a 
workaround may help one reach a solution.  Based on this line of reasoning, it was tentatively 
proposed that metacognitive awareness of shifting would positively predict scores on the 
Kaufman-domains of creativity mechanical/scientific scale.   
 
Within the domain of artistic creativity, metacognition may be important to monitor the 
degree to which one’s current mode of thinking is functioning correctly so as an optimal 
point is reached between idea generation and evaluation (Basadur, 1995).  There is also some 
evidence supporting the importance of metacognition in the artistic domain.  Fayena-Tawil, 
Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011) conducted a study examining the thinking processes of artists and 
non-artists as they created original drawings, finding that artists evidenced more 
metacognition concerning monitoring the emerging progress of drawings than non-artists.  It 
was therefore predicted that metacognitive awareness of shifting would positively predict 
scores on the Kaufman-domains of creativity artistic scale.  The capacity to shift may still aid 
the process of actually conducting shifts between different modes of thinking during the 
creative process in the artistic domain.  As such it was tentatively predicted that shifting 
competence would also predict scores on the Kaufman-domains of creativity artistic scale.  
 
The relationships between self-reported shifting and creativity on the K-DOCs may differ 
based on whether self-reported shifting is assessed in a professional versus everyday context.  
The reasoning here was that since the majority of participants were students, they may 
engage in a different set of activities described in the Kaufman-domains of creativity scales in 
their studies, that is within the professional context, compared to in the everyday context 
outside of their studies.  For example, engineering students may engage in activities within 
the mechanical/scientific domain in their studies but engage in other activities unrelated to 
their studies (e.g. music) in the everyday context.  As such, the relationship between self-
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reported shifting and creativity may differ in the professional context compared to the 
everyday context.  It was not clear how self-reported shifting would be associated with self-
reported shifting in other K-DOCs creativity domains other than mechanical/scientific and 
artistic.  Hence no specific predictions were made. 
 
Product improvement task 
 
This task is part of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974). For this task 
participants were asked to list the cleverest, most interesting and unusual ways they could 
think of for changing a stuffed toy elephant so that children would have more fun playing 
with it.  Participants were instructed to write down their responses on the test forms and, in 
accordance with instructions given by Torrance (1974), they were given ten minutes in which 
to write down their responses.  The product improvement task comes with a soft toy elephant 
which was placed in front of participants so that they could view it for the task duration.  The 
Torrance tests of creative thinking have a manual for scoring the product improvement task 
(Torrance, 1974).  The total fluency score is calculated by adding up all appropriate 
responses.  The total score for originality consists of the total number of responses that are 
distinct from the items on this list.  Also listed in the manual are different categories that 
responses fall into.   For example suggestions for adding bells and adding a squeaker would 
both fall into the same category of ‘adding things that means the toy will make a noise’.  The 
suggestion to give it a removable trunk would fall into a different category.  The total score 
for flexibility consists of the total number of different categories that a participant’s responses 
fall into. 
 
Tests of divergent thinking like the Torrance tests (1974) do not measure creativity per se but 
can be used as a measure of the ideation component of  creativity (Runco, 2010.; Plucker & 
Makel, 2010).  Runco (2010) points out that ideation involves both the generation of ideas 
and judgements and evaluations of them.  A close inspection of the product improvement 
subtest suggests that it does involve both idea generation and evaluation.  The product 
improvement subtest requires individuals to generate novel ways of changing an existing 
stuffed toy elephant so that children would have more fun playing with it.  The instructions 
and scoring criteria specify that responses must be focused on things that could conceivably 
make the toy more fun for children to play with and do not instead fulfil different purposes, 
such as making the toy do your homework (Torrance, 1974).  Since this task requires the 
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generation of ideas which also must have utility in fulfilling the purpose of making the toy 
more fun to play with, it would appear to involve shifts between modes (Howard-Jones, 
2002; Cropley & Kaufman, 2012).     
  
While there are often large correlations between measures of fluency, flexibility and 
originality they have each been shown to convey some unique information (Runco, 2010).  
As such performance on the product improvement task was analysed based on performance 
on each measure separately.  Since this task appears to involve shifting, it was predicted that 
scores on the shifting scales would positively predict fluency, flexibility and originality.  
There was no prior evidence to suggest that this relationship would differ as a function of the 
facet of shifting (shifting competence or metacognitive awareness of shifting) or the context 
of shifting (everyday or professional).  Hence no predictions at this level of specificity were 
made. 
 
Disposable coffee cup design task 
 
For this task participants were presented with a brief asking them to solve a problem 
concerning flaws with a disposable coffee cup and, in the process, come up with their own 
designs for disposable coffee cups.  Participants were presented with a brief with instructions 
for the task, a set of constraints that designs must adhere to and also a set of criteria 
previously used by Silvia et al. (2008) to assess originality.  Participants were presented with 
these criteria to emphasize ways that they could make the designs more original.  It has 
previously been shown that when participants are presented with instructions to ‘be creative’ 
they produce more creative output (Christensen et al., 1957; Runco, Illies & Eisenman, 
2005).  The instructions used in the present study provide three concrete ways in which 
participants could make their designs original and, together with earlier instructions to 
produce ‘creative’ designs, they should prime participants to maximise their motivation to 
produce original and creative designs for disposable coffee cups.   
 
 
Prior to commencing and for the duration of the task, participants were presented with an 
illustrated example of a design for a disposable, spill-proof coffee cup (see figure 13 below).  
This problem has been used in previous experiments to induce fixation; that is when 
presented with the illustrated example participants included in their designs significantly 
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more elements from the example design than a group of students who were presented with no 
example design (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  The effect of 
fixation persists even when participants are explicitly told to avoid using the features inherent 
in the examples (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  Fixation may 
reflect relatively less shifting during the creative process, being a measure of difficulty 
shifting from an analytic mode of thinking characterised by focused attention to an 
associative mode characterised by a broader attentional focus (Howard-Jones & Murray, 
2003).  Participants were asked to show their work on paper by drawing as many designs as 
they could within the time available and writing short comments with each.  They were given 
13 minutes in total for this task.    
 
 
Figure 13. illustrated example of a design for a disposable, spill-proof coffee cup taken from Jansson and  Smith 
(1991).     
 
Performance on this task was scored based on three different measures of performance.  One 
measure examined participant’s ability to avoid fixation on the example design in figure 5 
when producing their own designs.  The coding scheme devised by Chrysikou & Weisberg 
(2005) was used in order to assess the extent to which participants evidenced fixation on the 
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example design in figure 13.  This coding scheme, shown in table 18 below, identifies 
different facets (eg. direct physical similarity, analogical similarity) and specific instances of 
each facet that may be present in designs produced by participants. 
 
Table 17. Coding scheme for different facets of similarity present in the examples from Chrysikou & Weisberg 
(2005).  The numbers on the far right indicate the individual scores given to each specific example of each facet 
e.g. there are 2 examples of the facet “Unintentional flaws”, a narrower base than the top and a straw 
permanently attached to the lid.  If a participant’s design evidenced both of these it would get 2 points, if it 
evidenced one it would only get 1 and if it evidenced none of these it would be given zero points.  
 
 
 
Each design was scored out of 13, with higher scores indicating those designs that contained 
more facets from the example design and hence evidenced greater fixation on the example 
design (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  One rater coded the designs for the presence of all 13 
specific instances of these facets occurring in the example design.  Following the procedure 
used by Chrysikou & Weisberg (2005), a second independent rater then coded 68% of the 
designs in the sample. In order to examine coding agreement between independent raters, 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated across each of the five measures of 
fixation.  These revealed high correlations for direct physical similarity (r = .82), 
reproductive similarity (r = .84) and unintentional flaws (r = .75) but somewhat lower 
correlations for analogical similarity (r= .51) and intentional flaws (r =.52).  In light of the 
relatively low coding agreement for unintentional flaws and analogical similarity the decision 
was made to exclude these items from the calculation of a total score for fixation.  The total 
fixation score was therefore calculated out of 8 and not 13.  A total fixation score for each 
participant was calculated by summing scores for direct physical similarity, reproductive 
similarity and unintentional flaws for each of the designs that each participant produced.  
This score was then divided by the maximum fixation score that participants could have 
obtained on the three aforementioned facets, a score of 8, multiplied by the total number of 
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designs that each participant produced (Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  This resulted in a 
total fixation score that was not confounded by the number of designs produced.   
 
The second measure of performance was the total number of designs that participants 
produced.  It was sometimes not clear how many different designs participants had produced.  
As such, the reliability of this measure was assessed by examining the agreement between 
two independent raters who each totalled up the number of designs produced by 68% of the 
sample.  Pearson’s correlations coefficients revealed a very high level of agreement between 
raters (r= .93) for the total number of designs produced across participants.          
 
The third measure of performance was a consensual assessment of the functional creativity of 
disposable coffee cup designs (Cropley & Kaufman, 2012).  Two independent raters and the 
experimenter rated all designs on all 24 items of the revised creative solution diagnosis scale 
(Cropley & Kaufman, 2012).   Following ratings being given on all 24 items, all designs were 
also rated for their overall creativity.  Ratings were made on a 5 point likert scale, with “not 
at all”, “somewhat” and “very much” as verbal anchors.  All participants in the sample 
(N=56) produced designs and many participants produced more than one design.  This 
resulted in a total of 119 designs, all of which were individually rated.  The raters were 
instructed that they should look at all designs across the entire sample (N=56) first before 
rating them.  Raters were also instructed that they should rate all designs on each of the 24 
items relative to the other designs in the sample rather than against some absolute standard 
for coffee cup design (Amabile, 1996).  They were also instructed that it was important that 
they made use of the entire 1 to 5 scale and not assign all designs the same rating.  The 
suggestion was also made that raters should feel free to go back and review ratings that they 
gave earlier in the process once they had rated many of the designs as this would help to 
ensure consistency in rating throughout the process.  The order in which the 56 participant’s 
designs were rated was randomised across the two independent raters.  It was not feasible to 
randomise the entire set of 119 designs across raters because participants often drew multiple 
designs on the same piece of paper.   
 
The items were rated in the order that they were set out in the creative solution diagnosis 
scale in Cropley & Kaufman (2012) and this order was consistent across raters so as all 
judgments made on similar items, such as those relating to novelty, were made together (D. 
Cropley, personal communication, November 6, 2013).  The final rating of the overall 
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creativity of designs was always the last item that was rated because, as Cropley & Kaufman 
(2012) point out, reading item descriptions and using them may function as informal training 
in rating the overall functional creativity of designs.  The overall functional creativity of 
designs was the only CSDS measure used in the present study.  The reason for this was that 
there was a clear theoretical rationale to suggest that scores on the self-report shifting scales 
would predict functional creativity.  Factor analysis has revealed that scores on the 24 items 
of the CSDS consist of five distinct dimensions; relevance and effectiveness, 
problematization, propulsion, elegance and genesis.  It has been argued that these represent 
specific facets of functional creativity (Cropley & Kaufman, 2012).  However there was no 
clear theoretical basis to suggest that specific dimensions on the CSDS would be associated 
with scores on the self-report shifting scales.   
 
The two independent raters and the experimenter had a trial run rating two designs using the 
revised CSDS.  A meeting was then held to discuss any problems encountered in using the 
scale and differences in interpretation of items across raters discussed.  Common definitions 
of items were clarified based on this.  After all designs had been rated, the consistency of 
ratings across raters was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951).  Cronbach’s 
alpha showed a moderate level of consistency of ratings of functional creativity across raters 
(α= .68).  This is above α= .66 which has been argued to be the minimally acceptable 
threshold for Cronbach’s alpha (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby & Herron, 1996).  Average 
ratings of functional creativity were calculated for each design across all participants (N = 
127) by calculating the mean of ratings given to each participant across the three raters.  A 
single score for functional creativity was calculated for each participant by taking the mean of 
a participants two most creative designs.  In the case of participants who only produced one 
design the rating for that one design was used.  This is similar to the procedure used by Silvia 
et al. (2008) and was preferable to average ratings across all designs produced by each 
participant.  Assessing functional creativity based on only the two most creative designs 
produced by each participant does not penalize participants for generating many uncreative 
responses (Silvia et al., 2008).   
 
The generation of novel ideas and evaluation of their usefulness is a characteristic of 
functional creativity (Cropley & Kaufman, 2011).  It was therefore predicted that the self-
report shifting scales which appear to assess shifting between a mode of thinking supporting 
idea generation and a mode supporting evaluation would positively predict functional 
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creativity.  It was not clear however whether shifting competence or metacognitive awareness 
of shifting or both would predict functional creativity on this measure.  As such, no specific 
hypotheses were formed concerning whether there would be a difference between which of 
the facets of shifting would predict functional creativity.  The measure of the number of 
designs produced on this task would appear to primarily involve generative thinking and 
involve little evaluative thinking.  It was therefore predicted that the self-report shifting scales 
would not predict performance on this measure.   
 
Overcoming fixation would appear to represent the extent to which one is able to engage the 
associative mode of thinking to break out of a rut.  Shifting competence was therefore 
expected to predict the ability to avoid fixation on this task. It does also appear possible that 
one’s ability to assess the degree to which one’s current mode of thinking is functioning 
correctly could help identify that one should shift from an analytic to a more associative 
mode of thinking when fixation is experienced.  As such, it was also predicted that 
metacognitive awareness of shifting would predict the ability to avoid fixation.  There was no 
clear reason to expect that the relationship between shifting competence or metacognitive 
awareness of shifting and functional creativity or fixation on the coffee cup design task would 
differ across everyday versus professional contexts. Predictions concerning the relationship 
between self-reported shifting and measures of performance on the coffee cup design task 
were therefore the same in both contexts.        
     
Remote associate problems (RAPs) 
 
There is evidence that successful performance on a task that requires switching between the 
generation of different novel strategies within constraints predicts performance on a measure 
of insight (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005).  There is other evidence that the ability to resist 
switch costs on a plus-minus task, an ability that requires switching between the goals of 
addition and subtraction, is not related to performance on measures of insight, instead being 
positively associated with performance on non-insight problems (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009).   
Remote associate problems were included in the present study as there is evidence that they 
can be solved both via insightful and strategic, non-insightful means (Bowden & Jung-
Beeman, 2003).  For the purposes of the present study, they therefore allow an examination 
of the relationship between scores on the self-report measure of shifting modes separately for 
performance on problems solved via non-insight and insight processes. 
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Participants completed remote associate problems as described in chapter two of this thesis, 
with the following differences. In this study RAPs were delivered to participants on a 
computerised task programmed in e-prime 2.0.  Participants were given fifteen seconds on 
each problem within which to identify a solution word.  E-prime software recorded the time 
from the problem being presented to the time when the spacebar was pressed as the time 
taken to generate a solution.  After pressing the spacebar to indicate that they had identified a 
target word, or if no solution was generated after fifteen seconds had passed, participants 
were then instructed to type their solutions onto the screen.   Participants were given a time 
limit of 5 seconds within which to type their solutions in order to prevent them from engaging 
in solution generation at this stage.  A final screen required participants to input numbers 
from 1 to 5 indicating, as was the case in chapter two, how they had generated the solution; 
via insight or non-insight.   
 
Thirty six target words and their respective solution words were chosen for the present task 
from 144 examples collated by Bowden & Jung-Beeman (2003).  Some of these 144 
examples were used previously in chapter two of this thesis.  Based on the average insight 
ratings given on problems in chapter two, fourteen problems which received high mean 
insight ratings, scores of 4 or 5 in chapter two, were selected to be used in the present study.   
Fourteen problems that received low mean insight ratings, scores of 1 or 2 in chapter two, 
were also selected to be used in the present study.  This was done in order to maximise the 
chances of participants reporting that they solved at least some problems by insight and 
others by strategic means.  This was crucial so that performance on RAPs when insightful 
processes were driving successful solution generation could be compared to performance 
when solution generation was driven by more strategic processes.  Eight more problems were 
included that received a mean insight rating of 3 in chapter two.  There were therefore 36 
remote associate problems in total.   
 
These 36 problems formed the main block with problems presented in a randomised order 
across participants.  Four measures of performance on remote associate problems were 
calculated. Measures of the proportion of problems on which correct solutions were 
generated and the mean time to produce correct solutions across all problems was calculated.  
The mean time to produce correct solutions was calculated from the mean of a participant’s 
log10 transformed times to produce correct solutions.  Measures of the proportion of problems 
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on which correct solutions were generated was also calculated separately, on a participant to 
participant basis, based on problems solved correctly that participant’s assigned insight 
ratings of 4 or 5 to and those solved correctly that they assigned insight ratings of 1 or 2 to.  
This resulted in separate measures, respectively, of correct solution generation driven by 
insightful processes in comparison to correct solution generation driven by strategic 
processes.  Measures of the mean time to generate correct solutions on problems solved via 
insight and strategic processes were also calculated. 
 
As there is evidence for a relationship between both switching and insight (Gilhooly & 
Murphy, 2005) and switching and non-insight problem solving (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009) 
the present study will test both hypotheses.  There was no prior evidence to suggest that this 
relationship would differ as a function of the facet of shifting (shifting competence or 
metacognitive awareness of shifting) or the context of shifting (everyday or professional).  
Hence no predictions at this level of specificity were made. 
   
WASI matrix reasoning task 
 
The matrix reasoning subtest from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999) was used as a means of assessing IQ.  It should be noted that this test only 
provides an approximate age adjusted T-score estimate of IQ.  The two-subtest version that is 
required in order to provide a means of assessing full-scale IQ requires that the vocabulary 
subtest be administered alongside the matrix reasoning subtest.  However because the tasks in 
this study were administered in a group setting it was not possible to administer the 
vocabulary subtest as it requires feedback to be given between the experimenter and 
participants on a one to one basis.  Due to timing considerations for the study as a whole the 
matrix reasoning subtest of the WASI was the best candidate to provide an approximate 
measure of IQ that could be completed in a relatively short period of time and in a group 
setting.  The two-subtest version of the WASI has demonstrated concurrent validity with the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) (r = .71), which has been extensively 
validated as a measure of full scale IQ (Axelrod, 2002).  The matrix reasoning subtest of the 
WASI has also demonstrated concurrent validity with Raven’s (r = .49), a measure of general 
fluid intelligence (Gf) (Kane & Miyake, 2007).   
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There is evidence to suggest that individual differences in the extent to which students are 
able to shift between different modes of thinking is independent of variation in IQ (Dorfman, 
Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008).  It was thus hypothesized that self-reported 
shifting competence would predict performance on measures of creativity independently of 
IQ.    
 
Automated Reading span (ARSPAN) task 
 
This task was used as a measure of verbal working memory requiring participants to read 
sentences while they simultaneously remembered the order that a previously presented set of 
unrelated letters were presented in.  An automated version of the reading span task 
programmed in e-prime was obtained from the Georgia Tech working memory lab 
(Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock & Engle, 2005).  The task had two components to it; remembering 
sequences of letters in the correct order and judging if sentences were sensical or non-
sensical.  Strings of unrelated letters of various lengths were presented to participants.  
Following presentation of these letters participants had to click on boxes presented on a 
screen to indicate the order that they thought the letters were presented in.  After recall, 
feedback about the number of letters recalled in the previously presented letter string was 
provided. For the other component, participants were presented with sentences of 10 to 15 
words long and required to read each sentence to determine whether it was sensical or non-
sensical.  Participants indicated whether they thought the sentences were sensical by clicking 
on either a ‘true’ or ‘false’ box on the screen.  Half the sentences presented were sensical and 
half were non-sensical.  An example of a sensical sentence is “the prosecutors case was lost 
because it was not based on fact”.  Non-sensical sentences were formed by replacing one of 
the words in a sensical sentence with a different word that ensured the sentence no longer 
made sense.  For example, this could be achieved in the aforementioned example by inserting 
the word ‘dish’ in place of the word ‘case’.   
 
 
Participants first completed a practice session with a series of trials where they had to 
remember and enter in the correct order a series of letters.  They then completed a separate 
practice session with a series of trials requiring them to judge if sentences were sensical or 
non-sensical.  In addition to familiarising participants with the sentence judgement task this 
practice was also used to calculate how long it would take the participant to make sentence 
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judgements.  After the sentence judgement practice was completed the program calculated 
participant’s mean time to make sentence judgements.  Participants then completed a final 
practice session where they performed both the letter presentation and sentence judgement 
trials sequentially.  Participants were first presented with a sentence judgement trial followed 
by a trial where a letter appeared on the screen.  If the participant took more time to provide a 
response on the sentence judgement task than their mean time plus 2.5 standard deviations 
(SD), the program automatically moved participants on to the trial when a letter was 
presented.  The mean plus 2.5 SD limit was based on extensive piloting by Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock & Engle (2005).  This was done to prevent rehearsal of the letters when participants 
should have been performing the sentence judgement task.  After sequences of sentence 
judgement trials and letters had been presented, participants were asked to perform the letter 
recall task.  After practice sessions were completed, the program presented the main block of 
trials with sequences of letters of between 3 and 7 letters interleaved with sentence judgement 
trials.  All participants completed three repetitions of each set size but the order in which sets 
were completed was randomised across participants.  75 letters and 75 sentences were 
presented in total.  It was important that participants were attempting to remember letters and 
perform the sentence judgement task correctly.  As such, an 85 % criterion for accuracy was 
imposed.  Participants received feedback on their accuracy in order to encourage them to 
keep up an accuracy rate of 85 % or above throughout.  
 
Once all trials had been completed the program automatically displayed five different scores.  
The first was an absolute storage score that is the sum of trials only on which all letters were 
recalled in the correct serial order.  A total score was presented which was the sum of letters 
recalled in the correct serial position across all trials, regardless of whether all letters in the 
trial were recalled in the correct serial position or not.  Processing errors, the total number of 
errors made on the sentence judgement trials; speed errors, the number of sentence judgement 
trials which were not answered before the time limit and accuracy errors, the number of 
sentence judgement trials which were answered incorrectly were also recorded.  The total 
score was used in the current study as previous research has shown it to have better 
psychometric properties than the absolute storage score (Redick, Broadway, Meier, 
Kuriakose, Unsworth, Kane & Engle, 2012).   
 
There was no known prior research that had examined the relationship between shifting 
between modes of thinking and creativity controlling for differences in working memory.  As 
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such no specific predictions were made concerning whether self-reported shifting would 
predict creativity independently of working memory 
 
Verbal fluency task 
 
Verbal fluency was measured in order to control for the effects of individual differences in 
participant’s ability to fluently generate words which could have affected performance on the 
word-based measure of switching on Gasper’s (2003) mental set task and the remote 
associate problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003).  Verbal fluency was assessed using the 
FAS test previously described in chapter two of the present thesis. 
 
Summary of predictions 
 
This section summarises the hypotheses across all measures outlined in this chapter.  Shifting 
competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting were expected to evidence concurrent 
validity with task based measures that appear to capture shifts between modes of thinking.  
Specifically, shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting were expected to 
positively predict one’s ability to break set on the set breaking item of the mental set task and 
one’s ability to flexibly modulate cognitive control on the Stroop task.  Self-reported shifting 
was expected to predict performance on the plus-minus task, which appears to capture 
strategy switching.  These relationships were expected to be the same when self-reported 
shifting was assessed in the everyday and professional contexts.   
 
Shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting were both expected to 
positively predict self-reported creativity on the mechanical/scientific and artistic scales of 
the K-DOCs.  These relationships were expected to be different when self-reported shifting 
was assessed in the professional compared to when it was assessed in the everyday context.  
Self-reported shifting was expected to positively predict functional creativity and one’s 
ability to avoid fixation on the coffee cup design task, with no differences expected when 
self-reported shifting was assessed in an everyday versus a professional context.  Self-
reported shifting was expected to positively predict divergent thinking on the product 
improvement task, with no differences again expected when self-reported shifting was 
assessed in an everyday versus a professional context.  Self-reported shifting was also 
expected to positively predict performance on remote associate problems solved via insight 
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processes, with no differences expected when self-reported shifting was assessed in an 
everyday versus a professional context.   
 
It was predicted that working memory would be associated with measures of self-reported 
and task based shifting/switching and that inhibition and IQ would be associated with 
measures of creativity.         
   
Counterbalancing the order of task/questionnaire presentation       
 
The order in which tasks/questionnaire measures were completed was counterbalanced across 
participants.  This was done in order to limit any systematic effects in the data that could arise 
from carryover effects resulting from performing the previous tasks/questionnaire.  Due to 
the high ratio of the number of tasks/questionnaires to the number of participants taking part 
in the study, it was not possible to fully counterbalance the order that tasks/questionnaires 
were completed across participants.  Instead a balanced latin squares design was used which 
resulted in every single measure following every other measure once ("Counterbalanced 
measures design," 2013).  The balanced latin square was originally calculated based on there 
being a total of 12 tasks and questionnaires that were to be administered.  However after pilot 
testing revealed that the time to perform all twelve tasks took longer than originally planned 
one of the measures, a measure of visuo-spatial working memory, was not included in the 
final set of tasks.  The balanced latin square is shown in table 19 below. 
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Table 18. balanced latin square.   
 
 
 
In table 19, the rows represent the sequence in which participants completed the different 
task/questionnaire measures.  The column titled ‘order’ represents twelve sequences, with the 
sequence of tasks completed in twelve different orders.  Each participant was assigned to 
complete tasks in one of these twelve orders.  Twenty four participants completed two full 
sets of each order, from one to 12.  There was a third latin square missing two participants out 
of twelve, a fourth latin square was missing four participants, a fifth latin square was missing 
nine participants and a sixth was missing two participants.  The reason for the large number 
of incomplete latin squares was that a large proportion of the sample was tested in groups, 
which necessitated participants in the same group completing the task/questionnaire measures 
in the same order.            
 
The red boxes indicate where the visuo-spatial working memory task would have appeared in 
the sequences had it been included in the study.  Even though this task was excluded, the 
balanced latin square in table 19 still partially met the requirements of the method of 
counterbalancing chosen by ensuring that every single measure followed every other measure 
at least once.  So across the twelve participants who completed the twelve different orders 
  
155 
 
each task/questionnaire measure followed every other measure at least once.  However, it 
also meant that some task/questionnaire measures followed others twice.  For example, in 
order two in table 19, the visuospatial working memory task, “7”, was supposed to be 
performed between tasks “10” and “9”.  Since this task was omitted it was task “9” that 
actually followed “10” in order two.  Task “9” however also followed task “10” in order 
three.  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants completed all of the above tasks and questionnaires in computer labs in the 
departments of Psychology at the University of Surrey, University of Hertfordshire and 
University of Reading.  All tasks and questionnaires were completed individually but some 
participants completed these measures within groups in parallel with other participants.  
Group sizes varied from 1 to a maximum of 6.  Experimenters explained instructions and 
presented participants with the stimulus materials for the WASI matrix reasoning task and the 
test of verbal fluency.  The instructions and stimuli for all other tasks were either presented to 
participants on sheets of paper for them to read or, in the case of the computerised tasks, were 
explained within the computer programs.  Participants were provided with all worksheets and 
stationary required to record their responses on all tasks.  Once participants had completed all 
of the tasks they were asked to provide their age and their gender and, if they wished to be 
included in the prize draw or informed of the results from the study, to write down their email 
addresses.     
 
Participants either completed all measures in one session with a break in the middle, usually 
after they had completed the fifth or sixth task/questionnaire, or they completed tasks and 
questionnaires in two separate sessions, with five tasks completed in one session and six tasks 
completed in a second session.  If participants chose to complete all the tasks and 
questionnaires in one session the study lasted a total of two hours 15 minutes including a 
break for fifteen minutes in the middle where participants were provided with refreshments.  
If participants chose to complete the tasks in two separate sessions then the study lasted 2 
hours, with each session lasting an hour.  Once the experiment had been completed 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.        
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Results 
 
 
Data pre-processing 
 
 
One participant, participant ID 55, was excluded from all subsequent analysis as they did not 
complete the ARSPAN measure of working memory.  It is also important to note that four
23
 
participants reported during the experiment that they were non-native English speakers and 
one participant reported that they had mild dyslexia. Performance on the remote associate 
problems, the mental set task and the measures of verbal fluency and verbal working memory 
could be sensitive to differences in language ability between native and non-native English 
speakers.  All analyses involving these tasks were therefore run in parallel on the sample with 
the non-native English speakers and dyslexic included and then findings checked against 
analyses excluding the non-native speakers and dyslexic to examine if there were any 
differences.  Any differences found were reported within the sections that follow.    
 
Procedure used to correct for multiple comparisons 
 
A large number of tests were run examining relationships between different measures.  Since 
running a large number of tests increased the probability of finding significant effects by 
chance, the p-values used to determine whether effects were significant had to be corrected 
for multiple comparisons.  Bivariate correlations were considered to be exploratory and as 
such these were not corrected for multiple comparisons.  They were considered as 
exploratory in the sense that they were used to inform which regressions should be 
performed.  Only partial correlations and regressions were used to directly test hypothesised 
relationships between shifting scale scores and task/questionnaire based measures of 
shifting/switching and creativity.  The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure was used to correct for 
the false discovery rate in multiple comparisons across all partial correlations and regressions 
that were run; a total of 111 tests (Thissen, Steinberg & Kuang, 2002).  It was used as an 
alternative to the bonferroni correction in this study as it is less conservative and therefore 
less likely to reduce the power of the large number of tests that were run (Thissen, Steinberg 
& Kuang, 2002).  This method involves arranging the p-values from each test from within a 
                                                 
23
 this was in effect three as participant ID 55 was one of the non-native English speakers but, as mentioned 
earlier, they were already excluded from further analyses as they did not complete the ARSPAN measure.  
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family of multiple test statistics in descending order from largest to smallest.  Each p-value is 
given an ‘index’ starting from 1 for the largest p-value and increasing sequentially in steps of 
one for smaller p-values.  A critical value is then computed to determine which observed p-
values are significant using the formula, (total number of tests performed – index + 1) * .05) / 
(2 * total number of tests performed).  Using this method only the smallest p-value is 
compared to the bonferroni critical value, all other p-values are compared to a less stringent 
critical value.  This approach controls the false discovery rate so that it remains less than α/2. 
The use of the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure is highlighted in the following sections where 
partial correlations and regressions are reported.   
 
It is important to note that the overall purpose of this study was exploratory in nature, being 
intended to suggest avenues for future research rather than test existing theory.  There is a 
view that one should not correct for multiple comparisons in exploratory research (Rothman, 
1990).  In light of this, the results of regressions and partial correlations are reported without 
corrections for multiple comparisons.  However, it is noted which specific partial correlations 
and regressions remained significant when multiple comparisons were corrected for.  Results 
from analyses that were significant before corrections for multiple comparisons were applied 
are still discussed. However, those results found to be significant after multiple comparisons 
were corrected for were given prominence as they were the most robust findings. 
 
Correlation matrices displaying inter-correlations between all measures 
 
A series of bivariate correlations were run in order to gain an overview of relationships 
between self-report measures of shifting between modes of thinking, tasked based measures 
of switching/shifting and task and questionnaire based measures of creativity as well as the 
measures of working memory, inhibition, IQ and verbal fluency.  These correlations are 
referred to throughout the sections which follow.  A correlation matrix displaying these 
bivariate correlations across the entire sample (N= 54) is shown in table 20.  Table 22 
displays bivariate correlations between all task/questionnaire measures and measures of 
performance on remote associate problems, separately for problems solved via insight versus 
problems solved by strategic, non-insightful means.  One participant was excluded from 
analyses examining RAPs solved by insight versus non-insight because they failed to solve 
any problems by either insight or non-insight.  The sample size for these analyses was 
therefore N=53.   
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Table 21 displays correlations between the three measures of set breaking on the mental set 
task and all other measures but only for a sub-sample of participants who fully-formed the 
mental set in the first place.  In order for participants to fully form the mental set they must 
have completed all items prior to the set breaking item using the mental set strategy.  
Otherwise it would not be clear if participants used a strategy different from the mental set 
because they broke the set or because they never established the mental set in the first place 
(Gasper, 2003).  Excluding participants who had not fully-formed the mental set resulted in 
an N=33.  Results of the analyses from the sub-sample of participants who had fully-formed 
the mental set was compared to those using the full-sample of 54 and any differences in 
findings noted.  It is important to note that whether or not the mental set was broken on the 
set breaking item was a dichotomous variable.  However, correlations involving this variable 
were still reported.  The reason for this is that a point-biserial Pearson’s correlation can be 
computed when one variable in the correlation is a discrete dichotomy with no underlying 
continuum (Field, 2009).  
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Table 19. Bivariate correlations between all measures of performance across all tasks and questionnaires based on the entire sample (N= 54)    
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Table 20. Bivariate correlations between the two measures of set breaking on the mental set task and all other measures based on the sub-sample of full-set formers (N= 33)            
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Table 21. Bivariate correlations between the RAPs measures of insight and strategic problem solving and all other measures based on a sub-sample (N= 53)   
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Abbreviations are still used at times to stand for the four different scales of the self-report 
measure of shifting.  These abbreviations are as follows: metacognitive awareness of shifting 
between modes of thinking in a professional context (SP awareness), metacognitive 
awareness of shifting between modes of thinking in an everyday context (SE awareness), 
competence at shifting between modes of thinking in a professional context (SP competence), 
competence at shifting between modes of thinking in an everyday context (SE competence).  
For correlations between variables where a directional hypothesis was made concerning the 
relationship between variables, one-tailed hypotheses were reported.  If no directional 
hypotheses were made then two-tailed p-values were reported.  
 
Do sub-scales of the self-report measure of shifting measure similar types of behaviour? 
 
As shown in table 20, similar findings were revealed to those reported in chapter three of this 
thesis, with significant but not perfect inter-correlations between the four shifting scales (SP 
competence, SP awareness, SE competence and SE awareness). 
 
Assessing the concurrent and discriminant validity of the self-report shifting scales 
 
The validity of the self-report shifting scales as measures of real shifting behaviour was 
assessed by examining the relationship between self-report scale scores and measures of task 
based shifting/switching.  Tables 20 and 22 display bivariate correlations between self-report 
shifting scale scores and task based measures of shifting/switching which were run to 
examine the shared variance between self-reported and task based shifting/switching.  Partial 
correlations between sub-scale scores and task based measures were run controlling for the 
shared variance across self-report shifting scales.  Partial correlations allow an examination 
of the unique variance shared between each self-report shifting scale and the task based 
measures of shifting/switching (Field, 2009).  Partial correlations were also advantageous as 
they have more power to detect effects than bivariate correlations.  Linear regressions were 
run to follow up significant bivariate correlations in order to assess whether the self-report 
shifting scales predicted performance on task based measures of shifting/switching. 
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The relationship between self-reported shifting and task based shifting on the mental set task 
 
There were three measures of success at breaking set on the mental set task; the proportion of 
times breaking set before the set breaking item, the proportion of times breaking set after the 
set breaking item and whether or not participants broke mental set on the set breaking item 
itself.  Relationships between scores on each of these measures and scores on shifting 
competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting were investigated. 
 
Partial correlations were run examining the unique shared variance between each self-report 
shifting scale score and each of the three measures of set breaking on the mental set task 
separately while controlling for the shared variance between set breaking and the other three 
shifting scale scores (Field, 2009).  Partial correlations were run on the sub-sample of full-set 
formers (N= 33) to ensure that it would be valid to conclude that scores on the two measures 
of set breaking were based on switching to a new strategy and, crucially, away from a 
previously established mental set (Gasper, 2003).  These correlations are displayed in table 
23 below.   
 
Table 22. Partial correlations between self-report shifting scales and measures of set breaking on the mental set 
task 
 
  
As predicted, partial correlations revealed that greater competence shifting in a professional 
context was associated with a greater proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking 
item.  This was a robust finding, remaining significant after controlling for multiple 
comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg (B-H) procedure.  Greater SE awareness was 
also found to be associated with a greater proportion of times breaking set after the set 
breaking item.   
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Logistic regressions were performed in order to follow up the significant bivariate 
correlations to examine if SP competence and SE awareness predicted the likelihood of 
breaking set after the set breaking item.  Logistic regressions were also performed to examine 
if SP awareness and SE awareness predicted the likelihood of breaking set before the set 
breaking item.  Logistic regressions were performed instead of linear regressions
24
 as 
scatterplots suggested that scores on both of the measures of breaking set were not continuous 
and there appeared some evidence of homoscedacity.   
 
In the first two logistic regressions SP competence or SE awareness was entered as a 
continuous predictor and a dichotomous outcome variable formed from the dependent 
variable; proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item.  This dichotomous 
variable was formed from the sub-sample of participants who fully-formed the mental set 
(N= 33) and consisted of one group of participants who broke set at least once and another 
group who never broke set after the set breaking item.   
 
A logistic regression analysis was carried out with set breaking group as the dichotomous 
outcome variable and SP competence as the predictor.  A test of the full model with SP 
competence against a constant only model was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N =33) = 8.13, 
p = .004; nagalkerke R
2
 = .29, indicating SP competence did successfully distinguish between 
those evidencing no instances of set breaking and those evidencing at least one instance of set 
breaking after the set breaking item.  Prediction success was mixed with 82.4% of the group 
who demonstrated at least one instance of set breaking being correctly predicted but only 
50% of the group demonstrating no instances of set breaking correctly predicted, for an 
overall success rate of 68%.  Table 24 shows the regression coefficient, Wald statistic, odds 
ratio and its 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Parallel linear regressions were conducted on the continuous measures of set breaking revealing the same 
effects. 
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Table 23. Displaying the results of the logistic regression with SP competence as predictor and set breaking 
group (low/high proportion of set breaking) as the outcome variable   
        
95 % CI 
for  
Odds 
ratio  
Variable β 
Wald 
test 
Odds 
ratio Upper Lower 
(constant) -39.99 5.11     
 SP 
competence  2.26 5.12*  9.54 67.35  1.35 
*p < .05           
**p<.01, N= 33 
  
According to the Wald criterion, shifting competence in a professional context predicted set 
breaking group (z= 5.12, p=.02).  A large odds ratio of 9.54 indicated that a one unit increase 
in the predictor, SP competence, resulted in just over a 9-fold increase in the odds of being a 
member of the group who demonstrated at least one instance of set breaking after the set 
breaking item.   
 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted, with set breaking group as the dichotomous 
outcome variable and SE awareness as the predictor.  A test of the full model with SE 
awareness against a constant only model failed to reach statistical significance, χ2 (1, N =33) 
= 1.30, p = .25; nagalkerke R
2
 = .05, indicating SE awareness did not successfully distinguish 
between those evidencing no instances of set breaking and those evidencing at least one 
instance of set breaking after the set breaking item.  Prediction success was poor with 58.8% 
of the group who demonstrated at least one instance of set breaking being correctly predicted 
and only 50% of the group demonstrating no instances of set breaking correctly predicted, for 
an overall success rate of 54.5%.  Table 25 shows the regression coefficient, Wald statistic, 
odds ratio and its 95% confidence interval.   
 
Table 24. Displaying the results of the logistic regression with SE awareness as predictor and set breaking group 
(low/high proportion of set breaking) as the outcome variable   
        
95 % CI 
for  
Odds 
ratio  
Variable Β 
Wald 
test 
Odds 
ratio Upper Lower 
(constant) -2.28 1.13 .10   
 SE awareness .09 1.23 1.10 1.29 .94 
N= 33           
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According to the Wald criterion, metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context 
failed to predict set breaking group (z= 1.23, p=.27).   
 
In the second two logistic regressions SP awareness or SE awareness were entered as a 
continuous predictor and a dichotomous outcome variable formed from the dependent 
variable; proportion of times breaking set before the set breaking item.  This dichotomous 
variable was formed of one group of participants who broke set at least once and another 
group who never broke set from the sub-sample of participants who fully-formed the mental 
set (N= 33).   
 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted with set breaking group as the dichotomous 
outcome variable and SP awareness as the predictor.  A test of the full model with SP 
awareness against a constant only model was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N =33) = 4.01, p 
= .05; nagalkerke R
2
 = .16, indicating SP awareness did successfully distinguish between 
those evidencing no set instances of set breaking and those evidencing at least one instance of 
set breaking before the set breaking item.  Prediction success was poor with 90.1% of the 
group who demonstrated no instances of set breaking being correctly predicted but only 9.1% 
of the group demonstrating at least one instance of set breaking correctly predicted, for an 
overall success rate of 63.6%.  Table 26 shows the regression coefficient, Wald statistic, odds 
ratio and its 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 25. Displaying the results of the logistic regression with SP awareness as predictor and set breaking group 
(low/high proportion of set breaking) as the outcome variable   
 
        
95 % CI 
for  
Odds 
ratio  
Variable β 
Wald 
test 
Odds 
ratio Upper Lower 
(constant) 5.57 2.61     
 SP awareness  -.246 3.24  1.09 .60  1.02 
N= 33           
   
According to the Wald criterion, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional 
context was a marginally significant predictor of set breaking group (z= 3.25, p=.07).  A 
small odds ratio of 1.09 indicated that a one unit increase in the predictor, SP awareness, 
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resulted in an increase of just over even odds of being a member of the group who 
demonstrated no instances of set breaking before the set breaking item.   
 
A logistic regression analysis was conducted with set breaking group as the dichotomous 
outcome variable and SE awareness as the predictor.  A test of the full model with SE 
awareness against a constant only model was marginally statistically significant, χ2 (1, N 
=33) = 3.57, p = .06; nagalkerke R
2
 = .14, suggesting that SE awareness did successfully 
distinguish between those evidencing no set instances of set breaking and those evidencing at 
least one instance of set breaking before the set breaking item.  Prediction success was poor 
with 90.9% of the group who demonstrated no instances of set breaking being correctly 
predicted but only 18.2% of the group demonstrating at least one instance of set breaking 
correctly predicted, for an overall success rate of 66.7%.  Table 27 shows the regression 
coefficient, Wald statistic, odds ratio and its 95% confidence interval. 
 
Table 26. Displaying the results of the logistic regression with SE awareness as predictor and set breaking group 
(low/high proportion of set breaking) as the outcome variable   
 
        
95 % CI 
for  
Odds 
ratio  
Variable β 
Wald 
test 
Odds 
ratio Upper Lower 
(constant) 3.47 3.10     
 SP awareness  -.16 2.37  .85 .70  1.02 
N= 33           
   
According to the Wald criterion, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional 
context was a marginally significant predictor of set breaking group (z= 3.10, p=.08).  A 
small odds ratio of .85 indicated that a one unit increase in the predictor, SP awareness, 
resulted in an increase of just over even odds of being a member of the group who 
demonstrated no instances of set breaking before the set breaking item.   
 
The relationship between self-reported shifting and task based measures of shifting on the 
Stroop task 
 
Prior to examining if there was any relationship between self-reported shifting scale scores 
and measures of shifting on the Stroop task, it was first necessary to test the hypothesis that 
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there would be an interaction between prime and target congruence, with responses slower 
for incongruent in comparison to congruent targets following congruent primes but with this 
congruence effect eliminated or even reversed when targets are preceded by incongruent 
primes.  It was important to show this crossover pattern in order to support the inference that 
participants are flexibly modulating cognitive control on the Stroop task in response to the 
prime context (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  In order to examine this, a 2 (target congruence) 
x 2 (prime congruence) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the log10 mean 
reaction times obtained with target and prime congruence as the independent variables.  Error 
responses, which were infrequent (M= 3.42%), were excluded from these analyses.    There 
was a main effect of target congruence (F (1, 53) = 24.06, p < .001, ηp
2
= .31, power = 1) with 
faster log10 mean reaction times to congruent (M= 2.66, SE= .008) versus incongruent targets 
(M= 2.67, SD= .009).  The main effect of prime congruence was non-significant (F (1, 53) = 
.28, p = .60, ηp
2
= .01, power = .08).  However, there was a significant interaction between 
prime and target congruence (F (1, 53) = 34.02, p < .001, ηp
2
= .39, power = 1).  This 
interaction is illustrated in figure 14 below.   
   
Figure 14. Displaying the prime x target congruence interaction.  The congruence of the prime 
(congruent/incongruent) of each mean is displayed on the x-axis while the target congruence 
(congruent/incongruent) is shown by the green and blue lines.  
 
In order to break down this interaction, two one-way ANOVAs were run to examine 
differences in mean log reaction times separately for each target type as a function of whether 
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a congruent or incongruent prime had preceded the target trial.  Contrasts revealed that mean 
log10 reaction times to congruent targets were significantly faster when preceded by 
congruent (M=2.66, SE = .008) in comparison to incongruent primes (M=2.67, SE = .008), F 
(1, 53) = 10.57, p = .002
25, ηp
2
= .17, power = .89).  Contrasts revealed that reaction times to 
incongruent targets were significantly faster when preceded by incongruent (M=2.67, SE = 
.009) in comparison to congruent (M=2.68, SE = .009) primes, F (1, 53) = 12.57, p = .001
26
, 
ηp
2
= .19, power = .94).  
     
Congruent primes appeared to aid performance on subsequent congruent trials by reducing 
reaction times, in comparison to incongruent primes.  Incongruent primes appeared to aid 
performance on subsequent incongruent trials by reducing reaction times, in comparison to 
congruent primes.  These findings support Zabelina & Robinson’s (2010) argument that 
participants may be flexibly modulating cognitive control and that the Stroop task may be 
sensitive to individual differences in flexible cognitive control.  According to Zabelina & 
Robinson’s (2010) reasoning, participants were relaxing cognitive control in response to 
congruent primes, leading to faster reaction times on subsequent congruent targets where low 
cognitive control facilitates automatic colour naming, but slowing performance on 
incongruent targets where low cognitive control is not conducive to overcoming the colour-
word mismatch.   
 
The tendency for participants to relax cognitive control to a greater extent on congruent target 
trials in response to contextual cues to do so, that is with congruent as opposed to incongruent 
primes, is labelled the prime congruence effect on congruent targets.  This was abbreviated to 
prime congruence (con. target) and was calculated using the following formula, Inc. prime 
Con. target - Con. Prime Con. target.  The normal text represents the congruent (con.) and 
incongruent (inc.) primes while the subscript represents the congruency (con. or inc.) of the 
target.  All scores in the equation were mean log10 reaction times.  Higher positive scores on 
the measure of prime congruence (con. target) indicate faster reaction times following 
congruent primes, relative to incongruent primes.  This in turn indicates that cognitive control 
is flexibly relaxed to a greater extent on congruent target trials when primes are congruent 
compared to incongruent.     
                                                 
25
 The Bonferroni correction is applied here with α/4= .0125 due to a total of 4 possible contrasts that could be 
conducted here.  Thus the p-value required to accept an effect as significant was p=.0125.  
26
 The Bonferroni correction is applied here with α/4= .0125 due to 4 planned contrasts being conducted.  Thus 
the p-value required to accept an effect as significant was p=.0125.  
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The present findings also support Zabelina & Robinson’s (2010) argument that cognitive 
control is increased in response to incongruent primes leading to faster reaction times on 
subsequent incongruent targets which require the use of high cognitive control to overcome 
the colour-word mismatch.  Slower reaction times were observed for congruent targets where 
high cognitive control disrupts automatic colour naming.  The tendency for participants to 
increase cognitive control to a greater extent on incongruent target trials in response to 
contextual cues to do so, that is with incongruent as opposed to congruent primes, is labelled 
the prime congruence effect on incongruent targets.  This is shortened to Prime congruence 
(inc. target) and was calculated using the following formula, Inc. prime Inc. target - Con. Prime 
Inc. target.  Higher negative scores on the measure of prime congruence (inc. target) indicate 
faster reaction times following incongruent primes.  This in turn indicates that cognitive 
control is flexibly increased to a greater extent on incongruent target trials when primes are 
incongruent compared to congruent.     
   
A cognitive control flexibility score was also calculated for each participant to represent the 
prime congruence x target congruence interaction (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  This score 
was calculated using the formula, ((Inc. prime/Con. prime)Con. target + (Con. prime/Inc. 
prime)Inc. target))- ((Con. prime Con. target /Con. prime Inc. target) + (Inc. prime Con. target /Inc. prime 
Inc. target)).  This formula allows the prime congruence x target congruence interaction to be 
computed as a single score.  The top line represents the part of the interaction that represents 
the differential effects of the two primes on each target separately while the bottom line 
represents the differential effects across congruent and incongruent targets of each prime type 
separately.   
 
Partial correlations were computed in order to investigate the unique shared variance between 
scores on the Stroop measures of shifting; prime congruence (con.), prime congruence (inc.) 
and cognitive control flexibility with shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in everyday and professional contexts. 
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Table 27. Partial correlations between self-report shifting scales and Stroop measures of flexible cognitive 
control  
Shifting Scale  
Prime congruence 
(con.) 
Prime congruence 
(inc.) 
Cognitive control 
flexibility  
SPawareness .05 -.06 -.22 
SEawareness -.02 .16 -.02 
SPcompetence   -.23* -.07 .20 
SEcompetence -.13 -.18 .11 
**p<.01, df= 49       
*p<.05 
       
Partial correlations, in table 28, revealed that there was a relationship between shifting 
competence in a professional context and Prime congruence (con.).  There therefore appears 
to be unique shared variance between competence at shifting between modes of thinking and 
the extent to which cognitive control is relaxed on congruent trials in response to prior 
congruent contextual cues.  However, the negative relationship indicates that greater self-
reported shifting competence in a professional context was associated with relaxing cognitive 
control to a lower extent on congruent trials in response to prior congruent contextual cues.  
This effect was in the opposite direction to that predicted.   
   
Linear regressions were performed in order to follow up the significant bivariate correlations 
to examine if SP competence and SE competence were able to predict Prime congruence 
(con.).  A linear regression with shifting competence in a professional context as the predictor 
variable and prime congruence (con.) as the outcome variable revealed prime congruence 
(con.) score was significantly predicted by SP competence (F (1, 52) = 5.58, p = .02).  Table 
29 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, standardized beta and the 
values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and standardized Beta are significantly 
different from zero (t = -2.26, p= .02).  R
2 
indicates that 10% of the variance in the extent to 
which cognitive control was relaxed on congruent trials in response to prior congruent 
contextual cues was explained by SP competence.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a 
medium sized effect.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
172 
 
Table 28. Displaying the results of the linear regression with SP competence as predictor and prime congruence 
(con.) as the outcome variable   
        Model   
Variable B SE Β R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .21 .09 
 
  SP competence -.01 .01 -.31* .10 .08 
*p < .05           
N= 54 
 
      
A linear regression with shifting competence in an everyday context as the predictor variable 
and prime congruence (con.) as the outcome variable revealed prime congruence (con.) score 
was significantly predicted by SE competence (F (1, 52) = 4.04, p = .05).  Table 30 below 
shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and standardized Beta are significantly different from 
zero (t = -.2.01, p= .02).  R
2 
indicates that 7% of the variance in the extent to which cognitive 
control was relaxed on congruent trials in response to prior congruent contextual cues was 
explained by SE competence.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a small to medium 
sized effect.   
 
Table 29. Displaying the results of the linear regression with SE competence as predictor and prime congruence 
(con.) as the outcome variable   
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .22 .11 
 
  SE Competence -.01 .01 -.27* .07 .05 
*p < .05           
  N= 54 
 
The relationship between self-reported shifting and task based switching on the plus-minus 
task 
 
Prior to examining if there was any relationship between shifting scale scores and switch 
costs on the plus-minus task, it was first necessary to test the hypothesis that the present 
sample did indeed experience a switch cost when alternating between addition and 
subtraction.  It was predicted that the mean time to correctly carry out arithmetic operations 
in alternating blocks would be longer than the mean time to correctly carry out arithmetic 
operations in single task blocks where participants only had to perform one type of operation 
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throughout.  It was also predicted that a greater number of errors in arithmetic would be made 
in alternating compared to single task blocks. 
 
A doubly multivariate analysis of variance was run to test the hypothesis that the average 
time to correctly carry out arithmetic and the number of errors made would be higher in both 
sets of alternating blocks, predictable and unpredictable, compared to the single task blocks.  
It also enabled a test of the hypothesis that the average time to correctly carry out arithmetic 
and the number of errors made would be higher in the unpredictable compared to the 
predictable alternating block.  The mean time to perform arithmetic correctly
27
 and the 
number of errors made across all blocks (alternating predictable, alternating unpredictable 
and single task) were log10 transformed in order to correct for positive skew.   
 
A doubly multivariate ANOVA was run on the log10 transformed measures of mean time to 
perform arithmetic correctly and the number of errors made across the three different blocks 
within which arithmetic was performed (Block (3) - alternating predictable, alternating 
unpredictable and single task).  Multivariate tests revealed effects on overall performance on 
arithmetic problems on the plus-minus task.  This took account of the combined effects of 
performance on both mean time to perform arithmetic correctly and the number of errors 
made.  This revealed a significant main effect of block (F (1, 50) = 10.01, p < .001, ηp
2
= .45, 
power = 1.00).  Univariate tests were run to examine on which dependent measures the main 
effect of block was significant.  These revealed that there was a significant main effect of 
block on the mean time to perform arithmetic correctly (F (2, 106) = 16.92, p < .001, ηp
2
= .24, 
power = 1.00) but not on the number of errors made (F (2, 106) = 2.16, p = .12, ηp
2
= .04, 
power = .43).  Planned comparisons revealed that the mean log10 time to perform arithmetic 
correctly was faster in single task blocks (M=3.36, SE= .02) than within predictable 
alternating blocks (M=3.40, SE=.01), p <.001.  Planned comparisons also revealed that the 
mean log10 time to perform arithmetic correctly was faster in single task blocks than within 
unpredictable alternating blocks (M=3.60, SE=.02), p <.001.  A post-hoc comparison of the 
mean log10 time to perform arithmetic correctly in predictable alternating blocks compared to 
within unpredictable alternating blocks revealed that problems were solved faster in 
predictable compared to unpredictable alternating blocks, p =.04.  It should be noted however 
                                                 
27
 The average (log mean) time to solve arithmetic problems within each block did not include response times 
on trials on which incorrect arithmetic solutions were produced.  This was to ensure that the measure of average 
speed was not inflated by taking into account response trials on which incorrect responses were made. 
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that this difference was not significant when a bonferroni correction was applied to correct 
for multiple comparisons
28
.    
 
This analysis revealed that only the switch cost in terms of increased time to solve arithmetic 
problems was a valid measure of the cost of switching between the mental operations of 
addition and subtraction.  Blocks were not distinguished based on errors made, therefore this 
measure of switch cost was not included in the subsequent analyses. 
 
Partial correlations were run examining the unique shared variance between each shifting 
scale score and switch costs based on the mean time taken to produce correct solutions while 
controlling for the shared variance between switch cost and the other three shifting scale 
scores (Field, 2009).  These correlations are displayed in table 31 below.    
 
Table 30. Partial correlations between self-report switching scales and measures of switch cost on the Plus 
minus task. 
  
Switch cost on Plus 
minus task   
  Predictable alternations Unpredictable alternations 
Shifting Scale  Log mean time to solve Log mean time to solve 
SP awareness .20 .32** 
SE awareness -.20 -.44*** 
SP competence .16 .24* 
SE competence .01 .15 
***p<.001, df= 49     
**p<.01,  
  *p<.05 
     
Partial correlations revealed that self-reported shifting scale scores were only significantly 
associated with switch costs calculated based on switching in an unpredictable fashion.  
Higher scores on metacognitive awareness in an everyday context were associated with lower 
switch costs in terms of reduced time to produce correct solutions when switching in an 
unpredictable fashion.  This was a robust finding, remaining significant after controlling for 
multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg (B-H) procedure.  Higher switch costs 
in terms of the time to produce correct solutions when switching in an unpredictable fashion 
were associated with higher scores on metacognitive awareness and competence shifting in a 
professional context.   
                                                 
28
 Three comparisons were performed so .5/3= .02 was the level required for effects to be significant. 
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Two separate linear regressions with SP competence as the predictor variable were run.  
Switch costs based on the mean time to produce correct solutions when switching in a 
predictable fashion and in an unpredictable fashion were regressed on SP competence. 
 
The linear regression shown in table 32 revealed that SP competence was a significant 
predictor of switch costs in terms of the time to produce correct solutions when switching in 
an unpredictable fashion (F (1, 52) = 6.80, p = .01).  The unstandardized B and standardized 
Beta were significantly different from zero (t = 2.61, p= .01). R
2 
indicated that 12% of the 
variance in switch costs experienced when switching in an unpredictable fashion is accounted 
for by competence switching in a professional context.  According to Cohen (1988) this 
suggests a medium sized effect.   
 
Table 31. Linear regression with SP competence as the predictor and switch costs in terms the time to make 
correct solutions when switching in an unpredictable fashion as the outcome variable  
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) -.56 .22 
 
  SP Competence .03 .01 .34* .12 .10 
*p < .05 
   
    N=54 
 
The linear regression shown in table 33 revealed that SP competence was a marginally 
significant predictor of switch costs in terms of the time to produce correct solutions when 
switching in a predictable fashion (F (1, 52) = 3.07, p = .09). The unstandardized B and 
standardized Beta were significantly different from zero (t = 1.75, p= .09). R
2 
indicated that 
6% of the variance in switch costs experienced when switching in a predictable fashion is 
accounted for by competence switching in a professional context.  According to Cohen 
(1988) this suggests a medium sized effect.   
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Table 32. Linear regression with SP competence as the predictor and switch costs in terms the time to make 
correct solutions when switching in an predictable fashion as the outcome variable  
 
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) -.34 .22 
 
  SP Competence .02 .01 .24 .06 .04 
*p < .05 
   
    N=54 
 
 
Assessing the predictive validity of the self-report scales measuring shifting 
 
The predictive validity of the self-report scales measuring shifting was assessed by examining 
the relationship between scores on the scales and measures of creativity.  Displayed in tables 
20 and 21 are bivariate correlations between self-report shifting scale scores and measures of 
creativity.  These show the shared variance between self-reported shifting and creativity.  
Partial correlations between self-report shifting scale scores and measures of creativity were 
run to examine the unique variance shared between each self-report shifting scale and 
measures of creativity (Field, 2009).  Linear regressions were run to follow up significant 
bivariate correlations in order to determine if creativity could be predicted from scores on the 
self-report shifting scales.    
 
The relationship between self-reported shifting and K-DOCs measures of creativity 
 
Partial correlations were computed separately for each dimension of creativity measured on 
the K-DOCS in order to investigate the unique shared variance between scores on each 
dimension and shifting behaviour as measured by each of the four shifting scales.  The partial 
correlations displayed in table 34 below examine the shared variance between each of the 
shifting scales and each domain of creativity separately, while controlling for the shared 
variance between scores on the domain of creativity in question and the other three self-report 
shifting scale scores (Field, 2009).   
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Table 33. Partial correlations between self-report switching scales and K-DOCs creativity scores across domains  
  K-DOCS dimension       
Switching 
Scale  self/everyday scholarly Performance mechanical/Scientific    artistic  
SP awareness -.13 -.03 .12 -.13 .16 
SE awareness .02 .06 .20 .01 .14 
SP competence .10 .19 .02 .41* -.03 
SE competence .20 .02 -.05 .01 -.01 
*p<.001, df= 49           
 
Partial correlations revealed that there was unique shared variance between 
mechanical/scientific creativity and shifting competence in a professional context.  This was 
a robust finding, remaining significant after controlling for multiple comparisons using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg (B-H) procedure.  This indicated that greater self-reported creativity on 
the mechanical/scientific dimension of the K-DOCs was associated with greater competence 
shifting in a professional context.   
 
A composite measure of metacognitive awareness of shifting across contexts was calculated 
from the average of z-scored measures of SP awareness and SE awareness.  This was done on 
the basis that bivariate correlations revealed a similar pattern of associations between shifting 
awareness and K-DOCs performance and artistic creativity irrespective of context.  Two 
linear regressions were then run to examine if this composite measure of metacognitive 
awareness of shifting predicted K-DOCs performance and artistic creativity.  The use of this 
composite measure would reduce the number of regressions that were required here from four 
to two, thereby reducing the number of multiple comparisons that had to be controlled for. In 
addition, linear regressions were performed to examine if SP competence could predict scores 
on the K-DOCs measures of mechanical/scientific and scholarly creativity and to examine if 
SE competence could predict scores on the K-DOCs measure of self/everyday creativity.        
 
The linear regression with shifting competence in a professional context as the predictor 
variable and K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity as the outcome variable revealed that 
K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity was significantly predicted by SP competence (F (1, 
52) = 11.35, p = .001).  Table 35 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard 
error, standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and 
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standardized Beta are significantly different from zero (t = 3.37, p= .001).  R
2 
indicates that 
18% of the variance in K-DOCs Mechanical/Scientific creativity was explained by SP 
competence.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a medium to large sized effect.  It 
should be noted that this regression remained significant after controlling for multiple 
comparisons. 
 
Table 34. Displaying the results of the linear regression with SP competence as predictor and K-DOCs 
mechanical/Scientific creativity as outcome variable     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) -94.71 35.67 
 
  SP 
competence 
6.76 2.01 .42** .18 .16 
*p < .05           
**p<.01, N= 54 
      
The linear regression with the metacognitive awareness of shifting composite as the predictor 
variable and K-DOCs performance creativity as the outcome variable revealed that K-DOCs 
Performance creativity was significantly predicted by metacognitive awareness of shifting 
(composite) (F (1, 52) = 8.66, p = .01).  Table 36 below shows the regression coefficient and 
its standard error, standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized 
B and standardized Beta are significantly different from zero (t = 2.94, p= .01).  R
2 
indicates 
that 14% of the variance in K-DOCs Performance creativity was explained by SP awareness.  
According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a medium sized effect.   
 
Table 35. Displaying the results of the linear regression with metacognitive awareness of shifting (composite) as 
predictor and K-DOCs performance creativity as outcome variable     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) 25.70 1.06 
 
  S awareness 
(composite) 
3.47 1.18 .38* .14 .13 
*p < .05 
     N=54 
      
The linear regression with the metacognitive awareness of shifting composite as the predictor 
variable and K-DOCs artistic creativity as the outcome variable revealed that K-DOCs artistic 
creativity was significantly predicted by metacognitive awareness of shifting (composite) (F 
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(1, 52) = 7.39, p = .01).  Table 37 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard 
error, standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and 
standardized Beta are significantly different from zero (t = 2.72, p= .01).  R
2 
indicates that 
12% of the variance in K-DOCs performance creativity was explained by switching 
awareness (composite).  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a medium sized effect.   
 
Table 36.  Displaying the results of the linear regression with Switching awareness (composite) as predictor and 
K-DOCs performance creativity as outcome variable     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) 26.32 .84 
 
  S awareness 
(composite) 
2.55 .94 .35* .12 .11 
*p < .05 
     N=54 
      
The linear regression with shifting competence in an everyday context as the predictor 
variable and K-DOCs self/everyday creativity as the outcome variable revealed that SE 
competence was a marginally significant predictor of K-DOCs self/everyday creativity (F (1, 
52) = 3.73, p = .06).  Table 38 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, 
standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and 
standardized Beta are marginally significantly different from zero (t = 1.93, p= .06).  R
2 
indicates that 7% of the variance in K-DOCs performance creativity was explained by SE 
competence.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a small sized effect.   
 
Table 37. Displaying the results of the linear regression with SE competence as predictor and K-DOCs 
self/everyday creativity as outcome variable     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) 39.16 4.40 
 
  SE competence 
 
.48 .25 .26 .07 .05 
N=54 
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The relationship between self-reported shifting and measures of divergent thinking on the 
product improvement task 
 
 
Partial correlations were computed separately for each measure of the product improvement 
task in order to investigate the unique shared variance between scores on each product 
improvement measure and shifting behaviour as measured by each of the four shifting scales.  
The partial correlations displayed in table 39 below examine the shared variance between 
each shifting scale score and each measure on the product improvement task separately, while 
controlling for the shared variance between scores on that measure and the other three self-
report shifting scale scores (Field, 2009).   
 
Table 38. Partial correlations between self-report switching scales and Product improvement measures  
 
  
Product Improvement 
scores   
Shifting Scale  Fluency Originality Flexibility  
SP awareness .46** .43*  .29* 
SE awareness -.40** -.29* -.24* 
SP competence .03 .15 .15 
SE competence -.05 -.15 -.11 
**p<.001, df= 49       
*p<.05 
    
Partial correlations revealed that there was unique shared variance between SP awareness and 
fluency, originality and flexibility.  These results suggest that greater metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in a professional context is associated with a greater number of 
responses, more original responses and more responses that fall into different categories 
produced on the product improvement task.  This pattern was reversed for SE awareness, 
with negative correlations between SE awareness and fluency, originality and flexibility.  
These results suggest that greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context 
is associated with the production of fewer responses, less original responses and less 
responses that fall into different categories on the product improvement task.  It is important 
to note that the partial correlations between SP awareness and fluency and between SE 
awareness and fluency were robust findings, remaining significant after controlling for 
multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg (B-H) procedure.   
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Three linear regressions were performed in order to follow up the significant bivariate 
correlations between SP awareness and SP competence and product improvement scores.  In 
light of the strong positive bivariate correlation between product improvement fluency and 
originality scores it could be argued that a combined measure should be calculated from these 
scores.  However it has been argued that each measure explains some unique variance in 
divergent thinking (Runco, 2010).  Based on this argument it was deemed appropriate to 
include both fluency and originality as outcome measures in separate regressions.       
 
The linear regression with metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context as 
the predictor variable and product improvement originality as the outcome variable revealed 
that product improvement originality was significantly predicted by SP awareness (F (1, 52) 
= 6.34, p = .02).  Table 40 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, 
standardized beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and 
standardized Beta are significantly different from zero (t = 2.52, p= .02).  R
2 
indicates that 
11% of the variance in Product improvement originality was explained by SP awareness.  
According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a medium sized effect.   
   
Table 39. Displaying the results of the linear regression with metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context as predictor and product improvement originality score as outcome variable  
    
        Model   
Variable B SE β R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .69 .88 
 
  SP 
awareness 
.09 .03 .33* .11 .09 
*p < .05           
**p<.01, N= 54 
      
The linear regression with metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context as 
the predictor variable and fluency as the outcome variable revealed that SP awareness was a 
marginally significant predictor of product improvement fluency (F (1, 52) = 3.41, p = .07).  
Table 41 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, standardized beta and 
the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and standardized Beta are marginally 
significantly different from zero (t = 3.10, p= .00).  R
2 
indicates that 6% of the variance in 
Product improvement fluency was explained by SP awareness.  According to Cohen (1988) 
this suggests a small sized effect.   
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Table 40.  Displaying the results of the linear regression with metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context as predictor and product improvement fluency score as outcome variable 
     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .69 .22 
 
  SP 
awareness 
.02 .01 .25 .06 .04 
N= 54           
 
SP competence failed to significantly predict originality (F (1, 52) = 2.82, p = .10). 
 
The relationship between self-reported shifting and measures of functional creativity, number 
of designs produced and fixation on the coffee cup design task 
 
Partial correlations were computed separately for each measure of performance on the coffee 
cup design task in order to investigate the unique shared variance between scores on each 
coffee cup design task measure and shifting behaviour as measured by each of the four self-
report shifting scales.   
 
Table 41. Partial correlations between self-report shifting scales and Coffee cup design task measures 
 
      Performance on Coffee cup  
Shifting Scale  
Total fixation 
score 
Total N 
designs 
Functional 
creativity 
SP awareness -.15 .17 .22 
SE awareness .13 -.10 -.24* 
SP competence .02 .02 .05 
SE competence .18 -.17 .17 
 df= 49       
  *p<.05 
 
Partial correlations, shown in table 42, revealed that there was unique shared variance 
between SE awareness and functional creativity.  This suggested that higher metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in an everyday context was associated with the production of coffee cup 
designs with lower functional creativity.  The partial correlation between SP awareness and 
functional creativity was marginally significant.  However given the analyses to detect effects 
using partial correlations was sufficiently powered it was unlikely that this effect would 
emerge as significant with greater power.     
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The significant bivariate correlation between SE competence and fixation was followed up on 
by performing a linear regression with SE competence as predictor and fixation as outcome.  
This revealed that Fixation was significantly predicted by SE competence (F (1, 52) = 4.00, p 
= .05).  Table 43 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, standardized 
beta and the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and standardized Beta are 
significantly different from zero (t = 2.00, p= .05).  R
2 
indicates that 7% of the variance in 
Fixation was explained by SE competence.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a small 
to medium sized effect.   
   
Table 42.  Displaying the results of the linear regression with switching competence in an everyday context as 
predictor and fixation score on the coffee cup design task as outcome variable     
        Model   
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) -2.09 1.27 
 
  SE competence .14 .07 .27* .07 .05 
*p < .05 
     N=54 
      
The relationship between self-reported shifting and performance on the remote associate 
problems (RAPs) 
 
 
Prior to examining the relationship between measures of self-reported shifting and 
performance on the remote associate problems it was first necessary to show that participants 
who were solving a greater proportion of the problems were not solving more because they 
were solving problems more slowly or vice-versa.  It could have been the case that 
participants were quicker at solving RAPs correctly but at the cost of making more errors and 
getting a smaller proportion of the total RAPs correct.  This pattern of performance however 
was not shown, with shorter mean times taken to correctly solve RAPs associated with a 
greater proportion of RAPs solved correctly (r= -.59, p <.001).  This correlation shows that 
there was no evidence of a trade-off between the average speed in correctly solving problems 
and the proportion of problems solved overall.   
 
Partial correlations were computed for each measure of performance on the RAPs, separately 
for solutions generated via insight versus non-insight in order to investigate the unique shared 
variance between scores on each RAP measure and shifting behaviour as measured by each 
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of the four shifting scales.  The partial correlations displayed in table 44 examine the unique 
shared variance between each shifting scale score and the proportion of total problems solved 
correctly and the mean time to produce correct solutions separately for those solved via 
insightful versus non-insight processes. 
 
Table 43. Partial correlations between self-report switching scales and total RAPs measures based on problems 
solved via insightful versus those solved via strategic means  
 
 
 
Partial correlations revealed that there was unique shared variance between SP awareness and 
the proportion of RAPs correctly solved via insightful processes and SE awareness and the 
speed at which correct solutions to RAPs were generated via insight processes.  These 
suggest that greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context is 
associated with solving a greater proportion of RAPs correctly via insight but that a greater 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context is actually associated with 
solving RAPs more slowly.      
 
Linear regressions were performed in order to follow up the significant bivariate correlations 
between SP awareness and SE competence and measures of performance on the RAPs.  
These analyses were restricted to the significant bivariate correlations between shifting scales 
and RAPs measures of insight and non-insight.  The reason for this was that the hypotheses 
were aimed at examining differences in the relationship between shifting scales and RAPs 
solved via insight compared to non-insight processes.   
  
A linear regression revealed that SE awareness was a marginally significant predictor of the 
speed of generation of correct solutions via insight on RAPs (F (1, 51) = 3.25, p = .08).  
Table 45 below shows the regression coefficient and its standard error, standardized beta and 
the values of R
2 
and adjusted R
2
.  The unstandardized B and standardized Beta are 
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significantly different from zero (t = 1.80, p= .08).  R
2 
indicates that 6% of the variance in the 
speed of generation of correct solutions via insight was explained by SE awareness.  
According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a small sized effect.   
 
Table 44. Displaying the results of the linear regression with switching awareness as predictor and the 
proportion of correct solutions generated across all RAPs as the outcome variable     
 
        Model   
Variable B SE β R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) 3.48 .11 
 
  SE awareness .01 .00 .25 .06 .04 
N=54           
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context failed to significantly predict 
the proportion of correct solutions generated on RAPs solved via insightful processes (F (1, 
51) = 2.79, p = .10).  Shifting competence in an everyday context failed to significantly 
predict the proportion of correct solutions generated on RAPs solved via strategic processes 
(F (1, 51) = 2.85, p = .10).     
 
Are different task based measures of shifting/switching measuring the same construct? 
 
It was important to examine correlations between scores on the different task based measures 
of shifting/switching used in the present study.  Doing so would shed light on the extent to 
which different measures tap the same type of shifting or switching behaviour.   
 
As shown in table 22, there were significant correlations between measures of task based 
shifting on the Stroop and Mental set tasks.  Within the sub-sample of full-set formers, 
measures of the proportion of times breaking set after (r= .31, p= .04, N= 33) and before (r= 
.38, p= .02, N= 33) the set breaking item positively correlated with cognitive control 
flexibility.  Within the sub-sample of full-set formers, the proportion of times breaking set 
after (r= -.31, p= .04, N= 33) and before (r= -.29, p= .05, N= 33) the set breaking item were 
also negatively correlated with prime congruency (con.).  The positive correlations between 
cognitive control flexibility on the Stroop task and the two measures of set breaking are in 
line with the prediction that the form of shifting across Stroop and Mental set tasks is related.  
However, the negative correlation between prime congruency (con.) and set breaking shows 
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that participants who evidenced a greater proportion of set breaking on the mental set task 
actually relaxed their cognitive control to less of an extent on congruent trials in response to 
congruent primes.  This finding was not in line with predictions as relaxing cognitive control 
to less of an extent based on the prime cue would appear to reflect reduced flexibility and 
therefore reduced shifting.  
 
A point biserial correlation also revealed that there was a negative relationship between the 
Stroop task measure of prime congruency (inc.) and breaking mental set on the set breaking 
item (rpb= -.31, p= .04, N= 33)
29
.  A point biserial correlation can be used to examine whether 
a dichotomous measure and a continuous measure are correlated but it cannot be used to 
determine the direction of the effect.  The mean prime congruency (inc.) of the group who 
broke mental set was significantly lower (M = .26, SD = .06, N= 26) than that of the group 
who didn’t break set (M = .30, SD = .04, N= 7), t (13.18) = 2.20, p= .05).  Lower scores on 
prime congruency (inc.) suggest that cognitive control is flexibly increased to a greater extent 
on incongruent target trials in response to prior contextual cues on incongruent prime trials.     
Flexibly increasing cognitive control to a greater extent on incongruent trials in response to 
the prior incongruent context is therefore associated with breaking mental set on the set 
breaking item.  This finding was in line with predictions as increasing cognitive control to a 
greater extent based on the prime cue would appear to reflect increased flexibility and 
therefore increased shifting.  There were no significant correlations between any other 
measures of switching on the Stroop and mental set tasks.   
 
The proportion of times breaking set before the set breaking item on the mental set task was 
negatively correlated with switch costs based on alternating in a predictable fashion on the 
plus-minus task.  This was in the direction expected as increased set breaking before the set 
breaking item was associated with reduced switch costs in terms of the time to generate 
correct solutions on this measure of the plus minus task.  There were no further significant 
correlations between any other measures of performance on the Stroop or mental set tasks 
and measures of switch cost on the plus-minus task. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 As prime congruency (inc.) was not normally distributed a Spearman’s rho correlation was run to check this 
result.  The correlation holds when a Spearman’s rho was performed. 
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Are different task/questionnaire based measures of creativity measuring the same 
construct? 
 
It is important to examine inter-correlations between scores on different measures of 
creativity as this will shed light on the extent to which different measures tap the same types 
of creativity or the same components of the creative process.  
 
As shown in table 20, there were significant correlations between measures of creativity.  K-
DOCs scores on the domains of self-everyday and scholarly creativity were positively 
correlated (r=.52, p<.001) as were scores on the domains of performance and artistic 
creativity (r=.48, p<.001).  Scores on the K-DOCs domain of mechanical/scientific creativity 
were positively associated with originality on the product improvement task (r=.28, p= .02).  
Scores on the K-DOCs domain of artistic creativity were positively associated with scores for 
both fluency (r=.26, p= .03) and originality (r=.39, p= .002) on the product improvement 
task.  Higher scores on product improvement fluency were associated with the production of 
a greater number of designs on the coffee cup design task (r=.35, p= .01) and higher ratings 
of the functional creativity of coffee cup designs (r=.23, p= .05).  Ratings of the functional 
creativity of coffee cup designs also positively correlated with product improvement 
originality (r=.26, p= .03) and K-DOCs scholarly creativity (r=.23, p= .05) and negatively 
correlated with fixation on the coffee cup design task (r=-.27, p= .02).  These findings 
provide evidence that scores on the different measures of creativity administered in the 
present study were positively associated.  
 
When RAPs were divided into those problems solved by insight and those solved by non-
insight there was a correlation between K-DOCs performance creativity and the proportion of 
correct solutions generated by insight (r=.26, p=.03).  Higher levels of performance creativity 
were associated with the use of more insightful processes to generate solutions on RAPs.  
There was also a clear difference in the pattern of correlations between the total number of 
designs produced on the coffee cup task and measures of the proportion and speed with 
which solutions were generated on RAPs by insight and non-insight means.  There were 
significant correlations between fixation and RAPs generated correctly by insight (proportion 
correct: r=-.20, p= .07
30
, speed of solving: r=.28, p= .02) and significant correlations 
                                                 
30
 This is a marginally significant correlation. 
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between fixation and RAPs generated correctly by strategic means (proportion correct: r=.34, 
p= .01, speed of solving: r=-.25, p= .05).  The use of insightful over non-insight processes 
appears to be associated with experiencing lower fixation.  There was also a clear difference 
in the pattern of correlations between the total number of designs produced on the coffee cup 
design task and RAPs generated by insight and non-insight means, with a positive correlation 
between the number of designs and RAPs generated correctly by insight (r=.29, p= .02) and a 
negative correlation between the number of designs and RAPs generated correctly by 
strategic means (r=-.39, p= .002).  The use of insightful over strategic processes appears to 
be associated with the production of a greater number of designs.    
   
Are measures of task based shifting/switching associated with task/questionnaire based 
measures of creativity? 
 
An examination of correlations between scores on measures of shifting or switching and 
scores on measures of creativity will give an indication as to whether shifting/switching 
behaviour might be important to performance on the measures of creativity. 
 
There were no significant correlations between Stroop task cognitive control flexibility and 
any measures of creativity.  There was however a significant positive association between 
Stroop prime congruency (con.) and the total number of designs produced on the coffee cup 
task (r=.28, p=.02).  This suggests that the tendency to relax cognitive control to a greater 
extent in response to contextual cues to do so was associated with the production of more 
coffee cup designs.  There were also significant negative correlations between Stroop prime 
congruency (inc.) scores and K-DOCs self/everyday creativity (r=-.29, p=.02
31
) and K-DOCs 
scholarly creativity (r=-.27, p=.02).  These results suggest that higher scores on these two 
domains of creativity are associated with a tendency to increase cognitive control to a greater 
extent, in response to contextual cues to do so.  Within the sub-sample of full set formers, the 
proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item was correlated with scores on the 
K-DOCs measure of scholarly creativity (r=.31, p= .01, N= 33).  Correlations performed on 
the sub-sample of full set formers additionally revealed that both breaking mental set on the 
set breaking item (rpb= .44, p= .01, N= 33) and the proportion of times set was broken after 
the set breaking item (r=.31, p= .04, N= 33) were positively correlated with scores on the K-
                                                 
31
 Both these correlations involving prime congruency (inc.) hold when a Spearman’s rho was performed.  
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DOCs measure of mechanical/scientific creativity.  Interestingly, there was a negative 
correlation between mechanical/scientific creativity and the proportion of times set was 
broken before the set breaking item (r=-.45, p= .004, N= 33).  
 
Scores on the K-DOCs domain of mechanical/scientific creativity were positively correlated 
with switch costs, in terms of time to perform arithmetic correctly when alternating in a 
predictable (r= .35, p = .01) and unpredictable (r= .28, p = .02) fashion between addition and 
subtraction on the plus-minus task.  Scores on the K-DOCs domain of performance creativity 
correlated with switch costs, in terms of time to perform arithmetic correctly when alternating 
in a predictable fashion (r= .31, p = .01).  Scores on the product improvement task measure 
of originality positively correlated with switch costs, in terms of the time to perform 
arithmetic correctly when alternating in a predictable fashion (r= .26, p = .03).  Finally, the 
switch cost, in terms of time to perform arithmetic correctly when alternating in a predictable 
fashion was associated with reduced time required to generate correct solutions on remote 
associate problems solved via non-insight processes (r=-.33, p = .01).   
 
Are there associations between task/questionnaire based measures of creativity and 
working memory, inhibition, IQ and verbal fluency?   
 
An examination of correlations between scores for intelligence, working memory, inhibition 
and verbal fluency, with scores on task based measures of shifting/switching and creativity 
was important to gain a better idea of the contribution of these abilities to performance on the 
indicators of shifting/switching and creativity. As shown in table 20 and 22, there were no 
significant correlations between measures of Stroop inhibition and task based measures of 
shifting/switching or creativity, except between Stroop inhibition and other measures of 
shifting on the Stroop task.  Stroop inhibition positively correlated with cognitive control 
flexibility score (r= .74, p (two-tailed) <.001).  Stroop inhibition also correlated with the 
tendency to relax cognitive control to a lower extent in response to the cue from congruent 
primes (r= -.31, p (two-tailed) = .02) and the tendency to increase cognitive control to a 
greater extent in response to incongruent contextual cues (r= -.40, p = .003).   
 
There was a significant correlation between the matrix reasoning measure of IQ and speed of 
generation of correct solutions via non-insight processes on remote associate problems (r= 
.36, p = .009).  This suggests those with higher scores on matrix reasoning generated 
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solutions more slowly on remote associate problems via non-insight processes. There were no 
other significant correlations between measures of intelligence and shifting/switching or 
creativity.  Working memory was however positively associated with scores on the K-DOCs 
domain of mechanical/scientific creativity (r= .35, p (two-tailed) = .01).  Working memory 
was also associated with an increased proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking 
item on the mental set task (r=.38, p (two-tailed) = .03, N= 33) and with reduced time to 
generate correct solutions on remote associate problems via insight (r= -.30., p (two-tailed) = 
.02).  Verbal fluency was positively associated with fluency (r= .31, p (two-tailed) = .03) and 
originality (r= .35, p (two-tailed) = .01) measures on the product improvement task and 
functional creativity on the coffee cup design task (r= .27, p (two-tailed) = .02).  Verbal 
fluency was also positively associated with a greater proportion of correct solutions produced 
on remote associate problems via insight (r= .32, p (two-tailed) <.001), reduced time to 
produce correct solutions on remote associate problems via insight (r= -.39, p (two-tailed) 
=.002) and reduced fixation scores on the coffee cup design task (r=-27, p (two-tailed) = .05).      
 
Does task based shifting/switching mediate the relationship between self-reported 
shifting and creativity? 
 
There were correlations between measures of task based shifting/switching with measures of 
task/questionnaire based creativity, measures which were predicted by scores on the self-
report switching scales.  This suggests that the task based measures of shifting/switching 
could be tapping shifting/switching behaviour which mediates the relationship between self-
report shifting scale scores and creativity.  Evidence of mediation would suggest that the 
shifting behaviour captured by the self-report shifting scales is also the shifting/switching 
behaviour underlying variance in creativity.  As such, evidence of mediation would provide a 
strong test of the hypothesis that the shifting scales are capturing shifting behaviour that 
occurs during the creative process.    
 
Table 46 shows the four measures of creativity on which the shifting scales have previously 
been shown to predict performance which are also positively associated with measures of 
creativity.  The column marked ‘direct effect’ shows the self-report shifting scale that 
positively predicted performance on that measure of creativity.  Under the heading ‘task 
based shifting/switching measure’ are shown the measures of shifting/switching which have 
previously been shown to be correlated with both the self-report shifting scale and the 
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measure of creativity.  The ARSPAN measure of working memory was also included in the 
‘task based shifting/switching measure’ as it was found to be correlated with both the SP 
competence shifting scale and K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity.  The nature of the 
associations between the ‘task based shifting/switching measure’ and shifting scale and 
creativity are indicated by the plus signs in the columns marked association between the 
variables in question; pluses indicate positive relationships. 
 
Table 45. Showing patterns of association between shifting scales, task based measures of shifting/switching 
and measures of creativity.       
      
Switching scale Association 
Task based 
Shifting/Switching 
measure Association Creativity measure 
Direct 
effect 
      
SP competence + Proportion of times + 
K-DOCs  
mechanical/ + 
  
breaking set after 
set breaking item  
 
scientific  
 
      
SP competence + Working memory + 
K-DOCs 
mechanical/ + 
  
(i.e. ARSPAN total 
score) 
 
scientific  
 
      
SP awareness + Predictable switch + 
Product 
improvement + 
  
cost in terms of time 
 
originality 
 
      
SP awareness + Predictable switch + 
K-DOCs 
performance + 
  
cost in terms of time 
 
creativity 
 
       
An examination of the patterns of associations in table 46 suggests that mediation may be 
occurring.  Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro was used in order to test if the ‘task based 
shifting/switching measure’ was mediating the relationship between the self-reported 
switching scale and the measures of creativity in these four cases.  The indirect effect of SP 
competence on K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity through the shifting measure of the 
proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item was examined.  95% Bootstrap 
based confidence intervals were generated by taking 5000 samples from the dataset.  The 
95% Bootstrap based confidence interval for this analysis when based on the full sample (N 
=54) and when based on the sub-sample of full-set formers (N =33) was in both cases not 
entirely above zero [-.56, 2.07] and [-1.69, 4.38] respectively.  This indicated that the indirect 
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effect of the proportion of times breaking set was non-significant.  The indirect effect of SP 
competence on K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity through the ARSPAN measure of 
working memory was also examined and the 95% Bootstrap confidence interval was again 
below zero [-.01, 3.91] indicating a non-significant indirect effect.  Tests of the indirect effect 
of SP awareness on product improvement originality [-.003, .045] and K-DOCs performance 
creativity [-.42, .03] through predictable switch cost both revealed 95% Bootstrap confidence 
intervals that were not entirely above zero indicating non-significant effects.                          
 
Latent abilities which might underpin performance across different measures  
 
 
The analyses which have been conducted on the data up to this point have only examined 
relationships between pairs of measures in order to test hypothesized relationships between   
self-reported shifting and task and questionnaire based measures of shifting or creativity.  A 
different but complementary approach is to conduct exploratory analyses of how performance 
on different task based measures of shifting/switching, creativity and the additional variables; 
IQ, working memory, inhibition and verbal fluency cluster together with scores on the scales 
measuring self-reported shifting.  This could help identify the latent abilities or response 
tendencies that are captured by the self-report scales measuring shifting.  Measures of 
performance on the remote associate problems were excluded from the analysis below.  The 
reason for this was that the factor structure was unclear when these measures were included.  
Since remote associates problems were not key measures of creativity or shifting/switching 
their removal was therefore not a particular problem.  
 
Three different forms of analyses were performed in order to examine how different 
measures may cluster together.  A principal components analysis was performed in order to 
examine which measures load onto different components.  Principal components analysis 
(PCA) is usually run on a much larger sample.  It is possible to run a PCA on a small sample 
such as that in the current study but Tabachnick & Fidell (2005) state that sample sizes of 
approximately 50 are very poor as the covariance matrix on which the factor model is fitted 
in small samples tends to be near singular and estimates are therefore far from the true 
parameters (Jung & Lee, 2011).  In light of the present study’s small sample size sample size, 
a regularized exploratory factor analysis (REFA) was also run.  This has been recommended 
as an alternative to the PCA approach with small sample sizes similar to that in the present 
study (Jung & Lee, 2011).  Finally, a hierarchical cluster analysis was also performed, which 
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is another alternative approach to exploratory factor analysis.  If a similar structure is 
revealed across the different methods then that would strengthen the argument that items 
which cluster together represent measures tapping similar latent abilities or tendencies. 
 
Eigenvalues were examined in order to determine the number of different components to 
extract using PCA.  It should be noted that the KMO statistic (.41) was low.  Given this it 
could be argued that a different approach should be taken (Field, 2009).  This emphasises the 
importance of running both a REFA and cluster analysis in addition to the PCA.  The Kaiser 
criterion was used to extract only components that had eigenvalues greater than one (Field, 
2009).  Based on the Kaiser criterion, 10 components were extracted.  The scree plot in figure 
15 below does not show a clear point of inflexion to indicate how many factors should be 
extracted.  The final decision to extract ten factors was made based on both the Kaiser 
criterion and because the ten factors extracted made theoretical sense.         
 
 
Figure 15. Displays the scree plot for the principal components analysis conducted on the set of 28 measures. 
 
After determining the number of components to extract, 28 items which were made up of 
scores on each of the 28 measures, excluding the remote associate problems, from 54 
participants were subjected to an oblique rotation.  An oblique rotation was chosen because 
there was no hypothesis that the components would be orthogonal.  It has been argued that 
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forcing factors to be uncorrelated by running a method of rotation that relies on the 
assumption that components are orthogonal may misrepresent the data (C. Fife-Schaw, 
personal communication, June 2013).  The REFA was run in MATLAB using code 
developed by Jung & Lee (2011).  Running REFA based on this code resulted in 10 factors 
being extracted based on the Kaiser criterion. The regularization scheme used for the REFA 
was based on the anti-image assumption as it was not clear that unique variances were 
constant across items (S.Jung, personal communication, November 28, 2013; Jung & Lee, 
2011; Konecna, Weiss, Lhota & Wallner, 2012).  These factors were subjected to an oblique 
(geomin) rotation.   
 
The 10 components extracted from the PCA accounted for 74% of the variance.  These 10 
components are shown in table 47.  Loadings greater than or equal to .4 were defined as 
salient loadings and these are shown in table 47.  10 components were also extracted from the 
REFA using a slightly different criterion for salient loadings than was used in the PCA.  
Loadings equal to and above .35 have previously been considered as salient loadings 
produced from a REFA because REFA loadings are more conservative as they are shrunk 
towards zero (Jung & Lee, 2011; Konecna, Weiss, Lhota & Wallner, 2012).  Loadings greater 
than or equal to .35 were considered as salient in the REFA analysis conducted in the present 
study and they are shown in bold in table 48. 
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Table 46.  Principal components analysis run on the full sample (N=54) with the 28 measures as items.  Only loadings > .4 are displayed.  
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Table 47. Regularized exploratory factor analysis run on the full sample (N=54) with the 28 measures as items.   Only loadings >.35 are displayed. 
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A hierarchical cluster analysis was performed with the measures as cases and the participants 
as variables.  Scores on each measure were z-scored to overcome scaling differences between 
variables and the method of complete linkage, also known as furthest neighbour, was 
employed.  The use of complete linkage avoided degenerating solutions being produced (C. 
Fife-Schaw, personal communication, June 2013).  It also can be used when clusters are of 
different sizes as was clearly the case here (Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl, 2011).  The 
dendrogram based on complete linkage is shown in figure 16 below.   
   
 
Figure 16. Cluster analysis of the 28 measures across tasks and questionnaires.  The proposed “cut” of the 
dendrogram is indicated by the line.   
 
As can be seen from tables 47 and 48, very similar components were extracted using the 
REFA and PCA.  A very similar pattern of loadings was observed on components/factors 
one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight.  The same measures loaded onto the PCA 
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components and REFA factors.  There were also some additional measures which loaded 
onto the REFA factors that did not load onto the PCA components.  Inter-correlations 
between the 10 components extracted using the PCA and REFA are shown in table 49 below.  
 
Table 48. Intercorrelations between the 10 components extracted using PCA and REFA 
 
  
Subsequent analyses of the components/factors/clusters were restricted to those on which the 
self-report shifting scales loaded.  The rationale for this was that the purpose of this analysis 
was to help identify the latent abilities or response tendencies that are captured by the self-
report shifting scales not the other measures.  Shifting scales only loaded on to three 
components so these were the only one’s interpreted.    
 
Table 49. provides a summary of the components two, seven and ten.  Contexts, professional or everyday, and 
types of creativity associated with each component are labelled alongside it. 
 
 
Component seven is perhaps the clearest and most interesting component revealed by the 
PCA, REFA and hierarchical cluster analysis.  It is clear in the sense that all three methods 
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revealed a very similar pattern of loadings on the component, albeit the REFA reveals an 
additional salient loading for K-DOCs scholarly creativity.  Starting with the highest loading 
items; the ARSPAN measure of verbal working memory, the proportion of times breaking set 
on the mental set task after the set breaking item, K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity 
and self-reported shifting competence in a professional context all load positively on this 
component.  This component was labelled as ‘working memory processes that underlie 
effective set breaking and competence shifting’.  Since the ARSPAN measure is the highest 
loading measure the component would appear to have most to do with working memory 
processes.  The measure of the proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item 
reflects ‘effective’ set breaking as it taps the extent to which participants break set after 
experiencing the mental set strategy to be problematic.  The ability to maintain the break 
away from the mental set strategy to a novel strategy may require working memory.  The 
correlation between the proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item and the 
ARSPAN measure of working memory (r=.38
32
, p (two-tailed) = .03) also suggests a role for 
working memory on this type of set breaking. Since only shifting competence within a 
professional context, K-DOCs mechanical/scientific and, as the REFA suggests, scholarly 
creativity load onto this component it would appear that ‘working memory processes that 
underlie effective set breaking and competence shifting’ are only important in certain 
contexts and for certain types of creativity; namely in the mechanical/scientific domain.   
 
The PCA and REFA revealed that SP awareness, SE awareness, SE competence and K-DOCs 
performance creativity all positively loaded onto component two.  The REFA revealed that in 
addition to these items, K-DOCs artistic creativity also loaded positively on this component. 
The dendrogram produced from the cluster analysis also shows that SP awareness, SE 
awareness and SE competence cluster together. The switch cost in terms of errors made when 
switching in a predictable fashion forms the final measure in this cluster and this measure 
also loads on the REFA component two.  This component was labelled ‘metacognitive 
awareness and competence shifting’.  SP awareness and SE awareness are the two highest 
loading items on this component so this component probably reflects metacognitive 
awareness more than competence shifting.   
 
                                                 
32
 This is the correlation between these measures on the sub-sample of only those who fully formed the mental 
set (N= 33).  The correlation on the whole sample (N=54) is approaching significance (r=.22
32
, p= .11). 
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Component, 10, differed substantially between the PCA and REFA and the cluster analysis 
failed to reveal the existence of a similar component.  Only the component revealed by the 
REFA is interpreted here because only it includes a self-report shifting scale.  The REFA 
revealed that the coffee cup design measure of total fixation loaded positively on this 
component while the coffee cup design measure of the total number of designs produced 
loaded negatively onto it.  The REFA also revealed that SE competence and the matrix 
reasoning measure of IQ loaded negatively onto it.  This component was tentatively labelled 
‘low design fluency and fixation associated with lower IQ and everyday shifting 
competence’.  Total fixation score had the highest loading, so this component seems 
principally to be capturing variance in fixation.  Greater competence shifting in an everyday 
context was previously shown to be associated with greater fixation (r = .27, p= .03).  It is not 
clear what underlying abilities may be influencing performance on the different measures 
captured by this factor.  What is clear is that competence shifting in an everyday context does 
not appear to be tapping similar abilities to components associated with creativity (e.g. K-
DOCs domain scales, product improvement measures).  Fixation was negatively associated 
with functional creativity on coffee cup designs (r = -.27, p= .02).  In summary, shifting 
competence in an everyday context may therefore tap tendencies that also underlie fixation, 
the production of only a few different designs on the coffee cup design task, and possibly also 
designs that had less functional creativity. 
 
Discussion 
 
There was evidence of a positive relationship between scores on the self-report measure of 
shifting competence and task based measures of shifting on the mental set task.  Specifically, 
shifting competence in a professional context (SP competence) was a positive predictor of 
breaking set after the set breaking item on the mental set task.  This positive association 
remained after controlling for the effects of the other three shifting scales.  This suggests that 
shifting competence in a professional context was an independent
33
 positive predictor of 
breaking set after the set breaking item on the mental set task.  This finding supported the 
                                                 
33
 The term ‘independent ‘ is important here as it signifies that unique variance is shared between the shifting 
scale (SP competence in this case) and the task based measure of shifting/switching (the proportion of times 
breaking set in this case).  Failure to find a unique portion of variance shared between the shifting scale and the 
task based measure in question would suggest that any relationship revealed by a bivariate regression may be 
due to the influence of a third variable (e.g. another shifting scale) which covaries with both the shifting scale 
and task based measure of interest (Field, 2009).   
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hypothesis that greater self-reported shifting would be associated with greater set breaking 
and as such, greater task based shifting.   Shifting competence in a professional context was 
also an independent positive predictor of the extent to which cognitive control was lowered in 
response to congruent primes on the Stroop task.  However, higher shifting competence in a 
professional context was actually associated with relaxing cognitive control to a lower extent 
on congruent targets in response to congruent versus incongruent primes.  This finding failed 
to support the hypothesis that greater self-reported shifting would be associated with greater 
task based shifting.  Relaxing cognitive control to a lower extent would appear to be 
indicative of shifting to a lower extent.  
 
Shifting competence in a professional context was associated with task based switching on 
the plus-minus task.  SP competence was an independent positive predictor of the switch cost 
in terms of the time taken to produce correct solutions on the plus-minus task when having to 
switch in an unpredictable fashion.  Contrary to predictions, greater shifting competence in a 
professional context was associated with greater switch costs in terms of increased time to 
generate correct solutions when switching.   
 
The nature of the relationships between the other three self-report shifting scales and task 
based measures of shifting/switching were less clear cut.  Contrary to predictions, 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context positively predicted switch 
costs in terms of the time taken to generate correct solutions when switching in a predictable 
and unpredicatable fashion on the plus-minus task.  This association however disappeared 
after controlling for the effects of the other three shifting scales. Taken as a whole, these 
findings suggest that greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context 
was associated with greater switch costs in terms of increased time to generate correct 
solutions when shifting.      
     
As predicted, greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context was also 
associated with a greater proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item on the 
mental set task and lower switch costs in terms of the time taken to generate correct solutions 
when switching in an unpredicatable fashion on the plus-minus task.  These associations were 
only revealed after controlling for the effects of the other three shifting scales.  However 
contrary to predictions, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional and everyday 
context both negatively predicted the likelihood of breaking set before the set breaking item 
  
202 
 
on the mental set task.  These were however small sized effects.  However, taken together 
these findings tentatively suggest that higher metacognitive awareness of shifting was 
associated with a lower likelihood of breaking set before the set breaking item, but, within an 
everyday context, it was associated with a higher likelihood of breaking set after the set 
breaking item.   
 
Shifting competence in an everyday context negatively predicted the extent to which 
cognitive control was lowered in response to congruent primes on the Stroop task.  This 
association however disappeared after controlling for the effects of the other three shifting 
scales.  As such everyday shifting competence does not appear to explain any unique 
variance in the extent to which cognitive control was lowered in response to congruent 
primes, when the effects of the other three shifting scales were controlled for. 
 
There was evidence of a positive relationship between scores on the self-report measure of 
shifting modes of thinking and task/questionnaire based measures of creativity.  Shifting 
competence in a professional context was an independent positive predictor of 
mechanical/scientific creativity measured on the K-DOCs.  K-DOCs mechanical/scientific 
creativity was however the only measure of creativity which was associated with SP 
competence.  Shifting competence in an everyday context was also found to be a marginally 
significant positive predictor of K-DOCs self-everyday creativity.    
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context was an independent positive 
predictor of product improvement originality.  Greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in 
a professional context was also associated with greater fluency and flexibility on the product 
improvement task.  Associations between SP awareness and fluency and flexibility were only 
revealed after controlling for the effects of the other three shifting scales.  Metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in both everyday and professional contexts was a positive predictor of 
both performance and artistic creativity measured on the K-DOCs.  This association however 
disappeared after controlling for the effects of the other shifting scales. This might be 
expected based on the fact that the partial correlations were carried out controlling for the 
effects of the shifting scale measuring metacognitive awareness of shifting in the opposite 
context (professional or everyday) as well as controlling for the effects of scales measuring 
shifting competence.   
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After controlling for the effects of the other three shifting scales, shifting awareness in a 
professional context was revealed to be positively associated with the proportion of solutions 
generated on remote associate problems via insightful processes.     
 
These findings support the hypotheses that greater self-reported shifting is associated with 
greater creativity.  Specifically, they support the hypothesis that the shifting scale measuring 
shifting competence in a professional context would be an independent positive predictor of 
creativity within the mechanical/scientific domain.  This was a robust finding, revealed even 
after controlling for multiple comparisons.  Findings also support the hypothesis that 
metacognitive awareness of shifting within everyday and professional contexts is a positive 
predictor of creativity within artistic domains.  This finding is in line with those of Fayena-
Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011).  Additionally, the present findings suggest that 
metacognitive awareness of shifting within everyday and professional contexts is also a 
positive predictor of creativity within the performance domain.  Metacognitive awareness of 
shifting within a professional context also appears to positively predict divergent thinking on 
the product improvement task and is associated with insight problem solving on remote 
associate problems.  These findings appear to be similar to those of Gilhooly, Fiortou, 
Anthony, and Wynn (2007) and Gilhooly & Murphy (2005) respectively.     
 
However, it is important to note that greater competence and metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in an everyday context was often associated with lower creativity or greater fixation.  
Shifting competence in an everyday context positively predicted fixation on the coffee cup 
design task, albeit this effect disappeared after controlling for the effects of the other three 
shifting scales.  Metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context was also an 
independent negative predictor of the speed at which solutions on remote associate problems 
(RAPs) were generated via insight processes.  That is, greater metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in an everyday context was associated with the slower generation of correct solutions 
on RAPs solved via insight processes.  When the effects of the other three shifting scales 
were controlled for, greater metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context was 
found to be associated with lower fluency, originality and flexibility on the product 
improvement task and lower functional creativity of designs produced on the coffee cup 
design task.   
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Considered as whole, these findings lend weight to the use of the self-report scales developed 
in chapter three of this thesis as valid measures of real shifting behaviour that is in turn 
associated with established measures of creativity.  The findings also add to the empirical 
evidence base in support of the theorised positive relationship between shifting modes of 
thinking and creativity (Vartanian, Martindale & Kwiatowksi, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, 
Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).   
 
However the present findings appear to also reveal novel facets of the relationship between 
shifting modes and creativity.  Firstly, relationships between self-reported shifting and 
creativity differed based on the context in which self-reported shifting occurred.  Zabelina & 
Robinson (2010) have previously reported that the relationship between creativity and 
switching between low and high cognitive control is dependent on contextual cues.  They 
suggested that the ability to switch could be viewed as cognitive flexibility but only in terms 
of tendencies to modulate cognitive control based on the prior context.  The context in 
Zabelina & Robinson’s (2010) work was whether the previously experienced prime trial was 
congruent or incongruent to the target trial on which the participant was responding (Zabelina 
& Robinson, 2010).  Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theory of the emergence of a creative insight 
also states that shifting between different modes of thinking depends on the context; that is 
the situation one finds oneself in.  This situation could consist of an instance where one is 
unable to solve a problem using a rational strategy.  This context, in this case being unable to 
solve the problem, brings about a shift between modes through the mechanism of contextual 
focus (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).    
 
The present findings provide further support for the importance of the effect of context on the 
relationship between shifting modes and creativity.  Specifically, they suggest that the 
relationship between shifting modes and creativity may differ as a function of whether 
shifting is carried out within the professional versus within the everyday context.  Findings 
suggest that while greater competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting carried out in 
a professional context is associated with higher creativity, greater competence and 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in an everyday context may actually be associated with 
poorer creativity and divergent thinking.   
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The relationship between shifting and creativity also differed based on whether self-report 
shifting was defined as metacognitive awareness of one’s shifting behaviour or shifting 
competence, in the form of the capacity to shift between different modes of thinking.  Only 
the scale assessing shifting competence in a professional context was a clear positive 
predictor of both performance on a task based measure of shifting, the mental set task, and 
scores on a measure of creativity; K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity.  The scale 
assessing metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context in contrast was 
actually associated with poorer shifting in terms of a longer time taken to overcome switch 
costs on the plus-minus task.  Despite this, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context was still a positive predictor of performance on measures of divergent 
thinking and creativity.  The present study appears to be the first to suggest that the nature of 
shifting may impact on the relationship between shifting and creativity. 
 
These findings appear to support the prediction based on Kaufman & Baer’s (2010) 
Amusement Park theoretical model of creativity that some abilities may be more important to 
success in some creative domains while other abilities may be more important to success in 
others.  The positive relationship between shifting competence in a professional context and 
creativity within the mechanical/scientific domain supports the rationale that a strong shift 
from an entrenched analytic mode to an associative mode of thinking may be required to 
produce creative solutions within this domain.  Items on the mechanical/scientific domain of 
the K-DOCs such as ‘writing a computer program’ may involve following a series of 
established steps to write the code but at points, one has to break away from these entrenched 
ways of working to develop novel strategies such as a workaround to overcome problems that 
one has never encountered before.  Shifting competence may capture how good one is at 
breaking away from an established method to adopt a novel strategy.  Two of the measures of 
set breaking on the mental set task, that is breaking set on the set breaking item and breaking 
set after the set breaking item, appear to capture one’s ability to do this. This may explain 
why shifting competence in a professional context was a positive predictor of both breaking 
set after the set breaking item on the mental set task and mechanical/scientific creativity.  It 
was interesting to note that shifting competence was not associated with breaking set before 
the set breaking item on the mental set task and that this measure of set breaking was actually 
negatively associated with mechanical/scientific creativity and metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in everyday and professional contexts.  This suggests that it is not the ability to break 
set and adopt a novel strategy per se that is associated with shifting competence and 
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mechanical/scientific creativity but the ability to break set and adopt a novel strategy when 
the mental set strategy has been shown to be problematic.  
 
Metacognitive awareness of shifting on the other hand may be more important for success in 
divergent thinking where one may have to monitor when it is best to move between, as Runco 
(2010) states, processes of generating ideas to processes of judging ideas.  Success in the 
domains of performance and artistic creativity may similarly depend on such a meta-
cognitive ability to monitor the degree to which one’s current mode of thinking is functioning 
correctly so as an optimal point is reached between idea generation and evaluation (Basadur, 
1995).  A positive association between metacognitive awareness and artistic creativity has 
been shown in prior work (Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 2011).  Future work is required 
to examine if metacognitive awareness of shifting is distinct from metacognitive ability in 
general.  Competence shifting was not associated with measures of divergent thinking, insight 
problem solving or on creativity within artistic or performance domains.  The extent to which 
one is able to shift between different modes of thinking may be of less importance for 
creativity within these domains.   
 
The present findings suggest that distinct facets of shifting, metacognitive awareness of 
shifting and shifting competence are important in different domains.  The extent to which one 
is able to shift from an entrenched analytic mode of thinking to enter an associate mode 
conducive to generating novelty may enable creative solutions to be realised within domains 
such as science and engineering.  The ability to monitor the degree to which one’s current 
mode of thinking is functioning correctly may be the facet of shifting that enables creative 
solutions to be realised in artistic and performance domains.      
 
The final key novel facet of the relationship between shifting modes and creativity revealed 
by the present study was the role of working memory.  The principal components, regularized 
factor and cluster analyses all revealed a similar component labelled as ‘working memory 
processes that underlie effective set-breaking and competence shifting’.  An examination of 
this component suggests that working memory plays a role in shifting competence in a 
professional context, mechanical/scientific creativity and the proportion of times breaking set 
after the set breaking item on the mental set task.     
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In order to creatively solve a problem one needs to hold in mind existing knowledge that is 
relevant to that problem (Dietrich, 2004).  It seems feasible that working memory could 
buffer knowledge and other information specific to the problem at hand which could then be 
manipulated and drawn upon to develop a novel approach to the problem. Also, the measure 
of the proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item on the mental set task 
appears to tap one’s ability to break set after one has received evidence that the mental set 
strategy may be problematic; that is it can’t be used to form a viable solution (Gasper, 2003).  
Working memory may be required to hold a novel strategy or stategies ‘on line’ and resist 
interference from incorrect prepotent strategies Roberts, Hager & Heron, 1994); in this case 
the mental set strategy.  In support of this, the ability to inhibit prepotent responses on the 
Stroop task was positively associated with the proportion of times breaking set after the set 
breaking item on the mental set task (r = .31).  Further, out of the three measures of set 
breaking only the measure of breaking set after the set breaking item was associated with 
working memory and inhibition.  It could be that working memory supports the evaluation of 
different novel strategies on trials following the set breaking item and that evaluation is only 
engaged in once the mental set strategy has been shown to be problematic.  Holding a novel 
strategy ‘on line’, evaluating if it works and resisting interference from incorrect prepotent 
strategies (e.g. the established method of doing things) may be required when engaged in a 
creative act, such as ‘writing a computer program’. 
 
It could be the case that creativity assessed in the mechanical/scientific domain of the K-
DOCs relies on working memory. In contrast, other types of creativity such as K-DOCs 
artistic or performance creativity could be underpinned by processing that does not rely to the 
same extent on working memory.  In support of this, other than the association between 
working memory and mechanical/scientific creativity there were no associations between 
working memory and any other measures of creativity or divergent thinking.  There is other 
experimental evidence which also suggests that there is a positive relationship between 
working memory and successful insight and strategic problem solving (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 
2009) but no relationship between performance on a working memory task and divergent 
thinking (Takuechi et al. 2011).   
 
Working memory appears to be important in supporting shifting competence in a professional 
context.  However mediation analysis failed to reveal that working memory could explain the 
link between SP competence and K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity.  Shifting 
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competence in a professional context therefore doesn’t appear to be merely a proxy measure 
for working memory capacity. 
 
It is important to consider the findings of the present study in light of a number of limitations.  
Firstly, the majority of the findings discussed only reached the threshold for statistical 
significance prior to correcting for multiple comparisons.  The following relationships were 
the only ones which remained significant after the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure was used 
to correct for the false discovery rate: SP competence and K-DOCs mechanical/scientific 
creativity, SP competence and the proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking item 
on the mental set task, SE awareness and product improvement fluency, SE awareness and 
switch costs in terms of the time to generate correct solutions when switching in an 
unpredictable fashion and SP awareness and fluency on the product improvement task.  
However, the present research was not aimed at providing a rigorous test of existing theory 
and as such the case could be made for not applying corrections for multiple tests (Rothman, 
1990).  The aim of the present research was simply to suggest future directions for further 
research into the relationship between shifting between different modes of thinking and 
creativity.   
 
The findings of the present study add to evidence from previous research showing a positive 
association between shifting between different modes of thinking and creativity (Vartanian, 
Martindale & Kwiatowksi, 2007; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova & Vartanian, 2008; 
Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  However these studies only examined correlations between 
creativity and shifting. Mediation analyses were conducted in the present study to go a step 
beyond correlations and regressions and examine if task based shifting/switching mediated 
associations between switching scales and measures of creativity.  These analyses however 
failed to uncover any evidence of mediation.  The mediation analyses involved computation 
of simple linear regressions which had sufficient power to detect medium sized effects (1- B= 
.80) in the sample of 54 participants (Cohen, 1988; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2007).  
As such the analysis which examined whether the relationship between SP competence and 
K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity through working memory was fully powered.  
However, the strength of associations between the proportion of times breaking set after the 
set breaking item on the mental set task and other measures was only in the region of a 
medium sized effect when the sample was restricted to full set formers (N =33) (Cohen, 
1988).  Examining the effects of this mediator in the sub-sample of full-set formers meant 
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that this analysis lacked power (1- B= .58).  Increasing the size of the sample of full-set 
formers on the mental set task in future research would provide a more powerful test of the 
hypothesised mediating effect of the proportion of times breaking set after the set breaking 
item on the relationship between SP competence and K-DOCs mechanical/scientific 
creativity.         
 
It could be the case that the measures of task based shifting/switching used in the present 
study only partially mirror the type of shifting, namely shifting between different modes of 
thinking, that is thought to occur during the creative process.  The strongest inter-correlations 
between measures of shifting/switching on different tasks demonstrated that there was only 
9% shared variance between measures.  This suggests that shifting/switching is not a unified 
construct and task based measures of shifting/switching may at best only be picking up 
certain facets of shifting between different modes of thinking.  Furthermore, the measures of 
task based shifting/switching only positively correlated with scales measuring shifting 
competence and not metacognitive awareness of shifting in the present study.  The task based 
measures of shifting/switching did not probe meta-cognitive abilities such as the choice of the 
right points in the creative process to shift which may be associated with greater SP 
awareness.  It is clear that the inclusion of task based shifting/switching measures that more 
closely approximate metacognitive awareness of shifting between modes of thinking would 
have provided a more rigorous test of the concurrent validity of the shifting scales as 
measures of shifting modes.  One means of doing so in future may be to probe for indicators 
of shifting between different modes of thinking online as the creative process unfolds, using 
think-aloud protocols or ERP’s (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  A think-aloud protocol is 
used in chapter five of the present thesis to do this.   
 
The present study suggests that the novel scales presented in chapter three of this thesis 
demonstrate a certain degree of concurrent validity as measures of shifting and are capable of 
predicting scores on established measures of creativity and divergent thinking.  Furthermore, 
findings suggest that adopting a psychometric approach to study the relationship between 
creativity and shifting between modes of thinking raises important issues concerning the 
context in which shifting occurs and the nature of shifting itself within different creative 
domains. 
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Key findings 
 
 Shifting and flexible behaviour (set-breaking): 
 
There was a positive association between scores on one facet of self-reported shifting 
(shifting competence in a professional context) and a measure of flexible behaviour; 
successfully breaking out of a previously established mental set.  This positive association 
was only found when set breaking was measured after participants had worked on a 
problem that could not be solved using the previously established mental set strategy.  
There was no association between self-reported shifting and the propensity to break set 
prior to the presentation of a problem that could not be solved using the established mental 
set strategy. 
 
 Shifting and mechanical/scientific creativity: 
 
There was a positive association between one facet of self-reported shifting (shifting 
competence in a professional context) and self-reported creativity on the K-DOCs in the 
mechanical/scientific domain. 
 
 Evidence of associations between shifting, flexible behaviour, creativity  and working 
memory: 
 
Clustering procedures revealed positive inter-correlations between working memory, 
shifting competence in a professional context, set breaking after  participants had worked on 
a problem that could not be solved using the previously established mental set strategy and 
K-DOCs mechanical/scientific creativity.  
 
 
 
 
Key theoretical/empirical contribution from chapter 4 
 
 
The key findings suggest that the nature of the relationship between creativity and shifting 
between different modes of thought hinges on the type of shifting involved.  The evidence 
that the relationship between shifting and flexible behaviour, in the form of set breaking, 
hinged on participant’s having experienced the mental set strategy to have been unsuccessful 
suggested that shifting was not simply cognitive flexibility.  Specifically, shifting appears to 
represent the ability to flexibly adopt a novel strategy but only when a previously used 
strategy has been shown to fail.  Furthermore, associations between the aforementioned 
measure of set breaking, shifting and self-reported creativity suggest that this type of shifting 
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is involved in creativity in the mechanical/scientific domain.  Finally, associations between 
these measures and working memory suggest a role for working memory processes in the 
type of shifting involved in creativity in the mechanical/scientific domain.  The key 
contribution from this chapter is a theoretical one.  The empirical findings point towards the 
importance of clearly defining the type of shifting that is predicted to be involved in 
achieving creative solutions in a particular domain.  It is important that theoretical accounts 
of the relationship between shifting and creativity take account of this and clearly identify the 
type of shifting that is predicted to play an important role in the creative process. 
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Chapter 5- Exploring the relationship between creativity and in vivo 
shifting between modes of thinking on a garden design task  
 
Previous empirical work in the current thesis has revealed some evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that shifting between modes of thinking is positively associated with creativity.  
However, prior work has only examined the link between shifting modes of thinking and 
creativity when either, or both, measures of shifting between modes of thinking or creativity 
were based on self-reports.  Theoretical accounts propose that the process of shifting between 
different modes of thinking during a creative task (e.g. designing a garden) has an effect on 
the creativity of the outcome of that task (e.g. a garden design) (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; 
Howard-Jones, 2002).  Gabora & Ranjan (2013) for example propose that shifting from an 
analytic to an associative mode of thinking can help overcome an impasse by producing 
creative insights which propel the creative process forward towards achieving a successful 
outcome.  Prior work in this thesis has however not examined the type of in vivo shifting 
within the creative process that is described by Gabora & Ranjan (2013) and others.  The 
present study aimed to examine shifting between modes of thinking in vivo during the 
creative process of participants while they were creating a design for a garden.  The 
relationship between these in vivo measures of shifting modes and the creativity of the final 
output of the creative process, garden designs, would then be examined.      
 
Within the field of creative-cognition there is currently no known empirical work examining 
links between in vivo shifting during the creative process and the creativity of the output from 
that process.  However, there is work examining links between in vivo thinking processes 
which appear to have some overlap with mode shifting and the quality of output from that 
process (Kozbelt, 2008; Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 2011; Atman, Chimka, Bursic & 
Nachtmann, 1999).  Kozbelt (2008) videotaped college art students as they created original 
drawings.  Frames from these videos were then coded based on what activities the students 
were engaging in.  Patterns of activities across groups of students who differed in the judged 
creativity of their final drawings at the end of the process were then compared.  Findings 
revealed that the group judged to have produced more creative drawings more frequently 
engaged in revising, erasing and re-working the drawing than the group judged to have 
produced less creative drawings (Kozbelt, 2008).  These activities appear to correspond to 
evaluations of ideas, an activity which has been linked to the analytic mode of thinking 
(Howard-Jones, 2002).  It seems possible then that shifting between an associative mode of 
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thinking underlying idea generation and an analytic mode of thinking underlying evaluation 
may be occurring during instances of erasing and re-working drawings in Kozbelt’s (2008) 
study.  In support of this, Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011) found that artists 
verbalised more evaluations than non-artists as groups ‘thought aloud’ while drawing.  
Evidence of a greater frequency of these activities in the group who produced more creative 
drawings, that is the artists, suggests that a greater frequency of shifting modes in vivo may 
be related to increased creative output from that process. 
 
Work examining links between in vivo thinking processes and the quality of output at the end 
of those processes also suggests that there are important effects as a function of expertise.  
For example, Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras (2011) found differences between artists and 
non-artists that were in line with findings from the wider literature on expertise.  Experts 
were found to focus on more global issues such as revising problem representations and 
engaged more in meta-cognitive thinking to monitor their progress.  Novices in contrast were 
more focused on local issues such as generating and executing their plans.  Meta-cognitive 
processes of monitoring and control have been theorized to be linked to the intervention of 
system 2 on system 1 thinking processes (Thompson, 2009) and this in turn may correspond 
to shifts between modes of thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).   
 
Atman et al. (1999) used a think aloud protocol to examine the performance of senior and 
first year engineering design students tasked with designing a playground.  The verbal 
protocols were coded for different design steps such as ‘developing alternative solutions’ 
which involved generating and evaluating solutions.  Senior students evidenced a higher 
frequency of transitions between different design steps than first year students.   The 
frequency of transitions for both groups was also positively correlated with a measure of the 
quality of the final design (Atman et al. 1999).  Since transitions between design steps 
involve generating and evaluating solutions, the ability to shift between modes of thinking 
may be related to design quality and may also underlie the differences in transition behaviour 
across groups differing in experience level. 
 
The present study aimed to build on this base of evidence that indirectly suggests a positive 
association between the frequency of in vivo shifting between modes of thinking and the 
creativity and design quality of the output of this process.  It also examined differences in 
shifting between modes of thinking as a function of expertise, which from past research 
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would appear to be an important factor.  The frequency of shifting between modes of thinking 
was examined across four groups expected to differ in their level of expertise in garden 
design.  These groups were professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine 
artists and a group who were pre-screened for low levels of creative achievement.  The 
quality of participant’s designs produced at the end of the process was judged by experts in 
garden design on three dimensions of quality; fit to the brief, design quality and creativity 
evident in the designs.  Finally, patterns of shifting were examined across different time 
points in the creative process.  It may be the case that groups differ based on evidencing 
different patterns of shifting between modes at key time points across the task and not on 
their mean frequency of shifting across the entire task.  It has been proposed that patterns of 
shifting may differ across stages in the creative process (Basadur, 1995).  For example, the 
timing of shifts between modes of thinking may be critical to evaluate ideas at the optimal 
time (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).   
 
There were two main reasons behind including the group of fine artists in the current study.  
They would provide a ‘creative’ control group against which patterns of shifting in 
professional garden designers could be compared.  The group of fine artists were labelled the 
‘creative’ control group because it was predicted that, being professionals in a creative 
domain, they would, like professional garden designers, evidence a high level of creativity.  
Another reason was that, like the professional garden designers, they would likely have 
highly developed drawing skills making them a good match in terms of the technical skill 
required to produce a garden design on paper.  It may be the case that designers are 
particularly adept at shifting between different modes of thinking (Lawson, 1997).  The 
‘creative control’ group of fine artists thus enabled the hypothesized link between shifting 
and expertise in design to be examined separately from the hypothesized link between 
shifting and creativity.     
        
On account of their greater expertise in the specific context of this study, it was hypothesized 
that professional garden designers would evidence a higher frequency of shifting between 
modes of thinking than the other participant groups.  It was predicted that fine artists and 
student garden designers would demonstrate a higher frequency of shifting compared to the 
low creative achievement group.  Given that fine artists were likely to evidence higher levels 
of creativity but lower levels of garden design relevant expertise than student garden 
designers, it was not clear how shifting frequency across these groups would differ.  The 
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present study also explored patterns of shifting as a function of time point during the garden 
design process to examine if there were differences between groups in the timing of shifts.  It 
was also predicted that professional garden designers would produce designs judged as 
having a higher design quality and creativity than the other groups.    It was hypothesized that 
across the entire sample, shifting frequency would be positively associated with ratings of 
design quality and creativity.   
 
The present research aimed to gain access to participant’s modes of thinking by asking them 
to ‘think aloud’ as they designed a garden.  Previous studies reported earlier have used think-
aloud methods to examine cognitive processes (Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 2011) and 
activities which can be linked to cognitive processes (Atman et al. 1999). The current study 
used verbal protocol analysis to examine thoughts verbalised via ‘think-aloud’ methods.  
Once collected, verbal protocols can be segmented into shorter units of text and analysed 
based on a pre-defined coding scheme (Atman, Chimka, Bursic & Nachtmann, 1999).  
Findings from previous studies lend support to the use of verbal protocol analysis as a 
technique with sufficient sensitivity to reveal the cognitive processes of participants (Suwa & 
Tversky, 1997; Atman et al., 1999; Cross, Christiaans & Dorst, 1994 as cited in Cross, 2011).  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
An opportunity sample of twelve participants from four different groups was recruited giving 
a total sample size of forty eight.  The four different groups consisted of a group of 
professional garden designers, a group of student garden designers, a group of fine artists and 
a group who were pre-screened for reporting low levels of creative achievement, hereby 
referred to as the low scorers on the creative achievement questionnaire, low CAQ for short 
(Carson, Higgins and Peterson, 2005).  Professional garden designers were recruited using 
the designer search tool on the Society of Garden designers (SGD) website.  This is the 
professional association for garden designers in the United Kingdom and lists contact details 
of professional garden designers who are registered members of the society of garden 
designers, MSGD for short.  An email request for volunteers to take part in ‘a study on 
creativity in garden design’ was sent out to all MSGD registered designers listed on the 
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website that lived in the area around London and Surrey.  MSGD registered designers who 
responded to the email request were then contacted by telephone.   
 
Student garden designers were defined as those who were studying or who had graduated 
from courses in garden design within the last year.  They were recruited through the 
programme director of a local college that ran courses in garden design, from emails sent to 
programme directors of courses in garden design at other colleges in the London and Surrey 
area and through emails disseminated to student members of the SGD nationwide by staff at 
the SGD.  Fine artists were defined as those who had qualifications in fine art and for which 
fine art was currently their profession.  Fine artists living in the London and Surrey area were 
recruited from the Royal Society of British artists (RBA) and Surrey artists websites and from 
open studios events held in Surrey.  The low CAQ group were members of non-academic 
staff who were recruited in person at the University of Surrey and one language teacher based 
outside of the University who was recruited through a personal contact.  The low CAQ group 
were pre-screened for low levels of creative achievement (M= 3.58, SD=2.84) using the 
creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson, Higgins and Peterson, 2005).  All fine 
artists and members of the low CAQ group included in the present study had no prior 
experience of any form of design (e.g. product design, garden design). Means and standard 
deviations for the age of participants within each of the four groups were as follows; 
professional garden designers (M= 51.72, SD=7.38), Student garden designers (M= 39.17, 
SD=17.21), fine artists (M= 53.50, SD=13.42) and the low CAQ group (M= 44.10, 
SD=13.00).  The breakdown of gender across the groups was as follows; professional garden 
designers (10 females, 2 males), student garden designers (8 females, 4 males), fine artists (9 
females, 3 males) and the low CAQ group (10 females, 2 males).   The study was approved 
by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.    
 
Research design 
 
As stated in the last section, there were four different groups of participants in the current 
study.  In one set of analyses, the study had a between-groups design with shifting between 
modes of thinking compared across the four different experimental groups and across a high 
and low flexibility group.  In another set of analyses, the study had a correlational design 
where the relationship between shifting between modes of thinking and CAT ratings were 
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examined at the level of the entire sample (N = 48
34
).  A final set of analyses examined the 
relationship between self-reported shifting between modes of thinking and protocol based 
measures of shifting within each of the four original experimental groups. 
 
Tasks, Measures & Materials  
 
Garden design task 
 
This task required participants to produce a design for a garden on A3 paper within a period 
of forty five minutes.  Participants were presented with a brief stating that they should 
produce a design for a garden “based on a journey and the series of experiences those who 
walk around the garden will have on this journey”. The brief asked them to make the garden 
as creative as they could but that it should also be appropriate and work in the context of the 
brief.  The full brief is shown in appendix 4.  The brief was devised with assistance from a 
lecturer of garden design at a local college.  The task was piloted on a fellow PhD student at 
the University who was studying on a course of garden design
35
.  This helped ensure that the 
brief was both clear and had validity as a brief that a garden designer might work to.  They 
were allowed to sketch the design for the garden in any way they wished (e.g. plan view, in 
three-dimensions) and were allowed to produce as many sketches as they wished. 
 
Method used to rate the garden designs 
 
Prior to commencing the study, participants were informed that the designs they produced 
would be rated by experts in garden design.   Three judges with expertise in garden design 
were recruited to rate the designs using Amabile’s (1996) consensual assessment technique 
(CAT).  All three judges were experienced garden designers and all three had experience of 
judging at garden design shows in the United Kingdom including the Chelsea Flower Show.  
Judges were presented with original copies of all sketches of all designs produced by all 
participants.  Judges rated designs blind to which groups produced which designs.  They were 
asked to rate designs based on three dimensions; brief, design and creativity/wow factor.  
Brief referred to how well the designs met the requirements of the brief, design referred to the 
                                                 
34
 In practice this was N= 47 as participant ID 48 was excluded from all analyses after they were revealed to be 
an outlier. 
35
 This student was not included as a member of the group of student garden designers in the present study. 
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quality of the design that was evident in design sketches.  The creativity/wow factor was the 
creativity that judges saw evident in the designs.  Judges were asked to keep the criteria of 
judgment as separate from one another as possible.  Designs were rated relative to one 
another on each dimension rather than against some absolute standard for garden design.  
Judges rated designs using a 1 to 5 point scale with higher numbers indicating higher scores 
on each of the 3 dimensions (brief, design and creativity).  Each judge rated designs in a 
random order, defined by the experimenter, and they were instructed to make full use of the 1 
to 5 point scale when making ratings.  They were also instructed to go back and review the 
ratings they gave to designs that they rated early in the process once they had rated many of 
the designs.  This was to help ensure consistency of ratings.   
 
Video recording equipment & video analysis software 
 
A digital Sony high-definition video camera was used to video the process of designing the 
garden.  The video camera was positioned on a tripod focused on the A3 piece of paper and 
hands of the designer as they sketched their designs.  A computer based package called 
Transana (Woods & Fassnacht, 2012) was used to analyze the audio and video data captured 
by the video camera.  This package enabled segments in the video to be linked to segments in 
the verbal reports produced by participants so that both the video and audio data could be 
used when coding for attributes of different modes of thinking within the verbal protocol.       
 
Self-report measures of creativity  
 
Kaufman-domains of creativity scale (K-DOCS)  
           
This measure is described in chapter four of this thesis.   
 
Creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ) 
 
This measure is described in chapter two of this thesis.  
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Creative behavior inventory (CBI) 
 
The revised Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI) (Dollinger, 2003) measures creative 
behaviour in several domains: fine arts, crafts, literature, math-science, performing arts, and 
music.  A single score across these domains is computed giving a measure of the frequency 
individuals had performed creative activities or achieved creative accomplishments in their 
adult or adolescent life such as “put on a puppet show”.  The full CBI is shown in appendix 9.  
The CBI was included in the present study for two reasons.  Firstly, it appears to tap 
performance on more activities that are clearly related to design compared to the K-DOCs.  It 
also appears to tap performance on a wider range of design activities (e.g. designed and made 
a piece of clothing, assisted in the design of a set for a musical or dramatic production) than 
the CAQ which only taps achievements in architectural design.  Secondly, prior research has 
revealed positive correlations between CBI scores and the creativity of drawings, as assessed 
by Amabile’s (1996) consensual assessment technique (Dollinger, Dollinger & Centeno, 
2005).  The CBI may therefore be able to tap the type of creativity evident in sketches of 
garden designs in the present study. 
 
Self-reported measure of shifting between modes of thinking 
 
This measure is described in chapter three of this thesis.  
 
Measure of affect 
 
The affect grid provides a quick means of measuring affect on dimensions of pleasure-
displeasure and arousal-sleepiness (Russell, Weiss & Mendelsohn, 1989). Participants are 
asked to “rate how you are feeling right now” by placing a checkmark in a square within a 
larger grid (see appendix 6).  The pleasure-displeasure score is the number of the square 
checked, with squares counted left to right in the horizontal plane.  The arousal-sleepiness 
score is the number of the square checked, with squares counted from bottom to top in the 
vertical plane.  The affect grid has demonstrated strong evidence for convergent validity with 
other measures of pleasure and arousal and discriminant validity between dimensions of 
pleasure and arousal (Russell, Weiss & Mendelsohn, 1989).      
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Procedure 
 
Participants completed a session where they worked on the garden design task and completed 
self-report measures of creativity and affect.  This session took place within their own homes, 
places of work or study or in a lab at the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Surrey.  Eleven of the twelve members of the low CAQ group and one member of the group 
of fine artists completed the session within a lab at the University.  All other participants 
completed the session at their own homes or places of work or study.  The session lasted a 
total of one hour and thirty minutes with the garden design task taking forty five minutes and 
the remainder of the time used for participants to read the information sheet and give 
informed consent, to set up the video recording equipment and to complete the self-report 
measures of creativity and mood.        
 
After the participants had read the information sheet and provided informed consent they 
were given instructions to help them to ‘think aloud’ as they worked on the garden design 
task.  Participants were asked to ‘think aloud’ their thoughts and were given the following 
instructions to help them to understand how they should do this: 
 
“While designing you will be asked to ‘think aloud’ your thoughts, which means you will be   
asked to speak out whatever you are thinking at the time.  I would like you to focus on 
describing what you are thinking.  Don’t worry about complete sentences and don’t hold 
back from describing hunches, guesses, wild ideas, images, plans or goals that you have. 
Don’t over explain or justify.  Analyze no more than you would normally.  Just describe 
whatever is on your mind at the time.  Try and get into the pattern of saying what you’re 
thinking about now, not of thinking for a while and then describing your thoughts.  Though I 
am present you are not talking to me.  Instead you are to perform this task as if you are 
talking aloud to yourself.  Speak as continuously as possible, try to say something at least 
once every 15 seconds, even if only “I’m drawing a blank”.  Try and also speak audibly, 
watch out for your voice dropping as you become involved.  I will prompt you as we go along 
to help you to think aloud with phrases such as “what are you thinking now?” and “can you 
speak up?” if your voice drops”.   
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They were then given two practice tasks to get them used to thinking aloud.  These were to 
‘think-aloud’ while they answered the question “what is the sixth letter after B?” and to 
‘think aloud’ while naming ten animals.   
 
Following the ‘think-aloud’ practice participants completed the affect grid and were 
presented with the brief for the garden design task and given 45 minutes to work on it.  The 
experimenter was present in the room while participants completed the task and answered 
any questions they had during it.  Once participants had completed the garden design task 
they immediately completed the affect grid and then completed the self-report measures of 
creativity.  Participants were then debriefed on the purposes of the study and thanked for their 
time.  Participants completed the self-report measure of shifting modes via email at a later 
date.             
   
Results 
 
Sub-section outlining general statistical decisions  
 
This section outlines the general statistical decisions taken that are specific to analyses 
reported in this chapter.   
 
Assessing whether Multivariate normality was met 
 
 
For the MANOVA’s the assumption of multivariate normality was checked for each group 
using a procedure described by Steven’s (1992).  This required the calculation of 
mahalanobis distance for each participant based on the two dependent variables and then 
ordering the distances within each group and plotting these values against chi square 
percentiles.  The assumption of normality is met if plots resemble a straight line. 
 
The use of ANCOVAs 
 
ANCOVA’s were run to minimize error variance.  If there are significant differences between 
groups on a covariate then it is not appropriate to use the covariate to control for those 
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differences (Miller & Chapman, 2001; Field, 2009).  Covariates were thus only included in 
analyses if groups did not differ significantly on them (Field, 2009).     
   
Analysis of variance and covariance using mixed models  
 
In chapter five mixed models were used instead of general linear models to examine group 
differences on measures of shifting as a function of time bin.  The reason for this was because 
the number of time bins differed across participants.  This resulted in ‘missing’ data across 
participants.  For example, those participants whose verbal protocols were only fifteen 
minutes long did not have data for the ’30 to 35’ minute time bin.  General linear models 
cannot account for the missing data across participants and when run exclude any participants 
with missing data.  It was important here that all participants were included in the analyses.  
The ‘missing’ data referred to here were not missing in the sense that it was not recorded; it 
was expected that it should be missing.  Thus mean substitution of missing data would not 
have been appropriate and listwise deletion would have excluded participants who evidenced 
shorter protocols.  Missing data is not a problem for mixed models and allows data from all 
time bins across all participants to be analysed (Field, 2009; Howell, 2012). 
  
In the set of analyses reported in chapter five, group and time were entered as fixed, as 
opposed to random, effects as only the levels of the effects specified were of interest (Field, 
2009).  Time bin was specified as a repeated measures factor and group a between subjects 
factor.  The covariance structures of the mixed models specified were each based on a first 
order auto-regressive model.  An autoregressive model assumes that the score at a given time 
point, for example the 10 to 15 minute time bin, will depend on the score at the time point 
immediately prior to it, for example the 15 to 20 minute time bin, and an error component 
(Howell, website).  The autoregressive structure appears to reflect the Markov chain model 
and the prediction that the mode one is currently in will have an effect on one’s subsequent 
mode of thinking.  The parameters were estimated in the mixed model analyses using 
maximum likelihood.  Maximum likelihood was chosen as it has been argued that is produces 
more accurate estimates of fixed regression coefficients (Field, 2009; Twisk, 2006).   
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Using discriminant analysis to follow up a significant MANOVA 
 
Discriminant analysis was used to understand effects in significant MANOVA’s because it 
enables one to go beyond univariate tests and examine if groups differ along a combination of 
dependent variables (Field, 2009). 
 
Measures of effect size for chi-squares 
 
Odd’s ratios were calculated for 2 x 2 Chi squares.  It was not possible to calculate odd’s 
ratios as a measure of effect size for chi-squares with more than two levels.  
 
Protocol analysis 
 
The entire verbal report provided by each participant was divided into segments.  A segment 
is defined as words, phrases or sentences of any length that make up one distinct statement 
about something such as an idea or topic (Suwa & Tversky, 1997; Atman, Chimka, Bursic & 
Nachtmann,1999; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007).  A total of 13,611 segments 
were coded for across the 48 participants.  
 
A coding scheme was developed in order to examine the underlying operation of different 
modes of thinking based on the verbal and visual content of the segments.  The coding 
scheme is displayed in table 51.   
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Table 50.  Coding scheme used to code segments within the verbal protocol.   
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Table 51.  Coding scheme (continued). 
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Table 51.  Coding scheme (continued). 
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The coding scheme was based on dual-process models of creativity (Gabora, & Ranjan, 2013; 
Howard-Jones, 2002) and dual-process models of cognition (Epstein, 2003; Frankish, 2010; 
Kaufman, 2011).  Attributes that reflected the operation of associative and analytic modes of 
thinking were translated into examples of activities which could then be coded for in the 
verbal protocol as associative or analytic.  Only attributes that distinguished between the two 
modes of thinking were included.  The models and accounts from which each attribute are 
taken are listed alongside each attribute in the coding scheme. There are two reasons for 
integrating attributes defined across different dual-process models of creativity and different 
dual-process accounts of cognition into the coding scheme used in the present study.  Firstly, 
the alignment of similar attributes to the same types of thinking across different models 
increases the validity of the use of these attributes as measures of the two different modes of 
thinking.  Secondly, each model only makes reference to certain attributes as distinguishing 
attributes of different modes of thinking.  Drawing upon different models means that a 
greater number of distinguishing attributes can be identified and therefore a greater number 
of segments in the protocol can be coded as reflecting one type of thinking or the other.   
  
Segments were coded based on the attributes they contained and the mode of thinking they 
reflected.   Examples of these attributes and how they might appear in the verbal protocol are 
shown in table 51.  A segment could be coded for multiple attributes from the same over-
arching mode.  For example, a segment could be coded with “generating ideas/concepts” and 
“images, metaphors and analogies” from the overarching “associative mode”.  There was one 
exception to this rule.  Segments could only be coded for “generating ideas/concepts” or 
“developing/thinking through/exploring ideas”, not both.  The reason for this was to enable 
separate analyses to be carried out based on the generation of novel ideas versus the 
exploration or elaboration of existing ones.   
 
The initial aim was to also code each segment as only reflecting the operation of one 
overarching mode of thinking; associative or analytic.  However, it was not always possible 
to code segments as predominantly containing associative or analytic content, sometimes 
segments appeared to reflect similar levels of both modes of thinking.  A code was included 
in the coding scheme to reflect the operation of different modes of thinking within the same 
segment, labelled as two modes meshed together. For example in the segment “it’s not going 
to be curved because that doesn’t work” the participant introduces and evaluates the idea of a 
curve but it is not clear whether the idea or evaluation came first.  There were two different 
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types of two modes meshed together segments; one which involved the operation of both 
associative cognitive and analytic cognitive modes and the other which involved the 
operation of both associative cognitive and analytic affective modes
36
.  Some segments 
contained no content or a lack of clear content to reflect the operation of either associative or 
analytic thinking.  These segments were labelled as documentation, reminder to speak or 
experimenter talk.  For example in the segment “so it says in the brief to make the design as 
creative as possible” there is no reference to any attributes of either associative or analytic 
thinking, the participant is simply re-reading the brief they were given.  
 
Prior to coding the protocols, the researcher discussed using the coding scheme to code 
segments in the protocols with members of a cognitive lab group and another researcher who 
was experienced in both the subject matter with a doctoral thesis written on the subject of 
creativity and who also had experience in qualitative techniques of data coding.  Both the 
attributes and the means of applying them to code segments in the protocols were refined 
through these discussions. This led to two attribute codes ‘conscious reasoning’ and ‘thinking 
about thinking’ from Frankish (2010) being dropped from the scheme.  The rationale behind 
the decision to drop the code ‘thinking about thinking’ was that the instructions to think aloud 
may have primed individuals to make statements such as “what am I thinking now”.  One 
cannot be certain that statements such as this indicate that participants are ‘thinking about 
thinking’ of their own volition rather than merely because they were instructed to do so.  
Further, think-aloud protocols are evidently only capable of revealing conscious reasoning 
and not unconscious processes (Allen & Thomas, 2011).  Since all the verbal content in the 
protocol reflects conscious processes, ‘conscious reasoning’ is therefore a redundant code.  It 
is important to note here that while the workings of type 1 thinking are not reflected in 
conscious thinking, the outcomes of type 1 thinking are (Evans & Over, 1996).  The 
outcomes of type 1 associative processes are captured by the coding scheme attributes of the 
associative mode. 
 
The issue of what code should be given to segments in the protocol which indicated 
participants were making decisions was also discussed.  It was decided that decisions based 
on logical reasoning, such as “let’s have a fence here to ensure we have privacy from our 
                                                 
36
 It should be noted that these different types of two-modes meshed together segments were based on Dietrich’s 
(2004) framework.  Based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories there was only one 
type of two-modes meshed together segment; that containing associative and analytic modes.  An explanation of 
this distinction is provided later in this chapter. 
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neighbours”, would be coded as analytic thinking and decisions made on the basis of 
aesthetic elements, such as “to increase balance here” or intuitive feelings, such as “because 
that feels right” would be coded as associative thinking.  The rationale for this was based on 
Epstein’s (2003) cognitive-experiential self-theory where a different type of thinking 
underpins decision making on the basis of intuitive impressions or feelings and making 
decisions based on reason and logic.  It was also decided that instances where participants 
were positioning features and stating the size of features in designs would be coded as 
associative thinking because they appeared to entail thinking through ideas.  Instances when 
participants were resizing or repositioning features would be coded as analytic thinking 
because they appear to entail evaluations of existing elements. 
 
Another key issue that arose from this discussion was whether segments where participants 
engage in evaluation based on affective judgements such as “that’s nice, that’s boring”.  
should be coded as analytic or associative.  Making evaluations is characterised by Howard-
Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan (2013) as involving a more analytical mode of thinking to 
that underpinning the generation of ideas.  However, Evans & Stanovich (2013) suggest that 
type 1 thinking, which partially maps on to associative thinking (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 
2014), underpins basic emotions.  Similarly, Epstein (2003) argued that emotionality is a 
fundamental aspect of experiential thinking which appears to map on to associative thinking.   
There is some empirical evidence in support of the role of affective judgements in evaluation.  
Brain activity during the performance of an evaluative task has been found to evidence the 
recruitment of the default network, a general function of which is seen as evaluative 
processing using internally generated affective information (Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman & 
Christoff, 2012; Legrand & Ruby, 2009).  Since Dietrich’s (2004) framework proposes that 
each mode of thinking operates on both affective and cognitive content it could help address 
this problem. Dietrich’s (2004) framework was adopted in the present study to identify the 
operation of associative and analytic processing on two types of content; cognitive and 
affective.  This resulted in four categories of thinking: associative cognitive, associative 
affective, analytic cognitive and analytic affective.  Table 52 shows how each of these 
categories align with the four modes of thinking in Dietrich’s (2004) framework. 
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Table 51. showing the four modes of thinking coded for within verbal protocols in the present study and their 
alignment with Dietrich’s (2004) four modes of thinking.  
    MODE OF THINKING CORRESPONDING MODE OF THINKING IN  
PROPOSED    DIETRICH'S (2004) FRAMEWORK 
Associative cognitive Spontaneous cognitive 
        
Associative affective Spontaneous emotional 
        
Analytic cognitive   Deliberate cognitive 
  
 
    
Analytic affective   Deliberate emotional 
  
 
    
        
 
Protocol segments coded based on the associative affective attribute in the coding scheme 
represented the operation of the associative mode of thinking on affective content.  Protocol 
segments coded based on the analytic affective attribute in the coding scheme represented the 
operation of the analytic mode of thinking on affective content.  Protocol segments coded 
based on associative cognitive and analytic cognitive attributes represented the operation of 
the associative and analytic modes of thinking on cognitive content.  It should be noted that 
when segments were coded as analytic affective or associative affective then they were 
classed as containing affective content.  In this situation, all other attributes coded for in these 
segments such as ‘evaluation of design ideas/concepts’ were also classed as affective.  
Conversely, when segments were coded as ‘associative cognitive’ all other attributes in the 
segment were classed as cognitive.      
 
Segments were coded independently by two coders.  The experimenter coded all segments 
across all participants using the coding scheme.  The coding scheme was checked for 
reliability by the second coder.  The second coder was a researcher who had written a 
doctoral thesis on the topic of creativity, was experienced in qualitative analysis and had also 
been party to earlier discussions concerning the coding scheme.  Random segments to be 
coded were chosen by first dividing the protocol of each participant into four distinct time 
periods; 0-12, 12-24, 24-36 and 36-48 minutes.  A chunk of consecutive segments from one 
of these four time periods of a participant’s verbal protocol was then chosen for the second 
coder to code.  Only one of the four time periods for each participant was second coded and 
chunks of the protocols of a total of 16 participants were second coded in total.  The second 
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coder only coded at the level of the mode of thinking evident in the segments and not at the 
level of individual attributes present in segments.  This was done in order to make the second 
coder’s task more manageable and, fundamentally it was the modes of thinking present in 
segments not the attributes themselves that was of most interest in subsequent analysis.  The 
second coder coded segments based on the following codes; associative thinking, analytic 
thinking, documentation and two-modes meshed together.  Coding agreement between the 
two raters was examined based on a total sample of 289 segments obtained across the 16 
participants.  Simple agreement was found for 70 % of the segments with the kappa statistic 
(Fleiss, 1981) revealing a level of agreement after adjusting for chance of .53.  Disagreements 
between coders on the coding categories to apply were discussed.  After coding of all 
segments was completed, the first coder checked through the coding of modes of thinking 
across all segments to make sure the codes were applied consistently and any disagreements 
between coders were resolved. 
   
For each participant, the sum of the number of verbal protocol segments for each of the 
attributes aligned with the different modes of thinking was calculated.  The total number of 
verbal protocol segments coded as two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & 
analytic cognitive, two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic affective), 
documentation, experimenter talk and reminder to speak was also calculated. 
 
Assessing inter-relationships between attributes hypothesized to reflect the same mode 
of thinking 
 
Inter-relationships between the sums of the instances of different attributes of both 
associative and analytic modes of thinking across protocols were examined.  It was predicted 
that the number of instances of each attribute theorized to belong to the same mode of 
thinking would co-vary.  If the number of instances of an attribute did not co-vary with the 
number of instances of other attributes theorized to be facets of the same mode, then that 
would suggest that this attribute was not evidencing the operation of the same underlying 
mode of thinking.  In some dual-process theories of creativity exploring ideas appears to 
draw on associative thinking (Gabora & Ranjan, 2013) while in others it appears to draw on 
analytic thinking (Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992).  The present analysis would help determine 
whether the attribute ‘developing, thinking through and exploring ideas’ is evidencing the 
operation of the associative or analytic mode of thinking. 
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Table 52.  displays inter-correlations between the number of instances of different attributes across protocols. 
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Table 53 shows the inter-correlations between all attributes and modes of thinking. A 
regularized exploratory factor analysis (REFA) (Jung & Lee, 2011) was run to examine the 
extent to which instances of the attributes theorized to be facets of associative and analytic 
thinking loaded onto their respective modes of thinking.  The attributes ‘making 
associations’, ‘insight moments’, ‘spontaneous engagement’, ‘non-design associative’, 
‘fixation’, and ‘planning for the future’ were excluded from the REFA analysis and all 
subsequent analysis.  The rationale for this was that the distributions of the number of 
instances on each of these attributes were not normally distributed and the results of the 
REFA were clearer when these attributes were removed from the analysis.  The number of 
instances across all remaining attributes was normally distributed within the sample.   
 
A REFA was run on all remaining attributes.  A two factor solution was forced in order to 
examine if the attributes predicted to reflect the two different modes of thinking loaded onto 
two distinct factors.  The results of this REFA are shown in table 54.        
 
Table 53. Regularized exploratory factor analysis run on attributes coded for across participant’s verbal 
protocols when a two-factor solution was forced (N = 48).  Factor loadings <.35 are omitted.     
     
 
Attribute  Factor   
 
  
I II 
 
 
Images, metaphors, analogies   .48 
 
 
Memory retrieval 
   
 
Associative affective 
 
.42 
 
 
Associative cognitive 
 
.94 
 
 
Intuition, instinct, self-evidently valid 
   
 
Generating ideas / concepts 
 
.58 
 
 
Developing, thinking through & exploring ideas 
 
.86 
 
 
Half-baked/crudely integrated .37 
  
 
Logical deduction .56 
  
 
Reasoning justified via logic / evidence .62 
  
 
Evaluation of design ideas / concepts .81 
  
 
Analytic affective .50 
  
 
Analytic cognitive .92 
  
 
Evaluating remembered experiences/past 
behaviour .41 
  
 
Self-evaluation/critique 
   
 
      
  
The pattern of loadings in table 54 shows that attributes predicted to reflect the same mode of 
thinking did generally load on to the same factor.  With the exception of ‘half-baked/crudely 
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integrated’, all of the attributes that loaded onto factor one were those predicted to reflect the 
operation of the analytic mode of thinking.  All of the attributes that loaded on to factor two 
were those predicted to reflect the operation of the associative mode of thinking.  ‘Memory 
retrieval’, ‘intuition, instinct, self-evidently valid’, and ‘self-evaluation/critique’ all failed to 
load onto a factor.  This raises doubts concerning whether these particular attributes reflect 
the operation of a mode of thinking.  The finding that ‘half-baked/crudely integrated’ did not 
load on the factor with other attributes of the associative mode raises doubts concerning 
whether this attribute reflected the operation of the associative mode of thinking  Those 
segments previously coded with these attributes were re-coded as “documentation” in 
protocols.  This would ensure the modes of thinking coded for within the protocols were 
better defined. 
 
It is also important to note that when the number of factors to extract was not forced and was 
instead based on the Kaiser criterion of eigenvalues greater than one, a four factor solution 
emerged.  The results of the REFA with the four factor solution are shown in table 55. 
 
Table 54.  Regularized exploratory factor analysis run on attributes coded for across participant’s verbal 
protocols when a four factor solution emerged based on Kaiser’s criterion (N = 48).  Factor loadings <.35 are 
omitted.     
       
 
Attribute  Factor       
 
  
I II III IV 
 
 
Images, metaphors, analogies .50   .42   
 
 
Memory retrieval 
  
.43 
  
 
Associative affective 
     
 
Associative cognitive .94 
    
 
Intuition, instinct, self-evidently valid 
     
 
Generating ideas / concepts .57 
    
 
Developing, thinking through & exploring ideas .89 
    
 
Half-baked/crudely integrated 
  
.53 
  
 
Logical deduction 
 
.46 
 
.59 
 
 
Reasoning justified via logic / evidence 
  
.61 .43 
 
 
Evaluation of design ideas / concepts 
 
.91 
   
 
Analytic affective 
 
.81 
   
 
Analytic cognitive 
 
.74 
 
.35 
 
 
Evaluating remembered experiences/past 
behaviour 
  
.43 
  
 
Self-evaluation/critique 
  
.59 
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The pattern of loadings in table 55 suggests a four factor solution, with factor one capturing 
attributes of the associative mode and factors two and four capturing attributes of the analytic 
mode respectively.  Factor three captures attributes of both modes.  The finding of a four 
factor solution here does suggest that there may be more than two modes of thinking.  It is 
important to note however that there is no clear mapping between these four factors and 
Dietrich’s (2004) four modes.   
 
Taken as a whole, these findings demonstrate that the majority of attributes of each mode of 
thinking did load onto the latent mode of thinking that they were theoretically linked to.  As 
predicted, “developing, thinking through & exploring ideas” loaded on to the “associative” 
and not “analytic” mode of thinking.  As such segments coded as containing this attribute 
were coded as reflecting “associative thinking” in subsequent analyses.  
  
Assessing and improving the validity of affective content coded for within the protocol 
 
The validity with which affective content was coded for in protocols was also examined.  
Initially, the first coder coded whether or not segments contained affective content using his 
subjective judgment.  Words in these segments that appeared to reflect affective content were 
then checked against Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert’s (2013) database of norms for the 
affective meaning of words in order to provide an objective means of assessing the 
experimenter’s subjective judgments.  Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert’s (2013) affective 
ratings for words were made on a scale of 1 to 9 on the dimensions of valence, arousal and 
dominance.  Lower ratings on valence indicated unhappiness while higher ratings indicated 
happiness, lower ratings on arousal indicated calm while higher ratings indicated excitement 
and lower ratings on dominance indicated being controlled while higher ratings indicated 
being in control.  Ratings in the database for each word on each dimension were averaged 
based on ratings being given by 18 or more of Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert’s (2013) 
participants.  Words in the protocol segments that were subjectively judged to contain affect 
were only coded as indicating valid affect if they had ratings of one standard deviation above 
or below the mean, calculated based on all of the 13,915 words in the database, on any one of 
the three dimensions.  The means and standard deviations for each dimension based on 
Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert’s (2013) database were as follows; valence (M=5.06, SD= 
1.68), arousal (M= 4.21, SD= 2.30) or dominance (M=5.18, SD=2.16).  A list of each word 
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appearing in one or more participant’s protocols that was coded as affective based on the 
criteria outlined is given in appendix 7. 
 
How the overarching modes of thinking were coded for based on attribute codes 
 
Different dual-process models of creativity and cognition make different predictions 
concerning which overarching modes of thinking are represented by the ‘associative 
affective’ and ‘analytic affective’ attributes.  It was stated earlier that this problem was 
addressed by drawing upon Dietrich’s (2004) model to assign attributes to four overarching 
modes.  However, it was also necessary to conduct analysis based on only two different 
modes of thinking so that findings from this study could be compared to those from previous 
studies in the thesis which have conceptualized shifting between two and not four modes of 
thinking. To resolve this issue, two overarching modes were calculated in different ways 
based on different dual process theories.  Two overarching modes were calculated based on 
the set of dual process theories that appear to class all evaluations as analytic, irrespective of 
whether they contain affective content (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).  
Based on these, the attribute ‘associative affective’ was coded with the overarching 
‘associative’ mode and the attribute ‘analytic affective’ was coded with the overarching 
‘analytic’ mode.  Two overarching modes were also calculated based on the set of dual 
process theories that appear to class affective processing as associative thinking (Epstein, 
2003; Frankish, 2010).  Based on these, the attributes ‘associative affective’ and ‘analytic 
affective’ were both coded with the overarching ‘associative’ mode.  It should be noted that 
there was no disagreement between any dual-process theories concerning which of the other 
non-affective attributes (e.g. generating ideas/concepts) reflected which overarching modes 
of thought.  As such these attributes represented the same overarching modes across the 
different sets of theories.    
 
Subsequent analyses were carried out on the two overarching modes calculated based on the 
different sets of theories.  It should be noted that when the findings from the analysis based 
on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories were in agreement with that 
of Epstein (2003) and Frankish (2010), only the inferential statistics based on Howard-Jones 
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(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013)37 theories were reported.  The inferential statistics 
from both sets of theories were reported when there was disagreement between findings. 
 
Measures of the frequency of shifting between consecutive modes of thinking  
 
The frequency of shifting between pairs of segments representing the operation of different 
modes of thinking was calculated in two different ways; using a Markov chain model and 
based on the mean number of shifts per minute between modes.  The Markov chain model 
was used to analyze shifting between the modes of thinking outlined in Dietrich’s (2004) 
model, the modes outlined in Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories 
and the modes outlined in Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework.  The mean 
number of shifts per minute was only used to analyze shifting between the modes outlined in 
Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and the types outlined in Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s 
(2010) framework.  The subsequent analyses based on this measure did not produce any 
significant effects and as a result it was not used to analyze shifting within Dietrich’s (2004) 
framework.     
 
It is important to note that for the above methods, calculations of shifting frequency between 
pairs of segments were based only on segments that were coded with either of the two or four 
overarching modes described previously.  The rationale for this is that the mode of thinking 
operating in segments coded as “documentation”, “experimenter talk” and “reminder to 
speak” is unknown.  Within segments coded as “two modes meshed together” it is not known 
whether the operation of the associative mode precedes the operation of the analytic mode or 
vice-versa.  Therefore the type of transition between a pair of segments where one or both 
segments of the pair are “two modes meshed together” is not clear.   
 
A final measure of shifting frequency was calculated based on the frequency of “two modes 
meshed together” segments. Segments coded as either of the two categories of ‘two modes 
meshed together’ represent the operation of two different modes of thinking that could not be 
parsed into separate consecutive segments.  Since these segments represent the operation of 
                                                 
37
 Analyses based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories were given precedence here 
because these theories make specific predictions concerning the interaction between different modes of thinking 
on creativity.  Epstein’s (2003) theory and Frankish’s (2010) framework only make predictions concerning the 
role of different types of thinking on cognition in general.   
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two different modes of thinking, it follows that a shift between different modes has taken 
place within them.     
Each method used to calculate shifting frequency is now described in turn.   
 
Markov chain model 
 
A Markov chain is a model of a sequence of categorical events that evolves over time 
(Kaplan, 2008).  An assumption of the model is that the sequence is stochastic, with the 
probability of the current categorical event depending only on the categorical event 
immediately prior to it (Kaplan, 2008).  In the present study, the categorical events were 
defined as the different modes of thinking
38
.  In the analyses based on Howard- Jones (2002) 
and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) 
framework, there were two modes of thinking; associative and analytic.  The categorical 
event was thus either associative or analytic.  To illustrate, if events were randomly 
distributed then there is a .5 probability that the current mode is associative and a .5 
probability that it is analytic.  There is a .5 probability that the mode immediately following 
the current mode is associative and a .5 probability that the mode immediately following the 
current mode analytic is .5.  There are thus four possible types of transition, associative to 
associative, analytic to analytic, associative to analytic and analytic to associative.  Within 
the model, the probability of each type of transition occurring is .25.  Transition probabilities 
thus sum to 1 (Kaplan, 2008).  However, in reality we expected that the events would not be 
randomly distributed and that they would vary between groups. Thus, generalising for the 
example of associative to associative transitions:  
 
P (associative to associative) = Σ (associative to associative) / Σ (associative to associative + 
analytic to analytic + associative to analytic + analytic to associative) 
 
In the present thesis, the term transition probabilities reflect the ratio of the observed 
frequency of each type of transition (e.g. associative to associative) out of all known 
transitions (i.e. associative to associative + analytic to analytic + associative to analytic + 
analytic to associative).  For example, if there were 56 associative to associative transitions 
out of a total of 100 transitions then the associative to associative transition probability would 
                                                 
38
 Segments which were coded as failing to represent a clear mode of thinking. e.g. “documentation”, were 
excluded from these analyses.   
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be .56.  This differs from how the term transition probability is normally used which accounts 
for the transition from a starting state at time n to the current state at time n+1.  With 
reference to the previous example, the associative to associative transition probability would 
normally be calculated as the ratio of the observed frequency of associative to associative 
transitions out of the total number of transitions in which the start state at time n was 
associative.  If 73 out of a total of 100 transitions had an associative starting state then the 
associative to associative transition probability in the present example would be 56/73= .77.                  
 
A Markov chain model was also used to model transition probabilities between the four 
modes of thinking proposed in Dietrich’s (2004) framework. There were thus 16 possible 
types of transition, with a complete list of all sixteen included in appendix 8.  Generalizing 
for a representing one type of transition and b to p the other 15 types of transition, the 
transition probability observed for a is: 
 
P (a) = Σ (a) / Σ (b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i + j + k + l + m + n + o + p) 
 
In the analyses based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and 
Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework, associative to analytic transitions and 
analytic to associative transitions were classed as shift transitions, being indicative of shifts 
between different modes of thinking.  In the analyses based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework 
there were three types of shift transition, as illustrated in table 56.  It is important to note that 
the transitions reported in table 56 are collapsed across direction.  For example “analytic 
affective (P)- associative affective (S)” represents both analytic affective to associative 
affective and associative affective to analytic affective transitions.  It is important to clarify 
however that for the purposes of analysis, shifting in different directions, for example from 
analytic affective to associative affective and from associative affective to analytic affective 
were examined separately.    
 
 
 
 
 
Table 55.  The six different types of shift transition based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework.   
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Type of transition between modes of thinking 
Content 
transition Mode transition 
      
Analytic affective (P)- associative affective (S) 
 
x 
Analytic cognitive (Q)- associative cognitive (T) 
 
x 
   Analytic affective (P)- analytic cognitive (Q) x 
 Associative affective (S)- associative cognitive (T) x 
 
   Analytic affective (P)- associative cognitive (T) x x 
Analytic cognitive (Q)- associative affective (S) x x 
 
 
It should be noted that the top two transitions in table 56 are shifts between different modes 
of thinking based on processing the same content while the second set of transitions are shifts 
between processing different content but within the same mode of thinking.  The bottom set 
of transitions in the table are shifts that cross both modes of thinking and content of 
processing.   
 
All other transitions between segments coded with an overarching mode were classed as non-
shift transitions as they represented continuity in the mode or content of processing.  An 
example of such a transition based on the theories of Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & 
Ranjan (2013) is associative to associative and based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework an 
example is associative cognitive to associative cognitive.   
 
Analyses based on the Markov chain model also accounted for unknown transitions within 
protocols.  These were transitions between consecutive segments where one or both of the 
segments were not coded with an overarching mode.  An example of such a transition is 
documentation to associative.  Protocols containing a greater number of documentation, 
reminder to speak, experimenter talk and two modes meshed together segments would 
contain a greater number of unknown transitions.  The proportion of unknown transitions out 
of the total number of transitions within participant’s protocols across each group are shown 
in table 57.  A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, 
student garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences 
across groups on the proportion of unknown transitions. 
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Table 56. Displaying the proportion of unknown transitions to the total number of transitions (known & 
unknown) across the four groups. 
  
The effect of group on unknown transitions was not significant (F (3, 43) = .77, p = .52, ηp
2
= 
.05, power = .20).  Therefore the measure of unknown transitions was included as a covariate 
in subsequent analyses of group differences based on the Markov chain measures (see general 
statistics section for further explanation of why).  This should help minimize error variance 
between groups due to factors other than the effect of interest; that is differences in patterns 
of known transition probabilities.  In subsequent analyses, the results of the analyses 
including the covariate and the results without the covariate were both reported to examine if 
including the covariate did minimize error variance. 
 
Mean number of transitions per minute across the entire protocol  
 
This is the number of each type of transition per minute across the entire protocol.  This was 
calculated by dividing the total number of segments of each type of transition within a 
protocol by the total length in minutes of the verbal protocol.   
Frequency of ‘two modes meshed together’ segments  
 
Two modes meshed together segments across all verbal protocols only represented the 
operation of the overarching modes associative cognitive and analytic cognitive or 
associative cognitive and analytic affective based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework.  As such 
there were two measures of the frequency of two modes meshed together segments; two 
modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) and two modes meshed 
together (associative cognitive & analytic affective).  Two modes meshed together 
(associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) and two modes meshed together (associative 
cognitive & analytic affective) were summed to produce a single measure of the frequency of 
two modes meshed together based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) 
theories.  Two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) was the 
measure of two modes meshed together based on Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) 
framework. 
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It is possible that the likelihood of observing two modes meshed together segments within 
protocols is higher in longer protocols that included more segments. It was therefore 
important to examine if there were group differences in protocol length.  Table 58 below 
displays the mean length of protocols in terms of time and the total number of segments 
within protocols. 
 
Table 57. Displaying means and their associated 95% CI’s for measures of the total number of segments and the 
total time of the verbal protocol in minutes (min) across groups. 
 
 
  
A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden 
designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across groups in 
protocol length in terms of time.  This revealed a significant effect of group (F (3, 43) = 
15.06, p < .001, ηp
2
= .51, power = 1.00).  A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –
professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was 
run to examine differences across groups in protocol length in terms of the total number of 
segments within a protocol.  This revealed a significant effect of group (F (3, 43) = 6.84, p = 
.001, ηp
2
= .32, power = .97).  Post-hoc Tukey tests were run to break down the effects 
reported in the ANOVAs run on protocol length in terms of time and on the total number of 
segments within protocols.  The results of these are shown in table 59.   
 
Table 58. Displaying post-hoc Tukey comparisons between group means based on both the length of protocols 
in terms of the total number of segments and total time. 
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The mean protocol length of the Low CAQ group was significantly shorter, both in terms of 
the total number of segments and the time in minutes, compared to the groups of professional 
and student garden designers and fine artists
39
.  The mean protocol length of professional 
garden designers, in terms of time in minutes, was marginally significantly longer than that of 
student garden designers and fine artists.  
 
These findings have implications for subsequent analyses on the frequency of two modes 
meshed together segments across groups. It could be that any difference found in the 
frequency of two modes meshed together segments is merely a function of differences in 
protocol length.  As shown in table 60, there were indeed significant positive correlations 
between all measures of the frequency of two modes meshed together segments and protocol 
length in terms of time and the total number of segments.  It could be the case then that the 
longer participant’s protocols are then the more two modes meshed together segments they 
will contain.  However, it could also be the case that more creative participants produce both 
a greater frequency of two modes meshed together segments and elaborate and work on 
designs for longer, hence their protocols are longer.  The latter explanation would suggest 
that protocol length is not a confounding variable, instead being indicative of differences in 
the creativity of the different experimental groups. 
 
Table 59. Displaying correlations between two modes meshed together measures and protocol length in terms of 
the total number of segments and the total length of the protocol in minutes (min).      
 
 
Further, it was not appropriate to control for protocol length by including it as a covariate in 
subsequent ANOVAs because protocol length significantly differed across groups.  If there 
are significant differences between groups on a covariate then it is not appropriate to use the 
covariate to control for those differences (Miller & Chapman, 2001; Field, 2009).  
                                                 
39
 The difference between the Low CAQ and fine artists groups based on the total number of segments was only 
marginally significant.  
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Does the frequency of shifting between modes of thinking differ across experimental 
groups? 
 
Tables 61 and 62 below display the means and their associated 95% confidence intervals on 
both the Markov chain and the mean number of transitions per minute measures of the 
frequency of shifting between modes of thinking for each of the four experimental groups; 
professional garden designers (Prof GDs), student garden designers (Student GDs), fine 
artists and the low CAQ group.  Table 61 displays the results for the analysis based on 
Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories while table 62 displays 
measures of the frequency of shifting between modes of thinking across groups based on 
Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework.  Higher scores on all measures indicate 
greater shifting frequency.  Participant ID 48 was identified as an outlier within the group of 
student garden designers on all measures of shifting frequency.  This participant was 
therefore removed from all subsequent analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 60.  Displaying means their associated 95% confidence intervals across groups on different measures of 
shifting frequency (based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories).   
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Table 61. Displaying means their associated 95% confidence intervals across groups on different measures of 
shifting frequency (based on Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework).   
 
 
 
Table 61 and 62 suggest that professional garden designers, student garden designers and the 
low CAQ group all evidenced similar probabilities of Analytic to Associative and Associative 
to Analytic transitions.  These three groups also evidenced similar scores on the number of 
Analytic to Associative and Associative to Analytic transitions per minute.  The group of fine 
artists evidenced a lower probability of Analytic to Associative and Associative to Analytic 
transitions and less Analytic to Associative and Associative to Analytic transitions per minute 
compared to the other three groups.  The groups of professional and student garden designers 
evidenced a higher frequency of transitions on both measures of Analytic to Analytic 
transitions compared to the group of fine artists and low CAQ group.  The opposite was the 
case for Associative to Associative transitions, with the fine artists and low CAQ groups 
evidencing a higher frequency of transitions than the other two groups on both measures.  
 
 A one-way independent MANCOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups on Markov chain transition probabilities calculated based on Howard- Jones (2002) 
and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories (DV’s (4)-Analytic to Associative, Associative to 
Analytic, Analytic to Analytic, Associative to Associative) controlling for differences in unknown 
transitions
40
 across groups.  The assumption of univariate equality of variances between 
groups was violated for analytic to associative transitions (p = .04).  As such results from this 
                                                 
40
 A log10 transformation was applied to the measure of unknown transitions to correct for negative skew.  
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analysis were interpreted tentatively.  The MANCOVA revealed a significant effect of group 
on Markov chain transition probabilities (F (12, 123) = 1.87
41
, p = .04, ηp
2
= .16, power = .88).  
The MANOVA, run without controlling for differences in unknown transitions, revealed a 
marginally significant effect of group on Markov chain transition probabilities (F (12, 123) = 
1.79
42
, p = .06, ηp
2
= .15, power = .86).   
 
One-way independent ANCOVA’s (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden 
designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) were run on each of the different transition 
probabilities based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories to 
follow up the significant MANCOVA.  The results of these ANCOVAs are displayed in table 
63 below.  Table 63 shows that there were marginally significant effects of group on analytic 
to associative, associative to analytic and associative to associative transition probabilities.                       
 
 
 
 
Table 62.  Displays the results of the 4 one-way ANCOVAs
43
 run on each of the probabilities of the four 
measures of transition probability with unknown transitions as a covariate. 
 
 
 
 
DV  F-value p-value ηp2 power 
 
 
Analytic to Associative 2.74 .06 .16 .62 
 
 
Associative to Analytic  2.57 .07 .16 .59 
 
 
Analytic to Analytic  1.07 .38 .07 .27 
 
 
Associative to Associative 2.31 .09 .14 .54 
 
 
          
  
Games-Howell post hoc tests were performed on the ANOVAs that revealed marginally 
significant effects in order to identify which groups differed from one another.  These 
revealed that the fine artist group evidenced a significantly lower Analytic to Associative 
transition probability compared to both the group of student garden designers (p < .05, d = 
1.41) and the group of professional garden designers (p < .05, d = 1.13).  These also revealed 
                                                 
41
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2009).  
 
42
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2009).  
 
43
 The pattern of effects reported here were the same whether unknown transitions were or were not included as 
a covariate. 
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that the fine artist group evidenced a significantly lower Associative to Analytic transition 
probability compared to the group of student garden designers (p < .05, d = 1.21) and a 
marginally significantly lower Associative to Analytic transition probability compared to the 
group of professional garden designers (p = .07, d = .97).  According to Cohen (1988) these 
are all large effects.  There were no significant differences between professional garden 
designers, student garden designers and the low CAQ group on Analytic to Associative, 
Associative to Analytic and Associative to Associative transition probabilities.  There were no 
significant differences between any of the groups on the transition probability between 
Analytic and Analytic modes.    
 
In addition to these univariate tests, discriminant analysis was used to follow up the 
MANCOVA.  A discriminant function analysis was performed using the four measures of 
transition probability (Analytic to Associative, Associative to Analytic, Analytic to Analytic, 
Associative to Associative) as predictors of membership in the four groups (Group (4) –
professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and the low CAQ group).  
Three discriminant functions were calculated, with a marginally significant combined chi-
square, χ2 (12) = 20.12, p = .07. The first discriminant function accounted for 48.2% of the 
between group variability, the second function accounted for 39%, and the third function 
accounted for 13% of the between group variability.   After removal of the first function there 
was no longer a marginally significant association between groups and predictors (χ2 (6) = 
10.60, p = .10).  As shown in figure 17 the first discriminant function appears to separate the 
four groups, with the greatest separation between the professional and student garden 
designers.   
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Figure 17. Plot showing the scores of each participant on each function.  The group centroids represent the 
average scores on each function for each experimental group.       
 
The structure matrix, shown in table 64, was examined in order to determine which transition 
probabilities contributed to group separation.  The relative size of the canonical function 
correlation coefficients shown represents the importance of each variable to group separation.  
Transition probabilities with larger sized coefficients contribute more to group separation 
than smaller ones.  When functions contain both negative and positive coefficients, group 
separation is determined by the difference between the transition probabilities of the DV’s 
with positive and negative coefficients (Field, 2009).         
  
Table 63.  Displaying the structure matrix showing canonical function correlation coefficients.   
      
 
    Function   
 
 
  1 2 3 
 
 
AN to AS  .19 -.95 -.08 
 
 
AS to AN .26 -.90 -.18 
 
 
AS to AS -.12 .86 -.29 
 
 
AN to AN .00 -.35 .69 
 
 
        
 
  
249 
 
 
The pattern of coefficients shown in the structure matrix for function one suggests that groups 
are separated on a combination of Associative to Associative, Analytic to Associative and 
Associative to Analytic transition probabilities.  Associative to Analytic transition 
probabilities contributed most to group separation based on function one.  The negative 
coefficient for the Associative to Associative transition probability and the positive 
coefficients for Associative to Analytic and Analytic to Associative transition probabilities 
indicates that group separation is determined by the difference between the former and the 
latter two transition probabilities.  Overall, it appears that there is an effect of group on some 
underlying dimension influenced by a combination of transition probabilites, rather than on 
any one type of transition probability.   
 
Another means of investigating group differences along a combination of dependent variables 
is to examine correlations between different dependent variables within each group (Field, 
2009).  Partial correlations were performed to explore if there were between group 
differences in the pattern of associations between the different measures of transition 
probability.  It was possible that differences in unknown transitions between groups may have 
influenced patterns of associations within groups.  Hence variance due to unknown 
transitions was partialled out
44
.  Correlations between the four different measures of 
transition probability within each of the experimental groups are shown in table 65.     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 64.  Displays partial correlations between the four different measures of transition probability within each 
group while controlling for unknown transitions.     
 
                                                 
44
 The pattern of correlations remained unchanged for the bivariate correlations when variance due to unknown 
transitions was not controlled for. 
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Patterns of correlations between transition probabilities were similar across groups.  However 
there were some notable between group differences in associations between different 
transition probabilities.  Within the group of professional garden designers and fine artists 
there was a significant positive association between Associative to Analytic and Analytic to 
Analytic transition probabilities.  There was no such association between these two transition 
probabilities within the group of student garden designers or the low CAQ group.  
Furthermore the correlation between Associative to Analytic and Analytic to Analytic 
transition probabilities in the group of student garden designers is so small that it would be 
highly unlikely to reach significance with greater power.  Within the student garden design, 
fine artist and low CAQ groups there was a negative association between Analytic to 
Associative and Associative to Associative transition probabilities.  Within the group of 
professional garden designers the negative association between these two transition 
probabilities was not significant.  However this difference could have reached significance if 
the analysis had greater power.  The findings from these analyses are however highly 
tentative for reasons mentioned in the subsequent discussion. 
 
 
A one-way independent MANCOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups in Markov chain transition probabilities calculated based on Epstein (2003) and 
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Frankish’s (2010) framework (DV’s (4)- Analytic to Associative, Associative to Analytic, Analytic 
to Analytic, Associative to Associative) controlling for differences in unknown transitions across 
groups.  The MANCOVA revealed a non-significant effect of group on Markov chain 
transition probabilities (F (12, 123) = 1.59
45
, p = .10, ηp
2
= .13, power = .81).  The MANOVA, 
run without controlling for differences in unknown transitions, also revealed a non-significant 
effect of group (F (12, 126) = 1.29
46
, p = .24, ηp
2
= .11, power = .70).   
 
A one-way independent MANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups on the number of each type of transition per minute across the entire protocol 
calculated based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories (DV’s (4)- 
Analytic to Associative, Associative to Analytic, Analytic to Analytic, Associative to Associative).  The 
MANOVA revealed a non-significant effect of group on group on the number of transitions 
per minute (F (12, 126) = 1.30
47
, p = .23, ηp
2
= .11, power = .70).     
       
A one-way independent MANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups on the number of each type of transition per minute across the entire protocol 
calculated based on Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework (DV’s (4)- Analytic to 
Associative, Associative to Analytic, Analytic to Analytic, Associative to Associative).  The 
MANOVA revealed a marginally significant effect of group on the number of transitions per 
minute (F (12, 126) = 1.68
48
, p = .08, ηp
2
= .14, power = .83).  Since this analysis had a 
sufficient level of power there is a low probability (.17) that a type 2 error was made here.  
This marginally significant effect was therefore not interpreted further.  The MANOVA, run 
without controlling for differences in unknown transitions, also revealed a non-significant 
effect of group (F (12, 126) = 1.49, p = .14, ηp
2
= .12, power = .78).     
 
                                                 
45
 Pillai’s trace statistic was reported (Field, 2009).  
 
46
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2009).  
 
47
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2009).  
 
48
 Pillai’s trace statistic was reported (Field, 2009).  
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Table 66 below displays the means and their associated 95% confidence intervals on the 
Markov chain measure of the frequency of shifting between different modes and contents of 
thinking based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework for each of the four experimental groups; 
professional garden designers (Prof GDs), student garden designers (Student GDs), fine 
artists and the low CAQ group. 
 
Table 65.  Displaying means their associated 95% confidence intervals across groups on different measures of 
shifting frequency (based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework).  
  
 
 
Table 66 suggests that transition probabilities based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework were 
generally very similar across groups.  There don’t appear to be any differences between 
groups on transition probabilities that represent ‘content transitions’ or those that represent 
‘mode and content transitions’.  The group of fine artists evidenced lower analytic cognitive to 
associative cognitive and associative cognitive to analytic cognitive transition probabilities 
compared to the Low CAQ, professional and student garden designers groups.  These 
mirrored the patterns of group differences on transition probabilities between two 
overarching modes based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories 
and Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) framework.  The group of fine artists evidenced 
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higher associative cognitive to associative cognitive transition probabilities compared to both 
the fine artists and low CAQ group.  This also mirrored the previous patterns reported earlier 
based on two overarching modes. 
 
A one-way independent MANCOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups on Markov chain transition probabilities calculated based on Dietrich’s (2004) 
framework (DV’s (16)- PS49, SP, QT, TQ, PQ, QP, ST, TS, PT, TP, QS, SQ, PP, QQ, SS, 
TT) controlling for differences in unknown transitions across groups.  The MANCOVA 
revealed a non-significant effect of group on Markov chain transition probabilities (F (48, 87) 
= .88
50
, p = .68, ηp
2
= .33, power = .83).  The MANOVA, run without controlling for 
differences in unknown transitions, also revealed a non-significant effect of group (F (48, 90) 
= .91
51
, p = .63, ηp
2
= .33, power = .85).     
 
Table 67 below displays the means and their associated 95% confidence intervals on the 
frequency of two modes meshed together segments for each of the four experimental groups; 
professional garden designers (Prof GDs), student garden designers (Student GDs), fine 
artists and the low CAQ group.  The two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & 
analytic cognitive) and two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic 
affective) are based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework.  The two modes meshed together 
(associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) is the measure based on Epstein (2003) and 
Frankish’s (2010) framework and the final measure in the table represents the two modes 
meshed together measure based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) 
theories.      
 
 
Table 66.  Displaying means their associated 95% confidence intervals across groups on the two modes meshed 
together measure. 
 
                                                 
49
 See table 12 for which transitions map on to which letter codes. 
50
 Pillai’s trace statistic was reported (Field, 2009).  
 
51
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2009).  
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As displayed in table 67, professional garden designers evidenced a higher mean frequency 
across all measures of two modes meshed together segments compared to student garden 
designers, fine artists and the low CAQ group.  The fine artists evidenced a lower mean 
frequency of two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) 
segments compared to student garden designers or the Low CAQ group.  Fine artists did 
however evidence a slightly higher frequency of two modes meshed together (associative 
cognitive & analytic affective) segments compared to student garden designers and the low 
CAQ group. 
 
A one-way independent MANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was run to examine differences across 
groups on the frequency of two modes meshed together segments calculated based on 
Dietrich’s (2004) framework (DV’s (2)- two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & 
analytic cognitive), two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic affective)).  
The assumption of homogeneity of variance on two modes meshed together (associative 
cognitive & analytic cognitive) was violated hence the analyses were run on ranked scores on 
this dependent variable (Conover & Iman, 1981).  The MANOVA revealed a non-significant 
effect of group (F (6, 86) = .67
52
, p = .68, ηp
2
= .04, power = .25).     
 
 
A one way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden 
designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was also run to examine differences across groups 
on the frequency of two modes meshed together segments calculated based on Howard-Jones 
                                                 
52
 Given that one of the variables entered into the MANCOVA violated the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance Pillai’s trace was reported as it is most robust (Field, 2005).  
 
  
255 
 
(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories (DV- two modes meshed together).  The 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated hence the ANOVA was run on ranked 
scores on the dependent variable (Conover & Iman, 1981). The ANOVA, run without 
controlling for unknown modes, revealed a non-significant effect of group (F (3, 43) = 1.39, 
p = .26, ηp
2
= .09, power = .34).   
 
A one way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden 
designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) was also run to examine differences across groups 
on the frequency of two modes meshed together segments calculated based on Epstein (2003) 
& Frankish’s (2010) framework (DV- two modes meshed together (associative cognitive & 
analytic cognitive)).  The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated hence the 
ANOVA was run on ranked scores on the dependent variable (Conover & Iman, 1981).  The 
ANOVA revealed a non-significant effect of group (F (3, 43) = .75, p = .53, ηp
2
= .05, power = 
.20).     
                 
Discussion  
 
The findings from the prior analyses failed to provide any real support for the hypothesis that 
shifting frequency across the four groups would differ as a function of expertise.  As 
predicted, the group of professional and student garden designers did evidence significantly 
higher transition probabilities from analytic to associative and from associative to analytic 
modes compared to the group of fine artists.  However professional garden designers did not 
evidence significantly higher analytic to associative or associative to analytic transition 
probabilities than the group of student garden designers or the low CAQ group.  There was 
some evidence to suggest that groups may have differed on a combination of transition 
probabilities.  The finding showing a positive association between associative to analytic and 
analytic to analytic transition probabilities in the groups of professional garden designers and 
fine artists but not in the group of student garden designers or in the Low CAQ group is 
potentially of value.  It could suggest that professional garden designers and fine artists who 
make frequent shifts from associative to analytic modes are also able to more frequently 
persist in the analytic mode.  Student garden designers and members of the Low CAQ group 
who frequently shift from associative to analytic modes may not be able to persist within the 
analytic mode.  Further analysis would be required to pinpoint if this effect held when the 
transitions entered into the correlation were only those analytic to analytic transitions that 
  
256 
 
immediately followed associative to analytic transitions.   Further, all significant findings 
were highly tentative for one of three reasons. These were (1) because there was a violation 
of one of the assumptions of the multivariate analysis of variance that was used to uncover 
findings, (2) findings were only at best marginally significant or (3) analyses were 
underpowered. 
 
The analyses of shifting based on the overarching modes as conceptualized in Howard-Jones 
(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories were the only analyses that revealed 
significant effects.  The analyses of shifting based on the overarching modes conceptualized 
in Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s (2010) frameworks revealed mean scores on measures of 
the frequency of shifting in the same direction as Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & 
Ranjan’s (2013) analyses, but no significant effects. Since Epstein (2003) and Frankish’s 
(2010) frameworks offered no additional value, the overarching modes based on them were 
dropped from all subsequent analyses.  The analyses of shifting based on the overarching 
modes conceptualized in Dietrich’s (2004) framework also mirrored the findings of Howard-
Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan (2013) but failed to reveal significant effects.  However, 
differences in the patterns of means across groups as a function of whether two modes 
meshed together segments included analytic affective or analytic cognitive modes suggested 
that this framework could still reveal effects in more fine-grained subsequent analyses.  As 
such, the four overarching modes of thinking based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework were 
retained in subsequent analyses.     
 
Overall, findings across all measures of shifting frequency showed that shifting frequency 
was more similar than different across groups.   
 
Do groups differ as a function of the timing of shifts between modes of thinking? 
 
The measures of shifting frequency calculated previously examined shifting frequency at the 
level of the entire protocol.  In this section a more fine grained approach was taken to explore 
whether there were differences between groups in shifting frequency at specific time points 
during the creative process of designing the garden.   
In order to explore the time course of shifting across groups, each participant’s verbal 
protocol was first divided into 5 minute time bins. Markov chain transition probabilities 
based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and Dietrich’s (2004) 
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framework were calculated within each time bin.  The number of unknown transitions within 
each time bin was included as a covariate in subsequent analyses. 
 
Within each time bin, the number of two modes meshed together segments based on Howard-
Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and Dietrich’s (2004) two modes 
meshed together (associative cognitive & analytic cognitive) and two modes meshed together 
(associative cognitive & analytic affective) segments were also calculated.   
 
An additional measure of shifting was also included in this section.  This was the relative 
frequency of occurrence of different modes of thinking within each time bin.  It has been 
suggested that the extent to which different types of thinking are active varies across stages of 
the creative process (Allen & Thomas, 2011).  This necessarily suggests a shift between 
modes of thinking has occurred across stages.  For example, there may be a higher proportion 
of the associative relative to the analytic mode in one time bin but a higher proportion of the 
analytic relative to the associative mode in a subsequent time bin.  This would suggest that 
one has shifted from predominantly using the associative mode to predominantly using the 
analytic mode between these two time bins.  The relative proportion of associative to analytic 
modes of thinking within each time bin was calculated based on Howard-Jones (2002) and 
Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories53.  The relative proportion of associative to analytic mode 
segments in each time bin was calculated using the following formula: 
 
∑ (associative) segments / ∑ (associative + analytic) segments 
 
This value gives both the proportion of associative and analytic modes within a time bin.  To 
illustrate, if it was .5 then that would indicate that there would be .50 associative and .50 
analytic segments in the time bin.  Since this was a measure of the relative proportion of the 
number of associative to analytic segments there was no need to control for differences in the 
number of unknown modes.   
The length of verbal protocols differed across participants.  For example, some participants 
worked on garden designs for 60 minutes and thus their verbal protocol consisted of twelve 
five minute time bins.  Others worked on garden designs for 15 minutes and thus their verbal 
                                                 
53
 This analysis was only conducted based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories 
because their conceptualization of two different modes of thinking can be mapped on to Allen & Thomas’s 
(2011) conceptualization of two types of thinking.  It is not clear how Dietrich’s (2004) four modes map on to 
these two types of thinking.  
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protocol consisted of three five minute time bins.  The subsequent analyses of group 
differences in shifting as a function of time bin were thus performed using mixed models (see 
general statistics section for further explanation).   
 
It is important to note that the assumption of normality was violated for the analyses reported 
in this section.  Transformations were not successful in correcting for skew.  The mixed-
models were instead run on ranked data.  Scores on each dependent measure were ranked and 
each distribution transformed so that it had a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.  
This allowed parametric analyses to be run on the ranked data (Conover & Iman, 1981).  
One-way ANOVAs and post-hoc tests which were run to follow up significant mixed-model 
ANOVAs were also run on ranked data.  The means and confidence intervals reported in this 
section are for clarity however based on the raw scores.  Since the focus in this section is on 
exploring differences in shifting as a function of time, only the interactions involving time are 
explored here. 
 
A four (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and 
low CAQ group) by (transition type (4)- analytic to associative, associative to analytic, 
analytic to analytic, associative to associative)  by (time bin (12)- 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 
to 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 30, 30 to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45, 45 to 50, 50 to 55, 55 to 60 minute) 
mixed-model ANOVA was run to examine differences across groups as a function of time on 
Markov chain transition probabilities calculated based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora 
& Ranjan’s (2013) theories.  There were scores on all four transition probabilities within each 
time bin and as such, transition type was entered as a fixed repeated measures factor nested 
within time bin.  The proportion of unknown transitions out of the total number of transitions 
within each time bin was entered as a time varying covariate.  The main effects and 
interactions are reported in table 68 below.   
 
 
 
Table 67.  Displaying the main effects and interactions of the 4 group x 4 transition type x 12 time bin mixed-
model ANOVA on transitions probabilities based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) 
theories. 
      
 
Effect F-value 
Numerator   
df 
Denominator 
df 
 
 
Group 3.59* 3 489 
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Transition type .13 3 720 
 
 
Time 0.4 11 1158 
 
 
Group x Transition type 4.71** 9 506 
 
 
Group x Time 0.03 28 1107 
 
 
Transition type x Time .11 33 1155 
 
 
Group x Transition type x Time 1.35* 84 1116 
 
 
Unknown transition  1.27 1 1613 
 
 
p <.05*       
 
 
p <.001** 
     
The significant three-way interaction between group, time bin and type of transition 
suggested that there were differences in patterns of transition probabilities across groups that 
were only evident within certain time bins.  A series of one-way ANCOVAs with unknown 
transitions as a covariate, were run to break down the significant three-way interaction.  
These examined differences between groups (Group (4) –professional garden designers, 
student garden designers, fine artists and low CAQ group) on the probability of each of the 
four types of transition (analytic to associative, associative to analytic, analytic to analytic, 
associative to associative) for each time bin separately.  The ANCOVAs that revealed 
significant differences between groups are shown in table 69.  All other ANCOVAs failed to 
reveal significant differences between groups.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 68.  Displays the ANCOVAs that resulted in significant differences in transition probabilities across 
groups, controlling for differences in unknown transitions. 
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Post-hoc Tukey HSD and Games-Howell tests were run to break down the significant effects 
listed in table 69.  These revealed that the Analytic to Analytic transition probability within 
the 5 to 10 minute time bin was significantly higher in the group of student garden designers 
M = .17, 95% CI [.09, .24], compared to the Low CAQ group, M = .05, 95% CI [.01, .09], p = 
.01, r = .55.  The Analytic to Analytic transition probability within the 5 to 10 minute time 
bin was also significantly higher in the group of professional garden designers M = .14, 95% 
CI [.07, .21], compared to the Low CAQ group, p = .05, r = .45.        
    
The Associative to Analytic transition probability within the 15 to 20 minute time bin was 
significantly higher in the group of professional garden designers M = .20, 95% CI [.15, .24], 
compared to the group of fine artists, M = .12, 95% CI [.07, .16], p = .02, r = .51.  The 
Analytic to Associative transition probability within the 35 to 40 minute time bin was 
marginally significantly higher in the group of professional garden designers, M = .18, 95% 
CI [.11, .24], compared to the group of fine artists, M = .13, 95% CI [.07, .19], p = .09, r = 
.25.  The Associative to Analytic transition probability within the 15 to 20 minute time bin 
was also significantly higher in the group of student garden designers M = .18, 95% CI [.16, 
.21], compared to the group of fine artists, p = .04, r = .49.    The Analytic to Associative 
transition probability within the 35 to 40 minute time bin was significantly higher in the 
group of student garden designers, M = .21, 95% CI [.16, .26], compared to the group of fine 
artists, M = .11, 95% CI [.05, .16], p = .02, r = .56.    The Associative to Associative 
transition probability within the 15 to 20 minute time bin was however significantly higher in 
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the group of fine artists, M = .70, 95% CI [.58, .81], compared to the group of student garden 
designers, M = .42 95% CI [.31, .53], p = .03, r = .63.   
 
A four (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and 
low CAQ group) by (transition type (10)- analytic affective & analytic cognitive, analytic 
affective & associative affective, analytic affective & associative cognitive, to analytic, 
analytic to analytic, associative to associative)  by (time bin (12)- 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 
to 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 30, 30 to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45, 45 to 50, 50 to 55, 55 to 60 minute) 
mixed-model ANOVA was run to examine differences across groups as a function of time on 
Markov chain transition probabilities calculated based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework.  It is 
important to note that for this analysis, types of transition were collapsed across direction.  
For example, analytic affective & analytic cognitive reflects a transition between these two 
modes encompassing both analytic affective to analytic cognitive and analytic cognitive to 
analytic affective.  The rationale for this was that collapsing across direction reduced skew 
within the data, which was still present even after the rank transformation had been applied.  
Since each participant contributed to scores on all ten transition probabilities, transition type 
was entered as a fixed repeated measures factor.  The main effects and interactions are 
reported in table 70 below.   
 
Table 69. Displaying the main effects and interactions of the 4 group x 10 transition type x 12 time bin mixed-
model ANOVA on transitions probabilities based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework. 
     
      
 
Effect F-value 
Numerator 
df Denominator df 
 
 
Group 0.88 3 1336 
 
 
Transition type 0.15 9 1937 
 
 
Time 0.13 11 2945 
 
 
Group x Transition type 2.31* 27 1372 
 
 
Group x Time 0.78 28 2802 
 
 
Transition type x Time 0.08 99 2954 
 
 
Group x Transition type x 
Time 1.07 252 2802 
 
 
p <.001**       
 The non-significant three-way interaction between group, time bin and transition type shows 
that patterns of transition probabilities based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework did not vary 
across groups as a function of time.  The significant interaction between group and transition 
type suggested that there may be differences between groups but only on the transition 
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probabilities of certain types of transition.  However, this result differs from the finding 
reported in the previous section that did not reveal any differences in transition probabilities 
across groups as a function of transition type
54
.  Since the focus in this section is on shifting 
as a function of time, this effect was not explored further. 
 
A four (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and 
low CAQ group) by (time bin (12)- 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 30, 30 
to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45, 45 to 50, 50 to 55, 55 to 60 minute) mixed-model ANOVA was run 
to examine differences across groups in the frequency of two modes meshed together 
segments based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories as a 
function of time.  Since measures of the frequency of two modes meshed together segments 
were taken within each time bin, transition type was entered as a fixed repeated measures 
factor nested within time bin. The main effects and interactions are reported in table 71 
below. 
 
Table 70.  Displaying the main effects and interactions of the 4 group x 12 time bin mixed-model ANOVA on 
the frequency of two modes meshed together segments based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) theories. 
 
    
The non-significant interaction between group and time bin shows that the frequency of two-
modes meshed together segments based on Howard- Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) theories did not vary across groups as a function of time. 
 
 
A four (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and 
low CAQ group) by (Type of two modes meshed together segment (2)- associative cognitive 
& analytic cognitive, associative cognitive & analytic affective)  by (time bin (12)- 0 to 5, 5 
to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 30, 30 to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45, 45 to 50, 50 to 55, 55 
                                                 
54
 The reasons for this difference are not clear.  It may be due to the differences between the statistical tests run, 
with MANOVA run to explore differences in the previous section and Mixed-models run in the present section. 
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to 60 minute) mixed-model ANOVA was run to examine differences across groups in the 
frequency of two modes meshed together based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework as a function 
of time.  Since measures of the frequency of both types of two modes meshed together 
segments were taken within each time bin, transition type was entered as a fixed repeated 
measures factor nested within time bin. The main effects and interactions are reported in table 
72 below. 
 
Table 71. Displaying the main effects and interactions of the 4 group x 2 type of two modes meshed together 
segment x 12 time bin mixed-model ANOVA on the frequency of two modes meshed together segments based 
on Dietrich’s (2004) framework. 
   
  
  
The non-significant three-way interaction between group, time bin and type of two modes 
meshed together segment shows that the frequency of two-modes meshed together segments 
based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework did not vary across groups as a function of time. 
 
A four (Group (4) –professional garden designers, student garden designers, fine artists and 
low CAQ group) by twelve (time bin (9)- 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, 20 to 25, 25 to 
30, 30 to 35, 35 to 40, 40 to 45, 45 to 50, 50 to 55, 55 to 60 minute) mixed-model ANOVA 
was run to examine differences across groups in the proportion of associative to analytic 
modes of thinking across time bins.  The main effect of group was marginally significant (F 
(3, 115.46) = 2.54, p = .06).  The main effect of time bin (F (11, 287) = 1.06, p = .40) and the 
interaction between group and time bin were both non-significant (F (29, 284) = 1.12, p = 
.32).  The non-significant interaction between group and time bin shows that the relative 
proportion of associative to analytic modes of thinking based on Howard- Jones (2002) and 
Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories did not vary across groups as a function of time. 
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Discussion 
 
The findings from this section do suggest there may be differences in shifting frequency 
between some groups at certain time points during the creative process.  Professional and 
student garden designers evidenced a significantly higher frequency of shifts from associative 
to analytic modes of thinking compared to fine artists within the 15 to 20 minute time bin.  
Student garden designers also evidenced a significantly higher frequency of shifts from 
analytic to associative modes of thinking compared to fine artists within the 35 to 40 minute 
time bin.  Differences in the frequency of non-shift transitions, where participants persisted in 
one mode of thinking for at least two segments, were also observed across some groups.  
Professional and student garden designers evidenced a significantly higher frequency of 
analytic to analytic transitions compared to the Low CAQ group within the 5 to 10 minute 
time bin.  Fine artists evidenced a significantly higher frequency of associative to associative 
transitions compared to student garden designer within the 15 to 20 minute time bin. 
 
However, these findings still fall short of revealing clear differences between groups 
expected to differ in shifting frequency.  For example, there were no differences in shifting 
frequency between the Low CAQ group which was pre-screened to ensure group members 
had no expertise in garden design and the ‘high expertise’ group of professional garden 
designers.  The failure to reveal clear differences in shifting frequency across groups could be 
due to a lack of between-group differences in creativity and design ability.  In order to test 
this hypothesis, groups were compared on the creativity and design quality of the garden 
designs that they produced during the garden design task. 
 
Assessing the reliability of judge’s ratings  
 
Prior to examining the above hypothesis, it was first necessary to demonstrate the validity of 
judge’s ratings of garden designs.  Cronbach’s alpha was used to compute reliability scores 
across the three raters’ ratings of the creativity evident in designs, how well the designs met 
the brief and the quality of the design evident in designs.  The analysis showed that the judges 
demonstrated good agreement across all three rating categories (creativity; α= .80, brief; α= 
.76, design: α= .87).  In light of this good level of agreement, ratings on each dimension were 
averaged across judges as is standard practice for the consensual assessment technique (CAT) 
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(Amabile, 1996).  Average ratings on each dimension are the ratings reported in all 
subsequent analyses and are hereon referred to as CAT ratings.  
 
Assessing the concurrent and discriminant validity of CAT ratings 
 
The concurrent validity of CAT ratings of creativity was examined by correlating CAT 
ratings of creativity with self-report measures of creativity.  The self-report measures of 
creativity were the creative behaviour inventory (CBI) (Dollinger, 2003), the creative 
achievement questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and the Kaufman-
domains of creativity scale (K-DOCs) (Kaufman, 2012).  Evidence of positive correlations 
between CAT ratings of creativity and scores on these self-report measures of creativity 
would lend validity to CAT ratings of creativity as valid measures of individual differences in 
creativity.  Correlations between self-report measures and CAT ratings of brief and design 
quality were also examined but no a priori predictions concerning relationships between these 
two dimensions of judge’s ratings and self-report measures.  Finally, inter-correlations 
between the three different CAT ratings were calculated in order to examine their 
discriminant validity.   
 
As three participants had missing data for the K-DOCs and CBI, correlations for this set of 
analysis were only run on the 45 who had no missing data on any of these measures.  Table 
73 shows correlations between CAT ratings of creativity on each dimension and scores on 
self-report measures of creativity as well as inter-correlations between scores on different 
self-report measures.  Spearman’s rho correlations are reported for correlations involving 
either K-DOCS self/everyday creativity or CAT ratings of design.  Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients are reported for correlations involving all other measures.  One-tailed 
correlations are reported for all correlations between CAT ratings of creativity and self-report 
measures and inter-correlations between self-report measures.  All other correlations are two-
tailed. 
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Table 72.  Displaying inter-correlations across measures of creativity.     
 
 
Correlations shown in table 73 revealed that CAT ratings on the dimension of creativity were 
positively correlated with scores on multiple different self-report measures of creativity.  
CAT ratings of creativity were positively correlated with scores on the CBI and 
mechanical/Scientific and artistic domains of the K-DOCs.  There was a marginally 
significant positive association between CAT ratings of creativity and CAQ scores (r = .22, p 
= .06).  The garden design task appears to tap both artistic and design creativity.  Given that 
items on these self-report measures also tap artistic creativity, and to some extent design 
creativity, it seems logical that CAT ratings of creativity on the garden design task would 
correlate with them. 
 
It should be noted that these correlations were small in size.  This could be explained by the 
fact that there were only a small number of items on each self-report measure that appear to 
tap the creativity measured by the CAT ratings of garden designs.  Only five of the 28 items 
on the CBI tap the frequency of engaging in activities involving design (items 2, 17, 25, 27 & 
28 listed in appendix 9.  Only one item out of nine on the Mechanical/Scientific dimension of 
the K-DOCs (item 39) taps performance on an activity that is clearly related to design.  Four 
out of 28 items on the CBI (items 1, 14, 19, 24 and 26) and three out of nine items on the K-
DOCs (items 42, 43 and 44) appear to tap artistic activities that involve the technical skill of 
sketching.  The reason why CAQ scores were not significantly correlated with CAT ratings 
of creativity may be due to the CAQ failing to clearly capture design creativity.  There is a 
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section of the CAQ which captures creativity in architectural design. Five out of the twelve 
professional garden designers however indicated that they did not have any training or 
recognized talent on this area.  Some participants therefore appear to have equated 
architectural design with garden design and some not.   When the scores of these five 
professional garden designers were excluded, the correlation between CAQ scores and CAT 
ratings of creativity emerged as significant (r = .26, p = .05).  Self-reported self/everyday and 
scholarly creativity on the K-DOCs did not correlate with CAT ratings of creativity or design.  
This is logical given that these forms of creativity appear distinct from garden design 
creativity.  
 
Overall, these findings lend some evidence to CAT ratings of creativity as valid measures of 
domain specific individual differences in creativity.   
 
Evidence for the discriminant validity of CAT ratings         
   
Since judges were asked to make ratings on each dimension independently of other 
dimensions, it was expected that CAT ratings on different dimensions would evidence 
discriminant validity.  Evidence for discriminant validity was assessed by examining inter-
correlations between CAT ratings on different dimensions.  Correlations for this set of 
analyses were run on all 47 participants.  Inter-correlations between CAT dimensions are 
displayed in table 74 below. 
 
Table 73.  Inter-correlations between different dimensions of CAT ratings (N = 47)   
  
  
 
CAT ratings 
CAT ratings Design Creativity 
Brief .82** .81** 
Design 
 
.78** 
Creativity 
  All correlations are one-tailed     
Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed for all correlations 
**p<.01 
  * p <.05 
  N= 47 
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As can be seen from table 74, there were strong correlations between ratings across different 
CAT dimensions.  These findings suggest a high degree of overlap between ratings on 
different dimensions.  It would appear that there is limited discriminant validity between 
ratings with each capturing similar indicators of performance.  This may simply be because 
those who produced more creative designs also produced designs that more closely adhered 
to the requirements of the brief and evidenced a higher quality of design.  Further, the 
correlations reported in table 67 showing significant positive associations between certain 
self-report measures of creativity and CAT ratings of creativity but not between self-report 
measures of creativity and CAT ratings of design or brief do suggest that CAT creativity 
ratings are unique in capturing the creativity of garden designs.  
 
In summary, there is evidence that CAT ratings of creativity are both reliable and valid 
measures of creativity in the context of the garden design task.  CAT ratings of creativity also 
appear unique in capturing the creativity of garden designs distinct from measures of how 
well designs met the requirements of the brief or their design quality.  
 
Did groups differ on CAT ratings of design and creativity? 
 
Groups were predicted to differ on the creativity and design dimensions of CAT ratings as a 
function of group differences in domain specific knowledge and technical skill (Dietrich, 
2004).  Since professional garden designers were expected to possess both the highest levels 
of domain specific knowledge and technical skill in garden design, it was predicted that CAT 
ratings of creativity and design in this group would be higher than all other groups.  Since 
student garden designers were expected to possess greater domain specific knowledge than 
the low CAQ group it was predicted that CAT ratings of creativity and design would be 
higher in the former than the latter.  Fine artists were expected to evidence higher artistic 
creativity and also be more technically proficient drawers than the low CAQ group.  As such 
fine artists were expected to evidence higher CAT ratings of creativity than the low CAQ 
group.  However, since both fine artists and the low CAQ group were pre-screened for low 
levels of garden design relevant knowledge, no differences between them were expected on 
CAT ratings on the dimension of design.  It was not clear if there would be differences 
between student garden designers and fine artists on CAT ratings of creativity.  The former 
may possess greater garden design relevant knowledge but the latter may be more technically 
proficient drawers.  It could be that the two groups have complementary strengths which may 
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lead to similar CAT ratings of creativity across groups.  Due to their greater garden design 
relevant expertise, student garden designers would be expected to evidence higher CAT 
ratings on the dimension of design quality than fine artists 
 
A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, low CAQ 
group, fine artists and student garden designers) on CAT ratings of creativity was run to 
explore differences in the creativity of the garden designs produced across groups.  The 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group on CAT ratings of creativity (F (3, 43) = 9.91, 
p < .001, ηp
2
= .41, power = 1.00).  The means for each group and their associated 95 % 
confidence intervals are displayed in figure 18. 
     
 
Figure 18. Mean CAT ratings of creativity and their associated 95 % confidence intervals for each group.  
 
Tukey HSD tests were run to examine which groups differed on CAT ratings of creativity.  
As predicted, the group of professional garden designers evidenced significantly higher CAT 
ratings of creativity than the Low CAQ group (p <.001, r = .77) and the group of student 
garden designers (p = .04, r = .45).  As predicted, professional garden designers evidenced 
higher CAT ratings of creativity compared to fine artists, albeit this difference was only 
marginally significant (p = .07, r = .47).  There were no significant differences between the 
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group of student garden designers and the fine artists on CAT creativity (p =.99, r = .04).  As 
predicted, the group of fine artists evidenced higher CAT ratings of creativity than the Low 
CAQ group (p =.03, r = .57).  As predicted the group of student garden designers also 
evidenced higher CAT ratings of creativity than the Low CAQ group, albeit this difference 
was only marginally significant (p = .07, r = .47).   
 
A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (4) –professional garden designers, low CAQ 
group, fine artists and student garden designers) on CAT ratings of design was run to explore 
differences in CAT design ratings across groups.  CAT ratings of design across all groups 
were normally distributed.  The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group on CAT 
ratings of design (F (3, 21) = 14.51, p < .001, ηp
2
= .51, power = 1.00).  The means for each 
group and their associated 95 % confidence intervals are displayed in figure 19. 
   
 
Figure 19. Mean CAT ratings of design quality and their associated 95 % confidence intervals for each group.  
 
Games Howell tests were run to examine which groups differed on CAT ratings of the 
dimension of design quality.  As predicted, the group of professional garden designers 
evidenced significantly higher CAT ratings of design quality than the low CAQ group (p 
<.001, r = .79), the group of fine artists (p =.001, r = .69) and the group of student garden 
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designers (p = .04, r = .51).  As predicted, there were no significant differences between the 
group of fine artists and the Low CAQ group on CAT design quality (p =.20, r = .39).  As 
predicted, the student garden designers evidenced higher CAT design quality than the low 
CAQ group, albeit this difference was only marginally significant (p = .09
55
, r = .49).  
Contrary to predictions, there were no significant differences between the group of student 
garden designers and the fine artists on CAT design quality (p =.60, r = .26).   
 
Discussion  
 
Group differences on ratings of the creativity and design quality of garden designs were 
generally in line with predictions.  Professional garden designers produced designs that 
received higher CAT ratings of creativity and design quality than the other three groups.  The 
low CAQ group received lower CAT ratings of creativity than both the group of fine artists 
and the group of student garden designers.  While the low CAQ group received lower ratings 
of design quality for their designs compared to the group of student garden designers, they 
did not receive lower ratings of design quality compared to fine artists.  Student garden 
designers and fine artists received similar CAT ratings of both creativity and design quality 
for their designs.  This latter finding was surprising given that student garden designers had 
received at least some formal training in garden design while fine artists were pre-screened 
for having no training in design.   Some effects were only marginally significant.  However 
given that these were of a similar size to those that reached the threshold for significance, it 
would appear that these effects would emerge as significant given greater power.  These 
findings provide support for the rationale underlying the prior analyses examining differences 
in shifting frequency across four groups differing in their level of expertise in garden design. 
 
The present results showed the largest difference between CAT creativity and design ratings 
was between the group of professional garden designers and the Low CAQ group.  It was 
surprising then that there were no clear differences in shifting frequency in prior analyses 
between these two groups. Taken together with prior findings, this suggests that shifting 
frequency is not associated with creativity or design quality.  In order to fully examine this 
possibility, subsequent analyses dispensed with grouping participants and instead examined 
                                                 
55
 This was not classed as a marginally significant effect as the subsequent ANOVA was fully powered.   
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the association between shifting frequency and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality 
across the entire sample (N = 47). 
 
Examining the relationship between the length of verbal protocols and CAT ratings of 
designs  
 
Prior to examining the relationship between shifting frequency and CAT ratings of creativity 
and design quality, it was necessary to examine the association between protocol length and 
CAT ratings.  Analyses reported earlier revealed that the frequency of two modes meshed 
together segments was positively correlated with measures of protocol length.  It was argued 
that this could be due to either (1) a greater likelihood of two modes meshed together 
segments being coded for by chance in longer protocols (2) or that more creative participants 
produce both a greater frequency of two modes meshed together segments and elaborate and 
work on designs for longer.  The former explanation would suggest that protocol length is a 
confounding variable but the latter would suggest against this.  Given that both explanations 
are possible subsequent analyses did treat protocol length as a potential confound.   
 
The length of verbal protocols was defined in terms of two measures.  One was the total time 
in minutes for participant’s entire verbal protocol and the other was the number of segments 
that the verbal protocol consisted of.  It should be noted that the length of each participant’s 
verbal protocol was equal to the time they spent working on the garden design task.  Table 75 
below shows correlations between the three dimensions of CAT ratings of garden designs and 
each measure of the length of verbal protocols.   
 
Table 74.  Bivariate correlations between each dimension of CAT ratings of garden designs and each measure of 
the length of verbal protocols 
 
Judges ratings  Verbal protocol length   
 
 
N of segments time (min) 
 Brief .38** .40** 
 Design .48** .55** 
 Creativity .47** .53** 
  Pearson correlation coefficients are displayed for all correlations.   
 **p<.01 
   * p <.05 
   N= 48 
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The correlations in table 75 reveal that longer verbal protocols, when measured in terms of 
both time and the total number of segments, were associated with higher ratings on CAT 
dimensions of brief, design quality and creativity.  These findings are important for two 
reasons.  Firstly, they suggest that those participants who worked for longer on the garden 
design task produced designs which more closely met the requirements of the brief, had a 
higher design quality and were more creative than participants who worked for less time on 
the garden design task.  Secondly, these findings indicated that the length of verbal protocols 
could be a confounding factor in subsequent analyses on the relationship between CAT 
ratings and the frequency of two modes meshed together segments.  In order to address this 
potential confound, partial correlations were used to examine the relationship between the 
frequency of two modes meshed together segments and CAT ratings controlling for 
differences in protocol length. 
 
Are measures of the frequency of shifting between modes of thinking positively 
associated with CAT ratings of creativity or design? 
 
Bivariate correlations between Markov chain transition probabilities based on Howard-Jones 
(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and CAT ratings of creativity and design 
across the entire protocol are shown in Table 76.  Partial correlations were also preformed to 
partial out variance due to unknown transitions 
 
Table 75.  Correlations between transition probabilities based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) theories and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality. 
 
 
 
There were no significant correlations between any of the different types of transition 
probability and CAT ratings of creativity or design quality.  It is important to note that there 
  
274 
 
were marginally significant negative correlations between the frequency of unknown 
transitions and both creativity (r = -.23, p = .06) and design quality (r =-.23, p = .08).    
 
Bivariate and partial correlations between Markov chain transition probabilities based on 
Dietrich’s (2004) framework and CAT ratings of creativity and design across the entire 
protocol are shown in Table 77.      
 
Table 76.  Correlations between transition probabilities based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework and CAT ratings 
of creativity and design quality. 
  
There were significant negative correlations between associative affective to analytic 
affective transition probabilities and CAT ratings of both creativity and design quality. 
Scatterplots of associative affective to analytic affective transition probabilities against CAT 
ratings failed to show a linear association between variables.  These two significant 
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correlations would therefore appear to be spurious.  There was a significant positive bivariate 
correlation between analytic affective to associative cognitive transition probabilities and 
CAT ratings of design quality.  This correlation remained marginally significant when 
variance due to unknown transitions was partialled out (r = .22, p =.08).  There was also a 
marginally significant bivariate correlation between analytic affective to associative cognitive 
transition probabilities and CAT ratings of creativity (r = .20, p = .09).  This correlation was 
however no longer significant after partialling out variance due to unknown transitions.  
There were also marginally significant bivariate and partial correlations suggesting a negative 
association between associative cognitive to analytic cognitive transition probabilities and 
CAT ratings of creativity (bivariate: r = -.22, p = .07, partial: r = -.22, p = .08).   
 
A Linear regression was run to follow up the significant bivariate correlation and examine 
whether analytic affective to associative cognitive transition probabilities could predict CAT 
ratings of design quality.  This failed to reveal that analytic affective to associative cognitive 
transition probabilities was a significant predictor of CAT ratings of creativity (F (1, 46) = 
2.32, p = .14, R
2
 =.05).   
 
Bivariate correlations were run to examine the relationship between two modes meshed 
together segments based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories 
and CAT ratings of creativity and design across the entire protocol.  Partial correlations were 
run to partial out variance due to differences in the length of protocols in terms of time in 
minutes and in terms of the total number of segments.  This set of bivariate and partial 
correlations were also run on Dietrich’s (2004) two-modes meshed together segments 
involving the operation of analytic cognitive and associative cognitive modes and those 
involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes.  All bivariate 
and partial correlations are displayed in table 78.   
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Table 77.  Bivariate and Partial correlations between the frequency of two-modes meshed together segments and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality. 
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The pattern of correlations reported in table 78 showed that there was a positive association 
between the frequency of two modes meshed together segments involving the operation of 
analytic affective and associative cognitive modes and CAT ratings of both design quality 
and creativity.  Correlations on this measure of two-modes meshed together and CAT ratings 
of design quality remained significant after partialling out variance due to differences in the 
length of protocols, both in terms of their time and in terms of the total number of protocol 
segments.  Correlations on this measure of two modes meshed together and CAT ratings of 
creativity remained marginally significant after partialling out variance due to differences in 
the length of protocols, in terms of their time. 
 
The pattern of correlations between the frequency of two-modes meshed together segments 
based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and CAT ratings of 
design quality were similar to those reported above.  However the pattern of correlations 
between this measure of two modes meshed together segments and CAT ratings of creativity 
differs from those reported above.  The reason for this appears to be due to the lack of an 
association between the frequency of those two modes meshed together segments involving 
analytic cognitive and associative cognitive modes and CAT ratings of creativity.  It should 
also be noted that while still significant, correlations between the frequency of two-modes 
meshed together segments involving analytic cognitive and associative cognitive modes and 
CAT ratings of design quality are smaller in size compared to two-modes meshed together 
segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes. 
 
Linear regressions were run to examine whether the number of two-modes meshed together 
segments segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive 
modes could predict CAT ratings of creativity and design quality.  The linear regression 
shown in table 79 revealed that the number of two modes meshed together segments 
involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes was a 
significant predictor of CAT ratings of creativity (F (1, 45) = 5.82, p = .02).  The 
unstandardized B and standardized Beta were significantly different from zero (t = 2.41, p= 
.02).  R
2 
indicated that 12% of the variance in CAT ratings of creativity is accounted for by 
the number of two modes meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic 
affective and associative cognitive modes.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a 
medium sized effect. 
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Table 78. Linear regression with two modes meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic 
affective and associative cognitive  modes as the predictor and CAT ratings of creativity as the outcome variable  
          Model  
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .43 .03 
 
  Two-modes meshed 
together (‘associative 
cognitive, analytic 
affective) 
.05 .02 .34* .12 .10 
 
*p < .05 
N=47 
      
The linear regression shown in table 80 revealed that the number of two modes meshed 
together segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive 
modes was a significant predictor of CAT ratings of design quality (F (1, 45) = 8.32, p = .01).  
The unstandardized B and standardized Beta were significantly different from zero (t = 2.88, 
p= .01). R
2 
indicated that 16% of the variance in CAT ratings of design is accounted for by 
the number of two modes meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic 
affective and associative cognitive modes.  According to Cohen (1988) this suggests a 
medium sized effect.   
 
Table 79. Linear regression with two modes meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic 
affective and associative cognitive  modes as the predictor and CAT ratings of design quality as the outcome 
variable  
          Model  
Variable B SE β R2 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
(constant) .37 .03 
 
  Two-modes meshed 
together (‘associative 
cognitive, analytic 
affective) 
.06 .02 .40* .16 .14 
 
*p < .01 
N=47 
      
These results suggest that the frequency of two modes meshed together segments involving 
the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes are significant positive 
predictors of both CAT ratings of creativity and design quality.  However there are two 
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alternative possibilities that could explain this relationship.  The first possibility is that the 
frequency of the analytic affective mode might be correlated with CAT ratings of design 
quality and creativity irrespective of whether or not this mode operates within two modes 
meshed together segments.  This was examined by running partial correlations on the 
relationship between CAT ratings and the frequency of segments coded with the analytic 
affective mode, that did not also appear in two modes meshed together segments.  Variance 
due to the length of protocols in terms of time in minutes and the length in terms of the total 
number of segments was again partialled out during this analysis.  Partial correlations did not 
reveal evidence of correlations between the number of analytic affective segments and CAT 
ratings of either creativity (controlling for time: r= .12, p =.22; controlling for number of 
segments: r= -.00, p =.49) or design quality (controlling for time: r= .08, p =.28; controlling 
for number of segments: r= -.04, p =.39). 
 
The second possibility is that the relationship between the frequency of two modes meshed 
together segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive 
modes and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality is due to the affective content of 
these segments.  There is strong evidence showing a positive relationship between positive 
affect and creativity (Bass, de Dreu & Njistad, 2008).  Analytic affective segments often 
contained positive affective content such as “I like that” or “that’s nice” and hence a greater 
frequency of these segments within protocols could merely reflect a positive relationship 
between affect and creativity.  Partial correlations were run to examine the relationship 
between scores on the pleasure and arousal dimensions of affect after participants had 
finished designing the garden, controlling for differences in affect before they started 
designing the garden.  This enabled an examination of the relationship between CAT ratings 
of creativity and design quality and the change in affect while participants designed the 
garden.  After controlling for variance in arousal before starting designs, there was a 
marginally significant positive correlation between CAT ratings of creativity and arousal 
following completion of designs (r = .24, p = .07).  After controlling for variance in pleasure 
before starting designs, there was no significant association between CAT ratings of 
creativity and pleasure following completion of designs (r = -.12, p = .22).  The same 
analyses run on CAT ratings of design quality revealed there was no association between 
design quality and arousal (r = .19, p = .11) or pleasure (r = .02, p = .46).   
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These findings suggest
56
 that an increase in arousal experienced by participants while 
working on the garden design task was associated with higher CAT ratings of creativity.  A 
partial correlation was run to examine if the relationship between the frequency of two modes 
meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative 
cognitive modes and CAT ratings of creativity still remained after controlling for this 
increase in arousal.  The increase in arousal was calculated by subtracting participant’s 
arousal measured before commencing the garden design task from their arousal measured 
upon completing it.  The positive correlation between the frequency of two modes meshed 
together segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive 
modes and CAT ratings of creativity remained (r = .30, p = .03) after controlling for changes 
in arousal.     
 
Discussion   
 
These findings failed to provide strong support for the hypothesis that a greater frequency of 
shifting between consecutive modes of thinking, based on the Markov chain model, across 
the protocol would be associated with higher CAT ratings of creativity and design quality.  
There was a significant positive association between analytic affective to associative 
cognitive transition probabilities and CAT ratings of design quality.  With greater power the 
positive association between analytic affective to associative cognitive transition probabilities 
and CAT ratings of creativity may also have emerged as significant.  Further, the marginally 
significant findings showing a negative association between the frequency of unknown 
transitions and CAT ratings of creativity and design suggest that there were fewer known 
transitions within the protocols of less compared to more creative participants.  The Markov 
chain measure may have failed to identify transitions in less creative participants which could 
help differentiate them from the more creative.     
 
However, a relationship between shifting frequency and CAT ratings of design quality and 
creativity did clearly emerge when shifting was measured based on the frequency of two 
modes meshed together segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative 
cognitive modes.  The effects reported here were both more robust and bigger than any 
effects reported in any of the previous analyses in this chapter.  The evidence of a 
                                                 
56
 This conclusion is tentative as the findings were only marginally significant. 
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relationship between shifting frequency based on this measure and CAT ratings of design 
quality was stronger than the evidence for the relationship between shifting frequency and 
CAT ratings of creativity. 
 
In the next set of analyses a measure of flexibility is proposed.  Using CAT ratings of 
creativity and design quality, this measure is then used to more closely pinpoint the time 
points during the garden design task when there is reason to expect that participants shift 
between different modes of thinking.     
 
Measures of flexibility and elaboration based on participant’s sketches of designs 
 
Participant’s often produced a number of different designs in addition to their final design.  
Flexibility has been defined in terms of the tendency to switch between different approaches 
(Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010).  The tendency to produce different designs on 
the garden design task seems to reflect switching between different approaches and would 
therefore appear to be a measure of flexibility (Plucker, J, personal communication, 2013).  
Two measures of flexibility were obtained: (1) a dichotomous measure of whether 
participants had worked on the same or different designs from start to finish and (2) a 
measure of the total number of different designs participants produced.  The criteria used to 
define different designs were that they must be wholly distinct, for example a garden with 
curves versus a rectilinear garden.  Using similar criteria to that used by Kozbelt (2008), 
sketches that merely included the addition of some additional novel features or attempts to 
make the designs neater were not coded as new designs.  The number of additional sketches 
that showed the addition of novel features compared to previous sketches was summed and 
this number provided a measure of design elaboration (Kim, 2006).  Sketches that were 
simply neater versions of previous sketches were not counted as examples of design 
elaboration. 
 
Since the measure of design elaboration entailed the addition of novel features compared to 
previous sketches, it was predicted that the number of instances of design elaboration across 
participant’s design sketches would be positively correlated with the number of segments of 
the attribute “generating ideas / concepts” in their protocols.  The measure of design 
elaboration was not normally distributed and hence a Spearman’s rho correlation was 
performed to examine the relationship between design elaboration and the square root 
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transformed measure of “generating ideas / concepts”.  As predicted, there was a positive 
correlation between design elaboration across design sketches and the number of segments of 
the attribute “generating ideas / concepts” (rs= .43, p = .001).  This finding provides support 
for the validity of the protocol attribute “generating ideas / concepts” as a measure of novel 
ideas.  
 
Examining the relationship between measures of flexibility and CAT ratings of 
creativity 
 
The measures of flexibility described in the previous section appear to reflect the tendency to 
switch between different approaches to the garden design task (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel 
& Baas, 2010).  It is important to note that switching between the production of different 
designs may follow a period of shifting between associative and analytic thinking, for 
example in order to move from generating features of a current design to judging when it is 
appropriate to start a new design (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  Evidence of a 
relationship between these measures of flexibility and CAT ratings of creativity would 
therefore provide indirect support for the hypothesised link between shifting between modes 
of thinking and creativity.  Based on the hypothesised link between shifting between modes 
of thinking and design, the relationship between the measures of flexibility and CAT ratings 
of design were also investigated.   
 
Participants were divided into two groups; those who had worked on the same design from 
start to finish and ones who had worked on different designs from start to finish.  Table 81 
displays means and standard deviations for the CAT ratings obtained by each group and the 
number of participants in each group (N).   
 
Table 80.  Scores for CAT ratings across the group who worked on the same design for the duration of the 
garden design task compared to the group who worked on different designs during the task. 
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A one-way independent ANOVA (Group (2) –worked on same design, worked on different 
designs) on CAT ratings of creativity was run to explore differences in CAT creativity ratings 
across groups.  The ANOVA revealed a significant effect of group on CAT ratings of 
creativity (F (1, 45) = 11.85, p = .001, ηp
2
= .21, power = .92)
57
.  This indicated that the group 
who worked on different designs during the garden design task received significantly higher 
CAT ratings for their designs than the group who worked on the same design throughout the 
garden design task.    CAT ratings of design were not normally distributed in the group of 
participants who worked on the same design throughout.  Therefore a Mann-Whitney test was 
run (Group (2) - worked on same design, worked on different designs) to examine differences 
in CAT ratings on the dimension of design across groups.  The Mann-Whitney test revealed a 
significant effect of group on CAT ratings of design (U= 49, p = .002, r = -.44) with the 
group who worked on different designs during the garden design task receiving higher CAT 
ratings on the dimension of design quality (Mdn=2.92, IQR=1.88) than the group who 
worked on the same design throughout the garden design task (Mdn=1.33, IQR= 1.00). 
 
The relationship between a second measure of flexibility, the total number of different 
designs produced by each participant, and CAT ratings on dimensions of creativity and 
design was examined at the level of the whole sample (N = 47).  The measure of the total 
number of different designs produced by participants was not normally distributed so 
Spearman’s rho correlations were run to examine the relationship between this measure of 
flexibility and CAT ratings.  The total number of different designs produced positively 
correlated with both CAT ratings of creativity (rs= .43, p = .001) and CAT ratings of design 
(rs= .46, p = .001).       
 
Do the points in the design process at which participant’s demonstrate flexibility map 
onto shifts between modes of thinking? 
 
The time windows in verbal protocols when participants, who worked on different designs, 
switched from working on a current design to starting a new design were identified.  Each 
time window was examined for evidence of shifts between modes of thinking which had 
previously been coded for in the protocol.  Evidence of shifting between modes of thinking 
within these windows in the verbal protocol would provide support for the hypothesis that 
                                                 
57
 The results of this analysis were the same whether or not the means were weighted based on the different 
samples sizes of the two groups.  
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shifting between modes of thinking is associated with flexibly switching between different 
approaches to the garden design task.  
 
Figures 20 to 43 display the time windows when participants switched between working on 
different designs. Some participants produced more than two designs and each instance of 
switching between designs (e.g. design 1 to design 2, design 2 to design 3 etc.) is displayed in 
a separate figure.  Figures 20 to 43 display a timeline showing the segments from a 
participant’s verbal protocol shortly before, during and after they stopped working on one 
design and started working on a new design.    The timeline starts at the point of the first 
utterance of the first verbal protocol segment within the time window. Displayed on the 
timeline are time stamps at five minute intervals with increasing time into the design 
session/verbal protocol going from left to right. The point at which participants stop working 
on one design and the point at which they start work on their next design are indicated by the 
arrows on the timeline and the corresponding time stamps in brackets.  Photos of the two 
designs are displayed above the arrows
58
.  The point at which participants stopped working 
on a design was defined as the point at which they lifted their pencil from the paper and 
stopped sketching that design.  The point at which they started working on a design was 
defined as the point when they put pencil to paper and began sketching a new design.     
 
The individual segments of the verbal protocol are represented by the coloured bars.  The 
verbal content of each segment is shown at the bottom of the figure. The mapping of pieces 
of verbal content to segments is indicated by the dashed lines.  The attribute code or codes 
given to each segment are shown in the column to the left of the timeline.  Segments were 
coded with the attributes in the corresponding rows.   
 
The overarching modes of thinking which the segments are coded as representing are 
indicated by the colours of the segment bars.  Dark blue segments represent the operation of 
the associative cognitive mode, light blue represent the associative affective mode, red the 
analytic cognitive mode and orange the analytic affective mode
59.  Shifts between Dietrich’s 
(2004) modes of thinking are thus indicated by colour changes across consecutive segments.  
                                                 
58
 These photos have been annotated in places in order to make the designs clearer to see.  It also should be 
noted that the photo of the second design represents the finished sketch of that design, not the state of that 
design at that time point in the design session/verbal protocol.  
59
 Associative cognitive and associative affective can be collapsed together to produce Howard-Jones (2002) and 
Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) associative  mode and analytic cognitive and analytic affective collapsed to produce 
their analytic mode.  
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Shifts between modes of thinking based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) theories is indicated by colour changes across consecutive segments, when one 
segment is associative and the other is analytic.  Shifts between modes of thinking are also 
indicated by two-modes meshed together segments.  These are represented by a pair of 
different coloured bars at the same position in the vertical plane on the timeline.  When one 
of these segments is dark blue and the other red, that indicates a two-modes meshed together 
segment consisting of the associative cognitive and analytic cognitive modes.  When one of 
these segments is dark blue and the other orange, that indicates a two-modes meshed together 
segment consisting of the associative cognitive and analytic affective modes.   
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Figure 20. Time windows when participants switched between working on different designs 
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Figure 21. 
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Figure 22.  
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Figure 23. 
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Figure 24. 
 
  
291 
 
Figure 25. 
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Figure 26. 
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Figure 27. 
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Figure 28. 
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Figure 29. 
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Figure 30. 
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Figure 31. 
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Figure 32. 
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Figure 33. 
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Figure 34. 
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Figure 35. 
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Figure 36. 
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Figure 37. 
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Figure 38. 
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Figure 39. 
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Figure 40. 
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Figure 41. 
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Figure 42. 
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Figure 43. 
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Figures 20 to 43 show that all eight participants who produced different designs appeared to 
shift between different modes of thinking on at least some of the instances when they 
switched between designs.  Across all eight participants there were a total of 24 instances 
when switches between different designs were made.  On occasions, participants switched 
back to working on a design they had previously worked on.  This fits with the conception of 
design as a non-linear process (Lawson, 1997).  On 21 out of the 24 instances when 
participants switched between working on different designs they evidenced at least one shift 
between the different modes of thinking defined by Dietrich (2004).  When the different 
modes were defined based on Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories, 
participants shifted between different modes of thinking on 20 out of the 24 instances when 
they made switches between different designs.   
 
It was necessary to compare the frequency of shifting between modes of thinking during the 
periods in the protocol when participants switched between working on different designs to 
the frequency of shifting when participants were working on the same design.  In order to do 
this the frequency of transitions based on the Markov chain model were calculated within a 
time window when participants switched between working on different designs.  Time 
windows within verbal protocols were calculated from 30 seconds downstream of the point 
when participants stopped working on one design to 30 seconds upstream of the point when 
participants started working on a different design.  Time windows captured protocol 
segments that fell within the start point of the window
60
 through to segments that fell within 
the end of the window.  This time window was chosen because it was wide enough to ensure 
that all the transitions between different modes of thinking displayed in figures 11 to 34 were 
captured.        
   
Within this time window, the number of each of the four types of transition based on 
Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories, the six61 types of transition 
based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework and unknown transitions were calculated.  The number 
of two modes meshed together
62
 segments within time windows was also calculated.  These 
measures of the frequency of shifting were each summed to produce totals across all time 
                                                 
60
 If a segment was exactly on the start/end point of the time window it was also captured within the window. 
61
 It should be noted that for these analyses, the different types of transition were collapsed across direction of 
shifting.  The reason for this is explained when the analysis is reported. 
62
 This analysis was run on the different measures of two modes meshed together segments based on Howard-
Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and Dietrich’s (2004) framework.  
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windows across all of the participants who switched between working on different designs.  
Chi-square tests were run to compare the total frequency of shifting within time windows to 
the total frequency of shifting outside of these time windows.  The latter measure was the 
frequency of shifting displayed by the eight participants who worked on different designs 
outside of the time windows summed together with the frequency of shifting displayed by 
those participants who worked on the same design throughout the garden design task. 
 
A two (within time windows, outside of time windows) by six (analytic affective-associative 
cognitive (PT & TP), analytic affective-analytic cognitive (PQ & QP), analytic cognitive-
analytic cognitive (QQ), analytic cognitive- associative cognitive (QT & TQ), associative 
cognitive-associative affective (ST & TS), associative cognitive-associative cognitive (T-T)) 
chi-square was run to compare the frequencies of different transition types based on 
Dietrich’s (2004) framework within and outside time windows.  It is important to note that 
the reason why only six instead of sixteen different types of transition based on Dietrich’s 
(2004) framework were included in this analysis was because with sixteen transitions there 
was a count of less than five in some cells.  The requirement to have a count of at least five in 
25% of cells is a key assumption of chi-square (Field, 2009).  As such, those transition types 
that resulted in a count of less than five in any of the cells were excluded from this analysis.   
The chi-square revealed that there was a significant difference in the pattern of transition 
frequencies when they were obtained within compared to outside of time windows (χ2 (6) = 
35.95, p <.001).  Table 82 shows the observed counts and expected counts within and outside 
time windows.  Also shown are the percentages of each transition type out of the total 
number of transitions within and outside time windows.   
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Table 81.  Displaying the observed and expected frequency of the different types of Markov chain transition based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework within and outside time 
windows.  Also displayed are the percentages of each type of transition out of the total number of transitions (% within/outside time window).     
 
 
Table 82.  Displaying the observed and expected frequency of the different types of two-modes meshed together segments Howard-Jones (2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s 
(2013) theories within and outside time windows.  Also displayed are the percentages of each type of transition out of the total number of transitions (% within/outside time 
window).     
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Within time windows, there was a significantly higher observed versus expected frequency of 
shifts between Analytic affective and Associative cognitive modes (z
63
 = 4.2, p < .001).  In 
contrast, outside time windows there was a lower observed versus expected frequency of 
shifts between Analytic affective and Associative cognitive modes.  The difference outside 
time windows was however non-significant (z = -.6).  Within time windows, there was also a 
significantly higher observed versus expected frequency of non-shift transitions between 
Associative cognitive and Associative cognitive modes (z = 2.1, p = .05).  In contrast, outside 
time windows there was a lower observed versus expected frequency of non-shift transitions 
between Associative cognitive and Associative cognitive modes.  The difference outside time 
windows was however non-significant (z = -.3).  It is also important to note that within time 
windows there was a significantly lower observed versus expected frequency of unknown 
transitions (z = -3.0, p < .01).   
 
A two (within time windows, outside of time windows) by two (two-modes meshed together 
segments, segments not including two-modes meshed together) chi-square was run to 
compare the frequency of two-modes meshed together segments based on Howard-Jones 
(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories within and outside time windows.  The chi-
square revealed that there was a significant difference in the proportion of two-modes meshed 
together segments versus non two-modes meshed together segments within compared to 
outside of time windows (χ2 (1) = 6.97, p =.008).  Table 83, displayed above, shows the 
observed counts, expected counts and percentages of each transition type out of the total 
number of transitions within and outside time windows.  Within time windows, there was a 
significantly higher observed versus expected frequency of two-modes meshed together 
segments (z = 2.6, p < .001).  Within time windows, it was 2.5 times more likely that two-
modes meshed together segments would be observed than outside time windows.  There were 
no significant differences in the observed versus expected frequency of non-two-modes 
meshed together segments either within (z = -.4) or outside (z = .1) time windows. 
 
A two (within time windows, outside of time windows) by three (two-modes meshed together 
involving ‘analytic affective’ & ‘associative cognitive’, two-modes meshed together involving 
‘analytic cognitive’ & ‘associative cognitive’ segments, non two-modes meshed together 
segments) chi-square was run to compare the frequency of two-modes meshed together 
                                                 
63
 This is the standardized residual and was used to break down the chi-square to examine within which cells the 
observed frequency significantly differed from the expected frequency (Field, 2009). 
  
314 
 
segments based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework within and outside time windows.  The chi-
square revealed that there was a significant difference in the pattern of frequencies of these 
different types of segments when they were obtained within compared to outside of time 
windows (χ2 (2) = 7.83, p =.02).  However the assumption that at least 25 % of cells in the 
chi-square should have expected counts of five or more was violated.  It has been argued that 
this is an overly conservative criterion (Everitt, 1977).  The cells do reach Everitt’s (1977) 
criterion of expected values being greater than 1. 
 
Table 84 shows the observed counts, expected counts and percentages of each transition type 
out of the total number of transitions within and outside time windows.  Within time 
windows, there was a significantly higher observed versus expected frequency of two-modes 
meshed together (analytic affective & associative cognitive) segments (z = 2.1, p < .05).  
Within time windows, the difference between observed and expected frequencies of two-
modes meshed together (analytic cognitive & associative cognitive) segments was not 
significant (z = 1.80).   
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Table 83.  Displaying the observed and expected frequency of two-modes meshed together segments based on Dietrich’s (2004) framework within and outside time windows.  
Also displayed are the percentages of each type of transition out of the total number of transitions (% within/outside time window).     
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A two (within time windows, outside of time windows) by four (analytic to associative, 
associative to analytic, associative to associative, analytic to analytic) chi-square was run to 
compare the frequencies of different transition types based on Howard-Jones (2002) and 
Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories within and outside time windows.  This failed to reveal 
significant differences in the pattern of transition frequencies when they were obtained within 
compared to outside of time windows (χ2 (3) = 2.30, p =.51).   
 
Discussion 
 
The above findings provide some support for the hypothesis that shifting between different 
modes of thinking does occur at the points during the garden design task when participants 
switched between working on different designs.  Within time windows when participants 
switched between working on different designs, there was a greater frequency of shifts 
between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes based on the Markov chain and 
two modes meshed together measures than would be expected by chance. Within time 
windows when participants switched between working on different designs, there was also a 
greater frequency of non-shift associative cognitive to associative cognitive transitions based 
on the Markov chain measure than would be expected by chance.   These differences were 
not observed outside of these time windows when participants were working on the same 
design.   
 
The findings are very similar to the analyses reported in the section examining the 
relationship between shifting frequency and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality.  As 
was the case in that section, Markov chain measures of shifting based on Howard-Jones 
(2002) and Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories also failed to evidence elevated shifting at the 
flexibility points.  The only finding that differs from the previous section was an elevated 
frequency of non-shift associative cognitive to associative cognitive transitions at the 
flexibility points.  The present findings suggest that a combination of shifting between 
analytic affective and associative cognitive modes and persisting in the associative cognitive 
mode underlie the flexible behaviour observed when participants switch between different 
designs.   
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Are measures of self-reported shifting correlated with protocol measures of the 
frequency of shifting between modes of thought?  
 
Previous chapters of this thesis have measured shifting between modes by means of a self-
report measure.  This measured metacognitive awareness of shifting and competence in 
shifting across everyday and professional contexts.  It was important to determine the extent 
to which measures of self-reported shifting correlated with protocol based measures of 
shifting between modes.  It was hypothesised that self-report measures of shifting within the 
professional context would be positively correlated with protocol based measures of shifting, 
within the groups working on their profession’s tasks; namely professional and student 
garden designers.  Since fine artists and the Low CAQ group were not working on their 
profession’s tasks, there was no reason to expect self-report measures of shifting within the 
professional context and protocol based measures of shifting to be correlated within these 
groups.    
 
Correlations between self-report measures of shifting, protocol based measures of shifting 
and CAT ratings of creativity and design within each of the four groups are displayed in 
tables 85 to 88.  Two participants in the group of student garden designers and three 
participants in the group of fine artists did not complete the self-report measure of shifting so 
there was an N of 9 in each of these groups.  One participant in the Low CAQ group did not 
complete the self-report shifting measure so there was an N of 11 in this group.  All 
Professional designers completed the self-report measure of shifting giving an N of 12 in this 
group. 
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Table 84.  Correlations between self-report measures of shifting, protocol based measures of shifting and CAT ratings of creativity and design within the group of 
professional garden designers (N = 12).   
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Table 85.  Correlations between self-report measures of shifting, protocol based measures of shifting and CAT ratings of creativity and design within the group of student 
garden designers (N = 9).   
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Table 86.  Correlations between self-report measures of shifting, protocol based measures of shifting and CAT ratings of creativity and design within the group of fine artists 
(N = 9).   
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Table 87.  Correlations between self-report measures of shifting, protocol based measures of shifting and CAT ratings of creativity and design within the Low CAQ group (N 
= 11).   
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The patterns of correlations between self-report and protocol based measures of shifting 
clearly differed across groups.  Within the group of professional garden designers there was a 
strong positive correlation between shifting competence in a professional context and the 
frequency of analytic cognitive to associative cognitive protocol shifts.  There were no 
significant positive correlations between shifting competence in a professional context and 
any protocol based measures of shifting within either the group of student garden designers, 
fine artists or the Low CAQ group.   
 
There were no significant positive correlations between metacognitive awareness of shifting 
in a professional context and any protocol based measures of shifting within either the group 
of professional garden designers or fine artists.  Within the low CAQ group, there was 
however a significant positive correlation between metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context and the frequency of analytic cognitive to associative affective shift 
transitions. 
 
Within the group of professional garden designers there were moderate negative correlations 
between both shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional 
context and the frequency of associative cognitive to analytic affective and analytic affective 
to associative cognitive shift transitions.  In contrast, within the group of student garden 
designers there were strong positive associations between metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in a professional context and the frequency of associative cognitive to analytic 
affective and analytic affective to associative cognitive shift transitions.   
 
The other notable findings concerned correlations between the self-report measure of shifting 
and CAT ratings of creativity and design quality.  There was a moderate negative correlation 
within the group of professional garden designers between shifting competence in a 
professional context and CAT ratings of design quality.  There were moderate negative 
correlations within the Low CAQ group between CAT ratings of creativity and design quality 
and self-reported shifting on all scales except metacognitive awareness of shifting in an 
everyday context.  There was a large positive correlation with the group of fine artists 
between shifting competence in a professional context and CAT ratings of design quality.              
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Discussion 
 
The above findings provide some limited support for the hypothesized positive relationship 
between shifting tendencies reported by garden designers and the frequency of shifting 
observed within the verbal protocol.  Only within the group of professional garden designers 
did those reporting higher shifting competence in a professional context demonstrate a greater 
frequency of protocol shifting.  Further, this relationship only held for analytic cognitive to 
associative cognitive protocol shifts.  Student garden designers who reported a greater 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context did shift more frequently 
between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes.  It was interesting to note the 
contrast between professional and student garden designers.  Professional garden designers 
who reported a lower metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context evidenced 
a greater frequency of shifts between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes.   
 
The findings suggest that for the professional and student garden designers and for the Low 
CAQ group, greater self-reported shifting may negatively impact on the creativity and design 
quality of garden designs.  Only for the group of fine artists was there the suggestion that 
greater self-reported shifting competence may benefit the design quality evidenced in garden 
designs. 
 
It is important to note the extremely tentative basis of the conclusions drawn from the above 
findings.  Firstly these findings are merely correlations so the causative inferences made 
above are merely suggestions that need to be examined using experimental designs which can 
determine causation.  Secondly, the correlations were obtained from extremely small samples 
and therefore may not be robust.  No corrections for multiple comparisons have been applied 
to these findings because they were merely meant to be exploratory.  The above findings do 
however provide tentative evidence that self-report measures of shifting capture some types 
of shifts between the different modes of thinking that were observed within verbal protocols.  
However the relationship between self-reported shifting and protocol based measures of 
shifting on the garden design task appears complex and seems to differ based on one’s level 
of experience in garden design.  Further, possessing greater self-reported shifting competence 
or metacognitive awareness of shifting does not appear to benefit the creativity or design 
quality of the garden designs you produce, unless you are a fine artist. 
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Exploring potential drawbacks of the ‘think-aloud’ method 
 
Previous analyses in this chapter have suggested that the frequency of unknown transitions 
may increase as a function of decreasing scores on CAT creativity or design quality.  Also, 
within time windows when participants switched between different designs there were less 
unknown transitions than outside of these time windows when participants were working on 
the same design.  These findings indicate that there are more unknown transitions in the 
protocols of those scoring lower on CAT creativity and design quality.   It may therefore be 
the case that transitions that indicate shifts between modes of thinking are not being picked 
up within the protocols of those with lower CAT ratings.  This suggests that there may be 
some issues with the validity of comparisons of shifting frequency across individuals and 
between groups, when shifting frequency is based on the ‘think-aloud’ method.  Further, the 
number of instances of reminder to speak segments was significantly correlated with CAT 
ratings of creativity (r = .32, p =.03).  Creativity has been associated with a flow state 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).  It may be the case that people who had to be reminded to speak 
were actually in more of a flow state which ultimately resulted in greater creativity. 
Reminders to speak may then have disrupted this flow state and hence altered participant’s 
creative process and in turn the creativity of the outcomes of this process.  Taken together, 
these findings suggest that there may be some problems with using the ‘think-aloud’ method 
to examine the creative process.    
 
General Discussion 
 
 
The present results provide a degree of support for the hypothesis that the frequency of 
shifting between modes of thinking in vivo during the creative process is positively associated 
with ratings of the creativity and design quality of output from that process.  The present 
results suggest however that the relationship between the frequency of shifting between 
modes of thinking and creativity, and shifting between modes and design quality is however 
much more complex and nuanced than previous findings in this thesis suggest. 
 
A first set of analyses examined differences in shifting frequency, at the level of the entire 
verbal protocol, across professional and student garden designers, fine artists and a group pre-
screened for low levels of creative achievement.  Across different measures of shifting 
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frequency, the results generally failed to support the hypothesis that professional garden 
designers would evidence a higher frequency of shifting between modes of thinking than the 
other participant groups.  The results of these analyses also generally failed to support the 
hypothesis that fine artists and student garden designers would demonstrate a higher 
frequency of shifting compared to the low creative achievement group.   
 
A second set of analyses examined differences in shifting frequency across the four 
experimental groups as a function of time points in the verbal protocol session.  This revealed 
additional differences in shifting frequency between groups at certain time points in the 
verbal protocol.  However, it still failed to reveal clear differences in shifting frequency 
between groups that were expected on the basis of differences in expertise.  Crucially, there 
were no differences on any measure of shifting frequency between the group of professional 
garden designers and the low creative achievement group. 
 
Analyses examining group differences in the creativity and design quality of garden designs 
produced on the garden design task revealed that groups differed in line with predictions.   
The greatest creativity and design quality were shown by the professional garden designers. 
The failure to reveal concomitant systematic differences in shifting frequency across groups 
suggested that in vivo shifting during the creative process was not associated with the 
creativity and design quality of output from that process at a group level.   
 
However, clear associations between in vivo shifting frequency and the creativity and design 
quality of garden designs did emerge from analyses conducted at the level of the entire 
sample.  Shifting frequency based on the number of two modes meshed together segments 
involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes, positively 
predicted ratings of creativity and design quality for garden designs, demonstrating medium 
sized effects in both cases.  This effect could not be explained by the positive association 
between the change in arousal during the garden design task and creativity.  It was also not 
due simply to an association between the frequency of analytic affective segments and CAT 
ratings.  There was also some, albeit, weak evidence for a positive association between 
Markov chain analytic affective and associative cognitive transition probabilities and CAT 
ratings of creativity and design quality at the level of the entire sample.   
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Participants who, during the garden design task demonstrated flexibility by switching 
between working on different designs produced final designs that were rated as more creative 
and as having a higher design quality compared to participants who worked on the same 
design throughout.  It was subsequently revealed that there was a greater probability of 
transitions between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes during the time 
windows when participants switched between working on different designs compared to 
outside of these time windows when participants worked on the same design.  There was 
also, albeit less robust, evidence of a higher frequency of two modes meshed together 
segments involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes within 
compared to outside of the time windows when participants switched between working on 
different designs. 
 
Evidence of a positive association between self-reported shifting competence in a 
professional context and measures of shifting observed within the verbal protocol was 
restricted to the Markov chain measure of the probability of transitions from analytic 
cognitive to associative cognitive modes within the group of professional garden designers.  
This finding was direction specific, that is the positive association only held for transitions 
from analytic cognitive to associative cognitive modes not from associative cognitive to 
analytic cognitive.  Shifting from analytic cognitive to associative cognitive modes may 
reflect the type of shifting involved in breaking out of a mental set. In support of this, a 
positive association between shifting competence in a professional context and Gasper’s 
(2003) measure of set breaking was also observed in chapter four of this thesis.   
 
Evidence of positive associations between self-reported metacognitive awareness of shifting 
in an everyday and professional context and measures of shifting observed within the verbal 
protocol was restricted to the Markov chain measure of the probability of transitions between 
associative cognitive and analytic affective modes, within the group of student garden 
designers.  Professional garden designers who reported a lower metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in a professional context actually evidenced a greater frequency of shifts between 
analytic affective and associative cognitive modes.  The relationship between self-reported 
shifting and measures of shifting based on the verbal protocol clearly differed across 
experimental groups.  The only positive association between self-reported shifting and CAT 
ratings was observed within the group of fine artists, between design quality and shifting 
competence in professional and everyday contexts and shifting competence in an everyday 
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context.  Within the group of professional garden designers, shifting competence in a 
professional context was negatively associated with CAT design quality.  Within the low 
CAQ group, shifting competence in a professional context and metacognitive awareness in 
professional and everyday contexts were negatively associated with CAT design quality and 
creativity.  Within the low CAQ group, shifting competence in an everyday context was also 
negatively associated with design quality. 
 
The positive associations found between verbal protocol measures of shifting frequency and 
ratings of creativity and design quality appear to provide some interesting insights into the 
nature of the relationship between shifting and creativity.  Firstly, differences in findings 
based on the content on which shifts were made supports Dietrich’s (2004) distinction for 
different types of creativity based on both the mode of processing and whether processing 
operates on content which is cognitive or affective in nature.  A lack of any clear effects 
emerged when shifts were categorized simply as occurring between associative and analytic 
modes.  Howard-Jones (2002) & Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theories and Epstein (2003) and 
Frankish’s (2010) theories therefore appear to lack the specificity required in order to identify 
the types of shifting that are positively associated with creativity or design quality.  The 
present findings suggest that more frequent shifts between an analytic mode of thinking 
operating on affective content, analytic affective, and an associative mode of thinking 
operating on cognitive content, associative cognitive, is associated with higher ratings of 
creativity and design quality inherent in the outputs of this process; garden designs.  There 
was no association between the frequency of shifting and creativity or design quality, when 
shifting was based on any of the other types of shift transition within Dietrich’s (2004) 
framework. 
 
These differences based on the content of processing could be explained by reference to 
expertise.  It could be the case that those with expertise in garden design frequently shift from 
an associative mode that underpins cognitive idea generation to an analytic mode where they 
retrieve information from affective memory (Dietrich, 2004) which helps them to evaluate 
their ideas.  Dietrich (2004) proposed that the cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex are involved in processing information from affective memory.  There is some 
empirical evidence to support the involvement of default network regions, including the 
medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex, in evaluation, with both being 
activated during a task where participants evaluated book cover designs (Ellamil, Dobson, 
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Beeman & Christoff, 2012).  Subjective ratings of the success of engaging in evaluation of 
book cover designs also positively correlated with activity within this network (Ellamil, 
Dobson, Beeman & Christoff, 2012).  In contrast, shifts to an analytic mode of thinking based 
on cognitive content from an associative mode may fail to tap into reserves of expertise, that 
an individual may or may not possess, which are required to make effective evaluations.  As 
such, ideas may not be evaluated effectively resulting in a lack of a positive relationship 
between shifting and the creativity of the outputs of this process. 
 
It has previously been suggested that shifting between modes of thinking may either be under 
top-down control or shifts may occur automatically.  The type of shifting which predominates 
may vary based on context (Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 2009).  The correlations 
between self-reported shifting and measures of shifting frequency based on the verbal 
protocol could be informative here.  Self-reported shifting represents shifting that one is 
consciously aware of and therefore is likely to be under top-down control.  The positive 
association between self-reported shifting competence in a professional context and 
transitions from analytic cognitive to associative cognitive modes within the group of 
professional garden designers suggests that this type of shifting is under top-down control in 
this group.  The failure to reveal an association within the group of professional garden 
designers between self-reported shifting competence in a professional context and transitions 
between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes suggests that this type of shifting 
is not under top-down control.  Further, the finding of a negative relationship between 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context within the group of professional 
garden designers and transitions between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes 
suggests that awareness may adversely affect this type of shifting.  Interestingly, within the 
group of student garden designers there was a positive relationship between metacognitive 
awareness of shifting in a professional context and transitions between analytic affective and 
associative cognitive modes.  It may be the case then that shifting between processing 
cognitive content within an associative mode to processing affective content within an 
analytic mode only occurs automatically, and operates optimally without awareness, within 
those with a high level of expertise; in this case, professional garden designers.  Student 
garden designers may still be learning to shift in this way, hence why awareness of the 
process is positively correlated with the frequency of this type of shift within the student 
group. 
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Findings revealed that the relationship between shifting frequency and creativity and design 
quality was evidenced based on two modes meshed together measures and also, to some 
extent, on Markov chain measures of shifting between analytic affective and associative 
cognitive modes.  The Markov chain measure represents shifting between consecutive modes 
in series.  In contrast, the two modes meshed together measure represents shifting where the 
operation of both modes appears to occur in a more parallel fashion (Sowden, Pringle & 
Gabora, 2014).  Differences in findings as a function of these two different measures were 
revealed in each of the analyses that revealed a significant association between analytic 
affective and associative cognitive shifts and creativity/design quality.  Two-modes meshed 
together segments may be similar to dialectical thinking where two polar opposites of the 
same idea are considered (Guignard & Lubart, 2006).  There is evidence from prior research 
to suggest a positive association between dialectical thinking and divergent thinking (Wu and 
Chiou, 2008).  As has been proposed for dialectical thinking, instances of two modes meshed 
together segments could represent the operation of both associative cognitive and analytic 
affective modes of thinking in parallel (Allen & Thomas, 2011).  The size of the associations 
between CAT ratings of creativity and the frequency of shifts between associative cognitive 
and analytic affective modes of thinking were higher when shifting was based on the two-
modes meshed together compared to the Markov chain measure.  This suggests that shifting 
in parallel may be associated with higher creativity than shifting in series.  However, further 
work is needed to provide a more rigorous test of this prediction.                 
 
Findings revealed a higher frequency of shifts between associative cognitive and analytic 
affective modes of thinking at the points in the design process where participants switched to 
working on a different design compared to when participants were working on the same 
design.  This finding suggests that shifting between associative cognitive and analytic 
affective modes may underlie cognitive flexibility, defined as a switch to a different 
approach, goal or set (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010; Ashby, Isen & Turken, 
1999; Baas, De dreu & Nijstad, 2008).  There is previous evidence to suggest that creativity 
may involve flexible cognitive control which is applied automatically on a context specific 
basis (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  The present findings support this idea.  Shifts between 
associative cognitive and analytic affective modes of thinking appear to occur at points in the 
design process when it is advantageous to shift, as appears to be the case for participants who 
switched to working on a different design.  Evidence of higher ratings of creativity for groups 
who switched to working on a different design compared to those who only worked on the 
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same design throughout suggests that this form of flexibility is advantageous.  It is also 
important to comment on the higher frequency of non-shift associative cognitive to 
associative cognitive transitions at the points in the design process where switches were made 
between different designs compared to when the same designs were being worked on.  This 
suggests that persisting in the associative cognitive mode is also important when flexibly 
switching to working on a different design, possibly to support the increased frequency of 
idea generation at this point.     
 
While some measures of the frequency of in vivo shifting between modes of thinking were 
positively associated with ratings of the creativity and design quality of garden designs, it is 
important to note that persistence on the garden design task measured in terms of the length 
of verbal protocols was also positively associated with ratings of designs.  Longer verbal 
protocols were associated with higher ratings for designs on dimensions of creativity, design 
quality and adherence to the brief. This finding and the aforementioned finding 
demonstrating persistence within the associative cognitive mode at the points when switching 
between different designs would appear to provide support for the positive effect of 
persistence on creativity (Nijstad, et al., 2010; Zabelina & Beeman, 2013).   
 
The present study was the first of its kind to investigate in vivo shifting between modes of 
thinking using a ‘think aloud’ protocol.  The positive association between the frequency of 
the verbal protocol attribute ‘generating ideas/concepts’ and the measure of design 
elaboration suggests that this attribute was a valid measure of idea generation.  The validity 
of affective content was also assessed but it was not possible to assess the validity of other 
attributes, ‘evaluating ideas/concepts’ for example.  Different attributes were collected across 
different dual-process theories of cognition and dual-process theories of creativity.  Recent 
work has revealed that while there is considerable overlap between different dual-process 
theories of cognition and creativity the mapping of modes or types of thinking across theories 
is far from perfect (Sowden, Pringle & Gabora, 2014).   
 
There was a large amount of noise in the data reflected by the large standard deviations, 
standard errors and confidence intervals and the analyses used to detect effects often lacked 
power.  Therefore type 2 errors might have been made and important effects missed.  This 
noise could be the result of modes of thinking being relatively crudely defined.  Ultimately, 
neural markers for the different modes of thinking should be identified in order to more 
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clearly capture each mode and better define the time points when each mode occurs (Sowden, 
Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  The ‘think-aloud’ method has been used previously with success 
(Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Atman et al. 1999; Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 2011) but it 
still has some potential drawbacks in that concurrent verbalisation may interfere with aspects 
of designing such as perception during sketching activity (Lloyd, Lawson & Scott, 1995).  
Findings from the present study suggest that reminders to speak, which are issued as part of 
the think-aloud method, may also interfere with the creative process.  Furthermore, 
professional garden designers often explain the thinking behind their designs to their clients 
which may present a potential confound as other groups, particularly the fine artists and the 
low creative achievement group, are much less likely to have experience in verbalising their 
thinking than professional garden designers.    
 
The present study provides some support for the hypothesis that the frequency of shifting 
between modes of thinking in vivo during the process of producing a creative design for a 
garden would be positively associated with ratings of the creativity and design quality of 
designs produced at the end of the process.  Specifically, the frequency of shifting between 
associative cognitive and analytic affective modes demonstrated a positive relationship 
between in vivo shifting and the creativity and design quality of designs produced.  This 
finding emerged across analyses which examined the association between shifting frequency 
and creativity/design quality at the level of the entire protocol and at key points in the verbal 
protocol when shifting was mapped on to a marker of strategy switching.  Measures of 
shifting that did not entail shifts between associative cognitive and analytic affective modes 
failed to demonstrate a positive relationship between in vivo shifting and the creativity and 
design quality of designs produced.  
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Key findings 
 
 Failure to evidence an association between shifting in series and creativity: 
 
There was a failure to evidence that the frequency of shifting in series between associative 
and analytic modes of thinking was associated with creativity.  There was a lack of any clear 
evidence of differences in shifting frequency across four groups during the creative process 
of designing a garden, despite these groups evidencing differences in the creativity of the 
designs produced at the end of this process.  Shifting frequency across the entire sample was 
also not associated with creativity ratings of the designs produced.    
 
 
 The ‘two-modes meshed together’ measure of shifting was associated with creativity: 
 
A positive association between the frequency of ‘two-modes meshed together’ segments 
involving the operation of analytic affective and associative cognitive modes during the 
creative process and ratings of the creativity of designs produced at the end of this process 
was observed. 
 
 Increased frequency of shifting between analytic affective and associative cognitive modes 
when participants demonstrated flexible behaviour: 
 
There was an increased frequency of shifting between analytic affective and associative 
cognitive modes at the points in the creative process when participants demonstrated 
flexibility by switching from working on one design to beginning a different novel design.  
The frequency of this type of shifting was higher at these points in the creative process 
compared to points when participants were working on the same design.     
 
 
 
 
Key theoretical/empirical contribution from chapter 5 
 
 
The key findings provide further evidence to suggest that the nature of the relationship 
between creativity and shifting between different modes of thought hinges on the type of 
shifting involved.  Specifically findings suggest that the frequency of shifting between 
associative and analytic modes of thinking in series is not associated with creativity.  
Findings do suggest though that the frequency of operation of two modes of thinking that are 
closely meshed together, operating in a more parallel fashion, is positively associated with 
creativity.  Furthermore, findings suggest that the type of shifting that is related to creativity 
involves the analytic mode of thinking operating on affective content.  The key contribution 
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from this chapter is therefore a theoretical one, namely that accounts of the relationship 
between shifting and creativity must specify the nature of shifting in more detail and not 
merely conceive of it as simply involving shifting in series between associative and analytic 
modes of thinking.  The findings from this chapter certainly suggest that a broader conception 
of what shifting entails could lead to progress in understanding the nature of the relationship 
between the process termed “shifting” and the creativity of the product of that process. 
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Chapter 6- General Discussion  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the relationship between creativity and shifting 
between different modes of thought.  Specifically, it aimed to build on existing theoretical 
accounts of the relationship between shifting and creativity and previous empirical work 
examining this relationship.  In so doing it aimed to further our understanding of the role and 
nature of shifting between modes of thinking in the creative process. 
 
A review of different dual-process theories of creativity in chapter one suggested that there 
was considerable overlap between theories concerning the conceptualisation of different 
modes of thinking and the nature of shifting and its relationship to creativity (Howard-Jones, 
2002; Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Kaufman, 2011; Vartanian, 2009; Basadur, 
Graen, and Green (1982; see also Basadur, 1995).  Different theoretical accounts appeared to 
be mutually compatible.  This led to two different modes of thinking being defined; 
associative and analytic.  A theoretical account by Dietrich (2004) differed from other 
accounts in specifying that the two different modes of thinking may separately process 
affective in addition to cognitive content.  A review of dual-process theories of cognition was 
undertaken with the aim of mapping the two different modes of thinking on to the different 
types of thinking proposed by dual-process of cognition theorists.  This revealed a close 
mapping between types and modes of thinking which suggested that the attributes of different 
types of thinking, type 1 and type 2, could also provide a means to differentiate between the 
different modes of thinking, associative and analytic.  A review of dual-process theories of 
cognition also provided insight into how the process of shifting may be controlled.  This was 
useful because accounts of the mechanisms that may control shifting are lacking from dual-
process theories of creativity.    
 
In chapter one the issue of whether shifting between different modes of thinking was simply 
one example of cognitive flexibility was explored.  This raised important issues concerning 
the extent to which cognitive flexibility may be a characteristic of the associative mode of 
thinking (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas’s, 2010) or cognitive flexibility defined as 
switching to a different approach, goal or set may be underpinned by shifts between different 
modes of thought (Vartanian, 2009).  The relationship between shifting between different 
modes of thinking and persisting in one mode of thinking was also explored.   
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Four empirical studies were conducted to examine the relationship between creativity and 
shifting between different modes of thought.  These were reported in chapters two, three, four 
and five.  An outline of these studies and the main findings are summarised below.  
Connections are drawn between the findings across the different studies in the thesis and with 
those in previous research.  The limitations of the studies and directions for future research 
are also discussed.     
 
The empirical study described in chapter two built on the work of Vartanian, Martindale and 
colleagues.  Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues’ work suggested that the capacity to alter 
the mode of thinking engaged across tasks requiring different levels of attentional focus 
differed as a function of creativity.  Compared to a group with low creative potential, a group 
with high creative potential appeared to evidence a higher capacity to alter their mode of 
thinking between two different tasks and match it to the task requirements (Vartanian, 2009).  
However, the different tasks that Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues used appeared to lack 
face validity as activities that occur during the creative process.  Their tasks were also 
completed one at a time and therefore did not offer the possibility to examine the process of 
actually shifting between different modes of thought.   
 
The empirical study in chapter two used a paradigm to examine participant’s capacity to 
switch between one set of problems, inverse remote associate problems (I-RAPs), that 
appeared to require the associative mode of thinking and another set, remote associate 
problems (RAPs), appearing to require the analytic mode of thinking.  This paradigm was 
designed to examine how the capacity to actually shift between modes differed as a function 
of participant’s self-reported creativity on problems that required activities (i.e. divergent and 
convergent thinking) that appeared to be key constituents of the creative process (Cropley, 
2006).  Performance was assessed on the two different types of problem by examining the 
extent of performance decrements when participants had to repeatedly switch between 
performing two types of problem in sequence, termed switch blocks, compared to when they 
only had to perform one type of problem in sequence, termed pure blocks.  It was predicted 
that more creative participants would demonstrate a greater capacity to rapidly shift between 
different modes of thinking when they had to switch between performing the I-RAP and RAP 
problems.  The more creative group was therefore expected to evidence lower performance 
decrements when switching, termed switch costs, compared to the less creative group. 
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Findings however provided only very limited support for this hypothesis.  The group of more 
creative individuals only evidenced lower switch costs compared to the low creative group on 
one measure of performance on the I-RAPs and on none of the measures on the RAPs.  
Analyses revealed problems with I-RAPs measures of divergent thinking.  Insight ratings 
associated with the generation of correct solutions were found to be higher within switch 
blocks in comparison to within pure blocks.  This suggested that performing I-RAP problems 
may be priming remote associate problems to be solved by insight in switch blocks where 
both types of problems were performed.  This finding raised a crucial problem with the task 
switching paradigm in that both I-RAPs and RAPs problems, solved by insight, may have 
engaged the associative mode of thinking.  The paradigm may have failed to induce shifts 
between different modes of thinking and this could explain the lack of clear switch costs 
observed within the more creative compared to the less creative group.   
 
However, self-reported creativity on the creative achievement questionnaire (CAQ) did 
evidence correlations between the creativity of solutions generated on I-RAPs and the 
proportion of correct solutions generated on RAPs, but only in switch blocks.  These findings 
were not observed within pure blocks, where the proportion of correct solutions generated on 
RAPs was instead correlated with a measure of full-scale IQ.  These findings suggest that 
within switch blocks, performance draws on cognitive abilities or response tendencies that 
are associated with creativity.  In contrast, within pure blocks, performance is supported by 
cognitive abilities or response tendencies not associated with creativity which instead appear 
to be associated with IQ.   
 
There appear to be two explanations for these findings.  It may be the case that switch blocks 
actually engaged divergent thinking and this was why correlations were observed between 
measures within switch blocks and CAQ scores, which have been associated with divergent 
thinking in prior research (Carson, Peterson & Higgins, 2005).  These findings may also 
suggest that a mechanism which controls the process of switching between different task sets 
was engaged in switch blocks.  The correlation between CAQ scores and measures of 
performance in switch blocks may reflect the operation of a control mechanism akin to type 3 
thinking (Evans, 2009) or a metacognitive process (Thompson, 2009) that controls switches 
between different task sets/strategies on the RAP and I-RAP problems.  In support of this 
CAQ scores have previously been associated with a measure of flexible cognitive control 
(Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  Additionally, Gilhooly, Fiortou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) 
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revealed a switch between different strategies over the course of a divergent thinking task.  
As such, the operation of divergent thinking and a mechanism controlling switching in switch 
blocks may be mutually compatible explanations. 
 
The findings from chapter two suggested that creative individuals might be better at 
repeatedly switching between different tasks requiring different strategies and task sets.  
While this suggested a link between creativity and cognitive flexibility the evidence 
concerning the link between creativity and shifting between different modes of thinking was 
weak.  The findings reported in chapter two clearly demonstrate that a key drawback of 
examining shifting within an artificial task switching paradigm when participants are forced 
to shift, is that performance on one task may be altered by the task performed prior to it.  In 
light of this problem a different approach was taken in chapter three. 
 
Chapter three outlined the development of a novel self-report measure of shifting.  This self-
report measure consisted of items adapted from the rational-experiential inventory (REIm) 
which was previously used by Norris & Epstein (2011) to examine the operation of two 
interacting systems, rational and experiential thinking, which appear to map onto analytic and 
associative modes of thought.  Items included in this measure were intended to tap two facets 
of shifting behaviour; shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting.  Shifting 
competence was conceptualised as the extent to which participants are able to enter the mode 
of thinking that best suits the demands of the task that they are currently engaged in.  This 
facet of shifting appears to be similar to that investigated in prior work conducted in chapter 
two of this thesis and by Vartanian, Martindale and colleagues.  Metacognitive awareness of 
shifting was conceptualised as one’s awareness of the degree to which the mode of thinking 
currently engaged is functioning correctly.  This facet of shifting could be used to inform 
whether or not to perform a shift to a different mode of thinking (Thompson, 2009).   
 
The self-report measure of shifting was administered to a sample of architects and 
architecture students, medicine and medical students and professionals and students from 
disciplines other than architecture or medicine.  All participants completed items intended to 
tap shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting with reference to tasks they 
performed in an everyday context and also in a professional context, defined as within their 
professional role or their studies.  Responses from all participants across all groups were 
factor analysed revealing two distinct factors of shifting competence and metacognitive 
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awareness of shifting within both everyday and professional contexts.  Initial evidence for the 
validity of the measure of metacognitive awareness of shifting was obtained from findings 
revealing higher scores on this facet, when administered within a professional context, within 
a group of architects and architecture students compared to a group of practicing physicians 
and medical students and a group consisting of professionals and students from other 
disciplines.  Scores on the measure of metacognitive awareness of shifting were also higher 
within the group of architecture students when the scale was administered with reference to 
the professional compared to the everyday context. The case has been made previously that 
shifting may be particularly important within the domain of architecture (Lawson, 1997).  
Findings revealing that the group of architects evidenced the highest levels of metacognitive 
awareness of shifting, with reference to the professional context, therefore lent evidence to 
the validity of metacognitive awareness of shifting as a measure of shifting behaviour. 
 
Evidence of concurrent validity was also revealed by findings showing participants with a 
higher reliance on both experiential and rational modes of thinking on the REIm had elevated 
shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting scores in both everyday and 
professional contexts versus those who relied little on either rational or experiential thinking 
and therefore would be expected to have little need to shift between different modes.  The 
self-report measure of shifting differed from the rational-experiential inventory in that the 
former was sensitive to differences in whether shifting was reported within an everyday or 
professional context but the latter was not.  This highlighted that a key novel aspect of the 
self-report measure was that it captured the context dependent nature of shifting, which is a 
key feature of Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013) theoretical account.   
 
Findings also provided support for the conception in theoretical accounts that one’s ‘default’ 
tendency to be biased to one mode of thinking may impact on their shifting (Gabora & 
Ranjan, 2013; Howard-Jones, 2002).  Those displaying a strong bias towards analytic 
thinking, with a combination of high scores on the rational and low scores on the experiential 
scales of the REIm, evidenced lower metacognitive awareness of shifting in both everyday 
and professional contexts compared to those that did not display a strong bias to one mode 
over the other.  There was however a failure to evidence lower metacognitive awareness of 
shifting in those biased towards an associative mode of thinking, with a combination of low 
scores on the rational and high scores on the experiential scales of the REIm, compared to 
those that did not display a strong bias.  This finding may reflect a problem with the self-
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report scale only tapping shifting from an analytic to an associative mode of thinking.  
However it may also suggest that individuals displaying a default bias towards the associative 
mode of thinking could also be particularly sensitive to metacognitive cues to shift, thus 
enabling them to shift to a similar degree to those not biased to one mode of thinking 
(Thompson, 2009).  There appears to be some overlap here with the findings in chapter two 
suggesting that switching may engage divergent thinking.  It may be the case that a bias 
towards the associative mode of thinking supports divergent thinking, and hence shifting.  
There is some evidence in support of this from previous work by Norris & Epstein (2011) 
showing positive correlations between experiential thinking and measures of divergent 
thinking.   
 
The prior discussion also raises an important issue concerning the extent to which the self-
report shifting scales actually tap shifting between associative and analytic modes of 
thinking.  The novel shifting scale consisted of items adapted from the experiential and 
rational scales of the REIm to form new items designed to tap shifting between associative 
and analytic modes of thinking.  However the premise to devise items to tap the associative 
mode from items tapping experiential thinking may, on reflection, have been flawed.  If the 
experiential mode supports divergent thinking then it may tap shifts between associative and 
analytic modes of thinking (Runco, 2010) rather than associative thinking per se.  The 
difficulty in identifying valid indicators of associative and analytic modes of thinking was a 
problem repeatedly highlighted by empirical work in the present thesis.               
 
This study failed to reveal any strong evidence for the validity of shifting competence as a 
measure of real shifting behaviour.  Work was conducted in chapter four to address this issue 
and provide a more in depth examination of the validity of the self-report shifting scales.  
There were no also clear differences on either self-reported metacognitive awareness of 
shifting or shifting competence as a function of expertise.  A more in depth examination of 
differences in shifting as a function of expertise was examined in chapter five of this thesis.    
 
In chapter four the concurrent validity of both shifting competence and metacognitive 
awareness of shifting was assessed against tasks which appeared to tap real switching 
behaviour and measures of creativity.  As in chapter three, both shifting competence and 
metacognitive awareness of shifting were administered with reference to both everyday and 
professional contexts.  Findings revealed further evidence for the validity of metacognitive 
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awareness of shifting in a professional context with scores on this measure positively 
associated with those on a task based measure of divergent thinking and self-reported 
creativity within the domains of art and performance.  There was also tentative evidence that 
higher metacognitive awareness of shifting was associated with a higher proportion of correct 
solutions on remote associate problems generated via insight.   However, scores on 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context were not positively associated 
with task based measures of switching. Links between higher metacognitive ability and 
greater artistic creativity have been shown in prior work (Fayena-Tawil, Kozbelt & Sitaras, 
2011).  It could therefore be the case that metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context merely reflects metacognitive ability in general.  Future work should 
address this by assessing the concurrent validity of self-reported metacognitive awareness of 
shifting with task based measures that probe meta-cognitive abilities that appear to underlie 
shifting during the creative process.  It should also include measures to assess whether self-
reported metacognitive awareness of shifting evidenced discriminant validity with measures 
of general metacognitive ability. 
 
Findings also revealed evidence supporting the validity of shifting competence as a measure 
of switching capable of also explaining variance in creativity.  There was strong evidence that 
shifting competence in a professional context was positively associated with the ability to 
break out of an established mental set strategy to adopt a novel problem solving strategy.  
This association was specific to when the mental set strategy was shown to be problematic, 
that is when the use of this strategy would fail to lead to a correct solution.  There was no 
association between shifting competence and the ability to break set prior to the mental set 
strategy being shown to be problematic.  These findings suggest that shifting competence in a 
professional context specifically taps the ability to switch to a novel strategy when a 
previously established strategy has been shown to fail.  This ability may be a core facet of 
creativity (Gasper, 2003) and it does appear to closely mirror the account of shifting, from an 
analytic to an associative mode of thinking, during the creative process proposed by Gabora 
& Ranjan (2013).  These findings also suggest that shifting competence in a professional 
context is not simply capturing cognitive flexibility.  Working memory also appeared to be 
associated with shifting competence and may support the ability to switch to a novel strategy 
when a previously established strategy has been shown to fail.  Shifting competence was also 
positively associated with self-reported creativity in the mechanical/scientific domain and 
creativity in this domain was also positively associated with working memory and inhibition.  
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It could be the case that holding a novel strategy ‘on line’, evaluating if it works and resisting 
interference from incorrect prepotent strategies (e.g. the established method of doing things) 
could be key to realising creative solutions in the mechanical/scientific domain.  Findings 
suggest that the type of shifting required to realise creative solutions within the 
mechanical/scientific domain differs from that required to realise creative solutions within 
artistic and performance domains.  Analyses were conducted to examine if the positive 
relationship between shifting competence and mechanical/scientific creativity was mediated 
by working memory.  The findings were however not conclusive and further work is needed 
to determine if shifting competence in a professional context evidences discriminant validity 
from the working memory processes that appear to be involved in mechanical/scientific 
creativity. The measure of mechanical/scientific creativity used was only a self-report 
measure.  Future work should examine if the positive association between shifting 
competence in a professional context and mechanical/scientific creativity can be replicated 
when mechanical/scientific creativity is  externally assessed, for example based on 
performance on a task which taps creativity in this domain. 
 
The findings from the study reported in chapter four complemented those in chapter three 
demonstrating that the self-report shifting scales are context sensitive measures of shifting.  
Unlike shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting in professional contexts, 
both scales administered with respect to everyday contexts failed to reveal any positive 
associations with any measures of creativity, divergent thinking or insight problem solving. 
 
The studies outlined in chapters two, three and four only examined the link between shifting 
between modes of thinking and creativity when either, or both, measures of shifting between 
modes of thinking or creativity were based on self-reports.  An examination of shifting in 
vivo during the creative process and how this was associated with the creativity of products 
produced at the end of that process was investigated in chapter five.  This provided the most 
rigorous examination of theoretical accounts, notably Gabora & Ranjan’s (2013), that 
propose a direct link between shifting during the creative process and the outcomes of that 
process.   
 
In chapter five, in vivo shifting during the creative process of designing a garden was 
measured along with the creativity and design quality of the products of that process; 
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sketches of garden designs.  Participants were asked to ‘think-aloud’ and verbal reports and 
videos of their sketching activity were recorded as they sketched out designs for a garden 
based on a brief they were given.  The operation of associative and analytic modes of 
thinking during the process of designing the garden were coded for using a coding scheme 
based on dual-process theories of creativity and dual-process models of cognition.  Dietrich’s 
(2004) framework was also used to code the operation of associative and analytic modes of 
thinking separately based on whether the mode was operating on cognitive or affective 
content.  Four different groups took part in this study; professional garden designers, student 
garden designers, fine artists and a group pre-screened for low levels of creative achievement. 
 
Analysis of the relationship between ratings of the creativity and design quality of garden 
designs and the frequency of shifts between modes of thinking was conducted within each of 
the four experimental groups.  Findings failed to reveal any clear differences in shifting 
frequency between the four different experimental groups.  However, at the level of the entire 
sample, that is when groups were collapsed, positive associations between creativity and 
design quality and the frequency of shifting between an associative mode of thinking 
operating on cognitive content and an analytic mode operating on affective content were 
revealed.   
 
Shifting between an associative mode of thinking operating on cognitive content and an 
analytic mode operating on affective content was the only type of shifting that was positively 
associated with the creativity or design quality of garden designs produced.  This finding has 
important implications for theoretical accounts of the relationship between shifting and 
creativity.  Most accounts do not account for the role of affective processing in analytic 
thinking (Howard-Jones, 2002; Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013; Vartanian, 2009).  
The findings here suggest that theoretical accounts of the relationship between shifting and 
creativity should, like Dietrich (2004), distinguish between the content of processing on 
which the different modes of thinking operate. 
 
At certain points while designing the garden, some participants switched between working on 
different designs. Those who switched between working on different designs during the task 
received higher ratings of creativity and design quality for their designs compared to those 
who worked on the same design throughout.  It was revealed that the frequency of shifts 
between an associative mode of thinking operating on cognitive content and an analytic mode 
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operating on affective content was higher within time windows when switches were made 
between different designs compared to outside of these time windows when participants were 
working on the same design.  This appears to be related to the evidence in chapter four.  
Specifically it seems to mirror the finding that switching to a different strategy when a prior 
strategy was shown to be problematic on the mental set task was associated with greater 
mechanical/scientific creativity.  Switching to working on a different design could be 
performed for similar reasons.  For example, one could switch to a new design after the 
current one is judged to fail to meet the requirements of the brief.  Further, evidence of a 
higher frequency of shifting in time windows when switching between different designs 
suggests that strategy switching may be underpinned by shifts between an associative mode 
operating on cognitive content and an analytic mode operating on affective content.   
 
Within time windows when switches between different designs were carried out a higher 
frequency of non-shift associative to associative mode transitions drawing on cognitive 
content was also observed versus when participants worked on the same design.  Further, 
spending longer working on the garden design task in general was associated with the 
production of more creative designs.  These findings suggest that persisting in one mode may 
operate along with shifting between different modes and that both may positively impact on 
the creativity of designs produced.  These findings are in line with predictions that there are 
dual routes to creativity based on both flexibility and persistence (Nijstad, De Dreu, 
Rietzschel & Baas, 2010; Zabelina & Beeman, 2013).       
 
Participants who completed the garden design task also completed the self-report measures of 
shifting described in chapters three and four.  The relationship between self-reported shifting 
and in-vivo protocol based measures of shifting frequency differed across the four 
experimental groups.  Within the group of professional garden designers, self-reported 
shifting competence in a professional context was positively associated with in-vivo shifting 
from an analytic mode of thinking operating on cognitive content to an associative mode of 
thinking operating on cognitive content.  This effect was only observed in the direction from 
analytic to associative and thus appears to mirror the type of shifting involved in breaking out 
of a mental set on the mental set task described in chapter four.  This finding was only 
revealed in the group of professional garden designers and only for shifting competence in 
the professional and not everyday context.  This was expected because the garden design task 
involved professional garden designers shifting within their professional context.  The 
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evidence linking shifting competence in a professional context to an in-vivo protocol based 
measure of shifting does imply that shifting competence in a professional context taps shifts 
between different modes of thinking.  However, this type of in-vivo shifting, analytic 
cognitive to associative cognitive, was not associated with CAT ratings of creativity or design 
quality suggesting that this type of shifting does not promote higher creativity within the 
domain of garden design.        
 
Within the group of student garden designers, metacognitive awareness of shifting in a 
professional context was positively associated with ratings of creativity within this group; 
that is the frequency of shifting between an associative mode of thinking operating on 
cognitive content and an analytic mode operating on affective content.  However, within the 
group of professional garden designers the opposite pattern was observed with lower 
metacognitive awareness of shifting in a professional context associated with this type of 
shifting.  This may represent an expertise related difference in shifting.  It could indicate that 
in professional garden designers shifting occurs automatically while in student garden 
designers it is under top-down control.      
 
Conclusion and future research 
 
Considered as a whole, this program of research has provided evidence to support the 
theoretical position that shifting between different modes of thinking is positively associated 
with creativity.  Work conducted by others had already established a base of evidence that 
suggested that shifting was positively associated with creativity.  The present program of 
research however was novel in that it considered multiple conceptions of what the process of 
shifting might actually entail.  Shifting was framed as the extent to which participants were 
able to shift between different modes of thinking and match their thinking to the requirements 
of different tasks (Vartanian, 2009).  Shifting was also framed in terms of one’s 
metacognitive awareness of the degree to which the mode of thinking currently engaged is 
functioning correctly (Thompson, 2009).  Finally, shifting was framed in terms of shifts 
between different modes of thinking capable of operating on both cognitive and affective 
content (Dietrich, 2004).  The empirical work in the present thesis was designed to test which 
of these conceptions, or facets, of shifting were associated with creativity.  It also examined 
how shifting differed as a function of context, suggesting that context plays a key role in 
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determining the nature of the relationship between shifting and creativity.  This led to the 
important insight that shifting between modes of thinking was not simply a measure of 
cognitive flexibility.   
 
Assessing the validity of the measure of self-reported shifting against a wide range of 
different measures in chapter four revealed the novel finding that the association between 
shifting and creativity may differ across different domains.  The inclusion of different facets, 
namely shifting competence and metacognitive awareness of shifting, in the same study led to 
these insights.  Inclusion of a wide range of different measures also led to the novel finding 
that shifting in at least one creative domain may involve working memory.  Examining the 
relationship between shifting in-vivo during the creative process and the creativity of products 
of that process suggested for the first time that shifting during the creative process is 
associated with the creativity of the products.  This work also suggested that shifting may 
both occur automatically and be under top down control (Vartanian, Martindale & Matthews, 
2009) and that this may differ as a function of expertise.  It also revealed that only a specific 
type of shifting is positively associated with creativity in garden design, again suggesting that 
the association between shifting and creativity may differ across different domains.  In 
summary, future research examining the relationship between creativity and shifting modes 
should carefully consider what facets of shifting are likely to be related to creativity in a 
chosen creative domain before devising a measure of shifting. 
 
A key limitation of the present program of research was that the evidence supporting the 
relationship between creativity and shifting between modes of thinking was only 
correlational.  There is currently no research that clearly examines if shifting behaviour 
during the creative process plays a causal role in influencing individual’s creative output at 
the end of the process.  Future work on this could take the form of an intervention study 
which attempts to stimulate or disrupt shifting behaviour during the creative process.  The 
effects on the creative output of an experimental group receiving the intervention could then 
be compared to a control group who did not receive it.   
  
The present program of research also has methodological implications for future research 
examining the relationship between shifting and creativity.  The findings from the study 
described in chapter two suggest that task switching paradigms are problematic for 
investigating the association between shifting between modes and creativity.  Self-report 
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measures appear to hold promise as measures of shifting that, crucially, are sensitive to the 
context dependent nature of shifting.  Think-aloud protocols such as that used in the study 
described in chapter five also appear to hold promise in capturing shifts and may tap facets of 
shifting that self-report scales cannot.  However, some issues raised in chapter five suggested 
that think-aloud protocols could disrupt the creative process and the use of a coding scheme 
to identify the operation of different modes of thinking may also only crudely capture 
different modes of thinking.  More generally, better markers need to be identified which can 
validly assess the operation of associative and analytic modes of thinking.  Findings from the 
present thesis clearly suggest that divergent thinking is not a valid measure of the operation 
of the associative mode of thinking.  Neural markers of the different modes of thinking may 
hold the greatest promise as valid indicators of the operation of different modes (Sowden, 
Pringle & Gabora, 2014).  Neural markers could also hold promise for identifying the 
processes which control shifts between different modes of thinking. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this program of research has built on previous theoretical accounts and 
previous research suggesting a positive relationship between creativity and shifting between 
different modes of thought.  Over a series of different studies it has been revealed that the 
relationship between shifting and creativity is more complex than previous research appears 
to suggest.  The relationship appears to depend on how shifting is conceptualized, in what 
context shifting occurs and appears to differ across different creative domains.  Future 
research should clearly define the facet of shifting and creative domain in which the link 
between shifting and creativity is being investigated.  Theoretical accounts of the relationship 
between shifting and creativity should likewise ensure that they take into account different 
facets of shifting, the context in which shifting occurs and the different role that shifting may 
play in the creative process across different creative domains.                 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1- Self report shifting scales  
 
The following are some 14 statements about feelings, beliefs, and behaviours. 
Please describe how true the statements are for you with respect to everyday tasks/ with 
respect to tasks you perform as part of your degree or in your current profession.  Don't 
worry too much about any one item: first impressions are as good as any. 
 
1   2     3   4   5 
completely           mainly          undecided        mainly true         completely true 
false           false                  
 
1.  While working on a task, I often switch between thinking analytically and thinking 
intuitively 
 
2. While working on a task, I often engage in focused in depth thought during some phases 
and more intuitive thinking during others 
 
3. When working on a task, I like to think both in depth about the details and drift out of 
focus and let my mind wander (eg. looking out of the window) 
 
4. I am good at tasks that require both logic and going with my gut feelings 
 
5. I am not good at tasks that have phases requiring hard focused thinking and other phases 
that require broadening your attention and letting your mind wander (eg. looking out of the 
window) 
 
6. It seems I go through different phases of thinking through a task and accomplishing it from 
start to finish 
 
7. I rely on both careful reasoning and on my intuitive impressions 
 
8. I rely on both my intuition and logic when making important decisions 
 
9. When working on a task, I like to think both in depth about the details and drift out of 
focus and let my mind wander (eg. looking out of the window) 
 
10. I find that at times while working on a task my thinking and behaviour is driven more by 
my emotions and at other times it is driven more by reason and logic 
 
11. I find that at times while working on a task, I think or describe things using analogies or 
metaphors and at other times I don't use these and take a more reality oriented view 
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12. I am good at both figuring things out logically and going with my instincts when deciding 
on a course of action 
 
13. I find that I work best on certain problems when I am in a logical mindset and best on 
others when my mindset is less logical (eg. more infused with emotions, unusual imagery, 
metaphors etc.) 
 
14. While working on a task, I go through phases where I do a lot of thinking and other 
phases where I just sit back and muse over things/take a back seat 
 
 
Items 4, 7, 8, 12- Switching competence 
Items 2, 3, 6, 11,10, 13, 14- Switching awareness   
 
 
Appendix 2- instructions and answer sheet for mental set task (Gasper, 2003) 
 
Students have indicated that this task is rather simple.  Below are some letter strings.  It is 
your job to find a 4 or 5 letter word in these strings without changing the order of the 
letters. 
For example: 
LBIKOPN   ANSWER:  LION 
MSAXRCE   ANSWER:  MARE 
 
Notice that the order of the letters was NOT changed.  In this task, please do not attempt the 
next problem until you have finished the one prior to it.  Also, do NOT DWELL on any one 
item.  Write down your first response. Do not write down more than one answer per problem.  
1.  GZOQAXT   
2.  BRUFLML   
3.  DZEPEWR   
4.  MWUNLME   
5.  WIORLZF   
6.  BXESAUR   
7.  TSINGREVR   
8.  FYROOMG   
9.  GNEVERZOE   
10.  BLIARGD   
11. CQAFMTELL   
12. CJHFILMKP   
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Appendix 3- Kaufman Domains of Creativity Scale (K-DOCS) 
Instructions: Compared to people of approximately your age and life experience, how 
creative would you rate yourself for each of the following acts? For acts that you have not 
specifically done, estimate your creative potential based on your performance on similar 
tasks. 
1   2  3   4   5 
Much less   Less  Neither more  More  Much more 
creative  creative nor less creative creative creative 
1. Finding something fun to do when I have no money _____  
2. Helping other people cope with a difficult situation _____  
3. Teaching someone how to do something _____  
4. Maintaining a good balance between my work and my personal life _____  
5. Understanding how to make myself happy _____  
6. Being able to work through my personal problems in a healthy way _____  
7. Thinking of new ways to help people _____  
8. Choosing the best solution to a problem _____  
9. Planning a trip or event with friends that meets everyone’s  needs _____  
10. Mediating a dispute or argument between two friends _____  
11. Getting people to feel relaxed and at ease _____  
12. Writing a non-fiction article for a newspaper, newsletter, or magazine _____  
13. Writing a letter to the editor _____  
14. Researching a topic using many different types of sources that may not be readily apparent 
_____  
15. Debating a controversial topic from my own perspective _____  
16. Responding to an issue in a context-appropriate way _____  
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17. Gathering the best possible assortment of articles or papers to support a specific  
point of view _____  
18. Arguing a side in a debate that I do not personally agree with _____  
19. Analyzing the themes in a good book _____  
20. Figuring out how to integrate critiques and suggestions while revising a work _____  
21. Being able to offer constructive feedback based on my own reading of a paper _____  
22. Coming up with a new way to think about an old debate _____  
23. Writing a poem _____  
24. Making up lyrics to a funny song _____  
25. Making up rhymes _____  
26. Composing an original song _____   
27. Learning how to play a musical instrument _____  
28. Shooting a fun video to air on YouTube _____  
29. Singing in harmony _____  
30. Spontaneously creating lyrics to a rap song _____  
31. Playing music in public _____  
32. Acting in a play _____  
33. Carving something out of wood or similar material _____  
34. Figuring out how to fix a frozen or buggy computer _____  
35. Writing a computer program  _____  
36. Solving math puzzles _____  
37. Taking apart machines and figuring out how they work _____  
38. Building something mechanical (like a robot) _____  
39. Helping to carry out or design a scientific experiment _____  
40. Solving an algebraic or geometric proof _____  
41. Constructing something out of metal, stone, or similar material _____  
42. Drawing a picture of something I’ve never actually seen (like an alien) _____  
43. Sketching a person or object _____  
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44. Doodling/Drawing random or geometric designs _____  
45. Making a scrapbook page out of my photographs _____  
46. Taking a well-composed photograph using an interesting angle or approach _____  
47. Making a sculpture or piece of pottery _____  
48. Appreciating a beautiful painting _____  
49. Coming up with my own interpretation of a classic work of art _____  
50. Enjoying an art museum _____  
Items 1-11 comprise 1- self-everyday creativity 
Items 12-22 comprise 2- scholarly creativity 
Items 23-32 comprise 3- performance creativity 
Items 33 -41 comprise 4- mechanical/scientific creativity 
Items 42-50 comprise 5- artistic creativity  
 
 
Appendix 4- Garden design task brief 
 
 
I would like you to draw an initial plan for the design of a garden that is based on “a   
journey and the series of experiences those who walk around the garden will have on this  
journey”.  Try and make the design as creative as you can but remember that it  
should also be appropriate to and work in the context of the above brief.  Please sketch out  
your initial plan for the design within the site dimensions given on the paper in front of you.   
Feel free to use the other sheets of paper available to sketch out ideas prior to putting down  
on paper your final initial plan.  The site dimensions should be from (10 x 10m) to  
(10 m x 22m) and the garden will be on a south facing level site. You are welcome to use  
whatever scale you like but please specify on the paper which scale you use  
(eg. 1cm to 1 m).  The budget for design and construction is from £70,000 to six figure sums.     
You will be given 45 minutes to draw up an initial plan for the design.  Please feel free to ask  
any questions you may have at any point and remember to ‘think aloud’ as you design. 
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Appendix 5- Detailing the Unknown mode segments from participant 40’s transition 
between design 4 and 5  
 
A- right, oh ok so think 
B- I have got lots of ideas and nothing on the paper yet  
C- so what do I want 
D- I want to think about the fact that I need a minimum size of that 
which is the ten 
E- oooh, because thats the... 
F- ooh, is it the outer dimensions of the site should be 10 x 10 m? 
G- [Experimenter answers participant’s question] yes, absolutely. Yes  
 
 
Appendix 6- Affect Grid 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7- List of affective words from Warriner, Kuperman & Brysbaert’s (2013) 
database that appeared across all protocols 
 
annoyed 
annoying 
atrocious 
awesome 
awful 
awkward 
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bad 
balance 
beautiful 
boring 
calm 
claustrophobic 
clever 
confined  
content 
cool 
crap 
cute 
delightful 
disaster 
enjoy 
enjoy 
entertaining 
excellent 
excite 
exciting 
fan 
fascination 
fun 
good 
good 
gorgeous 
great 
harmony 
hate 
horrible 
important 
impressive 
inspire 
interest 
interesting 
like 
like 
love 
lovely 
neat 
nervous 
nice  
nurture 
peaceful 
perfect 
pleasing 
  
374 
 
pretty 
proud  
relaxing 
scary 
scary 
serene 
stressful 
stupid 
surprising 
sweet 
terrible  
treat 
ugly 
worried 
worrying 
  
Appendix 8- The sixteen possible types of transition between modes of thinking based 
on Dietrich’s (2004) model  
 
Mode transition: 
Analytic affective (P)-Associative affective (S) 
Associative affective (S)-Analytic affective (P) 
Analytic cognitive (Q)-Associative cognitive (T) 
Associative cognitive (T)-Analytic cognitive (Q)  
 
Content transition: 
Analytic affective (P)- Analytic cognitive (Q) 
Analytic cognitive (Q)- Analytic affective (P) 
Associative affective (S)- Associative cognitive (T) 
Associative cognitive (T)- Associative affective (S) 
 
Mode & Content transition: 
Analytic affective (P )- Associative cognitive (T) 
Associative cognitive (T)- Analytic affective (P) 
Analytic cognitive (Q)- Associative affective (S) 
Associative affective (S)- Analytic cognitive (Q) 
 Non-shift transition: 
Analytic affective (P) - Analytic affective (P) 
Analytic cognitive (Q) - Analytic cognitive (Q) 
Associative affective (S)- Associative affective (S) 
Associative cognitive (T) - Associative cognitive (T) 
 
 
Appendix 9- Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI) (Short Form) 
 
  
375 
 
The inventory is simply a list of activities and accomplishments 
that are commonly considered to be creative. For each item, 
indicate the answer that best describes the frequency of the behavior 
in your adolescent and adult life. Be sure to answer every 
question. In some cases, you should count activities that you have 
done as a school-related assignment. In other cases, you should 
not. To avoid confusion, the phrase “excluding school or university 
course work” makes it explicit when NOT to count such work. 
 
Here is the scale: 
A _ Never did this 
B _ Did this once or twice 
C _ 3–5 times 
D _ More than 5 times 
 
1. Painted an original picture (excluding school or university 
course work) 
2. Designed and made your own greeting cards 
3. Made a craft out of metal (excluding school or university 
course work) 
4. Put on a puppet show 
5. Made your own holiday decorations 
6. Built a hanging mobile (excluding school or university 
course work) 
7. Made a sculpture (excluding school or university course 
work) 
8. Had a piece of literature (e.g., poem, short stories, etc.) 
published in a school or university publication 
9. Wrote poems (excluding school or university course 
work) 
10. Wrote a play (excluding school or university course 
work) 
11. Received an award for an artistic accomplishment 
12. Received an award for making a craft 
13. Made a craft out of plastic, Plexiglas, stained glass, or a 
similar material (excluding school or university course 
work) 
14. Made cartoons 
15. Made a leather craft (excluding school or university 
course work) 
16. Made a ceramic craft (excluding school or university 
course work) 
17. Designed and made a piece of clothing (excluding 
school or university course work) 
18. Prepared an original floral arrangement 
19. Drew a picture for aesthetic reasons (excluding school 
or university course work) 
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20. Wrote the lyrics to a song (excluding school or university 
course work) 
21. Wrote a short story (excluding school or university 
course work) 
22. Planned and presented an original speech (excluding 
school or university course work) 
23. Made jewelry (excluding school or university course 
work) 
24. Had art work or craft work publicly exhibited 
25. Assisted in the design of a set for a musical or dramatic 
production (excluding school or university course work) 
26. Kept a sketch book (excluding school or university 
course work) 
27. Designed and constructed a craft out of wood (excluding 
school or university course work) 
28. Designed and made a costume 
